

LIEUTENANT COLONEL MUNRO'S
PLAN
FOR
ABOLISHING THE TENT CONTRACT
OF THE
MADRAS ARMY,
WITH
COLONEL CAPPER'S REMARKS

NOW PUBLISHED FOR THE FIRST TIME.

LONDON.

PRINTED FOR J. RIDGWAY, 170, PICCADILLY,
OPPOSITE BOND STREET.

1812.

W. Flint, Printer, Old Bailey, London.



ADVERTISEMENT.

NOTWITHSTANDING so many publications have issued from the press, on the subject of the late discontents of the Madras army, a very imperfect knowledge is yet possessed by the public of a paper, which is spoken of in every one of them, as a most important writing, and has on that account been quoted, and referred to, though it has not till this day made its appearance in an entire form: the document alluded to contains the remarks of the late Colonel Capper, Adjutant-General of the Madras army, on the proposed reform of Lieutenant Colonel Munro, the Quarter Master-General, in the provision of the camp equipage of that army.

It has become fit that it should be made public, not only to the thorough understanding of the merits of the case, but in elucidation of the character and conduct of Colonel Capper, which seems, from the absence of this document, to have been strangely misconceived.

With this view, the Editor, without apology, puts the annexed official paper into

the reader's hand, with scarcely a comment of his own, though with a few detached passages from works generally known, that would seem to bear on the purpose or application of the writing in question.

Why the subjoined paper is so little known, may be ascribable to a return to an order of the honourable the House of Commons dated the 27th of March, 1811, requiring, "copy of the remarks made by Lieutenant Colonel Capper, Adjutant-General, upon Lieutenant Colonel Munro's plan," to which it was stated that, "*the records at the East India House do not contain any document of the description required by this order.*"*

Thus it would appear that the paper in question had been withheld, by Sir George Barlow's government, from the knowledge even of the Court of Directors, though it is equally an official document with the plan of Lieutenant Colonel Munro, which had been transmitted home by Sir George, and published.

The copy of Colonel Capper's "remarks" having come into the possession of the Editor, he conceived it not only a duty, as he has shewn, to the memory of that officer, but to the constituted authorities, to publish the two plans together, by which the Court of Directors, the Board of Controul, and the public, may be able to judge between the crude suggestions of a young officer, (a captain of the army) without experience, but "who had by the favour of two preceding commanders in

* See No. 4. Papers printed by order of the House of Commons, 3d May, 1811.

“ chief, been prematurely raised to a station
 “ far above his claims from rank or service,”*
 and the advised considerations of an old, ex-
 perience, and most respectable officer of thirty
 years service.

“ Much pains have been used to represent
 “ Lieutenant Colonel Munro as the only
 “ person on whom the government could
 “ rely for assistance in effecting the retrench-
 “ ments in the military departments ; and all
 “ who opposed the plan of reduction suggest-
 “ ed by him, are described as being inimical
 “ to the introduction of *any* system by which
 “ the expenses were to be curtailed, or abuses
 “ abolished. The report of the Quarter Mas-
 “ ter-General, on the subject of camp equi-
 “ page is highly extolled ; no notice however
 “ is taken of the remarks on that paper, sub-
 “ mitted to Sir George Barlow, by Colonel
 “ Capper.”†

“ This plan, however, has been consigned
 “ to oblivion : indeed it seems to have been
 “ studiously suppressed, lest the publication
 “ of it should prove that it was not the actual
 “ amount of saving which recommended the
 “ Quarter-Master-General’s plan ; but the
 “ transfer of extensive establishments to the
 “ favourites of government.”

“ Colonel Capper, far from opposing the
 “ reduction of expenses, or the abolition of
 “ abuses, went into a minute examination of

* See page 43, of the “*Insurrection*,” published by Murray.

† See page 34 of the “*Postscript*,” published by Ridgway.

" the most expensive establishments in the
 " military department of Fort St. George ;
 " and in the month of April 1808, he sub-
 " mitted,* for the consideration of government,
 " a plan of reform which would not have been
 " invidious in its operation ; would not have
 " impaired the efficiency of the departments,
 " (since so lamentably experienced;) and would
 " have produced a saving to government,
 " exceeding that proposed by the Quarter-
 " Master-General in the proportion of nearly
 " three to one."†

The certainty of these conclusions is clearly demonstrated in the following copy of Lieutenant Colonel Munro's plan, and Lieutenant Colonel Capper's "remarks" upon it.

" The manner in which this plan of Lieutenant Colonel Munro's came into Colonel Capper's possession, having been misrepresented, and consequently misunderstood, it is essential to state, that "‡ about March 1808, Sir George Barlow, Governor of Madras, resolved to
 " abolish the allowance for camp equipage,
 " which had heretofore been supplied on
 " contract by officers commanding Native
 " corps. In the adoption of this measure, the
 " opinion of General Mac Dowell, the commander in chief, was not consulted ; but as
 " he was directed by government to have
 " the necessary orders prepared, Lieutenant
 " Colonel Capper, the Adjutant General, in
 " this way became acquainted with the ex-
 " istence of a plan that had been forwarded

* See page 35 of the "*Postscript*."

† See page 36, of the "*Postscript*."

‡ See page 5, of the "*Discontents*."

“ through the late commander in chief to the
 “ governments of Madras (and Bengal) eight
 “ months, by which the efficiency of the whole
 “ army was then considered likely to be (as has
 “ since been proved) most lamentably affected ”*

“ This officer had various opportunities of
 “ being acquainted with the general feeling of
 “ the army ;”† on a measure which would so
 materially affect its efficiency: possessed of
 similar sentiments, “ ‡ and with the sanction of
 “ the commander in chief, he waited on Sir
 “ George Barlow, and urged the expediency
 “ of *modifying* the system, in any way that
 “ might accomplish the views of œconomy
 “ entertained by the government.

“ Sir George Barlow said, that œconomy
 “ was his only object, and that if equal saving
 “ could be produced in any other way, he did
 “ not see any objection to its adoption. *He*
 “ gave to Colonel Capper the plan, as proposed
 “ by Lieutenant Colonel Munro, with instruc-
 “ tions to return it, with his remarks, in a few
 “ days.

“ Colonel Capper accordingly delivered in
 “ to Sir George Barlow, his remarks, with
 “ the original plan, in four days: the remarks
 “ given in by Colonel Capper stated generally,
 “ that the plan of Lieutenant Colonel Munro
 “ had not been submitted to the Military Board,
 “ or to any of the staff officers of experience,
 “ § who might be able to correct any errors that
 “ might have crept into the production of an

* See page 5, of the “ *Discontents.*”

† *Ibid.*

‡ See page 6 of the “ *Discontents.*”

§ See page 7, of the “ *Discontents.*”

" individual. They also noticed, that Lieu-
 " tenant Colonel Munro had insinuated a
 " charge of the most serious nature against
 " the officers who had commanded Native
 " corps; for Lieutenant Colonel Munro's
 " plan contains a passage, purporting, that
 " the experience of six years, and an observa-
 " tion of the practical effects of the contract
 " system, suggested the observation, that the
 " contract induced the officers commanding
 " corps to keep back the discipline of their
 " men, in order that they might not be fit for
 " field service: and that the contract might
 " therefore be more advantageous."

" *This may be the most convenient place to
 " observe, that if, as the Quarter Master Ge-
 " neral insinuated, any deficiency in the equip-
 " ments of the camp equipage department,
 " had in point of fact arisen, from the neglect
 " or cupidity of commanding officers holding
 " the contract, no record of such deficiency
 " can be traced. It was the duty of the office,
 " at the head of which Lieutenant Colonel
 " Munro is placed; and in which he had served
 " either as deputy or principal, from the first
 " institution of the system of contract, to ex-
 " amine the returns, and make quarterly reports
 " to the military board of the state of the camp
 " equipage, cattle, and followers, attached to
 " each corps, as certified on musters and month-
 " ly inspection; and the perfect good condition
 " of all these equipments stands vouched by his
 " own reports, during the whole and every

* See page 21, of the "Insurrection."

“ part of the period to which his *practical observation and experience* refers.

“ *If, therefore, the report proposing the abolition of that contract was *meant* to convey the *most* obvious meaning which the arguments bear;† (and it is to be observed, that this maxim is brought in as an inference, not from general principles, but from an *attentive observation of the practical effects of the system of contract*; and is expressly stated to be one of those discoveries which gave Lieutenant Colonel Munro means of forming a better judgment on the subject, than could be formed in the year 1801-2, by General Stuart and Colonel Agnew!!! The insinuation does not appear to have crept in through inadvertence; it is deliberately introduced into the body of a memoir, the composition of which was manifestly studied, and the clandestine manner in which it was transmitted to the higher authorities, never having been laid before the Military Board, and it having been purposely omitted from the records of the office of the Commander in Chief’s secretary—seemed to corroborate the opinion, that the obvious meaning of the insinuation was apparent to its author‡) that report is at variance with the other official reports of the Quarter Master General’s office. Those reports were *public*, supported by regular musters, and exposed, if erroneous, to instant de-

* See page 22, of the “*Insurrection*.”

† See page 10, of the “*Discontents*.”

‡ See page 11, of the “*Discontents*.”

"tection; the other was private, standing
 "solely on the personal assertion of the Quar-
 "ter Master General, and regular investiga-
 "tion was denied—both could not be true."

"The total absence of every thing in form
 "of proof, in the course of the report, consti-
 "tutes in itself the most powerful evidence
 "that the insinuations were groundless.*"

When these reports became known in the
 army, several officers commanding corps, "in-
 "dividually applied to the Commander in
 "Chief to direct such investigation as he should
 "deem to be proper, for ascertaining their
 "conduct in the execution of this branch of
 "their public duty, in order that the delin-
 "quency, if proved, might be adequately
 "punished, and that the innocent might be
 "acquitted of the unmerited reflection which
 "they deemed to be conveyed in the report of
 "the Quarter Master General.†"

Failing in this attempt "to obtain an inves-
 "tigation into their own conduct," the officers
 commanding corps "thought that they could
 "attain the same end by compelling the Quar-
 "ter Master General to prove the grounds on
 "which he had inserted in his report the insi-
 "nuations, which they deemed to be injurious
 "to their characters, and adopting that form
 "of combined appeal which the circumstan-
 "ces seemed to prescribe, they jointly accused
 "Lieutenant Colonel Munro, (Captain in the
 "Madras European Regiment) of conduct
 "unbecoming the character of an officer and

* See page 22, of the "Insurrection."

† See pages 16 and 17, of the "Insurrection."

See page 18, of the "Insurrection."

" a gentleman, in having made use of false and
 " infamous insinuations tending to injure their
 " characters," which charge was signed by
 thirty-two officers commanding corps. The
 merits of this charge have never been investi-
 gated, Lieutenant Colonel Munro having
 avoided a trial by a court martial, b
 ing for protection to the civil
 (and which he most unaccountably refused)
 when actually under arrest, by order of the
 Commander in Chief, preparatory to his trial.

It having been attempted to attach blame
 to Colonel Capper for the army becoming ac-
 quainted with the injurious insinuations con-
 tained in Lieutenant Colonel Munro's plan, it
 becomes necessary to observe, that the plan in
 question was delivered by Sir George Barlow
 himself to Colonel Capper, as has been already
 shewn: and that Colonel Capper doubtful of
 the term under which it was intended to entrust
 it to him, applied to Sir George Barlow,
 through one of his confidential staff, to ascer-
 tain whether it was to be considered as of a
 public or private nature; who in reply from
 Sir George, informed him, he was at liberty
 to make what use he pleased of it. There are
 officers now in Europe who can depose to this
 circumstance having been repeated to them by
 Colonel Capper himself, not at a period of
 days after, but at the very moment of its oc-
 curring.

The unfortunate discussions and events that
 followed the disclosure of these insinuations,
 termed in the charge *false and infamous*, can-

* See the papers published by order of the House of Com-
 mons.

not therefore be with justice attributed to any breach of confidence in Colonel Capper, but to the imprudence of Sir George Barlow himself; or rather to the breach of the orders of the Court of Directors, which direct that “*all military plans, for the equipment of troops, and subjects of that description, should be submitted to, discussed and maturely digested by the Military Board previous to their coming before government;” for in defiance of this wise regulation and prudent precaution of the court, as well as of the usage of the service, the government of Madras, and subsequently that of Bengal, received, deliberated,† and acted upon the crude plan which an officer of shorter service and less experience than any who had been on the general staff of the army for many years, had procured the commander in chief (“who had never seen a corps in the field in India, and who consequently could not form any judgment of his own” on the subject) to forward thus surreptitiously to the government.

“† It is unnecessary to enter into any detailed consideration of the merits of the contract system, and that of Lieutenant Colonel Munro now denominated new;‡ but if the authority of great names may influence a question of this nature, there is something more than mere sound in the practical judgment of such a man as Earl Cornwallis,§ the founder of the calumniated contract mea-

* See page 9, of the “*Discontents*.”

† See page 8, of the “*Discontents*.”

‡ See page 14, of the “*Insurrection*.”

§ See page 13 of the same.

¶ See page 14 of the “*Insurrection*.”

" sure; of General Harris, who adopted it from
 " necessity; of General James Stuart, than
 " whose a sounder judgment does not exist
 " on every branch of military arrangement;
 " and who, on the experience of every one of
 " those campaigns, recommended its adoption
 " as a permanent measure; of Sir Arthur
 " Wellesley, (now Lord Wellington,) who on
 " the actual experience of its effects, expressly
 " ascribes to the operation of this system, his
 " being enabled to perform those movements
 " of unexampled rapidity and efficiency which
 " are the admiration of every military man ca-
 " pable of receiving lessons from experience. I
 " will not draw a parallel between such sup-
 " porters and the subverters of the system."
 " The Quarter Master General was instructed
 " by Sir John Cradock to devise a change:
 " and this germ of discord was the result of
 " his instructions."†

" † The following opinion of Mr. Petrie, re-
 " specting these remarks, deserves consider-
 " ation.

" The various discussions this question has
 " given rise to since, induced me to examine
 " the plans with much attention: and I have
 " now not to regret that I had sooner seen the
 " superior advantages in point of *efficiency*,
 " *saving*, and *facility* of the Adjutant-General's
 " over the one (of the Quarter Master Gene-
 " ral) I had transmitted to Bengal."

* See page 15, of the "*Insurrection*."

† See page 13.

‡ See page 35, of the "*Postscript*," copied from: *State-
ments of Facts*—printed by Stockdale.

" Besides the approbation which Mr. Petrie
 " has recorded, relative to the plan of Colonel
 " Capper, it has been universally commended
 " by the officers of experience at the Presidency;
 " and by the members of the Military
 " Board whom Colonel Capper consulted; and
 " it produces an annual saving of pagodas
 " 190,000, to be effected by means perfectly
 " simple in their operation; notwithstanding
 " which, it has been suffered to lay unheeded,
 " while the plan of Lieutenant Colonel Munro,
 " proposing a saving of 64,000, has been
 " received and adopted."

" Extraordinary as this choice of Sir George
 " Barlow may appear, the correctness of the
 " above statement and comparison is incontrovertible; nay it is a fact that the departments alluded to have been placed
 " under the immediate controul of the Quarter Master-General; that the provision and
 " maintenance of them are for the most part
 " under his sole management; and that the
 " accounts of them have been placed beyond
 " the efficient check of the office of military
 " audit; and this is called a reform of
 " abuses!!!

" In spite of the conviction which these circumstances must produce on the mind of
 " every reflecting person, the partizans of Sir
 " George Barlow have the effrontery to represent the adoption of Colonel Munro's plan,
 " (and the consequent rejection of Colonel
 " Capper's) as a measure of reasonable economy, and to describe those who have not

" See page 43 of the "Postscript."

“ concurred in this opinion, as *factious oppo-*
 “ *nents of the government*, incessantly employ-
 “ ed in spreading the spirit of discontent, and
 “ studying to impress the belief, that the re-
 “ ductions that had been made were unneces-
 “ sary.”

“ * Lieutenant Colonel Munro was not su-
 “ posed to be concerned in any of the reduc-
 “ tions which took place, except the abolition
 “ of the tent contract; and, as it was generally
 “ known that Colonel Capper had proposed a
 “ reduction to a much greater extent, in room
 “ of which no equivalent was to be made,*
 “ while Colonel Munro’s plan provided a
 “ handsome remuneration under the head of
 “ ‘*Batta*,’ to commanding officers, it seems
 “ difficult to imagine how the latter should
 “ have incurred odium and unpopularity,
 “ though Colonel Capper escaped the slightest
 “ censure, or diminution of that esteem and
 “ regard which was felt for his person while
 “ living, and will ever be cherished for his
 “ memory by all who knew him.”

“ Had the military body been under the
 “ influence of self-interest, or of the motives
 “ so liberally imputed to them by the author
 “ of the “*Accurate and Authentic Narrative*,”
 “ assuredly the plan of Colonel Capper was
 “ more likely to have excited their dissatisfac-
 “ tion than that of Colonel Munro; the effect
 “ of which latter has, *erroneously*, been suppos-
 “ ed injurious to their pecuniary interests: it
 “ is, on the contrary, shewn most satisfactorily
 “ (in a letter which appeared in the *Pilot*
 “ Newspaper, and has since been printed in the

* See page 41, of the “*Postscript*.”

" Appendix to Indus's letters) that the allowances granted by government to commanding officers, from whom the tent contract was taken, *exceeded* the advantages which they could possibly derive from the contract.

" * The premises laid down, appear to authorize the following conclusions :

" First, that the actual retrenchments of public expenses was *not* the chief object of the reforms (more properly *revolutions*) which Sir George Barlow introduced into the departments of the government of Madras.

" Secondly, that the abolition of the tent contract did *not* occasion a diminution of pecuniary advantages to officers commanding corps; and

" Thirdly, that it was *not* in the diminution of pecuniary advantages, and in that source only, that the charge against the Quarter Master General derived its origin.*

" In the course of the proceedings which were carried on, subsequent to the arrest of Lieutenant Colonel Munro, we do not find any complaints made by the army respecting the reduction of allowances; neither do the various orders of the government, issued during this period, contain any allusion, however remote, to that subject; but every statement of grievances, every remonstrance from the officers, contains complaints, that the character of their profession has been violated, and the rights of individuals destroyed by the insinuations contained in Lieutenant Colonel Munro's report on the

* See page 45, of the " Postscript." . . . 1.

"tent allowance; by the interference of the
 "civil government with the established course
 "of military trial; by the punishment of the
 "most respectable officers, without a hearing;
 "by the governor's rejection of a respectful
 "memorial to the Court of Directors; and by
 "various other arbitrary and unprecedented
 "acts, from which it was to be inferred, that
 "the will of the governor, and the caprices of
 "a few favorites, were the only standard of
 "justice, the only measure of executive au-
 "thority.

"The facts upon which these complaints
 "are founded, being admitted on all sides, no
 "bigot, however prejudiced, can hesitate to
 "acknowledge; and no hireling, however
 "mercenary, can venture to deny, that in such
 "a system, there was abundant cause for dis-
 "satisfaction and discontent."*

The instructions on which Lieutenant Colo-
 nel Munro acted, were contained in the fol-
 lowing letter of the Commander in Chief,
 (Lieutenant General Sir J. F. Cradock,) which
 will not only show the commission given to the
 Quarter Master General, in respect to the
 camp equipage; but the excess of his zeal in
 the execution of it, as evidenced in his plan of
 reform, on which the Adjutant General was
 required to offer his "Remarks."

NOTE.

"The editor could have wished to have added
 to the explanatory passages that have foregone,

* See page 46, of the "Postscript."

a short memoir of the military services of the late Adjutant General of the Madras army, but his feelings wholly unfit him for the task. But it would seem superfluous to speak of his general character as a soldier, or of his high sense of honor, since they were manifest to all acquainted with the military history of India, or who had a knowledge of his private life.

To those who had not the means of this information or acquaintance, the *Remarks on the Plan of the Quarter Master General*, will be sufficient, perhaps, to give them some insight into the liberality of his sentiments towards his brother officers; of the integrity of his own views, and of his *proper zeal* for the interests of his employers, and the service in which he was embarked.

If any additional circumstance be wanting to mark his character to the stranger, it may be found in his manly demeanour to his deputy in office, whom he attempted, in the unrestrained generosity of his nature, to rescue from the arbitrary suspension of the Madras government, by taking upon himself the entire blame of the act for which he suffered; and exposing himself to the unsubdued vengeance of angry and unrelenting authority, which he supposed, but supposed erroneously, judging from his own breast, might have been satisfied with a single victim—which he cheerfully offered in his own person; but in vain for his suffering fellow soldier, and in vain for the infuriated government, whom he would have screened from a part at least of the effects of its own folly, by the sacrifice even of his own fortunes.

The magnanimity of Colonel Capper did not

save Major Boles; but the subsequent acquittal of the latter by the Court of Directors, has justified the honorable exertion of his colleague, and has shewn it as just in its motive, as it was generous in its object.

Colonel Capper embarked for England, to seek redress from the Court of Directors, and was lost on the passage.

It has been stated by the Madras government, and adopted by others, that the officers withdrew the charge which they had preferred against Lieutenant Colonel Munro, from Lieutenant Colonel Leith's opinion, that it was illegal; but this has been so stated and adopted *erroneously*; in proof of which, see the Memorial from officers commanding corps to the Court of Directors. That memorial Sir George Barlow refused to forward to Europe, and returned it to the Commander in Chief; for which *arbitrary rejection* the court has censured the conduct of Sir George Barlow.

The officers placed no reliance on the *impartiality* or *justice* on an opinion, officiously volunteered by a professed advocate of the Quarter Master General's; for Lieutenant Colonel Leith was not called upon for his opinion of the nature, but merely of the form of the charge.—His laboured opinion, or rather defence of Colonel Munro, had not the smallest weight with the army.

PLAN,

&c.

TO LIEUTENANT COLONEL MUNRO,

Quarter-Master-General.

Dear Sir,

The subject of the camp equipage for the native army has for a long time engaged my attention, and each day brings proofs to my mind, that the subsisting arrangements are erroneous, both as to public œconomy, and also as to the equitable indemnification to commanding officers, through the vicissitudes of peace and war; for it may happen in repeated instances that the officer who enjoyed the advantage through a peace, will not be the person to carry on the equipments during a campaign; and while it may be argued with force, that the contract with commanding officers is too high during peace, it is more decided, that it is not an equivalent compensation to meet the pressure of a lengthened service in the field, through all the variety of hardship and accident.

There are also other circumstances that peculiarly attend the present regulation, which appear to me to add most sensibly to the general objection, which it is not at present necessary to state; but that in my opinion urge most forcibly the propriety of an alteration, and which I shall submit to government, if the leading points of œconomy and efficiency can be established without risque, by another mode of supply.

I shall therefore request you will, without loss of time, take this subject into your special consideration, and give me every assistance that may enable me to form a just judgment.

It appears necessary that in the first instance, you should give me a return of the present expense, as it comprehends the contract for the camp equipage of the native army.

Also a return of the probable expense in its full view for a general supply for the native force on the part of government, should it be required that the whole were to be held in a state of preparation. This can easily be reduced to the more probable scale of two thirds, or one half, as may be judged upon, as a just estimation of that force which must be the field.

It will be necessary to accompany this statement by a detailed view of those places, and the necessary establishments at which depots of camp equipage must be maintained; for the service of this country entirely demands that immediate access to supply should be secured; and unless very ample precautions are also provided for its proper care, a very extensive loss to the public must ensue.

I shall not trouble you with more detailed instructions, than that the principal points, *efficiency* and *economy*, are the foundations upon which I intend that the whole structure should rest; and unless I can clearly ascertain those essential points, I shall not disturb the existing arrangements, which, it is to be remarked, arose from a sense of former imperfections supposed to attach to the system I in some measure wish to revise; but it may be hoped that an attentive investigation of the general case may enable us to see where the errors lay at that period, and lead to the adoption of some plan of more decided improvement.

I shall also request, that in a separate report you will favour me with that detailed plan for the carriage of the sick of the army, which has of late engaged your attention, and which it is not prudent to longer withhold from submission to government; for the result of the long deliberations on this subject has as yet only produced the institution of one Dooley corps totally inadequate to this branch of the service; and as the former arrangements for the conveyance of the sick of the army are in some measure done away, it may be stated, with an appearance of justice, that

notwithstanding all the attention that has been given to the important concern, a degree of injury rather than advantage has accrued.

I have the honour to be, &c.

(Signed) J. F. CRADOCK.

Madras,
7th February 1807.

To his Excellency Lieutenant General Sir J. F. Cradock, K. B. Commander in Chief, &c. &c. &c.

Sir,

In obedience to the directions contained in your excellency's letter, under date 7th February last, I entered into an examination of the existing system of camp equipage and carriage for the native troops under this establishment; and I have the honour of submitting to your excellency's judgment a paper containing the result of the consideration which I bestowed on that subject.

Your excellency was pleased to state in conversation your intention of recommending to government to grant the superior half and full batta of colonel to lieutenant colonels in command of battalions or regiments in garrison or the field.

The adoption of this measure will be entirely consonant to the Orders of the Honourable Court of Directors granting superior batta to officers in command of corps; and if the tent contract should be abolished will be rendered extremely desirable by the circumstances in which lieutenant colonels commanding corps will be placed. These orders direct all officers commanding corps to draw the batta of the rank next above that which they hold; but this government excluded lieutenant colonels commanding corps from the operation of that order. Majors, captains, or lieutenants commanding corps, accordingly draw superior batta, while lieutenant colonels commanding corps draw the batta of their own rank only.

The command of corps involves many extraordinary expences, and appears to demand allowances suitable to the responsibility and dignity annexed to that situation.

The recent orders regarding the Bazar fund will prevent officers of rank from participating in the benefits which have hitherto been derived from that source; and the abolition of the existing contract allowance for camp equipage, if it should be abolished, will deprive officers commanding native corps of many advantages which they have certainly realized in time of peace from that system. These circumstances appear to render it expedient, that the orders of the Honourable Court on the subject of superior batta should be carried into effect to their full extent, and that measure, if we adopt the number of lieutenant colonels actually in command of corps, as a standard for estimating its future expence, will only occasion an annual increase of disbursements of 12,000 pagodas.

I have the honour to remain, &c. &c. &c.

Quarter Master General's Office, (Signed)
 Fort St. George, J. MUNRO,
 30th June, 1807. Quarter Master General
 of the Army.

Return to the order of the Honourable House of Commons, dated 27th March, 1811, requiring "Copy of the remarks made by Lieutenant Colonel Capper, Adjutant General, upon Lieutenant Colonel Munro's plan."

"The records at the East India House, do not contain any document of the description, required by this order."

"Examiner's Office, East India House,
 "5th April, 1811."

MEMORANDUM BY COLONEL CAPPER,

RESPECTING THE

Proposed Measure of doing away the Contract for the Supply of Tents, and their Carriage, by Officers commanding Native Corps.

HAVING understood, that it is in the contemplation of government, to adopt a new system in regard to the equipment of the army, I have endeavoured to ascertain the principles upon which the proposed plan

is framed; but my applications to the officers where the records of preliminary discussions of this nature are usually deposited, have been fruitless; and I understood, that the plan has not been referred for discussion to any department; but has been laid before government, under the mere recommendation of those with whom it originated.

A subject of so great importance as the general equipment of the Madras army, merits investigation by those who possess experience regarding the effects of the various systems which have at different periods obtained under this government; and as the collision of different opinions may tend to remove the errors of each, it is perhaps to be regretted that the plan in question had not been submitted to that ordeal.

The following remarks on the proposed plan, are offered from a sense of public duty. Viewing this plan as it relates to the efficiency of the army, or to financial resources of the government, it seems to possess much of that exuberance which may be supposed to arise from an over-weening zeal, and which most of all requires the touchstone of enquiry and investigation; abstract principles are laid down, whose truth is self-evident, so long as they are abstract principles; but the misapplication of them, in various instances, produces a result, which on investigation, will be found fallacious.

From the difficulty which has occurred in procuring any information respecting the proposed system, no adequate opportunity has offered for the deliberate discussion of the various momentous objects which it embraces: the most prominent only will be adverted to; and for the sake of simplicity, the remarks are made in order corresponding with the paragraphs to which they refer.

Lieutenant Colonel Munro's proposed Plan.

1. THE measure for maintaining the army in a state of constant equip-

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1. THE concurring sentiments of all men of understanding and experi-

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ment for field movement, has long been considered essential to the efficiency of the military system, under the presidency of Fort St. George.

It has been suggested, by an experience of the disasters that have resulted from defective equipments; and by a sense of the necessity of possessing, in a country maintained by the sword, the ability to commence military operations with the utmost promptitude. That measure is founded upon just grounds; but the measures adopted for carrying it into execution, are, in some respects, unnecessarily extensive, and in others, entirely defective.

2. The whole native army, in what regards equipage and regimental stores, has been placed in a state of complete and constant preparation for field service, while a considerable part of the native army must be at all times in garrison, precluded from taking the field. The reasons for placing the army in a state of preparation for immediate movement, must refer

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once prove the justness of the principle laid down in this paragraph; but the application of it contradicts the judgments and experience of those who reported on the present system: they were officers whose experience of the warfare of India was extensive, and whose judgment has been considered, in general, good.

2. A reference to the discussion, which took place previous to the establishment of the present system, will shew that the objection in this paragraph was foreseen.

The tent allowance was given, not because all the corps of the army were to be always on field service, but because, under that arrangement, the whole army should be kept in a state of perfect readiness,

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exclusively to the prosecution of operations against an enemy in the field.

Those reasons cannot apply to the ordinary movement of troops in time of peace, for it is of little consequence, whether a corps proceeding from one station to another in time of peace, commence its march at two or ten days notice. But in order to accomplish the object of putting the army into a state fit for the immediate commencement of operations against an enemy in the field, it is requisite that it should be provided with other establishments beside those which relate to camp equipage. It should be supplied with carriage for the sick, with the means of subsistence, and with an ordnance equipment; but none of those establishments are attached to native corps. The camp equipage of those corps is not alone sufficient to enable them to commence operations against an enemy; and the object for which that equipment is maintained, is not therefore

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at an expence, less by the sum of pagoda 1637, than the expence which was before actually incurred on account of the native army, and the apparent impossibility of making the contract applicable to a part only together with the other considerations in favour of keeping the whole native army always ready to move, decided the question which had previously undergone full and fair discussion.

The objection regarding the want of carriage for the sick, appears extraordinary, as the Government have already incurred an enormous and unprecedented expence in the construction of sick carriages, and doolies, to an extent that has not before occurred during war even; also in raising a corps of dooly bearers, the expence of which is nearly equal to one fourth of the tent contract for the whole native army; and in allotting to the different stations, proportions of the Hurkannah doolies, which are maintained at a great expence, but if other avocations of

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the public service should render these branches of it inapplicable to the purposes for which they were designed, it will not be concluded by any officer of this service that a native corps is therefore unready to march, no corps going on field service, is accompanied by their sick, at least they have not been under the system hitherto observed; and it does not clearly appear, that their efficiency would be much increased if they were: on a question like this, however, matter of fact is more satisfactory than any speculative doctrine. Has any native corps, on any occasion been delayed from commencing a march on actual service, by the want of conveyance for sick? If the answer from any staff-officer in the army (who has had experience) be in the negative, this objection must appear to be purely theoretical, and at variance with practice.

3. Six years experience of the practical effects of the existing system of camp equipment of the native army has

3. That the persons who proposed the introduction of the present system, may, as all are, be liable to error, must be

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afforded means of forming a judgment relative to its advantages and efficiency, which were not possessed by the persons who proposed its introduction, and an attentive examination of its operation during that period of time, has suggested the following observations regarding it:

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admitted; but it is probable, they were as little liable to error on a point that regards experience, as any other officer then or now in the army. Lieutenant General Stuart, and Colonel Agnew, were the chief advocates for the plan, which underwent severe proof, from the opposition of Major General Ross, Major General Sydenham, and Lieutenant Colonel Brunton, an advantage that has hitherto been denied to the plan under discussion. The framers of the present system, may be said to have possessed all the experience which could be acquired in the wars against Hyder Ally, Tippoo, Suldaun, the French, and the Dutch, within the last thirty years; and as they did, after the Mahratta war, in October 1804, confirm their former opinion, it will not be said, that the experience of the last six years has altered their sentiments. Sir John Cradock, however high his character may be as an officer, generally speaking, had no experience in India. He never saw an

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4. The existing system appears to be liable to the following objections.

First. It incurs the expense of placing the whole army in a state of complete preparation for field movements, in respect to camp equipage, and regimental stores, while a great part of the native army must, from inevitable circumstances, be at all times in garrison, in a situation where the equipments are entirely unnecessary.

Secondly. That system incurs an immense expense, without accomplishing the purpose for which it was established: it provides for the constant maintenance of certain equipments, with the whole native army, with a view to the prompt commencement of operations against an enemy in the field, while other equipments, equally essential to the attainment of that object, are not maintained.

Thirdly. By granting

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encampment, except for muster; and when experience is the guide, the judgment of such a man cannot be relied on.

4. This objection is answered; it is a repetition, in other words, of the substance of the second paragraph.

This objection, like the first, is answered before: it is another modification of the second paragraph.

The justness of this re-

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the same allowance in peace and war for the equipment of native corps, while the expences incidental to that charge, are unavoidably much greater than in peace; it places the interest and duty of officers commanding native corps, in direct opposition to one another; it makes it their interest, that their corps should not be in a state of efficiency fit for field service, and therefore furnishes strong inducements to neglect their most important duties.

Fourthly, By changing commanding officers of corps with extensive concerns immediately, affecting their private interests, is calculated, particularly in the field, to divert their

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mark as a general principle, cannot be doubted; but the application of it in the Quarter Master General's papers, conveys a charge against the officers commanding native corps which merits investigation; it is stated, that the experience of six years has suggested the observation, "that the present plan renders it the interest of commanding officers, that their corps should not be in a state fit for a field service; and therefore furnishes strong inducements to neglect their most important duties." This is, indeed, a serious charge, and if true, would prove a reproach, not only to the plan, but to the service, in which were officers liable to the influence of such principles: it is to be hoped, that this may be an error, and that it may not be believed, unless the instances which warrant the conclusion, be produced.

This objection is of the same nature with the foregoing, true in general theory, but unfounded in fact. Men are not so bad as moralists represent them.

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attention and pursuits from the discipline and management of their corps, objects that should furnish them with sufficient employment for the whole of their time.

Fifthly, It illustrates the principal purpose of its adoption, that of maintaining at all times efficient carriage for the camp equipage and regimental stores of the native army, for it permits commanding officers to keep hired bullocks for that service, and the experience of all our wars has proved that common hired bullocks are entirely unfit for long continued labour.

This objection must arise from a report of some circumstances not generally known: the universal opinion of those who have seen the operation of the plan, on field service, is directly at variance with it, from the reports of such persons, and of General Wellesley in particular. The Military Board made a report to government, of which the following is an extract:

“ In addition to what is
“ above stated, we may
“ remark on the unparalleled celerity with which
“ the army took the field,
“ for the campaign against
“ the Mahratta confederates, a circumstance
“ which could not possibly have happened had
“ the camp-equipage been
“ provided by the public;
“ and we may add that
“ from the great distance
“ from our own territories,
“ of the country in which
“ the operations of the ar-

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“ my, in advance, under
 “ Major General the Hon-
 “ nourable Arthur Wel-
 “ lesley were performed,
 “ the provision by the pub-
 “ lic of camp-equipage, to
 “ supply the deficiencies
 “ which would have been
 “ subsequently occasioned
 “ by casualties on service,
 “ would have been abso-
 “ lutely impracticable
 “ at any expense whatso-
 “ ever; indeed, it has re-
 “ quired every exertion
 “ that could be used to
 “ ensure a constant supply
 “ of tents for the very
 “ limited number of Eu-
 “ ropean troops, which
 “ have been kept in the
 “ field.”

This report was signed by General Stuart, General Smith, Colonel Agnew, Colonel Trapaud, Lieutenant Colonel Orr, and Lieutenant Colonel Brunton, every individual of whom had some pretensions to experience, in the equipment of armies, and were assisted in their opinions by reports from General Wellesley and other officers of the army: the fact is notorious, but the circumstances which gave rise to this objection are yet secret.

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Sixthly, In time of war, individuals commanding corps, cannot command the resources necessary for the equipment of their corps with camp-equipage, and carriage; the measures necessary for that purpose must be provided by government, on the general principles which regulate the supply and the re-equipment of all departments of the army.

5. An examination of the military state of affairs under this government, will shew, that a limited portion only of the native army could take the field, in the event of a general war, and that a considerable number of native battalions must remain at all times, in our fixed garrisons, or in certain stations necessary to be always

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This objection seems to rest on the same ground as the former; the same answer will apply to it, in addition to which, the following extract of a letter from the Governor in Council, under date the —, after the experience of the Mysore war, and several discussions on the subject may appear relevant.

"The fact, however, being fully established by the introduction of the system in the Carny's country, and by universal admission, that officers can, at all times, provide the means of carrying their tents with much greater facility and expedition, than the public departments, I have the strongest conviction," &c. &c.

5. There can be no doubt that it will be prudent, at all times, to keep garrisons in all our military posts.

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occupied by troops, for the purpose of maintaining the authority of government in the provinces.

6. The following statement exhibits the number of battalions that must be constantly stationed in our garrisons and provinces, part of these troops will necessarily be employed occasionally upon internal service, and a provision will be made for this description of service in the sequel statement, shewing the number of native battalions that will necessarily be stationed, at all times, in garrisons and provinces :

	Battalions.
Fort St. George	2
Tripassone, Poona- malle, Chiltoon, and Chandernag- herry	1
Vellone	1
Seringapatani	2
Bangalore, Bed- none, Nundy- roog, Paughur, and Gooribundah	1
Chittledroog, Hun- nyghur, &c.	1
Bellany, Gurrum- condah, &c.	1
Gooty, Gundicatah, Ledhout, &c.	1
Cummam, Cude- pah, &c.	1

6. However applicable this distribution may be to the present state of affairs, there cannot be a doubt, that an alteration in the political relations of our friends or enemies, may suggest the propriety of altering it.

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	Battalions.
Goah - -	1
Hullial, Mangalore, Jemaulabad, Honore and Ledahagun	1
Cannanone, and Wynand	1
Tellicherry, Callicut, Palyhacherry, and Trichinapaly	1
Tangore, Nagore, &c.	1
Dindigul, Madura, &c.	1
Palameattah -	1
Sankernydroog, Ryacattah, and the Combatores country	1
Maculipatam -	1
Ellone, Semulcattah, Coninga	1
Chicacole and Vizagapatam	1
Ganjam, Caska, and Berhampore	1
Total	21

The remaining part of the native army may be considered as available for general field service: its amount and distribution are shewn in the following statement of the part of the native army that is disposable for general field service.

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	Subs.	Regt.	Batts.
Hyderabad force	-	0	6
Travancore	ditto	0	2
Wallajabad	-	0	3
Madras	-	0	1
Bangalore	-	0	3
Seringapatam		0	1
Trichenapaly		0	2
Bellany	-	0	2
Malabar and Canara		0	1
Masulipatam District		0	1
All the Cavalry		8	0
<hr/>			
Total		8	22
<hr/>			

Seventh, But of all the twenty-four battalions allotted to provinces and garrisons, a certain proportion will be necessarily employed on internal service, in suppressing commotions, escorting treasure or stores and in other duties. It is supposed that one fourth part of the twenty-four battalions, or a force equal to six battalions, should be continually employed in this manner; and it is necessary that they should be calculated upon as being always engaged in internal service and supplied with field equipments. The result of the foregoing statement is; that of the twenty-four battalions allotted

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to provinces and garrisons, six battalions are considered to be continually employed in a state of movement, and the remaining eighteen battalions always stationed in garrisons and posts; and that all the cavalry and twenty-two battalions of infantry are considered to be disposable for general field service.* If, therefore, a force equal to six battalions for internal service, and eight regiments of cavalry and twenty-two battalions of infantry for general operations in the

* In the following statement the force allotted to fixed stations is reduced to its lowest practicable amount; indeed to an amount much lower than it is ever likely to be reduced to: this statement therefore demonstrates that the force at six battalions allotted to internal service is greater than can almost in any circumstances be spared for that subject.

Battalions.		Battalions.	
Fort St. George	$\frac{2}{2}$	Cannanore and Wynard	1
Vellore and Chittoon	1	Tellicherry, Calicut, }	$\frac{1}{2}$
Seringapatam	1	and Polyhautherry }	$\frac{1}{2}$
Bangalore, Bednore, }		Trichinopoly	1
Muddicoog, Baughun }	1	Tanjore, and Nagore, &c.	$\frac{1}{2}$
Chittledroog, Hanny- }		Dindigul, Madura	$\frac{1}{2}$
ghoor, Lena }	1	Palamecottah	1
Bellary, Gurnecondah	1	Saukirry, Dindigul, Rya- }	1
Goody, Gundicottah, }		cottah, Cambatone }	1
Siderat, &c. }	1	Maculipatam and Ellore	1
Commamini and Cuddipah	$1\frac{1}{2}$	Gangain, Acka and }	$\frac{1}{2}$
Goah	1	Berhampoor }	$\frac{1}{2}$
Samuelcottah, Conin }			
gus, Vizagapatam, }	$\frac{1}{2}$	Battalions	18
Chicacole }			
Hulhal, Mangalore, Je- }			
maulabad and Honore }	1		

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field, are maintained in a state of constant equipment for service, every object of necessary preparation will be accomplished.

- 8. It may be useful to calculate the expence of supporting the establishment of that state of equipment, on the supposition that they are maintained by the public.

9. The Military Board in one of their calculations relative to general establishments of tent allowance, assumed a principle, on the foundation of experience, that alternative years of peace and war would occur in this country; and they supposed that the whole of the native cavalry, and two thirds of the native infantry would be employed on field service in the year of war, but that no field expenses whatever would be incurred in the year of peace. This principle of alternative years of peace and war appears to be sufficiently just to be applied to the present inquiry. I shall therefore suppose that the whole of the

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available force, viz. eight regiments of cavalry and 22 battalions of infantry, with the six battalions allotted to internal service are employed in the field in the year of war; a force amounting very nearly to the proportion assigned by the Military Board to the year of war; and that the six battalions allotted to internal service are also employed in the field in the year of peace.

10. I have prepared a statement exhibiting the expence of maintaining the camp equipage establishment of the disposable force in time of peace and war, and also a statement shewing the expense of the six battalions allotted to internal service, on the supposition that they are continually engaged in field movements.

It is of course supposed that no expense whatever is incurred for the camp equipage establishment of the 18 battalions fixed in posts and garrisons. By the statement No. 1, it is proved that the expense of the disposable force in two years on the supposition that its esta-

10. Some inaccuracies in the statement are pointed out, and a correct statement is drawn out on the principles laid down by the Quarter Master General. See the Appendix, No. 1.

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establishments are maintained by the public, and that the whole of it has been in the field one year, does not equal the existing contract allowance for that period of time.

By the statement No. 2, it is shewn that the expence of the six battalions supposed to be continually in internal service, is also considerably below the amount allowed at present for that number of corps.

If therefore the public should maintain the camp equipage establishments of that portion of the native army which can be allotted to field service, the following saving of expense would take place.

Difference between the present contract allowance and the expence of maintaining the establishments of eight regiments of cavalry and twenty-two battalions of infantry in two years, P. F. C.

Statement } 8712 2 32.
No. 1.

Difference between the present contract allowance and the expence of maintaining the establishments of six battalions in

The inaccuracies in the statements No. 1, and 2, render the abstract founded on them also incorrect; the following is an abstract from the corrected statements.

Difference between the present contract allowance and the expence of maintaining the establishments of eight regiments of cavalry and 22 battalions of native infantry in two years, as per statement, No. 1. P. F. C.

4054 41 12.

Difference between the present contract allowance and the expence of maintaining the establishments of

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two years. Statement No. 2.

Rs. F. C.
7853 28 16.

Present contract allowance for eighteen battalions for two years.

Pagod.
117,501.

Total saving in two years. } P. F.
134,078 36 21.
Saving in one year. } 67,038 36 21

The result is founded on data more liberal than those assumed by the Military Board.

The Board supposed alternate years of peace and war, and that all the cavalry and two thirds of the infantry should be employed in the year of war, but no troops in the year of peace. I have also supposed that alternate years of peace and war will occur, that all the cavalry and 28 battalions of infantry will be employed in the year of war, and that six battalions of infantry will be employed in the alternate year of peace. I will suppose that the camp equipage establishment of the foregoing force, are always maintained. Indeed the

six battalions in two years as per Statement No. 2.

Rs. F. C.
7039 22 25

Present contract allowance for eighteen battalions for two years. Vide Quarter Master General's statement

Rs.
117,501

Saving in two years. } 29,198 21 41
Saving in one year. } 64,719 10 60

Thus, although the abstract statement appears to contain all the items of expense, is found to be materially defective, as some principal heads of expense in the proposed plan are not included: and although the allowance for these which are included may appear liberal at first view, the numerous contingencies which must ever attend this expensive department, in the hands of the public will be found considerably to exceed any savings that might possibly arise from some of those heads. It is well ascertained that during the campaigns against the Mahratta confederates and against Doondiah, the corps which had the

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data which I have assumed are so unfavourable to the public, that I am persuaded a much greater saving would take place than what I have stated.

I have calculated that four regiments of cavalry and seventeen battalions of infantry shall be annually employed in* the field, but the present aspect of affairs, although it cannot justify a reduction of our military force, on the extent and efficiency of which our explanations of the continuance of tranquillity can alone be founded, yet it authorizes us to expect that a force equal to that which I have stated will not be annually employed in the field for some length of time. Indeed the amount of native force employed on the Dekan during the last war against the Maratta confederates, did not exceed the proportion which I have permanently assigned to annual service in the field.

All the detailed data which I have assumed in the statements are also

contract were as well tented as those provided by government, whereas the expense of the latter exceeded the contract allowance by an enormous proportion.

The following statement of the expence incurred on account of camp equipage for the 94th regiment during the years 1803, 4, and 5, will serve to elucidate the above assertion.

Prime cost of tents sent to the 94th regiment from 1st January 1803, to 31st December 1805 7591 28 47

Pay and batta to the Lascars attached during that period

3155 6 0

Amount of carriage paid by government for conveying the tents to the regiment, taken from average of two bills

1715 0 57

Proportion of the expence of the cattle attached to the regiment during this period

8823 5 75

* The same with eight regiments of cavalry and twenty-two battalions of infantry employed every alternate year; and six battalions every year.

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unfavourable to the public. I have calculated that a complete set of tents will be expended each year; but it is probable, that a set of tents will last two or three years in peace, the expense of grain and forage is also greater in the statement than is warranted by the ordinary prices of those articles. I have supposed in the statement No. 2, that the six battalions allotted to internal service are always supplied with bullocks; but reasons for concluding that this amount of force will not be annually employed in internal service, and therefore that a considerable portion of those bullocks will not be maintained. The whole of the statements are therefore constructed upon data so extensive and liberal that I have not included the sums proper to be granted to native corps for hutting, or changing their stations. The table No. 3, shews the sum necessary to be allowed for that purpose, and on the supposition that fifteen reliefs of corps shall annually take place, an expense of 9259 pagod.

Colonel Capper's Remarks.

Total, independent of the prime cost of cattle 21,284 41 19

Amount of contract allowance, calculated on the proportion allowed to a battalion of native infantry at 450 pagodas per month, the strength being 1808; amount of above 16,260 0 0

Difference in three years' being the actual cost beyond the rate of contract

5081 41 19

As per ann. 1691 41 59

Above at 10 $\frac{1}{2}$ per ann.

Hence it appears that instead of deducting from the expenses at which the Quarter-Master General has estimated the proposed system, a very considerable allowance should be made, after inserting every apparent head of expense.

Upon this principle the addition of 5 per cent. to the expense, (this is a very moderate calculation for contingencies) the insertion of the expense of hutting, which cannot upon any fair principle be left off, it will produce the following result.

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12 fanams will be incurred on that account. But it is probable that this expense will be more than balanced by the difference between the expense exhibited in the statement and those which will actually occur. I have not either calculated the first cost of the carriage bullocks; the price of the number registered for the disposable corps, will amount to 11544 pagodas, which must be deducted from the first year's service.

If the foregoing plan should be adopted, officers commanding corps will be relieved from a charge which is certainly adverse, in its present circumstances, to the first principles of public regulation. By maintaining the cattle in the public service, the efficiency of the carriage of the camp equipage of that part of the native army likely to be employed in the field will be insured.

The difference in regard to strength, and the capability of enduring labour, between cattle regularly fed, trained, and attended, and those hired for the occasion is very great.

The superiority of the

Colonel Capper's Remarks

Amount of expense as per No. 1.

Rs. F. C.

174,365 0 68

Add 5 per cent. 8718

Total expense in two years } 183,083 0 68

Contract for allowance for eight regiments of cavalry and 22 battalions of infantry, two years

179,320 0

Deficiency of contract allowance in 2 years

3703 0 68

Again,

Amount of expenses, as per statement No. 2

2577 15 51

Add 5 p. cent. 133 0 0

2510 15 51

Contract allowance

for eight battalions

for one year 3261 0 0

Excess of contract

for one battalion

453 26 20

Excess of ditto,

for six battalions, one

year 2721 32 14

Or two years

5413 28 28

From these data the general data will stand,

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present Karkhannah over those formerly employed in the transportation of our ordnance, results from this cause. Being properly fed and trained, the Karkhannah bullocks are capable of continued labour for a length of time; but the common bullocks hired for the movement of the ordnance fail in the course of a few marches: the efficiency of bullocks depends also in a great degree on the attention and care of their attendants. In this respect also, a very great benefit will ensue from maintaining the bullocks in the immediate service of the public, for their drivers being constantly paid and supported like those of the Karkhannah establishment will be sufficiently assured of the permanency and advantage of their situation, to adhere with fidelity to the service. Those observations apply with force to the carriage of the camp equipage of the army.

It is to be apprehended that the cattle maintained by officers commanding corps are the common hired bullocks of the country, and that a few marches would render

Colonel Cupper's Remarks.

thus: Excess of the present contract above the proposed expense of maintaining the establishment of six battalions native infantry in two years, as per correction of statement No. 2.

Present contract allowance for eighteen battalions for two years

117,501 0 0

Total 122,917 28 23

Deduct deficiency of contract as for correction of statement No. 1.

3763 0 68

Nett saving in 2 years

119,154 27 30

Or in one year.

59,532 13 60

Deduct the proposed expense of hutting ten of barracks

9,529 12 0

Actual saving

50,333 1 60

If the first cost of bullocks be considered as part of the necessary expense of the proposed plan, it should certainly be included: it is however already sufficiently proved, that the general principle adopted in the original calculation is mate-

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them unfit for service. Good drivers are seldom found with hired bullocks, and in this respect it is probable that the carriage for the camp equipage of the army at present is not in the most efficient state.

A general war, should it occur, may place the army in a situation that would totally disable commanding officers from re-equipping their corps with camp equipage and carriage. The ordinary sources of supply may be unavailable or exhausted; the communications of the army may be intercepted; and officers commanding corps, cannot possess sufficient knowledge of the plans or probable events of the war, or of the march of the convoys to the army, to adopt effectual measures for the procuring supplies of tents and carriage. The arrangements for the equipping corps, must be founded on the general principles which apply to the other great departments of the army.

The commander in chief must adopt previous measures for securing regular supplies of camps

rially defective: it professes to exhibit the *greatest* expense, whereas it cannot be said even to include all those which are known to exist; every officer of experience who has attempted calculation on this subject, has admitted the impossibility of bringing within the compass of an account, the variety of losses that arise in any extensive department like this from the carelessness or the abuse of the numerous persons who must be employed, and over whom it is morally impossible to establish any efficient check.

To this cause it is owing that the equipage of separate corps is kept up in all circumstances by commanding officers at an expense considerably less than it would cost the public. The department being limited, is within the superintendence of an individual; and it is obvious to the experience of all "that individuals in the management of their own concerns, will generally apply the full extent of their resources to

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equipage for the use of the troops, and bringing them forward to the magazines, from which the resources for the army are most likely to be drawn.—Officers commanding corps, might as well hold contracts for the supplying their corps with subsistence in the field as with camp equipage and carriage.

If this existing system should be abolished, a particular office should be made responsible for the efficient management of the new one.—And the great expenses stated to have been formerly incurred on account of the camp equipage, must be ascribed to the want of a system of strict and vigilant superintendence. The regulations of the service have long vested the Quarter-Master-General's office with the and superintendence of camp equipage; but those regulations, from the systematic inefficiency of that office, which prevailed until lately, and from several circumstances that opposed their proper execution, were for a length of time nugatory and ineffectual.

Colonel Capper's Remarks.

“ their ostensible object,
“ and derive advantage
“ from superintending in
“ person, what the state
“ is compelled to entrust
“ to the management of
“ others.”

The arguments adduced against the quality of the cattle employed by commanding officers in their contract, taken abstractedly, appear just, and might be deemed worthy of some consideration, did not the experience of *more than six years* prove incontestibly, that they are *unfounded in fact*, most of the native corps employed against Doondiah, were provided by contract, and *all* with General Wellesley in the Mahratta country; it is believed that those campaigns as severe as any in which the Madras army ever were, or ever will be employed, and those officers who have accompanied the army on every service, since the year 1780, uniformly assert that the native corps were on those occasions better covered than on any former occasion.—In short, the experience of the three last wars has proved, that all the resources of the

Lieutenant Colonel Munro's proposed Plan.

The Military Board assumed a constraint over this department; but that Board, from the nature of its constitution, is not calculated to enter into the active management of a department involving details connected with the distribution and movements of the troops. The Quarter-Master General's office should be made responsible in the strictest manner for the efficient conduct of this department.

Being the channel for issuing orders for the movement of troops, that officer will be best able to regulate the proper distribution of camp equipage, with a view to the wants of the troops and the exigencies of the service.

In carrying the new system into execution, the bullocks for the conveyance of camp equipage, should be attached to the Karkhanna establishment. A Karkhanna consisting of seventy carriage bullocks for the conveyance of camp equipage and regimental stores, and twenty-four draught bullocks, for the movement of the sick, according to a plan,

Colonel Copper's Remarks.

public have been inadequate to perform in this way what individuals have uniformly done with advantage to the service, and in many cases, with benefit to themselves.

Upon what grounds then, can the arguments of the Quarter-Master General be supported? has any instance occurred, in which the inefficiency of the present system has been proved? if not, the concurring testimony of all those who possess practical knowledge on this subject, must be conclusive.

The remarks that have been made, refer chiefly to the question of the relative efficiency of the present and proposed system; and if matters of fact, and opinions drawn from extensive experience be admitted to produce a more satisfactory ground of belief than the speculations of pure theory, it will be evident that on the score of *efficiency*, the present is preferable to any one, by which the details of the camp equipage may be conducted on account of government.

The Quarter Master General's plan, however, pro-

Lieutenant Colonel Munro's proposed Plan.

Colonel Capper's Remarks.

which will hereafter be given in, may be attached to each battalion of the disposable force.

The result of the foregoing observations is so different from the plan proposed by the Military Board, in their letter to Government of the 18th January, 1802,* on which the existing system is founded, that it was necessary to examine the data employed in preparing that plan.—

mises a saving to government and this; although at the probable expense of the efficiency of the native army; may, under existing circumstances, be deemed eligible, nay, perhaps requisite! it may therefore be of importance that a plan should be suggested, from which the good effect promised, may be produced while the dangers to be apprehended from that now under discussion, may be avoided.

* Some of the detailed data, on which the Military Board, in their report to Government of the 18th of January 1802, founded their recommendation for the introduction of the present system of providing and carrying the camp-equipage of the native army by contract, appear to be entirely erroneous. The Board calculate the expences of the former plan of providing and carrying the camp-equipage of the army, directly by the public, and then compare the amount of those expences with the amount of the proposed contract allowance. The first item of the expences of the former plan, is 59,315 Pagodas, 25 Fanams, 60 Cash, stated to be the pay and batta for one year of the Lascars, employed with the camp-equipage, &c. &c. of the men; but the pay and batta, and the establishment of tent Lascars, required for the whole of the army, which was maintained at the date of the Board's report, amount for one year, to 38,131 pagodas, only, on the supposition that the whole of the army was in the field during that year, and that all European regiments, were complete to their full establishment. The cost and repair of tents for the men for one year, stated in the Military Board's report at pagodas 66,521 42 7, but the expense of supplying the whole army, at the period of the Board's report, with a complete set of camp equipage, a quantity almost sufficient for the service of one year of war, amounts only to pagodas 40,764 92 1. But, it is impossible that the whole army should have been in the field during the year, assumed by the Military Board, a certain proportion of the army must have been stationed in garrison during that year; and it is supposed that one third of it was stationary. A third part of the expences which I have assigned to Lascars and

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Colonel Capper's Remarks.

It appears that the grounds assumed by the Military Board are rather inconclusive. The Board make a calculation of all the expenses connected with the camp equipage, barracks, and carriage of regimental stores of the native army, for one year, 1800, and consider those

A modification of the proportions of the whole expense. Each elephant costs 28 pagodas per month, each camel, 4 pagodas, 12 mules and each bullock, pagodas 133 10, that the completion of this establishment according to the Quarter-Master-General's plan,

camp equipage, during the year assumed by the Military Board, must accordingly be deducted from the amount of those expenses. The following statements will exhibit the difference between the calculations of the Board and those which I have made - Calculation of the Military Board -

	Pag	F	C
Pay and batta to Lascars employed with the camp equipage of the men, &c	59,315	25	60
Cost of tents expended	45,250	0	0
Repair of tents	21,271	43	7
Total	125,836	68	67

CALCULATION

Pay and batta for one year of the Lascars registered for the complete equipment of the whole army, maintained at the date of the Board's Report	38,132	0	0
Expense of a complete set of equipage for the whole army, maintained at the period of the Board's Report	40,764	29	1
	78,896	29	1
Deduct one third on account of troops fixed in garrisons	26,296	37	53
Total expense	52,597	91	28
Difference of expense	79,234	31	39

The Hyderabad subsidiary force is deducted from this calculation, as they were on tent allowance in 1800, and their tent allowance is included in the Military Board's calculation, it amounted to 31,000 pagodas.

Lieutenant Colonel Munro's proposed Plan.

expences to afford data sufficiently authentic to judge of the expediency of establishing the contract.

The expences of the year 1800, are estimated at 228,887 pagodas, the amount of the tent contract force, the force maintained when it was established, was 215,120 pagodas, and the Board therefore calculated that it would be permanently advantageous to the public.

The Board further stated, that the year 1800 had been more expensive than the years which immediately preceded and followed it. The Board did not explain the grounds on which the contract allowances were calculated.—

But the year 1800, was peculiarly expensive in regard to camp equipage, it was the year following that, in which the conquest of Mysore was effected, a considerable number of our troops were on a field establishment. The expedition against Doondiah took place in that year, and large detachments were employed in field service, in almost

Colonel Capper's Remarks.

will produce, an increase of expense, exclusive of the prime cost of the elephants and camels equal to pagodas 25,428 per annum; making the whole expense of that establishment amount to the enormous sum of pagodas 190,524 per annum.

I am not aware that any considerable deduction can be made on account of work performed by the cattle of that establishment; by a minute of the Quarter-Master-General's, dated the 2d instant, it would appear that the company would lose by employing their own bullocks in aid of their other resources towards repairing the mutilated fortifications of Fort St. George. However extraordinary this result may appear, it operates as proof, that during peace, these animals are nearly useless, and it seems therefore doubtful, whether any arguments can prove the utility of continuing (during peace) an establishment so expensive; however the decided advantages derived to the public service, from the

Lieutenant Colonel Munro's proposed Plan.

every part of our territories. The expences of 1800, cannot therefore be received as a just standard for estimating the expences to be incurred in future, on account of these establishments, and yet this was the only standard afforded by the Board.—

The subject of tent allowance has undergone repeated discussions under this presidency—the introduction of that allowance was proposed in 1791, by General Musgrave. In a minute which he recorded, at the Military Board, he endeavoured to prove, that this measure would be equally advantageous on the grounds of efficiency and economy. His arguments were opposed by *Colonel Capper*, controulor of public accounts.

This officer proved by calculations, that the establishment of tent allowance would be extremely expensive, and he offered several arguments to shew, that it would not contribute to the efficiency of the army in a state of war. *Colonel Capper* contended, that if the data assumed

Colonel Capper's Remarks.

cattle of this establishment during war, may appear a sufficient motive for incurring a moderate expense in order to preserve them. The establishment at present greatly exceeds what it was at the period when General Stuart commanded the army assembled in the Ceda districts, and when General Wellesley was in advance with a large division of the force, the movement of which afforded incontrovertible proof that his departments were not defective; the number of cattle in the establishment at that time, was 73 elephants, 34 camels, 4080 bullocks, and of this number about 1500 draught bullocks were with General Wellesley's division.

There is reason therefore to doubt the necessity of increasing this establishment to the extent mentioned as the establishment by the Quarter-Master-General, in his minute of the 10th January. On the contrary it may appear expedient to reduce this extravagant and now useless establishment within such a limit

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by General Musgrave were admitted, their inevitable consequence would be an increase of our military establishments, to an extent that would render the possession of India a loss, rather than an advantage to the British empire. Colonel Capper was so much impressed with this sentiment, that he maintained, we could not, in discussing questions of this nature, afford to calculate upon more than two years of war in ten years; a greater proportion of war to peace would involve expences fatal to the prosperity of the empire. In this respect, Colonel Capper's opinions have been contradicted by experience: but his calculations were considered to be sufficiently correct, to render the establishment of tent allowance inexpedient. At the period of the establishment of the existing system, no person entertained more confident expectations than myself, of the benefits that would be derived to the service from its adoption. I confess, that ~~my~~ ^{my} opinions have undergone a considerable

Colonel Capper's Remarks.

as may render the prospect of their future services in some degree proportionate to their present expencé.

The cattle that are to be procured for hire, are in general found to be adequate to every purpose of an army, except for ordnance, treasure tumbrils, and arrack carts. A proportion of the Karkhannah bullocks should therefore be retained for eventual service, and under the present aspect of affairs, 2000 are as many as can be reasonably required, and this number will suffice for the ordnance, &c. of an army of 12,000 men.

The number of tents requisite for the whole European establishments, amount to about 1150 bullock loads. But as there is scarcely a possibility that the whole can require camp equipage at the same time; the expence of keeping up a complete establishment may justly be deemed unnecessary.

Indeed, a complete equipment for two-thirds of the European troops, may at present be considered a large proportion.

Lieutenant Colonel Munro's proposed Plan.

change. I am persuaded, that all establishments for the supply, accommodation, and movement of the troops, should be furnished and maintained directly by the public.

The subject of tent allowance for officers, involves in it a greater variety of considerations, and without going into a detailed examination of that question, I judge it sufficient to state my opinion, that it will be expedient to continue that allowance. The expence of building quarters for officers, and supplying them with camp equipage and carriage, would probably equal the present amount of their tent allowance. (Signed)

J. MUNRO.

Quarter-Master General
of the Army.

Quarter-Master-General's Office,
Fort St. George,
30th June, 1807.

Colonel Capper's Remarks.

Elephants although superior to camels, for the carriage of tents, are so much more expensive in proportion to their ability, that it is doubtful whether the superior expence is equalled by the advantage; the cost of keeping an elephant, exceeds that of keeping a camel in the proportion of nearly flat, whereas the load of an elephant, does not exceed that of a camel in a higher proportion than 5 to 2.

Seventy elephants, in addition to the 124 camels now on the establishment, will afford ample carriage for 767 tents, or two-thirds of the number required for the European troops of the establishment; and the sale of the superfluous cattle, supposing them to be disposed of at 60 per cent. loss, will fetch the sum of pagodas 10,810, i. e. 39 elephants, value 300 rupces, at 120 pagodas each 4680
4400 bullocks, value 7 at 1-18 6160

Total estimated }
produce of sale } 10,840

A proportionate reduction in the tent *Lascars*

Colonel Capper's Remarks.

should also be made ; 175
 Lascars will be fully adequate to the care of the
 tents during peace, and to
 furnish details for any
 troops that may be ordered
 to march ; the reduction
 in this department,
 may be estimated thus :—
 The number of tent Lascars
 now in the service is,
 6 Syrang, 8 1st Tindals,
 12 second Tindals, and
 341 Lascars.

The amount	} Ps. F.
pay of this establishment is	
	8409 6

The annual pay of
 175 Lascars, with
 the due proportion
 of Syrang
 and Tindals, is 4224 12

Saving	4184 39
--------	---------

Should this arrangement be adopted, the following saving will be produced.

Present expence of the Karkana establishment	175,096
--	---------

Permanently hired cattle kept up at Hyderabad, although the cattle of government are fully disposable	1931
---	------

Total present expense of the Kar-	
-----------------------------------	--

Colonel Capper's Remarks.

kanah and hired
cattle establish-
ments 177027

Establishments propos-
ed in lieu of the above.

Pr. Mo. Pr. An.

70 elephants }
at 28 present } 1960 23520
rate }

124 camels, }
at 4, 12. } 529 6348

2000 bullocks
at 2 pagodas
each, allowing
12 fanams ad-
ditional on ac-
count of em-
ployment at
Hyderabad &
other stations 4000 48,000

Total expence of
proposed plan 77,868

Amount of annu-
al saving from
Karkanah esta-
blishment 99,157

Amount of annu-
al saving from
the reduction of
the Lascar esta-
blishment 4,184

Amount of annu-
al saving from the
proposed modifi-
cation of tent al-
lowance 60,828

Total actual sav-
ing to be produc-
ed, without im-

Colonel Capper's Remarks.

paring the efficiency of any of the departments, and without allying the existing system of the service 151,171

To which add, the account arising from the sale of superfluous cattle 10,810

Total amount of saving within the 1st year 175,011

The discussion of the equipment of the European force, naturally induces the consideration of the *Dooley corps*, an establishment unknown during the period of war and difficulty, which had on the 31st of December last, cost the company 77,580 pagodas, and which is now maintained at the monthly expence of pagodas 341,524; or at Pagodas 40,986 per annum, without any return whatsoever, except the trifling saving, by employing the bearers in the barrack department, and with the cavalry regiments.

That a corps of this description may be eminently useful in war time,

Colonel Capper's Remarks.

cannot be disputed, and if maintained to a very limited extent during peace, the means of quickly extending it during emergency will exist, while the permanent expence may be rendered inconsiderable, by a proper distribution of the bearers to stations, when persons of this description must otherwise be permanently hired, and by their employment as carriers of military stores or as Lascars, in charge of tents.

The saving which, on the present plan arises from their employment in carrying cadets to Cuddalore, or with regiments marching from station to station, bears no proportion to the expence of the institution: and in order to render this corps unobjectionable, it should be reduced within such a limit as may afford a due proportion between the present expence, and the prospect of future service.

It is presumed, that 6500 Dooley bearers, are as many as can reasonably be required during peace, and the total expence of that number would be 27,500 pagodas per an-

Colonel Capper's Remarks.

num. The saving, therefore, by the modification of this establishment would be as follows :

	Pagodas.
Present annual expende	40,986
Expende of the proposed es- tablishment	17,500
<hr/>	
Amount of an- nual saving	23,486
on ditto.	
Which added to that before noticed	175,011
<hr/>	
Produces a to- tal saving of	198,497
pagodas	

Lest it should be imagined, that the reduction proposed in this memorandum, will operate to impair the general efficiency of the departments, which have been alluded to, it may be proper to exhibit under the different heads of view, the general effect of the proposed plan of reform.

1st, Camp equipage of the native force.

The proposed modification of this branch does not alter the state of equipment: the whole of that force will be at all

Colonel Capper's Remarks.

times in readiness for immediate service, while a saving of more than one-third is produced to the public, *during peace*, and the addition to the allowance which is proposed during the war; removes the only objectionable part of the present system, in regard to efficiency, viewed generally.

2d, Camp equipage and Lascars for the equipment of the European force.

The proposed modification of this branch, preserves a perfect equipment for two-thirds of the European forces at the shortest notice; under present circumstances, this may be considered an ample provision against the contingencies that may be looked for.

3d, Karkhannah establishment.

This establishment is connected with two principal departments of the service; first, with the ordnance department—the draught cattle being applicable either in peace or war, solely to the service of that branch; the proposed modification leaves a number of cattle exceeding that which was

Colonel Capper's Remarks.

employed with the army, when it was found under General Stuart, in the year 1803. So great a force as that, cannot, on any future occasion, be found, without some previous arrangements for collecting troops, provisions, &c. &c. which will occupy a time sufficient to encrease this department, if it be considered necessary; this department will consequently remain fully efficient. Secondly, the Karkhannah establishment is also connected with the equipment of the European troops. The remark made under that head, applies to this branch.

4th, Dooly corps.

Under this head, it may be sufficient to state, that the establishment of sick carts, if they be properly distributed, will prevent any inconvenience from the want of Doolies on an emergency; and as the proposed modification allows 500 bearers, independent of the sick-carts, in addition to the resources which have heretofore existed; the means of speedy equipment in this way, are possessed to

Colonel Capper's Remarks.

a much greater extent than on any former occasion; consequently, the efficiency of the army cannot be considered as impaired.

(Signed)

F. CAPPER,
Adjutant-General of the Army.

No. 1. (Corrected.)

STATEMENT shewing the expences incidental to the provision and carriage of the camp equipage, and the carriage of the regimental stores of eight regiments of native cavalry, and 22 battalions of native infantry, during two years, viz. one of peace and one of war.

Expences of one regiment of native cavalry during peace.

A complete sett of tents, taking the rate of prime cost, from the rate lately recommended by the Quarter-Master-General, sixteen pagodas and a half and adding three pagodas and a half for the average expense of delivery at the different stations,	Ps. F. C.
	500 0 0

Two setts of intrenching tools omitted in the Quarter-Master-General's statement,

3 41 34

Pay of twelve Lascars,

260 21 0

Expense of 48 bullocks, the number allowed by the regulations, viz. pay of sixteen drivers, at one pagoda thirty fanams per month

320 6 0

Ps. E. C.

Grain, at the rate of one seers per day, and 20 seers per rupee 250 12 0

Dry forage, at $1\frac{1}{2}$ rupee per month, each bullock 249 30 0

The prime cost of 48 bullocks, at six pagodas each, is 288 pagodas, of which sum take one seventh part as 14 per cent 41 6 0

870 12 0

Total expense of one regiment in a year of peace

1631 35 34

Present contract allowance for 1 year, as per Quarter-Master-General's statement 2214 0 0

Difference, or surplus of the contract allowance in a year of peace 609 6 16.

Expense of one regiment of native cavalry in a year of war.

A complete sett of tents, as before 500 0 0

Bullock hire for one month, to carry them from the frontiers to the army 37 21 0

Two setts of intrenching tools (omitted by the Quarter-Master-General 3 41 34

Pay of twelve Lascars 260 24 0

Batta ditto. ditto 154 12 0

Expense of forty-eight bullocks, viz.

Pay of 16 drivers 239 6 0

Batta of 16 drivers 192 0 0

Grain, at the rate of one seer each bullock, and five seers per rupee 1601 6 0

Prime cost of forty-eight bullocks, at 10 pagodas each, is 480 pagodas, of which sum, take $\frac{2}{3}$ as 50 per cent. are supposed annually 240 0 0

1762 12 0

	Rs.	Rs.	Cs.
Total expense of one regiment in a year of war	2718	26	34
Present contract allowance	2244	0	0
Deficiency of the contract allowance in a year of war	474	26	34
Expense of one battalion of infantry in a year of peace.			
Complete sett of tents, estimated as formerly	720	0	0
Three ditto of intrenching tools, omitted by the Quarter-Master-General	5	39	51
Pay of twenty Lascars	434	12	0
Expense of 70 bullocks, viz.			
Pay of twenty-one bullock drivers, at 1 pagoda 30 fanams per month.	432	0	0
Gram at the rate of one seer each bullock, and 20 seers, per rupee	365	0	0
Forage of 1½ rupee per month each bullock	360	0	0
Prime cost of 70 carriage bullocks at 6 pagodas is 420 pagodas, of which sum take 1 seventh part as 14 per cent. are supposed to die annually	60	0	0
Total expense of 1 battalion in a year of peace	2377	9	58
Present contract allowance	3261	0	0
Surplus of the contract allowance in a year of peace	886	32	29

Expence of one battalion of native infantry in a year of war.

	Rs.	P.	C.
A complete sett of tents, estimated as formerly	720	0	0
Three setts of intrenching tools (omitted)	5	39	51
Carriage to the army	54	0	0
Pay of 20 Lascars	434	12	0
Batta of 20 Lascars	257	6	0
Expense of 70 bullocks, viz.			
Pay of 21 drivers	432	0	0
Batta for ditto	252	0	0
Grain at the rate of 5 seers per rupee.	1460	0	0
Prime cost of 70 bullocks, at 10 pagodas each, is 700 pagodas, of which take $\frac{1}{4}$, as 50 per cent. are supposed to die annually	350	0	0
Total expence of one battalion in a year of war	2491	0	0
Present contract allowance	3965	15	51
Deficiency of the contract allowance in a year of war	3264	0	0
Expense of 8 regiments of native cavalry in a year of peace	13,078	31	32
Ditto ditto in a year of war	21,749	1	32
Expense of 22 battalions of infantry in a year of peace	52,299	2	2
Ditto in a year of war	87,238	8	2
Total expenses of 8 regiments of native cavalry and 22 battalions of native infantry, in two years, viz. one year of war and one of peace.	174,365	0	68
Present contract allowance for ditto ditto	179,320	0	0
Difference of surplus of the contract allowance in two years	4954	41	12
Ditto in one year	2477	20	46

No. 2. (Corrected.)

STATEMENT shewing the expenses incidental to the provision and carriage of the camp equipage and the carriage of the regimental staff for one year of six battalions Native infantry supposed to be employed upon internal service.

A complete sett of tents, taking the rate of prime cost, from the rate lately recommended by the Quarter Master-General, 16 $\frac{1}{2}$ pagodas, and adding 3 $\frac{1}{2}$ pagodas average expence of delivery at the different stations.	P. F. C.
	720 0 3

Three setts of intrenching tools omitted by the Quarter Master General	5 39 51
--	---------

Pay of 20 Lascars	434 12 0
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Batta of ditto	257 6 0
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Expense of 70 hired bullocks including drivers, at the regulated rate of 1 $\frac{1}{2}$ per month each bullock	1260 0 0
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Total expence of one battalion in one year	2677 15 51
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Contract allowance of ditto ditto	3264 0 0
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Surplus of the contract allowance for one battalion	586 26 29
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Ditto ditto for six battalions in 1 year	3519 32 14
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Or in two years	7039 22 28
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APPENDIX

TO

LIEUT. COLONEL MUNRO'S PLAN.

No. 1.

STATEMENT, shewing the expence incidental to the provision and carriage of the camp equipage, and the carriage of the regimental stores of eight regiments of Native cavalry, and 22 battalions of Native infantry, during five years, viz. one year of peace and one of war.

Expence of one regiment of Native cavalry, during a year of peace.

	Pagod.	Rs.	Cs.
(a) A complete sett of tents	458	1	35
(b) Pay of 12 Lascars	260	24	0
(c) Expence of 48 bullocks, the number allowed by the regulations, viz. pay of 16 drivers, at 1 pagoda 30 fanams per month	329	6	0
(d) Grain at the rate of one leer per day, and 20 leers per rupee	250	12	0
(e) Dry forage at 1 ½ rupee per month	249	30	0
(f) The prime cost of forty-eight bullocks, at 6 pagodas each, is 288 pagodas, of which sum take one seventh part, as 14 per cent. are supposed to die annually.	41	6	0
	870	12	0
	1885	37	35

	Rs.	P.	A.
Total expence of one regiment in a year of peace	1588	37	35
Present contract allowance for one year	2244	0	0
Difference or surplus of the contract allowance in one year of peace	655	4	45

Expence of one regiment of cavalry during a year of war.

(g) A complete sett of tents	458	1	35
(h) Bullock hire for one month to carry them from the frontier to the army	37	21	0
(i) Pay of 12 Lascars	260	21	0
(k) Batta of 12 Lascars	154	12	0
Expence of 48 bullocks, viz.			
(l) Pay of 16 drivers	329	6	0
(m) Batta of 16 drivers	192	0	0
(n) Grain at the rate of 1 leer each bullock and 5 leers per rupee	1001	6	0
(o) Prime cost of 48 bullocks, at 10 pagodas each, is 480 pagodas, of which sum take one half, as 50 per cent are supposed to die annually	240	0	0
	1762	12	0

Total expence of one regiment in a year of war	2672	28	35
Present contract allowance	2244	0	0

Deficiency of the contract allowance in a year of war	428	28	35
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Expence of one battalion of native infantry in a year of peace,

(a) A complete sett of tents	657	11	12
(b) Pay of 20 Lascars	434	12	0

Expence of 70 bullocks, viz.

(c) Pay of 21 bullock drivers at 1 30 per month	432 0 0	
(d) Grain, at the rate of 1 leer each bullock, and 20 leer per rupee	365 0 0	
(e) Forage at $1\frac{1}{2}$ rupee per month each bullock	360 0 0	
(f) Prime cost of 70 carriage bullocks at 6 pagodas each is 420 pagodas, of which sum take one seventh part, as 14 per cent. are supposed to die annually	60 0 0	
		1217 0 0

Total expence of 1 battalion in a year of peace } 2308 23 12

Present contract allowance } 3201 0 0

Surplus of the contract allowance } 892 18 68

Expence of 1 battalion of Native infantry in a year of war.

(g) One sett of tents	657 11 12
(h) Carriage to the army	51 0 0
(i) Pay of 90 Lascars	431 12 0
(k) Batta of 20 Lascars	257 6 0

Expence of 70 bullocks, viz.

(l) Pay of 20 drivers	432 0 0
(m) Batta of 20 drivers	252 0 0
(n) Grain at the rate of 5 leer per rupee	1460 0 0
(o) Prime cost of 70 bullocks, at 10 Pagodas each, is 700 Pagodas, of which sum take one half, as 50 per cent are supposed to die annually	350 0 0
	2491 0 0

3896 29 12

	Ps.	Fs.	C.
Total expence of one battalion in a year of war	3896	29	12
Present contract allowance	3264	0	0
Deficiency of the contract allowance in a year of war	632	29	12
Expence of 8 regiments of native cavalry in a year of peace	12,711	5	49
Expence of 8 regiments of native cavalry in a year of war	21,381	17	40
Expence of 22 battalions of native infantry in a year of peace	50,788	5	24
Expence of 22 battalions of native infantry in a year of war	85,727	11	24
Total expence of 8 regiments of native cavalry and 22 battalions of native infantry, in two years, viz., one of war and one of peace	170,607	39	45
Present contract allowance for 8 regiments of native cavalry and 22 battalions of native infantry for two years	179,520	0	0
Difference or surplus of the contract allowance in two years	8,712	2	32
Ditto ditto in one year	4356	1	16

No. 2.

STATEMENT shewing the expences incidental to the provision and carriage of the regimental stores for one year of 6 battalions of Native infantry, supposed to be employed upon internal service.

	Ps.	Fs.	C.
A complete set of tents	657	11	12
Pay of 20 Lascars	434	12	0
Batta of ditto	257	6	0

Expence for one year of 70 hired bullocks, including drivers, at the regulated rate of 1 pagoda and a half per month, each bullock	P.	F.	C.
	1260	0	0
Total expence of one year, for 1 battalion	2608	29	12
Contract allowance for 1 year for 1 battalion	3264	0	0
Surplus of the contract allowance for 6 battalions for 1 year	655	12	58
Surplus of the contract allowance, for 6 battalions for 1 year	3931	35	8

Note.—Hired bullocks are supplied to the 6 battalions, applicable to internal service.

As the services on which those corps will be employed, will be occasional only, and as hired bullocks to a sufficient extent for their equipment, can be obtained at a short notice, in every part of the country, it is considered to be entirely unnecessary to incur the expence of maintaining a permanent establishment of bullocks for their use.—The nature of the service in which those corps are likely to be engaged, will not require a degree of activity and labour beyond the favour of common hired bullocks. By this arrangement, a considerable saving of expence will occur, when those corps are not employed on internal service, as no bullocks will be then attached to them.

The foregoing statement shews, that if hired bullocks were maintained for the 22 battalions, allotted to general field service, instead of bullocks, the property of the public—a saving of 655 pagodas would be obtained, on account of each corps, in a year of war.

It may be proper to attach hired bullocks to the corps composing the Hyderabad subsidiary force, as the draught bullocks permanently maintained with that force, are hired.

The measure would produce a saving of about 2000 pagodas each year, on the supposition that the subsidiary force is employed every alternate year in the field.

(Signed)

J. MUNRO,

Quarter-Master-General

Quarter-Master-General's Office, of the Army.

30th June, 1807.

No. 3.

STATEMENT shewing the amount of the allowances necessary to be granted for the purpose of hutting a battalion of Sepoys.

	Rupees.
900 Sepoys, at 1½ rupee each	1350
50 Noigues, at 3 rupees each	150
50 Havildars, at 6 rupees each	300
10 Jemadars, at 12 rupees ditto	120
10 Subedars, at 24 rupees each	240
Total rupees	2160

Pagodas 617 12

Note.--It is proposed, that places of arms, guard-rooms, and hospitals, shall be the only buildings provided at the public expence, for the accommodation of native corps, and as those buildings are also directed by the existing regulations, to be provided by the public, in addition to the contract allowance granted to commanding officers, they will not occasion any increase of expence above what is actually incurred. In some garrisons there are Sepoy barracks, which will obviate the necessity of granting any allowance for hutting to the corps stationed at those places. Where there are no barracks, an allowance for hutting must be granted.

Commanding officers are indeed directed by the existing regulations to provide for the cover of their men, in all situations; but there are reasons for believing that this regulation, as it regards the provision of cover for the men at fixed stations, in time of peace, is not very exactly observed.

(Signed)

J. MUNRO,
*Quarter-Master-General
 of the Army.*

*Quarter-Master-General's Office,
 Fort St. George,
 30th June, 1807.*

STATEMENT of Tent Lascars, bullocks, and drivers, attached to the under-mentioned corps, exhibiting the number of each to be provided, maintained, and mustered, in constant readiness for service: by officers commanding those corps respectively, on the allowance granted for providing accommodation for the native commissioned, and all non-commissioned officers and privates, and carriage of regimental stores in peace or war.

CORPS.	Private Tents, with Gunneries complete				Carriage follow- ers attached to tents.		Carriage and followers, to re- gimental stores.		Total of monthly allow- ance.	
	bullocks with saddles, &c.				Drivers.		Bullocks with saddles.		Pagodas	
	Lascars.				Drivers.		Lascars.		Fannam.	
A regiment of Native cavalry, with artillery attached	25	30	10	8	18	6	4	16	7	
A battalion of Native infantry	26	41	14	12	22	7	8	27	2	

N. B. This statement forms one of the tables of the existing regulations.

Note a a. A complete set of tools is allowed annually to each corps; but no provision is made for the repair of the tent or gunneries: this allowance is much greater than is likely to be necessary, under any circumstances.

A tent is usually calculated upon to last, with a repair equal to half its value, one year in the field, and

three years in garrison. I have made the allowance sufficiently liberal to meet every exigency of the service, in order to cover all probable expences, and to remove all objections against the adequateness of the data, I have assumed. The number of tents allotted to each corps, is the same with what is prescribed by the regulations; and the price at which each tent is estimated, is the mean of the prices, at which Salene tents are now supplied at the head-quarters of the several divisions of the army.

Note bb. The number of Lascars assigned to each corps, corresponds with the regulations: Their pay is the same with that of the company's Lascars, being permanently maintained in the company's service, it is probable that those men will not desert in the field, they will be usefully employed in repairing and taking care of the tents of their corps, and their services may be also applied to other necessary purposes.

Note cc. This is the number of bullock drivers prescribed by the regulation. Their pay is the same with that given to the drivers of the Karkkanah establishment, and is considerably greater than the pay usually allowed to this description of servants. I have inserted the batta of one pagoda per month to each driver when employed in the field, although that allowance is not granted by the regulations to the drivers of the Karkkanah establishment, it must, however, be granted to them in future wars. General Wellesley was obliged to obtain authority for its being paid to the drivers who were attached to his army during the Malabar campaign, and it appears to be absolutely necessary for the purpose of inducing this class of public servants, to continue with our army in the field: the efficiency of bullocks in the field depends so much upon the attention and care of their drivers, that they should receive every reasonable encouragement, and the pay which I have assigned to them, together with the permanency of their situation is calculated to secure their attachment. The pay usually granted by natives to bullock drivers is $1\frac{1}{2}$ pagoda on ordinary services, and 2 pagodas in the field.

Note dd. The grain supplied to the Karkkanah bullocks in Mysore is charged for at the rate of 12 seers

per rupee. I have estimated the grain at 20 seers per rupee, in order to cover every expence; although that price is considerably dearer, than the ordinary price of grain in most parts of the country.

Note e e. For a long time, no charge was admitted for forage, on account of the Karkkanah bullocks. The straw supplied to them when marching in time of peace, is now charged for; but when stationary at the grazing ground, they incur no expence for forage, and the cattle allotted to corps will be stationed in general, at a place favourable to their grazing, within twenty or thirty miles of their corps, and will require div forage at night only. The allowance which I have granted for this purpose, is founded upon many enquiries, and I am enabled to form what is likely to be necessary. I have allowed nothing for forage in the field, no charge on this account has been made in the field for the Karkkanah bullocks, and in this country, forage is very seldom to be purchased in the field.

Note f f. The prime cost of bullocks fit for the service of camp equipage, will seldom amount to six paces each, in time of peace; and the proportion of casualties which I have assumed is founded upon a report from the agent for public bullocks, in which it is stated, 14 per cent. die annually, including the casualties of the bullocks employed in the transportation of stores from one station to another. This proportion is, therefore, applicable to the bullocks allotted in time of peace, to the camp equipage department.

Note g g. A complete set of tents is allowed for a year of war, this allowance may not be exactly adequate, but it is more than compensated by the allowance, which is made to each corps in a year of peace.

Note h h. Bullock hire for 1 month is allowed for forwarding the tents from the frontier magazines to the army.

Notes i i k k. And the pay and batta granted to the Lascais, correspond with the allowances given to the company's Lascais.

Note l l m m. Vide note c c.

N.B. Grain in the Mysoor is generally sold at the rate of 10 or 20 seers per rupee.

Note n n. This is the dearest price, at which grain was usually sold in General Wellesley's army, it was once or twice dearer, but in general considerably cheaper.

Note o o. The price of bullocks and the proportion of casualties in the field, are taken on the most liberal scale. It is the opinion of many officers of experience, (it is Colonel Close's opinion) that a bullock of well fed and attended, will endure labour in the field, as well as an elephant or a camel, and this opinion is corroborated by the report which General Wellesley made regarding the Karkkannah bullocks employed with his army in the Mahratta war. He stated, that although they had endured immense fatigue, and performed a succession of very long marches in the worst season of the year, yet that the number of casualties that occurred amongst them, was scarcely greater than what would have occurred at the grazing ground.

Quarter Master General's Office, (Signed)

Fort St. George,

5th June, 1807.

J MUNRO,

*Quarter Master General
of the Army*

N B By an inspection of the returns of the superintendent of Bazaars of General Wellesley's army in the De Kan, it appears that grain was in general sold at the rates of 8, 9, & 10 seers for a rupee, for some months it was sold at the rates of 5 and 6 seers, and on one occasion at the rate 4½ and 1½.

THE END.



A LETTER, &c.

A LETTER

SIGNED BY

C. GRANT, Esq.	R. C. PLOWDEN, Esq.
W. ASTELL, Esq.	C. MARJORIBANKS, Esq.
C. MILLS, Esq.	J. INGLIS, Esq.
A. ROBERTS, Esq.	J. BEBB, Esq.
G. SMITH, Esq.	G. A. ROBINSON, Esq.

DIRECTORS OF THE EAST-INDIA COMPANY;

CONTAINING

A MINUTE EXAMINATION AND FULL VINDICATION

OF THE

MEASURES

ADOPTED BY

SIR GEORGE BARLOW,

DURING THE

Dissentions

AT THE

PRESIDENCY OF MADRAS

Extracted from the Papers laid before Parliament

LONDON:

PRINTED FOR BLACK, PARRY, AND CO. BOOKSELLERS TO THE HON
EAST INDIA COMPANY, LEADENHALL STREET.

1812.

PREFACE.

AN Honorable Member of the House of Commons (Mr. Creevy) lately announced his intention of bringing forward a motion for the recall of Sir George Barlow from the Government of Madras. The motion was to have taken place on the 2d of June, but has been since postponed, *sine die*. Whatever may have been the Honorable Member's motive for suspending or for relinquishing his intention, the circumstance is to be regretted, as Parliamentary discussion would have given the best opportunity of informing the public mind on many points connected with the dissensions at the Presidency of Madras, and have freed it from the delusion which has too long existed. The papers relative to that subject have been now long on the table of the House of Commons : and it is probable
A that

that the Honorable Member may have become sensible of the untenable grounds on which any motion of the nature proposed would have rested.

Some dissents, recorded by six Honorable Directors, relative to the proceedings at Madras, have recently been extracted from the Parliamentary papers, and brought to the public attention in the form of a separate pamphlet. We shall offer no observation on those dissents; but request the reader to peruse the following manswered and manswerable letter, subscribed by ten Directors of the first respectability and distinction, as that letter contains the most ample vindication of all the material measures adopted by the Government of Madras—a vindication which, being founded on the demonstration of proof, can never be shaken.

It would have been satisfactory that the subject should have had the benefit of public discussion in Parliament; but as it seems now questionable if such discussion will take place, those who may be desirous of looking further into the question,
may

may be enabled to compare the opinions stated in the dissents, with those stated in the letter which follows, and to draw their own conclusions as to the side of truth.

The low scurrility interspersed in different parts of the recent pamphlet, is such as can require no observation.

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TO THE

HONOURABLE THE COURT OF DIRECTORS.

GENTLEMEN,

THE late Revolt of the Officers of the Madras Army, is the most remarkable and most important event, that has occurred in the history of British Administration in India, since our first acquisition of territory there. It led to the commencement of a Civil War in the Carnatic; it threatened to involve the whole Peninsula in anarchy and blood; to encourage the numerous disaffected adherents of the fallen families of Tippoo and Mahomed Ali to insurrection, to invite the Native Powers to fall upon us whilst in this state of internal convulsion, and to subvert a Government which had successfully resisted, through a long course of years, the repeated attacks of neighbouring States. This intestine war did not proceed from the natives displaced by our power, or employed in our service. It proceeded from our own people, from British-born subjects, from military men to whom the command of the Army, the defence of our Government, was committed, and who, by their profession, and the solemn obligations it imposed on them, were bound to fidelity and obedience. So signal an event ought to leave a profound impression upon the minds of all those to whom the administration of British India is entrusted; and the causes which led to it ought, with a view to future good, to be well understood and established, to be, where any doubt or dispute still remains, investigated with the utmost care and impartiality.

Preliminary observations on the late Revolt at Madras.

To mistake the causes, to suppose the revolt to have been occasioned by what did not produce it, and to overlook circumstances which really had a material effect in bringing on that unnatural proceeding, would have a fatal influence upon our determinations respecting the merits of the actors in the recent transactions, and the policy which ought to be observed in future. Condemnation might thus be pronounced on those who are entitled to the highest praise, and encouragement, instead of resistance, be given to the dangerous spirit of insubordination.

We conceived indeed, that the task of passing a final judgment upon the conduct both of the Government of Madras, and of the Officers of the Army in the late extraordinary commotions, had been performed in the several dispatches sent by the Court upon those subjects to the Presidency of Fort St. George, under dates the 17th August, 29th September, 12th October 1809, and 7th February 1810; and we lament to see the opinions which so long afterwards have been given to the Court, and through them to the public, upon these momentous topics, on occasion, not of any original direct question then brought forward concerning those topics, but of a question concerning an individual. The opposition made at the periods of those dispatches to the sentiments they contained relative to the conduct of the Army, and of the Government towards it, proceeded, to the best of our recollection, only from a few gentlemen, and had reference chiefly to the suspension of certain Military officers; Mr. Elphinstone alone having recorded a Dissent on 13th October 1809, to the approbation generally bestowed by the Court on the measures of the Government then in question. Afterwards certain proceedings of the Court itself, with respect to those Officers, drew from Messrs. Elphinstone, Hudleston, Pattison, and Bannerman severally, Dissents, in which, indeed, there were some strictures upon the character and proceedings of the Governor Sir G. Barlow; but in the Dissents which have been entered by those four gentlemen respectively, and by Sir Francis Baring and Sir Hugh Inglis jointly, on occasion of the removal of Mr. Petrie from the Council of Fort St. George, the whole question of the causes of the discontent

*The Dissents to
the removal of
Mr. Petrie go,*

In the Madras Army, and of the conduct of the Government of that Presidency in relation to them, is again opened and discussed, and a judgment passed upon it very different from that which the Court has pronounced. We feel ourselves, therefore, called upon to go into this question anew ; and though we shall proceed to it certainly with unabated conviction of the soundness of the conclusions we have formed, and consequently with a just disposition to defend them, yet also with a full purpose of reviewing and stating fairly the facts and arguments from which those conclusions have been deduced, and of examining in the same spirit, the opinions delivered in the Dissents above mentioned. It was our declared wish to do this soon after the production of those Dissents ; but successive interruptions occasioned unintentional delay, which, however, does not affect the question, nor, we hope, the public interest. In the performance of the task we have proposed, we shall be led to unfold the grounds on which, when it became unavoidable to determine on a new commission of Government for Fort St. George, we deemed it our indispensable duty to vote for omitting the name of Mr. Petrie in that commission ; because we agree with the authors of those Dissents, in viewing the question concerning the merit or demerit of the Madras Government in its policy and conduct respecting the Army, as intimately connected with the question of the merit or demerit of Mr. Petrie in the opinions he professed, and the part he acted with relation to the same most important objects ; though there is still another question distinct from these :—whether Mr. Petrie, upon his own principles, acted rightly ?

with reference to that measure, into the whole subject of the disputes between the Government and the Army of Fort St. George.

Intended review of that subject here.

In the agitations produced by civil discord, when numbers are involved, when personal and party interests are at stake, and as a natural consequence, violent inflammatory representations are from many quarters made to the public, it must be more difficult to pursue inquiry with a dispassionate and unbiassed mind. For those especially whose duty it is, as Directors, to perform the solemn office of Judge upon the conduct both of the Government of Madras, and of the Officers of the Army, in the late extraordinary commotions, one of our own body, Mr.

Different representations on the subject.

Elphinstone, in his Dissent of the 14th April 1810, has proposed a good rule ; “ That the Minutes and Consultations of “ Council are the only true and constitutional information that “ ought to come to the Government at home, and on which “ they ought to form their decision, all other being only “ *ex parte* evidence, which never should be implicitly believed “ or acted upon.” Presuming that the honourable gentleman did not mean by his proposition, the scope of which is, that decision should proceed only upon well authenticated facts, to exclude truth otherwise incontrovertibly established by public proof, we approve of the spirit of his rule, which is conformable to our own sentiments ; and it shall be our aim, in the whole course of this paper, to adhere to it still, under a deep impression of the imminent perils to which the Company and the Nation have recently been exposed, and the transcendent importance of guarding against such evils in the time to come.

Since the alarms excited by the progress of revolt, have been removed by the knowledge of its suppression, it has become the fashion of many persons, both in writings and discourse, greatly to overlook the guilt of the Officers in that most criminal and dangerous proceeding, as if the whole with respect to them were over, and to draw the attention chiefly to the conduct of the Madras Government, or rather of Sir George Barlow, the Governor, in order to fix upon him the blame of the evils which have happened. This is a question which may now be discussed with perfect safety too the generality of the Officers, since the amnesty of Lord Minto has exempted them from punishment, which he declares them to have deserved : but although the opposite parties in the late contests are thus very unequally placed, and the accusations against Sir G. Barlow, however expanded in this country, originate chiefly with those Officers, it is our wish, that when they are adopted or supported by the written opinions of Members of this Court, that they may also undergo an examination in writing ; and this will be most properly done by following the important inquiry already proposed, into the *causes* which produced the revolt of the Officers of the Coast Army.

Those

Those who look no further for the springs of this event, than to the occurrences which immediately preceded it, reason contrary to general experience, which has established the maxim, "that no one becomes all at once deeply criminal." The revolt was not a mere paroxysm of resentment into which men were suddenly hurried from a state of perfect subordination; it had in it characters of matured, systematic combination and pretension, which could only be the work of time: and the persons who thus argue, must also be unacquainted with the existence of authentic information, which militates against their hypothesis.

Inquiry into the causes of the Revolt.

The account of the first ostensible movements in opposition to the measures of Government, shows a temper of insubordination already formed; and it has long been our conviction, that the spirit and principles by which the sedition of the Officers was incited and impelled, had their origin in an early period, and that the causes of the revolt might justly be distinguished into such as were more remotely predisposing, and such as were proximate. Gallant as the conduct of our Eastern Armies has been in the Field, and fertile as they have been in men eminently fitted for civil and political as well as military employments, it is not unknown to persons well acquainted with India, that even before our force there became considerable, very many of the Officers, who lived chiefly in camps, separate from other society, indulged and provoked in each other a spirit of discontent, founded in invidious comparison between their own advantages and those of the civil branch of the service. The desire of rank and emolument, common probably to all Military Officers, has, in that country, from local circumstances, operated with peculiar force. It was not stimulated only by the idea of unequal allotments, and the powerful influence of a common sentiment, strengthened by free communication through the general mass of military society, but that society remained, from the principle of advancement only by seniority, composed of individuals who looked to pass a great part of their lives far distant from their native country, to which they naturally cherished a wish to return, with the provision of

Remoter causes.

which

which the adventurous spirit of youth had indulged the hope, and of which the scene before them seemed to afford the means.

The workings of this desire in the cases of individuals, and in questions of military allowances, may be traced through the whole course of the Company's records; and its ebullitions in the combination which produced the mutiny in 1766, and the agitations of 1796, were very formidable. It was, in our opinion, also a predisposing cause of the revolt of 1809, in co-operation, no doubt, with other causes of the same tendency, some of which may now be noticed. The infusion of the King's troops into the Indian service, which has happened within the last twenty years, seems, from the beginning, to have been a source of discontent to the Company's Officers, as interfering with honours and emoluments which they before exclusively enjoyed. It took place chiefly under the Madras Presidency; and as the number of those troops progressively increased there, and the Company's Officers thought, not always without reason, that partiality was shewn to those of the King, in the distribution of advantages, the privations to which they appeared to be thus subjected, became a permanent theme of complaint in the Madras Army—a complaint which the Company have done all in their power to remove, by enjoining the strictest justice in the distribution of places and emoluments: and their orders were actually, in a great measure, carried into execution at the time when the late disturbances broke out, although the charge of partiality still continued to be then repeated. With respect to the introduction of a large portion of the King's Army into India, our political circumstances in that country have required a considerable accession of European troops; and since the privilege of recruiting has been withdrawn from the Company, the supply could only be furnished from the public force. The Company's Armies have also been largely increased, and with their numbers the former feelings of injury have been extended and strengthened. Their brilliant achievements in the late wars, of which, and of the superlative praise bestowed on them by the Indian Governments, the Madras Army has had its full share, have naturally enhanced their sense of their own importance :

portance : and it will hardly be denied, after the decisive evidence furnished by the late revolt, that the Officers of the Madras Army (we wish always to be understood as meaning the majority only) fully believed they had the native troops entirely at their devotion. From this sentiment, which the implicit obedience of those troops had long tended to confirm, the Officers appear to have tacitly persuaded themselves that they had the power not only of overawing, but even of overturning, the Civil Government. We mean not to insinuate that they entertained such an intention, until the late excesses carried them at length to that fearful precipice : but the idea of their possessing such a power, must have had an habitual influence in exalting still more their estimate of their own importance, raising also their expectations, and aggravating their impatience under supposed wrongs. The example of the concessions obtained in 1796 is now proved to have had, as might have been expected, a great effect upon the minds of the Madras Officers.* The Indian Army may be allowed to have had at that time real causes of complaint, which were indeed very improperly urged, but too long unredressed. Since that period, however, the Bengal Army has been highly distinguished, as well by cordial obedience and attachment to legitimate authority, as by valour in the field ; and great praise is due, on the same score, to the Army of Bombay. The Military Regulations of 1796 extended their benefits to the three Presidencies, and with comparatively greater advantages to the two subordinate ones ; but the Officers of Fort St. George, when in the enjoyment of these, took encouragement from former concession, in framing new pretensions, such as had never before been heard of.

* General Macdowall's Letter to the Governor, of 16 May 1808, and the writings of the Officers in reference to this subject.

In forming such pretensions and pursuing them, they acted under the influence, and by the support of *combination*. It is the nature of this principle, when resorted to by an Army, to obtain concessions from the Government ; to place the former in some degree of opposition to the latter, and to weaken the sentiment of respect and subordination. Such combination is hardly known in the armies of Europe, and would be instantly put down on its first appearance. It has also been repeatedly forbidden

forbidden in our Indian Armies, but the prohibition has not always been duly enforced abroad, as it might easily and successfully have been.

From this fact, connected with the other circumstances already mentioned, it might be inferred that the discipline of the Madras Army had become relaxed; but we are not left to uncertainty in this matter, and it is material to show, from authentic records, that a considerable time before Sir George Barlow's accession to the Government, (which was on the 24th Dec. 1807,) and before the commencement of the late retrenchments, there appeared among the Madras Officers, symptoms, more or less general, of a spirit of insubordination, which must indisputably be reckoned a predisposing cause, to future excesses. In the Fort St. George Military Letter of the 6th March 1807, we find the following passage.

" Para. 429. We reported in our last letter, the proceedings which had taken place in consequence of an unfounded complaint from the Officer commanding the subsidiary force at Travancore, with regard to the inconveniences to which the Officers and troops of that force were described to be subjected by the discontinuance of the field allowances, the payment of which had been ordered to cease."

" 430. On full inquiry, the conduct of Lieutenant Colonel Grant, the Commanding Officer, appeared so reprehensible, from his having given his earnest support to representations which it had been established had no just foundation, that we considered it proper to express in General Orders our disapprobation of the mode of proceeding which that Officer had adopted, and in which he appeared to have shown himself not less forgetful of his duty to the Government, than of his own character."

The Fort St. George Military Letter of 31st October 1807, contains a great deal on the same subject; and from it several extracts shall here be presented:

" Para.

Para. 467. We are constrained to state, that repeated instances of improper conduct on the part of Captain Boardman, of the 18th regiment of native infantry, in his communications with the Civil Magistrate at Chittoor, as will more fully appear on the records of the Judicial Department, have induced us to direct that he shall be removed from the command of that station, as we had in vain endeavoured to satisfy him of the necessity of regulating his conduct, in the exercise of his command, with more discretion and temper."

" 468. We have also been under the necessity of directing that Lieutenant Brown, of the 14th regiment native infantry, should be dismissed from the command of Oaore, in consequence of his disrespectful conduct towards the Civil Magistrate of that place, whom he appears to have impeded in the execution of a useful work, without authority or any necessity."

" 469. We are concerned to bring to the notice of your honourable Court, a very unfavourable report of the state of the 8th regiment of native cavalry, which was submitted to us by the Commander in Chief at our Consultation of the 10th July. We entirely concurred with his excellency in the necessity of using effectual means to restore a due sense of subordination among the Officers of that corps. In pursuance of that opinion, we removed Lieutenant A. Macleod from the appointment of Quarter-master of the 8th regiment."

" 583. We feel considerable concern in soliciting the particular attention of your honourable Court, to a Memorial which has been addressed to the Supreme Government, by the Honourable Lieutenant Colonel Sentleger, an Officer belonging to the native cavalry of this establishment, and also to the Minutes which have been recorded by Lord William Bentinck, and by the Commander in Chief, in explanation of the grounds of complaint exhibited in that Memorial."

“ 584. It will be observed in those papers, that a Memorial was addressed to this Government, by the Honourable Lieutenant Colonel Sentleger, at a very early period after his late return to India, stating his pretensions to the appointment of Inspector of Cavalry on this establishment, in preference to those of Lieutenant Colonel Gillespie, who was selected for that station, from the opinion which was entertained of his qualifications for the performance of its duties, and as a recompence for the signal service rendered by that Officer to his country at the momentous crisis of the mutiny at Vellore. Without intending any disparagement to the Honourable Lieutenant Colonel Sentleger, it did not appear to us that his claims were sufficient to invalidate the circumstances under which Lieutenant Colonel Gillespie had, by an achievement of the highest importance, recommended himself to the public attention ; and we were not prepared to yield to the improper, not to say indecent, precipitancy of Lieutenant Colonel Sentleger, who had then scarcely landed on his return from England, by depriving Lieutenant Colonel Gillespie of those honours which had been conferred upon him.”

“ 585. In the Memorial addressed to the Supreme Government, the Honourable Lieutenant Colonel Sentleger deemed himself at liberty to take a more extensive range of alleged grievance ; and, after slightly adverting to the particular object which had formed the ground of his Memorial to this Government, *that Officer placed himself in the character of a defender of the general interests of the Company's Army, without any apparent authority from the Officers whose particular cause he pretended to support.*”

“ 587. We consider the agitation of such subjects to be attended with great delicacy, and we feel particular regret that they should at this moment have been forced upon our attention, or on that of the Supreme Government, as *there can be no mode more effectually calculated for the revival of the unhappy feuds by which this part of the British dominions was so long distracted and endangered.* As, however, the Honourable

" honourable Lieutenant Colonel Sentleger judged it proper to
 " appeal to the authority of the Supreme Government, we have
 " thought it necessary, that the appeal should not be unaccom-
 " panied by such documents, as would evince the fallacy of the
 " grounds, on which that Officer had intruded himself on the
 " public notice, as well as the dangerous tendency of the discus-
 " sion which he had been eager to promote. With regard to the
 " disrespectful and injurious terms, as affecting this Govern-
 " ment, in which the appeal of Lieutenant Colonel Sentleger
 " was conveyed, we informed the Governor General in Council,
 " that we should offer no comment, being satisfied of the dis-
 " position of His Lordship in Council to afford to our authority
 " that degree of support which is necessary for the suppression
 " of ~~the~~ *alt.*"

" 588. We shall only add, that though impressed with the
 " strongest sense of the dangerous tendency of the inflammatory
 " and factious proceedings pursued by the Honourable Lieutenant
 " Colonel Sentleger; we have, for the present, adopted no fur-
 " ther step than the measure of directing that Officer to leave
 " the Presidency, and to join his regiment."

" 589. We are concerned to have occasion to draw your
 " attention to a further circumstance, which though not of the
 " same offensive nature as that which occurred in respect to
 " Lieutenant Colonel Sentleger, was sufficient to call for our
 " strong disapprobation. We allude to a very disrespectful
 " application which was addressed to us by Lieutenant Colonel
 " Alexander Cuppage, of the native infantry, stating his re-
 " quest to be permitted to proceed to England, and assigning as
 " his motive, certain supposed grievances which he considered
 " himself to have suffered, and particularly the ' being turned
 " out of the command of Nundydroog.' "

" 593. The whole circumstances of Colonel A. Cuppage's
 " conduct having been fully explained in the Minutes of Lord
 " William Bentinck and the Commander in Chief, to which we
 " refer you, we considered the disrespectful tenor of his address

" to be so unqualified and unprovoked; as to merit the expres-
 " sion of our strongest disapprobation. We accordingly re-
 " corded these sentiments, and decided against taking into con-
 " sideration the application of Colonel Cuppage, for leave to
 " proceed to Europe, until it should be submitted in more re-
 " spectful terms."

" 731. We have already stated, that a very dangerous spirit
 " of cabal has shewn itself among several Officers in your Army.
 " This feeling has been greatly inflamed by the impunity with
 " which the Honourable Lieutenant Colonel Sentleger has been
 " hitherto enabled to brave and insult the authority of this Govern-
 " ment: for it is with concern that we observe, in addition to
 " the explanation which we have already given regard to the
 " conduct of that Officer, that every means of the most public
 " nature have been taken, at some of the principal military sta-
 " tions, to hold up Lieutenant Colonel Sentleger as the champion
 " of the rights of the Company's Army, and as one whose example
 " calls for general imitation."

" 732. We should think it necessary to apologize to your
 " Honourable Court, for so particularly addressing you on a
 " subject in itself obscure and unimportant, were we not strong-
 " ly impressed with the necessity of discouraging, by every means,
 " such factious proceedings as generally lead to consequences of
 " dangerous extremity. This is a discussion in which we can
 " have no personal interest, as the distinguished personages
 " chiefly concerned in its origin, do not now form a part of our
 " Councils; and we may claim the merit of sincerity in con-
 " veying to your Honourable Court our earnest opinion, that
 " the conduct of Lieutenant Colonel Cuppage calls for your
 " marked disapprobation, and that any encouragement of the
 " groundless pretensions of that Officer, may be fatal to the dis-
 " cipline and interests of your Army."

The information contained in the passages now quoted, is
 decisive as to the existence of a spirit of insubordination and
 cabal, and of the doctrine of the Rights of the Army, long
 before

before Sir G. Barlow was even known to be the intended successor to the Government of Madras, or the business of retrenchment came into operation. But what is deserving of peculiar attention is, that this letter was written in the short period in which Mr. Petrie was Governor, and signed by him. It is to be taken as his dispatch, and it establishes the insubordinate state of the Army till within two months of the accession of Sir G. Barlow. It is remarkable also, that Mr. Petrie intimates neither in that letter, nor in the consultations, any general measure to be in contemplation for repressing the dangerous temper of the Army; nor do the records, during the remainder of his short administration, give any indication of a favourable change in that temper. On the contrary, it is found, from the papers transmitted in the Secret Department, with Lord Minto's letter of 5th February 1810, which contain some very striking traits, that, as early as the month of July 1807, a proposal had been started among the Officers, to apply for Bengal allowances; and, in April, 1808 at furthest, four months only after Sir G. Barlow's arrival at Madras, and before the orders for the abolition of the Tent Contract were issued, an Address to the Governor General was circulated in the Army, for signatures; the object of which was to solicit, that, with respect to allowances, "the military establishment of Fort St. George might be put on a similar footing to that of Bengal." These are the words of General Macdowall, in a letter to Sir G. Barlow, dated the 16th May 1808; from which it appears, that the Army had recently agitated the question, of the comparative state of the Bengal and the Coast allowances, and that the Address had then been circulated:—points which, on account of the great distance of various corps from each other, could not have been effected in a very short time. The same letter from General Macdowall contains other passages important and conclusive as to the present point of inquiry. "It will demand," says he, "the most serious deliberation, to effectually check the spirit of remonstrance, which perhaps extends further than we are aware of."—"My judgment and experience lead me to believe, that the seeds of discontent are very widely disseminated; and almost every individual in the service is more or less dissatisfied." The
fir-t

first cause to which he ascribes this state of the army is, "*the abolition of the Bazar fund*;" which (without inquiring now whether he is right or not in assigning this as the *first* cause) certainly took place long before the time of Sir G. Barlow, and has not existed in Bengal since the Regulations of 1796. He says also, that the abrogation of the Tent Contract is one of the prominent causes of discontent.

The only thing we have been able to trace on the records, which seems not perfectly to accord with this representation, is a passage in Mr. Petrie's Minute, dated the 8th September 1809, in answer to Sir G. Barlow's. "When absent from the Presidency," says he; "in the month of June last year, I first heard of considerable discontents in the Army." From this it might be understood, that he knew of no discontents before that time; and hence that he meant to imply, they originated after Sir G. Barlow came to the Government. But the extracts already quoted, particularly paragraphs 587 and 731 of Mr. Petrie's public letter of 21st October 1807, the letter from General Macdowall to the Governor, and the combination of the Officers to obtain Bengal allowances, all militate against such a proposition.

It is therefore established, upon incontrovertible authority, the evidence of the Government of Madras, Mr. Petrie being then Governor, and of General Macdowall, Commander in Chief, not to refer again to other corroborating circumstances, that, before, and at the accession of Sir G. Barlow to the Government, there existed in the Madras Army a dangerous spirit of insubordination and cabal, which, in a few months after that accession, "the seeds of discontent being then very widely disseminated," exerted itself openly; not at first in opposition to any measure adopted in his time, or to the retrenchments projected before his arrival, but to obtain an *augmentation*, or what the Officers conceived to be such; that is to say, the same allowances in all things as the Bengal Army received.

The opinion given by Lord Minto on this subject, in his letter,

ter, lately arrived, of the 5th February 1810, written from Madras after deliberate reflection, is too important, and of too high authority to be overlooked. "The discontents," says his Lordship, "of the Coast Army, have prevailed with so little interruption, and with so much continuity, beginning, for the sake of brevity, no higher than with General Stuart's command, and proceeding through that of Sir John Cradock to the *present hour*, that it is difficult to fix a distinct period for the events in which we are immediately concerned, or to separate the present from the past." It is, doubtless, very satisfactory to us, to find the views we have entertained upon this subject corroborated and improved by the convincing exposition which his Lordship's information respecting it has enabled him to give. But we must desire it to be distinctly understood, that the plan and substance of what the preceding pages contain, relating to the *remoter causes* of the discontents in the Madras Army, (even to the use of that expression) were determined upon long before the arrival of Lord Minto's letter, of which we had no expectation; and that the general coincidence, which appears between his sentiments and ours, arises from the separate reflections of each party.

The establishment of the existence of insubordination and discontent in the Madras Army, before and at the period of Sir G. Barlow's entrance on the Government, and the progress of those tempers for several months afterwards, not on the score of any thing he had done, but on grounds taken up long before his time, we deem to be a point of great importance, and we request particular attention to it.

Let us now turn to the account which some of the Dissent, before give us of this subject.

"When Mr. Petrie," says one,* "delivered over the Government to Sir G. Barlow, it cannot be denied, that he left him an Army not surpassed in discipline, obedience, submissions or in attachment to their country by any troops in the British service. During the former," (the Government of Mr.

The account given in the Dissents of the state of the army at the time of Sir G. Barlow's accession to the government.

* Dissent of Sir F. Baring and Sir H. Inglis, 24 April 1810.

Petrie)

† Dissent of Mr. Pettison, 26th April 1866.

Petrie) says another, † “ though the Tent Contract had been “ abolished under the previous Government of Lord W. Bentinck, of which Mr. Petrie was a Member ”—(not abolished, only proposed to be; the actual abolition did not take place till Sir G. Barlow’s time)—“ the Army was patient.” A third says, “ that the abolition of the Tent Contract, and other savings “ from the Army, were well known to the Officers, months “ before the arrival of Sir G. Barlow, without producing any “ visible discontent among them. ‡ I must impute; says the same “ Dissent, to the violent and arbitrary measures of the Govern- “ ment,” (Sir G. Barlow’s), “ all the dissatisfaction and unfortu- “ nate events that have taken place at Madras.” § And in general all the Dissents are totally silent as to any existing dissatisfaction before the Government of Sir G. Barlow; and those which do not directly ascribe to him the commencement of the evils, seem to set out with tacitly assuming, that no complaint was heard of till his time.

‡ See Gen. Macdowell’s Letter of 16 May 1868, which affirms just the contrary.

§ Mr. Elphinstone’s Dissent, 12 October 1869.

After what has been already said, we need hardly observe, that all such representations or views are in direct contradiction to the records, which, according to Mr. Elphinstone, are our only authentic source of information: and thus Sir G. Barlow is condemned, not only without due evidence, but against it. Such statements may, perhaps, be advanced in the anonymous publications, of which many have issued from the press, relative to the late disputes at Madras. It is to be expected, that in such disputes, where numerous individuals, having a deep personal interest at stake, are engaged in opposition to a public officer, or to a Government, the assailants will be many and active; that they will endeavour to impress the public with their own views of their case, and the one which they oppose; and it would be wonderful if their passions and interests should not mix in their representations. But such representations, without proof or authority, can be no materials for Judges to act upon. There is, indeed, one publication which may be thought of a different character, entitled, “ *A Statement of Facts, by William Petrie, Esq.*” Of that publication it is proper to remark, that it comes to the English public without any such voucher

as,

in the absence of the reputed author, it ought to have, of
 his production, and sent to the press by his own autho-
 rity. It falls, therefore, under the description of unauthen-
 ticated information, which Mr. Elphinstone calls "a paper evi-
 dence that should never be implicitly believed or acted
 on," and, as a document, independent of its matter, it is
 liable to this further objection, that it is not only no record
 of the Company's Consultations, but purports to have been a
 private communication to Lord Minto, and does not appear to
 have been at all communicated to Sir G. Barlow, as it should
 have been, before it was used as an appeal against him any
 where else, even to the Governor General. We think, how-
 ever, it bears internal evidence of being the work of Mr.
 Petrie; and, from its whole substance, and its dates, to have
 been the original from which this Minute, already quoted, was
 formed, with the omission of those parts which most strongly
 reflect on Sir G. Barlow, on whom, and on whose measures, it
 now comes forth, under the title of a Statement delivered to
 Lord Minto, as a public attack; an attack made in a pending
 cause, far distant from, and unknown to the party accused,
 who has thus no opportunity of defending himself. But when
 Mr. Petrie censured Sir G. Barlow, in his Minute of the 8th
 September, drawn from a work which, excepting the conclu-
 sion, was composed, as appears by its date, in the month of
 August, it should seem that he ought to have brought forward
 all he had to charge against that public officer, and not to have
 reserved the severest part for the private ear of the Governor
 General, or for dissemination among his distant friends; more
 especially as the Statement, being written partly in the manner
 of a diary, exhibits the dismal prospective pictures drawn from
 time to time by Mr. Petrie's apprehensions, which are calcu-
 lated to make impression on the reader, although when he
 delivered the Statement out of his hands, the dangers foreboded
 in it were at an end, by the complete suppression of the rebel-
 lion. Certainly, therefore, it should have no reception preju-
 dicial to Sir G. Barlow, though it is to be feared the case is
 very much otherwise; but it may be received as Mr. Petrie's
 own account of his principles, opinions and conduct, in rela-
 tion

tion to the subjects in question, and as such we shall take occasion to refer to it. With respect to the present point, it uses the same language as the Minute, "*When at Cuddalore,*" (in June) "*I heard of considerable discontents in the Army;*" but it goes more plainly to place the rise of these discontents after the accession of Sir G. Barlow, without, however, any precise information on that head, and without a shadow of evidence that no discontents prevailed before. Indeed, the paper would shew Mr. Petrie to have been ill informed of the state of the military mind. "Although," says he, "the projected reductions were severely felt," (by General Macdowall and the principal Officers to whom he, when Governor, explained them) "*I must, in truth and justice, declare, that there was not a sentiment expressed incompatible with the strictest principles of military duty and subordination.*" That individual Officers might not choose to express to the Governor any sentiment incompatible with military duty, is very conceivable; but that the great body of the Officers, so far from really acquiescing in the new retrenchments, as their duty required, were at that very time discontented on account of the old, and cherishing schemes of obtaining, by combination, new concessions, is very evident, from all the authorities already adduced, especially from General Macdowall's letter to the Governor, in which he not only tells him of "*deep-rooted, widely disseminated discontents,*" at a time when Sir G. Barlow had originated no one public act towards the Army, at which, in all their subsequent violences, they have expressed offence, but plainly shews, that he himself sympathized in their feelings and opinions. Mr. Petrie's *Statement*, moreover, was written sixteen months posterior to General Macdowall's letter, when the standing discontents of the Officers, for alleged old grievances, had fully developed themselves; and the hollow phraseology which, so long after, would imply, from the circumstance of individual Officers not expressing to him "*any sentiment incompatible with the principles of military subordination,*" that the Army in general dutifully submitted to the new retrenchments, is plainly most unsatisfactory.

When

When, then, Sir G. Barlow came to the Government, there was a formed spirit of discontent in the Army. Only two months before, his predecessor, Mr. Petrie himself, had publicly stated, "that a spirit of insubordination and cabal had shown itself, which must be dangerous to all Armies, and might lead to consequences of the most fatal nature; that every means of the most public nature had been taken at some of the principal military stations, to hold up Lieutenant Colonel Sentleger as the champion of the rights of the Company's Army, and as one whose example called for general imitation." The Officers were dissatisfied on the score of former retrenchments, (although certain compensations for them had been determined) and of recent, or projected reforms; they aimed at new concessions; they acted by combination; the sentiments of the Commander in Chief, were favourable to their views and pretensions, and he was himself an avowed malcontent. Candour will not refuse to admit that Sir G. Barlow was placed in a difficult situation; and it will be no departure from impartiality, to inquire what line of conduct he ought to have proposed to himself, when he became sensible, as he could not fail soon to be, of the embarrassments he had to encounter. Should he have inclined to gratify the Officers, by restoring the Bazar fund, abolished on the most incontestible principles of sound policy, or by stopping the progress of the new retrenchments, common to all the Presidencies, and enjoined, not only by the Supreme Government of India, but also by the controlling authorities at home, under the most imperious necessity, for the safety of the Company? Or should he have countenanced new and before unheard-of pretensions? Should he have encouraged the spirit of combination, of which he himself had formerly seen the dangerous effects, and which Mr. Petrie had so recently pointed out and denounced? Probably no person, unconnected with the Madras Army, will venture to reply to any one of these questions in the affirmative. All who duly regard the interests of the Company will be ready to maintain, that he could not propose to stop short in the necessary work of general retrenchment, which was going on all over India; and that, at the moment when such retrenchment was indispensable, it was impossible for him

State of the Army when Sir G. Barlow came to the government.

Inquiry into the means of conciliation then in his power.

to lend himself to new concessions. It is then fair to look again at the situation in which he stood, and at the views, the temper, the combination of the Army. Was it possible to conciliate them to what must necessarily be done? It is reasonable to ask this question, but not to assume the affirmative. No doubt a Government ought at all times, and especially in times of difficulty, to cherish a conciliating spirit; and we shall hereafter examine whether this was done in the present case; nay, we shall allow it here to be supposed, for the sake of argument, that the Government may have been deficient in this respect; but still, more is not to be expected from this quality than it is calculated to produce. And it must have been a very extraordinary talent of persuasion, a fascinating ascendancy, that could have induced a very numerous body, with the majority of whom the Government could have little personal intercourse, among whom popularity was gained by contending for the rights of the Army; a body who were influenced much less by individuals, even of the military class, than by an *esprit du corps*, and who strongly relied on the success of combination; to set aside their long-indulged prejudices and wishes, their interests and opinions, without any substantial compensation, unless in the principle of public duty. For a Governor had no compensations of interests to offer them, and he could not honestly hold out expectations not likely to be gratified; nor could he, without sacrificing the requisite dignity of his station, attempt to gain them by unbecoming flatteries and submissions; neither, indeed, was this method likely to succeed. In short, the extreme difficulty of persuading a large body of military men, so circumstanced, to give up their favourite objects and passions, must be admitted, and the practicability of it to be incapable of proof, except by example; an example which the Indian history has not yet afforded. The continuance, and even the growth of that spirit which had long prevailed in the Army, was therefore to be expected; and it is subsequent to the time Sir G. Barlow thus set out in the Government, that we are to look for the more proximate causes of the sedition and revolt to which the Officers advanced.

Proximate
cause of the
revolt.

From

From the period of Sir G. Barlow's accession in December 1807, till towards the close of the following year, there does not appear to have been any one act of his Government at which the Army could have even a pretence for taking umbrage, or which they have, in point of fact, ever made an article of complaint.

State of matters between Government and the Army in the following year, 1808.

The confirmation, indeed, by the Supreme Government, of those retrenchments which Lord William Bentinck and Sir John Cradock had proposed, and of which Mr. Petrie, when in the Government, had on record strongly expressed his approbation, arrived early in 1808; and Sir G. Barlow performed only an unavoidable duty in proceeding to carry them into execution. But in doing this, instead of adding to them, he relaxed in favour of the Army some of the regulations enjoined by the Governor-General in Council, to the acknowledged satisfaction of General Macdowall, who professed to think that the Army also had cause to be satisfied. Mr. Petrie's statement says, that the unpopularity of the measure of abrogating the Tent Contract, was reported to him to have been greatly increased by the manner in which it was given out in General Orders. He might have referred to the General Order, before he had conveyed to his reader this idea of it. Happily this Order is in the India House. It proves to be a plain inoffensive paper, written in the ordinary official style, and adopted by Government on the recommendation of the Commander in Chief, (General Macdowall).

But in this period, the conduct of General Macdowall himself, as it stands authenticated by public records, is marked by a most pernicious activity, and demands the most particular attention. At the time of his appointment to the chief command of Fort St. George Army, the Court of Directors were nearly unanimous, on general grounds which have never yet been invalidated, though since overruled, in resolving that the Commanders in Chief at the subordinate Presidencies should not have a seat in Council—a point entirely optional with them, and on which they had formerly exercised their discretion. General Macdowall

Conduct of Gen. Macdowall.

was

was not deprived of a seat in Council, as Mr. Petrie has expressed it in his *Statement*: he never had a seat, nor any right to one, or to the chief command, unless the gratuitous act of the Court had conferred it on him. He accepted the office of Commander in Chief, without a seat in Council, and was therefore bound by his honour and his oath to fulfil the duties of that office. But he entered upon it with feelings of indignant discontent, which he was at no pains to conceal, intimating, perhaps with some hope, the arrangement might not be final, that he would return to Europe rather than let the office be, what he termed, degraded in his person; and for a time maintained the appearance of some good understanding with the Government. But as the shipping season drew nearer, without any indication of a change in respect to him, and before, indeed, there was time for such a change, had it been intended, he began more openly to vent his resentments in expressions of disrespect towards the executive body of the Company, and the local Government, before even any thing had occurred in India which could furnish him with a pretext. He espoused the views of the Army, and became the champion of their rights, and imbued them with his personal resentments; he joined factions with which neither he nor the Army had the least concern—factions raised in the civil community, and most unjustly, in our opinion, against Sir G. Barlow; using the influence of his office and the popularity he thus acquired to harrass and degrade the Government, and proceeding wantonly from one act of violence to another, still on the side of Army feelings, or in support of the pretended rights of the Commander in Chief, which the Army had been brought to incorporate with their own, until the seeds of alienation and sedition were widely sown, and the Officers were left by him in a state of ferment and disaffection, which, excited yet further by the criminal activity of his friends, after his departure, and by new circumstances, carried them from one stage to another, until the whole ended in open insubordination and revolt.

The history of General Macdowall's proceedings, which bears out the facts here stated concerning him, is so fully exhibited in the

the records transmitted by the Fort St George Government, in the comments of the Court of Directors upon those proceedings, and in the very clear and convincing detail which Lord Minto has given in his letter of 5th February 1810, that it is unnecessary to go minutely into here; but some circumstances sufficient to support what has been now advanced it may be proper to notice.

In the month of May 1808, General Macdowall, of his own motion, addressed to Sir G. Barlow the letter already mentioned, which being on the records, need not be transcribed here. It is more remarkable for its tenour than its professed object; because, at a time when it is now known he was united in sentiments with the Army, as well as discontented with the Government, he communicated, in the forms of confidence, to Sir G. Barlow, that an address was preparing from the Officers to the Governor General for Bengal allowances, which proceeding he knew to be contrary to established rules. But, having done this, he goes on immediately to express in forcible language the discontents of the Army, and his own,—the difficulty of checking the spirit of remonstrance, "*which*," says he, "perhaps extends further than we are aware of;" and he notices "*the many points which the Army had formerly gained by representation, as naturally leading them to expect relief*;" he also alludes to the "*convulsions*" in the Bengal Army, of which Sir G. Barlow had been a witness. And then coming to the ostensible object of the letter, namely, to consult how and when the proceeding ought to be opposed, he says, "Nothing can be more simple than the publishing an Order," (that is, by Government) "*highly disapproving the nature and tendency of the Memorial to Lord Minto, and stating, that any Officer who shall encourage similar remonstrances, shall incur the severest displeasure of Government. Will this have the desired effect? It will be very easy for me to decline transmitting the address, and to express my own sentiments: but will this mode be correct?*"

It must be owned, the Commander in Chief here presents a picture

picture well fitted to alarm, without proposing any thing that might strengthen the hand of Government. On the contrary, he questions the propriety of his own interference, and whilst he suggests a General Order of Government, *severe in its terms*, as an obvious expedient, he intimates a doubt of its efficacy. A timid mind might easily have been shaken by such a representation from such a quarter. But the answer given by Sir G. Barlow * opposed irrefragable arguments against the design on foot, and General Macdowall, in consequence, "made corresponding communications to the Officers commanding the principal military stations, requiring them to adopt the most effectual measures for stopping such proceedings." †

* See the import of it, in paragraph 39, Fort St. George Military Letter, 29 Jan'y. 1809.

† Do. Do.

The circular letter of General Macdowall, on this occasion, points out in forcible terms the exceptionable nature of the intended Memorial, as militating against established Orders, and as calculated to excite a spirit of discontent and insubordination in the Army, whence it would be the duty of the Commander in Chief, should he eventually be obliged publicly to consider the Memorial, to bring to punishment those who might have been most active in supporting it. ‡ Could it have been conceived that, at the very time he was thus in appearance acting in concert with Government, for the suppression of this prohibited, culpable and dangerous proceeding, he was really co-operating with the insubordinate spirit of the Army he commanded, and counteracting, his own circular letter? The fact is now established. Something of this nature seems to have been early hinted at by the Government of Fort St. George || ; but formal proof was then wanting. The Court, however, have since been assured, on evidence which has received Lord Minto's confirmation §, that, at the very period General Macdowall was circulating the letter in question, "he was acquainting the Officers, in personal and convivial communications, that his circular letters were merely official, written at the requisition of Government, but not expressing his own sentiments; and that he wished them success in their pursuit." And Lord Minto further intimates, that General Macdowall's letter to the Governor, of the 16th May 1808, containing an enumeration of military

‡ See also Lord Minto's Letter, 5th February 1810, para. 16.

|| Military Letter, 29 January 1809, para. 34.

§ Letter of 3th February 1810, para. 16.

military grievances, and a significant reference to the successful struggles of the Bengal Army in 1796 against the Government—"an enumeration," says his Lordship very justly, "which, if addressed in the same language to any other quarter, was calculated not to repress a particular act of insubordination, but to excite a general mutiny"—had been communicated by General Macdowall to other men. Let it be remembered, that at this time General Macdowall had not pretended to have received any personal injury or offence from Sir G. Barlow; and that he maintained with the Governor, as appears from the letter in question, the forms of confidential intercourse. In the month of May, General Macdowall set out on a tour to the different stations of the Army, and seems to have been little at the Presidency till towards the autumn, soon after which he went again into the Northern Circars. The records of the Madras Government, during this period, do not, as far as we have discovered, contain any material information relative to the temper of the Commander in Chief; and but little concerning the Army. It would appear, from letters of the Government written afterwards to General Macdowall, that they were studious to avoid controversy with him* and his letters to them, on the other hand, indicate no backwardness to express his feelings. A desire naturally arises, to know what was passing in that period, from May to December. Lord Minto's letter of the 5th February 1810, affords some light into this matter. He states it as "a fact, too positively asserted and too generally known at Madras, to leave the shadow of a doubt upon his mind, that General Macdowall's conversation at his own table, uniformly conveyed to the Officers of the Army he commanded, sentiments hostile to the Government he served; and clothed in language disrespectful and contemptuous." His Lordship says, in reference to this statement, that specific instances have been related to him, by persons entitled to implicit faith, who were themselves witnesses of what they reported; "and that, on this general point of conduct, the accordant assurances, given in confidence, of those whose means and knowledge have been such, and whose personal credit is, in his judgment, so much beyond question, that he

* Military General Letter, 29th January 1809, and the marginal references.

“ can neither resist a personal conviction, nor think himself at
 “ liberty to withhold the expression of his belief, that the con-
 “ duct of Lieutenant-General Macdowall was certainly such as
 “ it has been above described.”

His Lordship next adduces, to the same effect, a clear and solemn act done openly by General Macdowall, namely, his address to the Commandant of the European regiment at Masulipatam (that regiment afterwards so conspicuous in the revolt), when reviewed by the General on the 24th December 1808. This Address, having been printed in a periodical publication at Madras, whilst General Macdowall was on the spot, may certainly be regarded as authentic. It is already known here, but contains expressions so remarkable, in reference to the present point, as to deserve special attention. “ It was my particular
 “ wish to see those (regiments) in the Northern Circars, and
 “ particularly the Madras European Regiment. From many
 “ circumstances, *this regiment has, in a measure, been overlooked,*
 “ *indeed I may say, neglected. Placed in a corner of this extensive*
 “ *country, it has seldom had its practice with the other corps of the*
 “ *Army.* Notwithstanding these circumstances, from my know-
 “ ledge of your zeal and ability, Colonel Taylor, I was con-
 “ fident I should find this corps in the high state of discipline it
 “ has this morning evinced; and it shall be my business, as
 “ much as lies in my power, to let the service benefit from this
 “ state of discipline, by calling it into more general notice; for
 “ I know that this state of inactivity must be painful to the
 “ feelings of honourable gentlemen and officers, and painful
 “ to the feelings of honourable gentlemen and Officers, and
 “ painful to the feelings of brave soldiers. *Indeed, I am at a*
 “ *loss to know the reason of this neglect.* This regiment has
 “ always been forward for its courage and loyalty: you are
 “ composed of the same materials as the other European corps
 “ in the service, and I am sure that the same brave and generous
 “ spirit actuates you.”—“ This Address,” says Lord Minto,
 “ requires no comment; and I shall only observe, that it is
 “ adduced as one example of the means employed habitually by
 “ Lieutenant General Macdowall to foment discontent in the
 “ Army,

“ Army, and to exalt his own popularity with that body, at the
 “ expence of the most obvious duties of his station, and inte-
 “ rests of the public. It affords also a very clear specimen of
 “ the practices imputed to him on the tour he was then making
 “ to the several stations of the Army.”

The view with which these evidences are brought forward, is thus explained by the Governor General: “ *The deliberate intention of Lieutenant General Macdowall to make the Army an instrument of opposition and disturbance to the Government of Fort St. George, forms so remarkable a feature, and proved so operative a cause in the events under review, that I feel the propriety of establishing so material a point, before I enter on the discussion to which they gave rise.*”

Of the truth of the fact here illustrated, we have long been thoroughly convinced, from the whole tenour of the Madras advices and records; but the Dissents we are called to answer, require us to insist upon it; and it is satisfactory to find it confirmed by new proofs. It was immediately after the return of General Macdowall from the different Army-stations, to Madras, in the beginning of January 1809, that the disputes between him and the Government commenced. Till then, let it be again remarked, no public controversy had arisen between the Government and the Commander in Chief, or between the Government and the Army. No act of Sir George Barlow's towards the Army was at this time complained of; not a single instance even of uncourteous behaviour on his part towards the Commander in Chief is mentioned: whilst, on the other hand, the proneness of that Officer, from the beginning, to take offence is visible.

At this stage, therefore, it may be proper to advert to the account which the Dissents give of General Macdowall, in the period through which we have been passing.

The accounts given in the Dissents of General Macdowall.

Mr. Pattison draws the following contrast: “ Although General Macdowall was not appointed to Council, he was” (that is, during the temporary Government of Mr. Petrie)

"quiet, and to all appearance resigned." "General Macdowall, on the part of the new Government, meets with slights." "Who can avoid tracing the evils which ensued to their real source, in Sir George Barlow's harsh and unconciliatory character?" *

* Mr. Pattison's Dissent, 21 April.

General Macdowall's cordial support might have been gained by attention, civility and politeness." "At the head of the Army, pushed from one step to another, he fell at last into

† Dissent of Sir F. Baring and Sir H. Inglis

"error which is unpardonable." † Another gentleman seems to assign the non-appointment of General Macdowall to a seat in Council, as one of the original causes of the evils; and he goes on to say, "It was but too true that General Macdowall had been neglected by the Governor on many occasions. It had been the general practice of the service, and often directed from the Court, that the Governor should pay great attention to the recommendation from the Commander in Chief, upon all military promotions, and consult with him upon military subjects. All Orders to the Army ought necessarily to go through the Commander in Chief: those necessary and wholesome regulations the Governor entirely left out of his sight; and on many occasions seemed to wish to engross the power of Governor and Commander in Chief in his own person." §

§ Mr. Elphinstone's Dissent 15th October 1809.

Where, we would ask, are the evidences of these comprehensive charges, or any part of them? The records, through the course of a whole year, from December 1807, to December 1808, afford no fact that can be turned to such a purpose. These gentlemen have produced no fact. So far was General Macdowall, who did not know till the 3d November 1807, that the Commander in Chief was left out of Council, from being "quiet and resigned," as Mr. Pattison says, that he, immediately on receiving that knowledge, applied to General Hewitt for leave to proceed to Europe, Mr. Petrie being then Governor. His Government continued only seven weeks afterwards, in which little space General Macdowall, then new in the command, had not opportunity to act such a part as he subsequently did. At a time when General Macdowall made no complaint of want of attention, of no harshness or unconciliatory conduct

duct on the part of the Governor, and was acting in confidence with him, to suppress insubordination, he proceeded secretly to foment it. Was there any fair "attention or civility" within the Governor's power, which could gain or secure such a man? Did any act of the Governor's "*push him*," amidst professed co-operation, to that species of counteraction which had a decisive effect on the conduct of the Army? If the influence of Counsellor had been added to that of Commander in Chief, would it certainly have been better employed? Mr. Elphinstone § quotes one solitary case, in more aggravated terms than General Macdowall himself uses—the ordering of the Travancore expedition, without previously or fully consulting him. Mr. Pattison || uses the expression of "troops ordered to march "without his knowledge," with a double note of astonishment: as if the bare idea carried in it its own condemnation; as if it had been the cause of the evils that ensued; and as these, amongst the other evils, proceeded from Sir George Barlow's "harsh and unconciliatory character." This is the only specific complaint of neglect adduced by General Macdowall himself. On all the other occasions of military equipments, during General Macdowall's command, his opinion was taken, and the details committed to him. His complaint on this, is answered by the Government in the most solid and satisfactory manner.

§ Dissent, 15th
October 1809.

|| Dissent, 26th
April 1810.

From reading the two Dissents just quoted, it might be supposed, that General Macdowall was present at Fort St. George, was wantonly passed over, and this from harshness and unconciliation in Sir G. Barlow. The fact is proved to be, that General Macdowall was in the Northern Circars, far distant from the Presidency; that instant dispatch was most important; the delay of corresponding with the Commander in Chief hazardous to the whole object; and that no temper of Sir G. Barlow's, but the necessity of the public service, induced the immediate commencement of operations, of which, however, at the same moment, full information was sent to the Commander in Chief. When these operations, after being suspended, were resumed, he had returned to the Presidency,

but

* See the Letters of December 1868 and January 1869, on the Travancore expedition.

† Letter 5 February 1869, para 24.

but never went near the Governor. The Governor, therefore, could not well have a personal conference with him; but he sent the Chief Secretary, Mr. Buchan, to him, with all the papers and communications respecting Travancore; upon which he gave his sentiments at large; and the Officer ultimately placed in the command of the expedition, was appointed expressly on his representation. The letters between him and the Government on these subjects,* mark his extreme disrespect (to use no stronger term) and their exceeding forbearance. Throughout the year, let it be again observed, this affair of the Travancore expedition, is the only one concerning which he made any specific complaint; a fact from which, in his temper of mind, it may be fairly implied, that he had no other charge to bring forward. With the exception of this distorted article, all the charges just quoted from the Dissents are *mere assertions*. They are unsupported by proof, indeed opposed by it: they have nothing in them of the nature of argument, and ought therefore to be wholly laid aside in forming a true judgment. General Macdowall appears to have returned to the Presidency from Masulipatam, early in January 1869. He had adopted and inflamed the pretensions and discontents of the Army; he had impregnated them with his own, and with a spirit of disregard and contempt towards the Government. He had determined to embark for Europe, and, as his conduct proves, to keep no measures with the Government; for Lord Minto states,† that “on his return, he abstained altogether from any communication with Sir G. Barlow, neglecting, or rather systematically refraining from common visits of ceremony, and withholding the most usual observances of exterior respect due to his station.”

Enumeration of the public acts of General Macdowall against the Government,

We approach now to those public official acts of his, which directly attacked the authority of Government; and brought into practical question, its supremacy over the military body; out of which acts sprang the events that immediately preceded the revolt. Under the first head may be enumerated:

The arrest of Lieutenant Colonel Munro, Quarter-master General,

General, in order to be tried for an official opinion delivered by him in 1807, relative to the Tent Contract :

The presentation and warm recommendation by General Macdowall, of a Memorial from the officers of the Army to the Court of Directors, containing a variety of claims, and among others, the right of having the Commander in Chief in Council as their representative :

The censure of Lieutenant Colonel Munro, and virtually of the Government itself, in a General Order addressed to the Army, for his successful appeal to Government, to be delivered from arrest ; and,

The address of General Macdowall to the Army, on his quitting the command of it ; in which he arraigns the conduct of the executive body of the Company.

Under the second head the more important articles are :

The release of Lieutenant Colonel Munro from arrest, by the Government : *and of the event thence arising.*

The dismissal of Lieutenant General Macdowall, Commander in Chief, and of Lieutenant Colonel Capper and of Major Boles, Adjutant and Deputy Adjutant General, from their respective situations, for circulating the Address to the Army, censuring Lieutenant Colonel Munro, and the Government through him :

The Government General Order of the 1st May 1809, suspending certain Officers, for being concerned in preparing and circulating a seditious Memorial or Remonstrance to the Governor General, and a seditious Address to Major Boles :

The public acts of the Hyderabad Subsidiary Force, rejecting the compliment paid them by Government on the 1st of May, declaring their participation in the sentiments of the disaffected Officers, and their intention to separate themselves from the

the authority of Government, unless the General Order of the 1st May was rescinded :

The open revolt of the Garrison of Masulipatam :

The publication by the Hydrabad Force, to the Government and the Army, of what they called their Ultimatum, requiring the revocation of the General Order of 1st May; the restoration of all Officers who had been removed; and an amnesty for the whole Army :

The open rebellion of the troops at Hydrabad and Seringapatam :

The establishment of an organized system of combination throughout the greatest part of the Company's Madras Army, for subverting the authority of Government by force of arms; and,

The requisition by Government, on the 26th July, of a test of loyalty from the Officers, in order to discriminate the enemies of Government from the well affected

How these subjects have been considered by the Court—

Military Letters from Fort St. George. 20 Jan. 1809, 31 Do.; 3 Feb.; 28 Do.; 13 May; 6 Sept.; 10 Do.

Letters from the Supreme Government to Fort St. George. 20 Feb. 1809, 27 May.

Governor General's Letters to April 1809; 15 Sept.; 12 Oct.

Military Letters to Fort St. George. 1 Sept. 1809, 8th Do., 7 Feb. 1810; 1 May.

It is not our intention to enter particularly into the history, or the merits of these various transactions. This is already done in the Indian dispatches and consultations received from the Presidency of Fort St. George, from the Supreme Government, and from the Governor General; and in the answers sent to those dispatches by the Court of Directors, with the sanction of the Board of Commissioners, acting, as no doubt they did in so momentous a case, with the approbation of His Majesty's Government. We have from conviction and duty approved and supported the principles, the reasonings, the decisions contained in those answers, from the authority which is supreme in the Government of India, upon all the matters in dispute between General Macdowall and the Madras Officers on the one hand, and the Governments of Fort St. George and Bengal on the other, and also upon the conduct of those

those several parties. The arguments and the evidences on which the Court have founded their decisions, we have a right to consider as valid, until they are refuted or are overpowered by other arguments and evidences. But we presume to say, that this is not done in the Dissents before us, in respect to the causes which produced the revolt, and to the conduct of the parties concerned; neither does this method appear to be proposed in them. They do not discuss the arguments and reasonings of the Court; they do not invalidate the evidence on which the Court have proceeded, nor prove that it has been unfairly used; nor do they introduce opposing evidence. They assign certain grounds of dissent, and those grounds, as far as they relate to the causes of revolt, (of which we now speak) are stated very much in the way of *opinions*, which, however strongly they may be delivered, are not entitled to claim the assent of others, unless the premises of facts or principles, on which they are founded, and the conclusions justly deducible from them, are exhibited, and are found to warrant such a claim. Nor will assent be more readily yielded, if the language of passion or declamation is used, and if the opinions are opposed by a great majority of the constituted authorities in England and in India. Such certainly is the case here; therefore the arguments employed by the Court, (of which we were concurring members) we are entitled to have considered as part of this defence, equally as if they were specified in it. And we may likewise claim the benefit of the luminous writings of the Governments of Bengal and Fort St. George, particularly of those noted in the margin, upon the insubordination and revolt of the Madras Officers. Writings, many of which, though produced in times of great disorder and peril, are, in our opinion, in reasoning, temper, and composition, surpassed by no State Papers on the records of the Company.

Bengal Letter to
Fort St. George
20 Feb. 1809, &
May.
Govt. of India
to Com. of D.
16th 25 April 1809;
15th Feb., 12 Oct.,
1 Feb. 1810.
18th, 15th Letter to
Com. 20th Janu-
ary 1809. General
Order, 6th Feb.
1809. General
Order, 1 May, 1809.
Do. Do. 12 Aug.
1809. General Let-
ter to Com. 10
Sept. 1809.

In opposition to the tenour of the voluminous official documents and evidences from India, and the conclusions formed from them by the authorities in this country, it is, we must be allowed to repeat, the main scope of the Dissents to maintain, that all the evils which have occurred in the Madras Army, and

especially the revolt, have been wholly, or chiefly, occasioned by the temper and the measures of Sir George Barlow. Although the numerous evidences and arguments to which we have already appealed, leave, as we conceive, no room for the further maintenance of this doctrine, and it is lest easy to argue against mere assertions, yet we shall beg leave to offer some remarks upon it. This is certainly the language of many of the guilty Officers and their abettors. It is the only plea which it is possible to use for them. It is the plea by which numbers still hope to procure impunity to themselves, and disgrace to the Government they have opposed. But how carefully and impartially ought all existing evidence to be weighed, before this conclusion is formed. If wrong, it treats with the most cruel injustice those, who, by their wisdom and fortitude, have saved an empire; it extenuates the criminality of soldiers who have turned their arms against their Employers and their Country; it encourages insubordination, and discourages future resistance to it.

*Observations on
the opinions given
in the Dissents
on these
subjects.*

This proposition seems to assume, that the Officers were, by the *immediate impulse of provocation*, transported from a settled state of contentment, to a state of insubordination. The error of this proposition has been demonstrated. The proposition seems also to imply, that a revolt was the greatest possible evil; —there was, however, in our opinion, a greater possible evil—the timid, weak submission of Government, to military controul and usurpation. The prevalence of such a power would have subverted the Civil Government, and forced us at length, under accumulated disadvantages, to contend by arms for the re-establishment of legitimate authority. It seems to be taken for granted in the Dissents, that if any act of Government was made by the Officers *on occasion* of insubordination or revolt, that act must necessarily have been wrong. But the measure must be judged of by all the circumstances as they appeared at the time. It might have been dictated by duty, or have been unavoidable.

The crisis arrived when the Government had only to make its election between submission to the Army, and contest with it.

it. Will it be said that the Government ought to have chosen submission? The Dissents do not affirm this (though something tantamount to it has been said elsewhere); but they dwell in so unqualified a way upon the evils of harsh measures, and the want of conciliation, as to leave one of two things, or perhaps both, to be inferred, that the authors would have deemed large concessions preferable to the continuance of a contest; or think that both concessions and contest might have been avoided by a conciliatory spirit and conduct in Sir G. Barlow. As to the first point, we conceive it has been proved in the writings already quoted,* and is evident from the nature of things, that concession would, in effect, have been submission. With regard to conciliation, it is a topic upon which a great deal has been said, but said, as we think, without either due proof or explanation. The Dissents, the writings of Mr. Petrie, and all the publications which have appeared in behalf of the Officers, are full of this topic. All concur in charging Sir G. Barlow with the want of conciliation, and in maintaining, either that this want occasioned many of the evils which ensued, or, what is much the same, that the exercise of conciliation would have prevented them. Either way *the question is begged*, and what is advanced on this head *resolves itself into matter of opinion*. Where the inquiry is concerning the causes of a most momentous event, and the conduct and character of a great public officer, surely more is requisite. The language held respecting *conciliation*, conveys no idea of limit either in the exercise of it, or in its efficacy. But are we to suppose the one or the other may be unbounded? Might not an Army be so confederated, and determined to obtain certain objects from the Government, as that no personal courtesy and civility, on the part of the Governor, could soothe and charm them from their purpose? And might not a Governor, with the most conciliating disposition, be enforced, by his instructions and his duty, to oppose their demands, even at the hazard of irritating them, and becoming unpopular with them? These points should be weighed and settled before the doctrine of conciliation is applied, especially after the solemn declarations repeatedly made by Sir G. Barlow and the Madras Government. "We observe with

* The dispatches from India, and the Answers of the Court.

* General Letter,
31 January 1809.

“ concern,” say they, † “ that the Commander in Chief has
“ conveyed his sentiments in terms unusual in public correspon-
“ dence, and with disrespect to the authority of Government.
“ But we consider it our duty to abstain as much as possible
“ from controversial discussion of this nature ; and we trust
“ that our desire to evince every possible respect for the station
“ of the Commander in Chief, will be apparent.” See also
their strong profession to the same effect, on occasion of the
arrest of Lieutenant Colonel Munro. ‡

‡ General Order,
6 February 1809.

*Inquiry how con-
ciliation could
have been ap-
plied in the se-
veral cases of
dispute, and
how it may be
applied to that
case.*

Certainly we ought no longer to be left to vague generalities on this subject, or to unlimited accusations standing not on proofs, but on assertions and conjectures. We wish particularly to obtain some definite idea of the manner in which the honourable authors of the Dissents would have had conciliation practically employed in the different questions that arose between the Madras Government and the Army, and of the extent to which they think that, under all existing circumstances, it should have been carried, or that Sir G. Barlow, consistently with his duty, could have carried it. Let us turn to the commencement of their disputes, and place ourselves on the scene as it then stood. The

*The arrest of
Lieut. Col.
Munro, which
happened about
the 20th Janu-
ary 1809.*

first question that arose was concerning the arrest of Lieutenant Colonel Munro, which happened about the 20th January 1809. Until this time, it should be once more remarked, there had been no matter of controversy between the Army and the Government since the accession of Sir G. Barlow ; but we have seen what the conduct of General Macdowall had been through the last half of the preceding year. What he had stated in the month of May of that year, to the Governor, was then still more emphatically true, and by his own means,—“ that the
“ seeds of discontent were very widely disseminated ; ” and that
“ the spirit of remonstrance extended further ” than the Go-
vernor was aware of ; so that the Army, “ who,” as he said,
“ had formerly gained so many points by representation,” were
combined to bring forward, under his auspices, and strengthened
by his public sanction and recommendation, not only the one
claim which he had before ostensibly discouraged, but a variety
of claims, and among them a seat in Council for “ the Repre-

“sentative of the Army.” General Macdowall’s “deliberate intention,” (to recur to the words of Lord Minto) “to make the Army an instrument of opposition and disturbance to the Government,” is manifested by what he had done, and by the further measures he pursued.

The first of these was the trial of Lieutenant Colonel Munro, who had advised the abolition of the Tent Contract ; by which trial the Army would be gratified, and the Government affronted and degraded. The case is stated and discussed in the Court’s letter to Fort St. George, of 15th September 1809. Never was there one more clear, nor a proceeding more plainly factitious and insubordinate. For using some expressions perfectly fair in general reasoning, according to the principles of human nature, in a confidential opinion, which the duty of his office and the injunction of the Commander in Chief required him to give, respecting the operation of the Tent Contract, Colonel Munro was a year and a half afterwards arraigned, by a number of Officers commanding native corps, of false insinuations injurious to their characters. Sir J. Cradock, the late Commander in Chief, had adopted his opinion ; two Governments of Madras preceding Sir G. Barlow’s time, and the Supreme Government, approved of it ; and his plan of abolition was carried into execution. These authorities had made the whole their own measure. But, “aided by collateral circumstances, the adoption of the improved system had excited a great degree of clamour in the Army, and the Quarter-master General was chosen as the object of obloquy” Now it was proposed by the accusers and General Macdowall, although the words were evidently within the natural scope of official discussion, and Colonel Munro had disavowed all intention of reflecting on any individual, that he, a confidential Staff Officer, for an act which the discharges of his bounden duty according to his conscience demanded of him, should be brought to the ignominy of a public trial ; and General Macdowall, without even apprising the Government, actually put him under arrest for that purpose, although he had been previously informed by the Judge Advocate General, his legal adviser, whose opinion

he had required, that the charges were of an illegal nature. This was at once to strike at all fidelity in Staff Officers, and to bring the measures of Government before a military tribunal for decision. The Advocate General also, whose opinion on the case had been required by Government, stated that Lieutenant Colonel Munro was entitled to their decided support. The Officers themselves state in a Memorial to the Government, on hearing their proceeding was illegal, that they solicited the charge might be *suspended*; but General Macdowall has said that he had not seen *that Memorial*, when on the 20th January, he directed Lieutenant Colonel Munro to be put under arrest. The letter, however, of the Officers, to the Adjutant General, conveying that Memorial to the Commander in Chief, is dated in December. The Government used all the endeavours they could, to prevent General Macdowall from persisting. Nevertheless he refused, with very aggravating circumstances, to release Lieutenant Colonel Munro. What were the Government to do in this case? It may be said, to *conciliate*. "It was the wish and endeavour," they affirm, "of the Governor and Council, to effect this object," (the removal of the arrest) "by every means of conciliation and explanation;" but their efforts were fruitless. Were they then not only to abandon to persecution and the shame of a public trial, a most meritorious and confidential public Officer, for the performance of his duty, but to submit their own acts to the judgment of a tribunal of their Officers? This was the question they had to decide upon, but not the only question depending. The proceeding was plainly the work of military combination, directed against the authority and dignity of Government itself, and its success would certainly encourage other attacks. They were forced, therefore, to act here, as in several following instances, in *their own defence*. "We should not," say they to the Court*, "in ordinary circumstances, have adopted a measure of this nature, but we are satisfied that a more fatal shock to the public authority could not have been experienced than in permitting the charges which had been preferred by the Commander in Chief against Lieutenant Colonel Munro, to be brought under the investigation of a Court Martial.

* General Letter
29 January 1809.

“ This measure would have involved in its immediate effect,
 “ under circumstances of the most offensive nature, the de-
 “ gradation of the public acts and character of the Govern-
 “ ment, the annihilation of all confidence on the part of its
 “ public Officers, and the utter confusion of the departments
 “ under its authority.”

Colonel Bannerman is the only Member of the Court who has maintained that this proceeding of the Government was contrary to law, founding his opinion on the Act of 27th Geo. II. The discussion between the Colonel and us, of a legal point, would perhaps not entirely settle it. But he has not answered, and we apprehend will find it impossible to answer, the following opinion of the Court, on the demand of a combined number of Officers, for a Court Martial on Colonel Munro. †

*Observations in
 the Dissents up-
 on the affairs of
 Lieut. Colonel
 Munro, and An-
 swers to them.*

† General Military
 Letter, 10 Sept.
 1792.

“ Para. 13. If any Officer thought himself alluded to or
 “ aggrieved by any thing that Colonel Munro had said, he
 “ might easily have repelled the supposed imputation by de-
 “ manding that, if he were suspected, he should be brought to
 “ trial upon it. Government would then either have granted
 “ a Court Martial, or would have officially and publicly de-
 “ clared, that no imputation rested upon such Officer.”

“ 14. Each individual Officer would have had an undoubted
 “ right to have demanded such a clearance or trial for himself;
 “ but an Officer in command of one particular corps cannot,
 “ in the nature of things, undertake to answer for the conduct
 “ of an Officer in command of another corps, far removed,
 “ perhaps, from his possible observation; much less for a whole
 “ body of such Officers so circumstanced.”

“ 15. The character of each individual must be distinct
 “ and particular, and a combination, therefore, of many
 “ Officers, to repel insinuations (supposing such to have been
 “ advanced) against unnamed individuals of their body or class,
 “ respecting whose conduct the personal knowledge of the
 “ Members,

“ Members, generally, of that body, could not enable them to
 “ speak, does not seem to be founded in any principle of
 “ equity; nor would it be justified by alleging that general
 “ insinuations against the whole body, but pointing to no
 “ Officer by name, could not be met in any other manner;
 “ for the obvious course to be followed in that case would
 “ still be, that every individual Officer who conceived his
 “ character to be brought into question, should desire to have
 “ his own conduct separately investigated.”

“ 16. But we are the more astonished at their proceedings,
 “ when we consider the expressions which have been assigned
 “ as the ground of the charge. Detached as they have been
 “ from their context, they still appear to us to be couched in
 “ the usual style of official discussion: and to be as far from
 “ conveying any imputation against individual characters, as
 “ the Minutes of Sir J. Cradock and Mr. Petrie, by which
 “ the plan was supported. But when they are considered, as
 “ they actually stand in the Paper prepared by Colonel Munro,
 “ as forming a part of the chain of reasoning founded upon
 “ general principles, it appears to us, that no inference can
 “ fairly be drawn from them unfavorable to the character of the
 “ Madras Army.”

To us these remarks alone appear conclusive against granting the Court Martial in question, and therefore against the *legality of the arrest*; but on the general question, of the power of Government to remove arrests, it is fair to refer to the very able opinion of the Judge Advocate General of Madras, supported by that of the Advocate General, which maintain the legality of it. The Indian Governments are in the general practice of ordering Officers under arrest; and their right to release is understood by the Judge Advocate to be a received principle in the Army. It is certain, that long after the Act of George II. that is, in 1783, the Government of Madras exercised the power of removing an arrest imposed by the King's Commander in Chief upon a King's Officer.* The Judge Advocate mentions also a case where two Officers had been recently released

* Col. Stepling.
 See F. S. G. Secret
 Letter, 24 Jan. 1791
 1, 31

released by the Bengal Government, from an arrest, under which they had been placed by the Commander in Chief of that Army; and however the Act of George II. (passed before our acquisition of territorial dominion in India) may have been intended, we conceive that it must merge in the very large and comprehensive powers given to the Company's Governments by the Acts of 1784 and 1793, in all matters, military as well as civil.

Colonel Bannerman says, "it might be a distinct and aggravated ground of accusation," that the "insinuations" and "aspersions" contained in Colonel Munro's Report, were adopted by Government as their own; and that it is wretched sophistry to contend that, because a public act has been founded in "calumny," therefore the "calumny" ceases to be such. But in all these remarks he evidently *begs the old question*. It is denied that there is any insinuation, aspersion, or calumny, actual or intended, in the Report. Colonel Munro has disavowed all intention of reflecting on the Officers. Government have declared, that under any correct construction, no offensive meaning can be attached to the words used by him.

Mr. Elphinstone and Mr. Pattison charge Sir G. Barlow with having brought Colonel Munro's Report "most unnecessarily" out of the secret Records, and delivered it to the Adjutant General.* "Hence," says Mr. Pattison, "sprung the fatal feuds between Colonel Munro and the Officers." The fact, however, is, that Colonel Munro's proposition for abolishing the Tent Contract, after having been referred to Government, was submitted to the examination of some Officers of talents and experience, and, on receiving their concurrence, adopted by Lord W. Bentinck, referred to the Supreme Government in the Public Department, and in the time of Mr. Petrie, entered on the Consultations in the Public Department on the 7th October 1807, and transmitted to the Court of Directors with the public letter of 21st October 1807. To suppose, therefore, that from the period of all this publicity, which took place before the arrival of Sir G. Barlow, the paper could remain a secret to the Officers, (if indeed it was not known to them still

Note.—Had the

ed, these Gen-
would have
to have
ed the
luc of the
Staff Officer who
betrayed the con-
fidence of the Go-
vernment, by the
communication of
a secret record.

liar,) would be altogether idle. But we have the account of this matter unfolded in Lord Minto's last dispatch. According to the information given to him by Colonel Munro, (who would hardly venture to state, on such a point, what he could not substantiate,) Colonel Capper, Adjutant General, the intimate friend of General Macdowall, forwarded to several Officers in his own and General Macdowall's confidence, all the passages in Colonel Munro's Report, that could be construed into an offence to the Army; and these passages were soon transmitted by the Officers, two of whom were Colonel Vesey and Colonel Sentleger, to the Commander in Chief, with a demand for justice, &c. This points distinctly to the confidential friend of General Macdowall, as the source of this business; and General Macdowall's refusal, as will be seen afterwards, to receive a public disavowal from Colonel Munro, of the sense put on his words, which must have stopped the whole proceeding, gives him the appearance of being a party in the design. It was not till the month of June 1808,* *eight months* after Colonel Munro's paper had been a *public document*, and when the Commander in Chief had decidedly adopted and fomented the discontents of the Army, that the idea of arraigning Colonel Munro was agitated: and it was three months more before charges against him were brought forward. Mr. Elphinstone's representation, therefore, that the Officers acted on coming to the knowledge of the paper,—that "*they took fire*" as on a sudden discovery, and demanded a Court Martial, is not only wholly unsupported by evidence, but opposed by it. Some other views which he gives relative to this matter may also be noticed. He says Colonel Munro intended the agency of the new system of tent provision for himself. We presume he infers this because the new plan proposed to charge the Government with the provision of tent equipage, and it might hence fall within the province of the Quarter-master General; but the plan no where points to any salary or emolument for the superintendence of that business; and it is unwarrantable to insinuate, without the least evidence, that an Officer of distinguished character was influenced by private motives in recommending a great public measure. The honourable Writer forgot, on this occasion, that he was,

* Col. Munro's Letter to Government, 22d Jan. 1809.

at the moment of writing these words, treating with tenderness the complaint of Officers who, only on a construction of general expressions, alleged themselves to be aggrieved; he forgot too his own rule of adhering to the public records; and unhappily the Dissents before us furnish very numerous instances of the same nature, without supplying the want of public proofs by any satisfactory private evidence. But, on the other hand, Mr. Elphinstone thinks "General Macdowall might have had many " good and substantial reasons for what he did, which we as " yet know not." It is to be presumed, then, that the reasons he publicly recorded in his letter of the 25th January 1809, were not thought by him "the best reasons," and that he reserved till he came home, reasons "good and substantial," for a body too, with whom he would not condescend to have further explanation? Mr. Elphinstone says, General Macdowall seemed desirous to prevent a Court Martial, and declined it to the Officers individually. It appears, however, from the facts, that his objection was not to a Court Martial, but to individual application for one; which was, as has been already shown, the only way wherein such a business could be taken up by him. "When," says Mr. Elphinstone, "a Court Martial was requested by 19 of the senior Officers, its complexion was "entirely changed;" which is most true, for then there was a combination, and a charge which it was impossible any one Officer could intelligently make on behalf of all the rest. "But "he (General Macdowall) still tried to stave it off," and "applied to the Judge Advocate for his opinion." Did he then, on being advised by that Officer, that the proceeding would be illegal, and on being strongly dissuaded by him to refrain from it, gladly avail himself of such authority, to put an end to it? Quite the contrary. In defiance of this opinion of his legal adviser, he persisted in bringing the charges forward. "But "he gave full time," says Mr. Elphinstone, "to the Government, to explain their sense of the Memorial to the General, "and for him to have done it to the Officers; which would, in "all probability, have had the desired effect; and they had no "reason to doubt but he would have been as ready to have "done it upon this occasion as he had been upon a former:

“ but nothing of the kind was attempted.” Whether the explanation of the sense of Government, or the General’s readiness to convey that explanation to the Officers, *as on the former occasion* (respecting the suppression of the Memorial for Bengal allowances) would have had the desired effect, the account already given of that former occasion may show. But he did not so much as inform the Government that a charge was preferred to him, against Colonel Munro, though it evidently involved a question concerning their acts. They were not indeed uninformed of the fact ; but, instead of interfering to tell him what was his duty, they concluded “ he would take due means to suppress such factious proceedings, and give the Quarter-master General the protection to which every public Officer was entitled in the performance of his duty.” However, to the great surprise of Government, he even put Colonel Munro in arrest, without giving him any previous intimation. Still they thought the communication of their sentiments of the arrest, as “ contrary to the clearest principle of order and justice,” would induce General Macdowall to remove it. So far from it, that he told them it was his intention to bring an additional charge against Lieutenant Colonel Munro, for having appealed to Government ; “ without which appeal,” say they, “ we should have had no authentic information of the circumstances of the case, until the conduct of Lieutenant Colonel Munro, and with it the proceedings and orders of the Government, had been brought before a Military Tribunal for decision.” “ But,” says Mr. Elphinstone, “ he gave full time to the Quarter-master General to explain away the offensive expressions : ” “ Even he would make no advances.” Does General Macdowall himself insinuate any thing of this kind ? No ; and as at the same moment that General Macdowall made the affair a public one, Colonel Munro publicly disavowed the injurious sense put upon his words, and did this still in time enough for General Macdowall to have acted upon this disavowal, had he been so disposed, the fair presumption is, that he made this disavowal personally to General Macdowall from the beginning. But we are now relieved from conjecture in this matter. Colonel
Munro

Munro has stated to Lord Minto, that on first learning from General Macdowall, about the month of September, of the dissatisfaction of the Officers on this score, he "earnestly requested the General to permit him to address a letter to him, disavowing the meaning imputed to his words, which they were never intended to express. General Macdowall refused his permission, as the Tent Contract, he said, was done away without his being consulted;"—a very inadequate reason, for he was not Commander in Chief when the measure passed. Colonel Munro "repeated the application without success; and Colonel Campbell, who, at his request, also urged it, though of the General's family, was likewise refused." The public disavowal made by Colonel Munro is in these words: that "in preparing the Report upon the Tent Contract, nothing was more remote from his mind than to state a sentiment in any respect adverse to the honour, integrity, and military virtue of any portion of the Officers of the Army."—"General Macdowall acted," continues Mr. Elphinstone, "with great coolness and deliberation, very unlike a man wishing to promote discontent or disaffection." "After so long time for deliberation and conciliation, he ordered the Quarter-master General under arrest; and from that moment we hear the heaviest accusations of the General." Whatever coolness and deliberation he might have used, it was clearly not in view to conciliation; for he neither communicated the charges to the Government, nor his intention to proceed to the arrest; neither would he remove the arrest at their request, though Colonel Munro had previously made the public declaration just quoted; nor offer any acknowledgment for a wanton, indecent attack on Government, in a public letter to Colonel Munro. An observation of Lord Minto's is so apposite here, that we cannot avoid quoting it. "If General Macdowall's not being consulted about the abolition of the Tent Contract, furnished an adequate reason for refusing to a person accused the common privilege of being heard in his justification, in order to avert a criminal prosecution, it was not thought sufficient by General Macdowall to prevent him

" from

" from interfering much more deeply and efficaciously in the
 " affair of the Tent Contract, by placing Lieut. Col. Munro in
 " arrest upon the very accusation, in an earlier stage of which
 " affair he had employed that pretext for suppressing an expla-
 " nation which must have precluded the whole proceeding."
 Was he here "*pushed on from step to step*," as has been said
 for him specifically in one Dissent, and virtually in most of
 them? Or did he, against all dissuasion and remonstrance,
 persist to set a firebrand, just as he was quitting the scene,
 to that mass of combustibles which he so well knew had
 been before collected? The accusations " from that moment "
 brought against General Macdowall, are only of public noto-
 rious acts which the Government could not tolerate or overlook.
 Their having forbore till then to record any animadversion on
 his conduct, though they could not have been ignorant of the
 part he was acting in the Army, especially after his public
 Address to the European regiment at Masulipatam, does not
 look like severity or harshness of disposition. In respect to
 the arrest, the history of that affair must demonstrate that the
 want of conciliation did not lie on their part, and supports the
 declaration made by Government to the Army soon after, on
 the 6th February 1809. " It was the wish, it was the earnest
 " endeavour of the Governor in Council to effect this object,"
 (the prevention of the evils which bringing Colonel Munro to
 trial would have occasioned,) " by every means of conciliation
 " and explanation; but such means having been used in vain,
 " and even repelled under circumstances highly offensive, no
 " alternative remained but that of conveying a specific order
 " for the removal of the arrest."

We have dwelt the longer on this first subject, to shew that
 there is not the least ground for charging any thing to the want
 of conciliation on the part of the Government; but abundant
 proof of a spirit of animosity and faction on the other side; and
 we have wished also to give a specimen of the way in which,
 generally, the Dissents comment on the conduct of the one
 party and the other. The limits we must prescribe to ourselves,

will

will not allow us to follow, with the same detail of observation, the views given in those Papers of the subsequent events, to which we now proceed.

Whilst the affair of Colonel Munro's arrest was yet pending, General Macdowall, on the 23d January, transmitted to Government a Memorial from the Officers of the Madras Army to the Court of Directors, complaining of many alleged grievances—their state of banishment, their poverty and prospects—the abolition of the Bazar allowances, full batta, and the Tent Contract—the inequality of their allowances, to those of Bengal—and the “ Representative of the Army, the Commander in Chief,” being deprived of his usual power, and seat in Council, &c. This last point is urged with peculiar earnestness; and whilst the tenour of the Memorial seems to point to very general *redress*, they distinctly claim the restoration of the profits of the Bazar fund, and to be placed permanently on the same allowances as the Bengal Army, *as their just rights*.

*Memorial from
the Officers,
transmitted by
Gen. Macdowall
to Government.*

When the Memorial projected in May, which had for its object only the obtainment of Bengal allowances, is compared with the present, it will be evident that some powerful influence must have operated upon the minds of the Officers, to work them up to such an unprecedented representation. It should be observed, that not one of the articles of grievance set forth in it, originated with Sir G. Barlow. It condemns the acts of preceding Governments, ratified by the Supreme Government and the Court of Directors. It claims certain allowances as *matter of right*; it interferes with the prerogative of the Court of Directors, in framing the Civil Government, requiring a seat in Council for the “ *Representative of the Army* ;” thus incorporating the cause of General Macdowall with their own; and all this is done at a moment (we must be pardoned for repetitions) when the well-known exigencies of the Company had imperiously demanded a very general reduction in their expenditure—when the resentment of General Macdowall against the Court of Directors, and his hostility to the actual Government of Madras, were notorious—and when the Government had

been

been deliberately attacked by the arrest of Colonel Munro. And all this was done by *combination*, in direct violation of the general regulation of which the Officers had been reminded by the circular letter of May.

* Of 15th Sept.
1809.

After reviewing the different subjects of this Memorial, and what has been said on them from India, and by the Court of Directors in the letter to Fort St. George*, and after considering the time and manner in which it was brought forward, hardly any one will be disposed to maintain that it is not animated by a vehement spirit of insubordination and encroachment; neither will it be contended that, if General Macdowall's part in this proceeding had been put wholly out of view, the Government could have done otherwise than express a decided disapprobation of it.

But was it possible to consider it distinct from the share he took in it? That share gave a new and alarming aspect to the whole—a combination between the Commander in Chief and the Officers of an Army, to press each other's objects upon the Government—objects not to be yielded—and to endeavour to carry them by a general attack, in violation of all the rules of subordination! And what an appearance does General Macdowall make on this occasion! He who had, but eight months before, as his duty required, though the question was only about *one* of the many points now contended for by the Officers, warned them by a circular letter of the culpability of the course they were pursuing, and the obligation which would attach upon him to bring to punishment the leaders in such a proceeding, he now comes forward, with the most indecent inconsistency and disregard of the duty of his high station, to abet all the discontents of the Officers, and all the accumulations of their extravagant pretensions, “to do every thing in his power” “to protect their rights and redress their grievances;” and with a plain intimation that the Government will not be *generous* or *just* if it does not also espouse their cause. It was not possible General Macdowall and the Army must not have been aware that the Government could give no countenance to such
a pro-

a proceeding; that it was a proceeding in defiance of subordination and positive rule, at the most exceptionable time which could have been chosen; and that General Macdowall's part in it was a flagrant insult to the Government. If the Government had then proceeded to inflict punishment upon General Macdowall, and to expose to the Officers, in General Orders, their highly blameable conduct, they would certainly have still been within the line which the case warranted; but they took the least notice of this proceeding that was possible, compatibly with their duty. They only stated, in answer to the Commander in Chief, that they could not view the sentiments contained in the Memorial without extreme disapprobation, and that they would suspend the final disposal of that paper until it had been laid before the Supreme Government—no notice whatever is taken of the conduct of General Macdowall. Does this look like harshness, severity, arbitrary, oppressive proceeding, of which so much is said in the Dissents? Like any desire to irritate or provoke, or to indulge an unconciliatory spirit? And we wish those who see in the proceeding of the Madras Government, on this trying occasion, a want of conciliation, would be pleased to explain how that principle could otherwise have been applied here. Do they think it could have been hoped, that solicitations on the part of Government, if such could have been used to individuals, would have broken the confederacy? Or that soothing speeches would have made the confederacy relinquish their objects? To expect any thing of this sort argues, in our opinion, a most erroneous conception of the very serious nature of this case. This was not, as we have remarked on another occasion, the sudden ebullition of a new impulse; it was the progress of a long existing principle, now much invigorated by additional influences, and grown to a size truly formidable. The Government seem to have had a just idea of their situation and their duty; and to have had far higher and better objects than the indulgence of tempers and humours of their own. They appear to have been sensible that there was danger, and that they ought to maintain their legitimate authority with temperate firmness. In our humble judgment, this was

*Inquiry how
and what conciliation
could
have applied in
the case of that
Memorial.*

the true line of policy in their circumstances, and will be so in all similar cases in our Indian Governments.

It was the more necessary to act upon these principles at this crisis, because the military faction, though the most formidable, was not the only one the Government had to guard against.

Factions in the Civil branch of the community, which strengthened the insubordination of the Military.

There were also factions among the Civilians which, excited by private and personal interests, were most active in decrying the Government, and exceedingly increased the prejudices against Sir G. Barlow. These, though in themselves less formidable, added to the confidence of the military combination, and derived encouragement from it. With these it was natural that a man taking the line General Macdowall did, should fraternize; and of the fact of his having done so, there is sufficient evidence.

We wished to advert in the briefest manner possible to these collateral circumstances, our main subject being amply sufficient for one paper; but so much reference has been made to them in the Dissents,* and we think with such extreme incorrectness, that it becomes indispensable somewhat to enlarge our view of them.

* Mr. Elphinstone's Dissent, 15 Oct. 1809, Mr. Pattison's 21 April 1810.

The other Dissents of the latter period dwell on the unpopularity of Sir G. Barlow.

† Letter of 5th February 1810, para. 15.

Rise of the unpopularity of Sir G. Barlow.

We must begin, however, with observing, that it would now seem "unpopularity had accompanied Sir G. Barlow to Fort " St. George." Until we saw Lord Minto's late dispatch † we were not apprised of this fact, nor prepared for it, by the general character which, as far as our knowledge went, a long course of distinguished service in Bengal had established for Sir G. Barlow. The cause, however, is highly to his honour—" a firm and faithful discharge of ungracious and unpopular, " but sacred and essential duties, not sought or relished by " himself, but cast, by circumstances peculiar to the times, on " the period of his administration in Bengal." This is a cause that should endear a servant to his employers; and it more intelligibly accounts for Sir G. Barlow's unpopularity at Madras, than a reason assigned by Mr. Petrie—" his wishing, in almost every case,

Observations on Mr. Petrie's account of that unpopularity.

“ case, to make Bengal the standard or criterion for conducting the affairs of this Government.” * We do not discover on the records, nor have we heard from any other quarter, of any material change made by Sir G. Barlow, in the manner of transacting the public business. It is sufficiently understood, that the earlier establishment and longer practice of the Bengal Government in the exercise of territorial dominion, have given a priority and an advancement to its institutions, which have made them, in very important branches of administration, models to the other Presidencies: and if Sir G. Barlow saw that, in any of the details of business also, the improvements of Bengal could be grafted on the usages of Madras, it was his duty to recommend the change. But the language of Mr. Petrie implies, that he must have attempted this upon a very large scale, and almost immediately after his arrival. “ On general principles,” † says Mr. Petrie, “ respecting policy, finance, commerce, and revenue, an uniformity of system is just and beneficial to the public interests; but in the details of business, and in arrangements which are affected by local circumstances, by physical or moral distinctions, amongst the native inhabitants, it is unwise and inexpedient to attempt it. Experience universally admits, that the laws, customs, forms, and practice, which may be beneficial to one State, Government, society, or people, may form irreconcilable differences, and be radically and totally inapplicable to others.” We are not able to collect very definite ideas from these passages, nor prepared to contend for such a sweeping uniformity of principle as Mr. Petrie approves: and we think that changes in the modes of transacting business, especially changes for the better, among Europeans, need be attended with little difficulty. But what “ arrangements affected by or affecting the *physical and moral distinctions of the native inhabitants*,” has Sir G. Barlow attempted? The natives have been perfectly quiet and loyal when Europeans were setting them a very bad example. Has Sir G. Barlow endeavoured to introduce *laws, customs, or even forms and practice* irreconcilable, totally and radically inapplicable to the natives and Europeans of Fort St. George? Certainly if his numerous enemies could have quoted instances of this kind,

† Printed Statement, p. 7—8.

we have no reason to imagine we should not have heard of them: and it would have been well if Mr. Petrie had been more particular, and if there were such innovations, had officially marked his opposition to them, instead of intimating them for the first time in terms vague, but likely to instil prejudice in persons at a distance who, seeing some of the general positions plausible, may likewise infer that there has been reason for the application.

The case of Mr. Sherson, a civil servant, mail, a party question.

If Sir G. Barlow, from the performance of ungracious duties, brought unpopularity with him from Bengal, it appears that he was unfortunate in being called to a new occasion of the same kind soon after his arrival at Fort St. George. We allude to the case of Mr. Sherson. As the Court have not yet decided upon this case, we should think it premature to give a final judgment upon it, had we completely gone through the two large folios which are filled with the documents concerning it.

* Mr. Pattison's Dissent, 24th April 1810.

View taken of it in some of the Dissents.

But Mr. Pattison * having declared it as his opinion not only that, in every case in which Sir G. Barlow and Mr. Petrie, have differed, (and consequently in this,) " Mr. Petrie was right, " and Sir G. Barlow wrong," but having condemned Sir G. Barlow specifically for his conduct towards Mr. Sherson, we deem it necessary to say, that the perusal of the principal papers in this discussion, including the Minutes of Mr. Petrie in defence of Mr. Sherson, has not impressed us with Mr. Pattison's view of the subject. Neither are we prepared to go with him in the peremptory sentence he has pronounced upon the collateral case of Mr. Cecil Smith, which the Court have never hitherto had the adequate means of considering, because a material document relating to it has been lost in the missing ships, and has not yet been supplied. The removal, however, from one department to another, which Mr. Pattison censures, is common in the service, and, for very sound reasons, ought to continue so. The charge against Mr. Sherson was of the most serious nature, and several weighty articles in it appear to remain unanswered. Sir G. Barlow is accused not, as far as we can perceive, of having punished a person positively and clearly innocent, but of proceeding harshly and severely, contrary to the

the rules of the service, against a person whose guilt was not established, but was still under examination by a suit in the Supreme Court. This is Mr. Petrie's view of the case, and according to him, the ground of the unpopularity incurred on this account by Sir G. Barlow with the Madras service. Now, if we understand the matter aright, the question referred to the Supreme Court respecting Mr. Sherson is, whether he is liable to the Company, for the money embezzled in the Grain Department? His conduct as Superintendent of that Department, is a distinct question which it belongs to the Company and their Government to decide upon. This affair did not originate with Sir G. Barlow. He found, on his arrival, a Committee sitting to investigate it. That Committee, composed of Madras servants, declared Mr. Sherson guilty. Messrs. Oakes and Casamajor, old Madras servants, composing the majority of the Counsellors, also concurred in that decision. Sir G. Barlow, equally unconnected with all the parties, could apparently have no motive except the assertion of public principle and the performance of public duty. But whilst, at the best, the cause could only be considered as doubtful, the Madras servants have loaded Sir G. Barlow with more odium than ought to have attached to him, if it had indeed been proved that the Committee and the majority of the Counsellors as well as himself had erred in their judgment. This has been signally made the cause of party and faction, and the subject of inflammatory invectives against Sir G. Barlow, of whose tyranny and injustice Mr. Sherson has been held up as the victim. But we in this country ought not to adopt the violent language and feelings of party, even if we had decided that the Madras Government had formed an inaccurate judgment on the case: still less ought we to do so now, when the decision of the Court of Directors may yet be, that they have acted as the justice of the case and their duty demanded. And if it should indeed appear, that such has been the conduct of the Government, what would the act of the authorities at home be but a kind of *felo de se*, if they were to join in the reprobation of that conduct? Yet such in effect is the spirit and the language of the Dissents now before us—"arbitrary and oppressive measures, from their
" violence

* Mr. Elphinstone's Dissent, 25 April 1810.

† Dissent by Sir F. Baring and Sir H. Inglis.

"violence universally disapproved*"—"harsh unconciliatory measures—ignorance of the habits and manners of Madras"—the servants are and must be disgusted."† These expressions, and many more of the same tenour in the Dissents, which are quite in unison with the general current of the party accusations transmitted from Madras, (and not the less party accusations because adopted by great numbers,) derive their origin very much from this affair of Mr. Sherson's. But if the Government, honestly solicitous for purity in the exercise of public trusts, should adopt an erroneous proceeding in any case—(a supposition the suggestion of which obliges us to add that it is by no means our intention to imply they did act erroneously in the present instance)—the Court of Directors, were they to join with discontented parties in decrying and reprobating that Government, would, in fact, strike a blow at their own authority.

Proceedings in relation to the Carnatic Debts became the source of violent opposition to the Government.

As Sir George Barlow did not seek this affair of Mr. Sherson's, so, in the next business that occasioned and increased popular ferment, it is evident from the Records, that he was called on to act either by circumstances which originated in the time of the preceding Government, or by public requisition, with which he thought it his duty to comply. We speak of the proceedings relative to the Carnatic debts. The Arcot Durbar was, for at least forty years, a source of corruption and faction in the Presidency of Madras. The baneful influence of its system has continued after the extinction of its power and the transfer of its territory. In disobedience of all the orders of the Company, Europeans became to an immense amount creditors of the Nabobs of Arcot. The liquidation of the bonds granted by those Nabobs occasioned, during their lives, repeated agitations in the Settlement of Madras. Since their decease, new and more violent feuds have sprung from the same source. Their real remaining debts were estimated to exceed the enormous sum of four millions sterling, part, no doubt, incurred for money borrowed, and fair services received. The Company, having acquired the territory, entered some years ago into an agreement with the creditors, for the liquidation

tion of their claims. Commissioners were, in consequence, appointed to act in India and in England for the examination of them. Those in India were to sit at Madras. The Government of that Presidency were desired to afford them all due assistance; but, to exclude local influences, they were to be selected from the Bengal service. The reputation of the three gentlemen so chosen, for ability and integrity, has remained unimpaired amidst all the storms of faction. When they entered on their office about the month of April 1808, Madras swarmed with forged Nabob's bonds, which seemed exceedingly to have increased from the time it was known that a plan of liquidation was on foot. The claims given in to the Commissioners have amounted in all to 29 millions sterling!

From some questions respecting forgeries, vehement disputes and animosities arose at Madras, and a numerous, active party, was hence formed against the Government. Government, upon the advice of a Committee appointed to enquire into the nature and extent of the forgeries of Nabob's bonds, had, in order to check that practice, directed the Company's law officers to institute a prosecution against Paupiah Braminy, an intriguing native, of recorded infamy, for forging a bond of 46,000 pagodas. This man, on the other hand, accused Reddy Row, a native Officer of character, confidentially employed by the Commissioners for investigating the debts; of the same crime of forgery. The Commissioners before whom this accusation came, carefully examined into the charge; pronounced Reddy Row innocent, and advised the prosecution of the witnesses in the cause for perjury, by the law officers of the Company; to which Government assented. Paupiah, however, found means to anticipate these measures, by prosecuting Reddy Row for forgery in the Supreme Court; and he was abetted by several European creditors of the Nabob. The disputes and litigations that grew out of these circumstances went to great length. For a very brief sketch of the leading facts, as connected with our main subject, but still too long to be inserted here, we beg leave to refer to the annexed paper.*

*Brief Review of
the Proceedings
relative to the
Carnatic Debts,
in an Appendix.*

* Vide App.

Observations on the conduct of Government relative to those Proceedings which created opposition in the Civil community.

† Mr. Petrie's Minute.

‡ Dissent.

The conduct which the Fort St. George Government was led to adopt in the course of these proceedings, seems to have been dictated solely by a desire to support the cause of public principle and public good; the just authority of the Commissioners for the Carnatic Debts, and of the Government itself. We are not aware that the support given to the Commissioners, which Mr. Petrie † calls *unlimited*, was carried beyond the point to which, under existing circumstances, it might fairly have been asked and given. Mr. Petrie has not explained, nor do we see what was *unconstitutional* in the measures adopted by Government for the defence of two persons whom they deemed innocent and oppressed; and that those measures were intended to "influence the juries," or to do any thing more than to bring forth truth, whatever might have been said of their "tendency," there is not the least evidence: that they had no such effect is plain from the event. "Of the severe punishment which," Mr. Petrie says in his *Statement*, "was inflicted on those who concurred in the verdict against the two men," punishment which Mr. Pattison ‡ also inveighs against under the terms of "shameful vindictiveness," neither of these gentlemen has given any proof or particular; nor is any mention made of such a circumstance in Mr. Petrie's *Minute*, which Sir George Barlow had an opportunity of seeing. All we have heard, is, that whilst some persons who served as jurymen were advanced to stations of respectability and advantage, two were, for general impropriety of conduct, removed to stations distant from the Presidency. These facts do not warrant the charge of Mr. Petrie and Mr. Pattison; and we must therefore be allowed to suspend our assent to what appears to us very improbable until it is substantiated.

It is most true, that the interference of Government in these affairs proved very unfortunate to themselves, and to those whom they thought it a duty to support; but that does not at all decide it to have been culpable. Many of those who condemned it, and particularly the leading persons among the Carnatic Creditors, had a direct private interest; and it is not unreasonable to suppose they might have felt the influence of a principle

principle so operative. It has not been insinuated that Sir George Barlow had any private interest, unless to avoid the painful task of conflicting with that of others. To this conflict his sense of duty led him, and, as it proved, at the expence of much of the peace and popularity of his Government.

The opposition of part of the Civil community of Fort St. George, and the prejudices of others against the Government, were, in the course of those judicial trials, carried to a still greater height, and coalesced with the insubordination of the Army, and the factious conduct of General Macdowall, who is known to have been present in the Hall of the Supreme Court at the most popular harangues delivered there, and on the motion of persons in open opposition to Government, was complimented with an address and a service of plate. It is indeed said in some of the Dissents,* and by Mr. Petrie, that in these marks of attention to him, persons of different parties concurred, and that they were paid only on the score of his private and social qualities. But the names which appear to the address, with the exception of two or three military men, who may have had personal obligation or attachment, are clearly of the description just mentioned; and the address itself professes respect to him on account of his *uniform public and private conduct*.

Of Sir F. Baring
and Sir H. Leigh,
and Mr. Elphinstone.

The occurrences which come next in order are the Farewell Address of General Macdowall to the Army, and his last General Order censuring Lieutenant Colonel Muuro. In the former, *he appeals to the Army against the Court of Directors*, because they had not appointed the Commander in Chief to a seat in Council. Mr. Elphinstone says, he finds no cause to quarrel with the word "Representative" here.† In the Court's Dispatch, however, to Fort St. George,‡ the objectionable nature of the term "Representative" has been distinctly shown; but the seditious tenour of the address is surely cause enough of "quarrel." General Macdowall's Order conveys to the Army a marked and gross insult to the Government, whom it was his duty and theirs to support. The character of these papers is so flagrantly seditious, that though their strongest features have

General Macdowall's Farewell Address to the Army, and his General Order, censuring Lt. Col. Muuro for appealing to the Government.

* Dissent, 15th Oct. bet 1809.

† — — —, 15th Sept. bet 1809.

been by many left too much out of view, we shall forbear, as thinking it unnecessary, to insist on this topic. The question we have to consider is, what was the course Government ought to have pursued after coming to the knowledge of the General

Mr. Petrie's Observations on the conduct of Government ought to have pursued on that occasion; with Remarks in answer.

* Statement, p. 11.

Order? Mr. Petrie states the question to have been—"shall we proceed on principles of severity and coercion, or on those of dignified firmness, moderation and expediency?"* We confess we do not collect any definite meaning from these generalities. The immediate question was not about severity or moderation, (as to the application of which terms there might be great diversity of opinion,) but about what, under existing circumstances, propriety and duty required on the part of Government. Mr. Petrie has, in entering upon this subject, observed, "that Government had to consider, not the extent of their power to punish General Macdowall, but to adopt such measures as were best calculated to counteract the effects we apprehended, and to prevent injury to the public interests." He thinks, "any personal severity towards General Macdowall ought to have been cautiously avoided, as what would most certainly increase the agitation in the military mind, and that while the supreme authority of Government was vindicated by the publication of an appropriate General Order to the Army, the General should have been allowed to leave India without any further marks of displeasure." He censures the measures adopted in respect to General Macdowall, "as lowering the respectability of Government:"—"exposing its Councils to the imputation of weakness, undisguised resent-

† Statement, p. 14.

ment, and an useless unavailing degree of rigour:"‡—a view, however, which seems to be contradicted in another place, where he says, "it was observed, that the removal of General Macdowall sufficiently vindicated the authority of Government, and exhibited to the Army a memorable proof that the supreme power is vested in the Civil authority."§ But he goes on in the place first quoted, to say, that if the Commander in Chief had been allowed to depart without "these useless manifestations of resentment, he and the Order would have

† Statement, pp. 11-15.

§ Statement, pp. 14-15.

been forgotten in the course of a few weeks."§ Mr. Elphinstone, after strongly expressing the same sentiments of the proceedings

proceedings of Government, says, that "General Gowdie should
 " have been directed to explain to the Army the impropriety of
 " the Order and the displeasure of Government ; and that if a
 " moderate course of this sort had been pursued, he has no
 " doubt the General and his discontent would have sunk into
 " oblivion in a very few days *."

* Dissent, 15th
 Oct. 1809, which
 was six months
 before Mr. Petrie's
 Statement appeared
 in London.

These strictures, of which the import seems to be adopted into the Dissents, bring immediately into view the question of *Conciliation*. They are to be found (as we have had occasion to remark with respect to other passages) in Mr. Petrie's Statement, (pp. 14 and 15.) which Sir G. Barlow never, as we are led to suppose, and must again observe, had an opportunity of perusing. In Mr. Petrie's Minute, taken from that *Statement* and laid before the Board, there is not the least appearance of the insinuation which seems to be intended here; that the indulgence of resentment against General Macdowall, or a " vindictive childishness," as Mr. Elphinstone has expressed it, was a leading object with the Government. If Mr. Petrie thought so, it was his duty to have pointed it out on the Records. He forbore to do this publicly, even when freely charging Sir G. Barlow with other things, but he conveys it in a Statement, of which the party impeached has no knowledge. It is saying less than the occasion might warrant to observe, that as such private unsupported insinuations are in their nature no evidence, so they ought, in every view, to be peremptorily rejected. Respecting the measures adopted by Government against General Macdowall, it is not to be wondered at, that the adherents of that Officer should put a very invidious construction upon them; but as such persons were generally the adversaries of Government, it was less to be expected that its " exposing its Counsels to the imputation of weakness " should be a subject of their animadversion. The mere opinions, assertions or insinuations of opponents of any description, proceeding too from private or anonymous sources, are certainly no evidence; and the recorded declarations of Government may be taken as a full counterbalance to them. The Government repeatedly declare, that they have acted from deliberate conviction,

tion, upon public principles of duty and policy : and one quotation from their Letter, written after all the commotions of the Army were subdued, may serve for their own account of their motives, both in respect to the transactions already reviewed, and those yet to be noticed. " We have therefore," say they, " through the whole of these disturbances, been " influenced by an earnest solicitude to suppress a course of " proceedings so pregnant with disastrous consequences ; and " we conceived that this important object would be accom- " plished by a firm but temperate maintenance of our authority, " by pursuing measures equally remote, on the one hand, from " increasing the spirit of insubordination in the Army, by an " appearance of weakness on the part of Government ; and, " on the other, from exciting discontent by undue severity *."

* Letter
from Lord S.
George, 10th Sept.
1810.

Government, that is to say, the majority of the Board, profess to have that object in view, which Mr. Petrie says was the proper one : " the prevention of injury to the public interest." He has no where attempted to prove they had not this object ; but they certainly differed with him as to the mode in which it should be pursued, and they differed with him also as to the state of the Army at that moment, upon which their reasoning must have, in a material degree, proceeded. Mr. Petrie says, " the discontents of the Army *were in their infancy*." Distant they probably were from purposes of actual rebellion ; but they were not in their *infancy* either as to age or stature. He himself, at the opening of his Statement, gives it to be understood that they were " *considerable*." The mass of evidence produced and referred to in this Paper, has abundantly shown that a spirit of insubordination had been long and deeply rooted, and was advanced to a great height ; and Mr. Petrie has said, in another place, that to suspend Colonel Capper and Major Boles was to add fuel to " *the flame which was ready to burst forth in every " division of the Army*." Now the removal of General Macdowall and suspension of Major Boles happened on the same day, and Colonel Capper's on the following one. It could not, therefore, have been the removal of General Macdowall, yet unknown, which raised this flame. Mr. Petrie entirely over-looks

looks the whole series of General Macdowall's offensive and criminal proceedings, and speaks of his General Order in terms which are surprising. It was, he says, "*intemperate*," (in another place "*disrespectful*") and "*the publication of it might and probably had a tendency to increase the discontents.*" How different is the language of a conspicuous Military character, Colonel Malcolm, certainly not wanting in attachment to the Army. "General Macdowall," says he, "set an example of that contumely and insubordination which it is his particular duty to repress. There is no calculating the mischief of such proceedings. It is waving a torch over a magazine†." Nothing can be more evident, than that the General Order was a most seditious paper, thrown into the midst of an Army prepared by the Commander in Chief to catch the flame it was calculated to kindle. This was not a measure to which he was "*pushed*," and as to which he gave any room for conciliation. He prepared for it in silence, and placed the Government on the defensive. It was a deliberate studied insult to the Government: it taught the Army to consider that power, to which they owed obedience, as the violator of their "*Rights*:" it was calculated to degrade the Government in the public estimation, in the eye of the Army, and in the eye of all India. It co-operated to this end with the acts and views of those in the Civil community, who had openly arraigned the conduct of Government, and with the spirit of hostility to the same power which had, on a variety of occasions, but more particularly during the administration of Lord William Bentinck, even shown itself in the Courts of Law. There seems to have been a very general concurrence to break through those fences with which the constitution of all countries has invested the supreme power, reverence, respect, and subordination; and a contemptuous insolent spirit was, at that very time, risen to a great height. As a Government that suffers itself to be despised cannot duly perform the important functions assigned to it, the business and the duty of the Madras Government, at this moment, was to repress encroachment and faction, and to maintain order and authority unimpaired. The alternative before them was, whether to do this or to submit to degradation.

† Lord Macdowall's
Letter to the
Governor.

degradation. Notwithstanding all the circumstances that have been stated, Mr. Petrie thought it would have been sufficient, in order “ *to vindicate the supreme authority of Government*, that “ *an appropriate General Order* should be published to the Army.” By an *appropriate General Order* it would seem, that he means an order asserting the authority of Government to do that which General Macdowall’s Order had presumed to censure as illegal; that is to say, to pass over the studied intended public insult: an insult respecting a matter, in which the Officers must have had a common feeling with their Commander; and to lay before the same body, whom he had made a tribunal of appeal respecting Army “ *Rights*,” the Rights of the Government. In our apprehension, this would have been a most weak, insufficient and ruinous proceeding: it would have been avowing to the Army—“ *we see ourselves grossly insulted*, but “ *we have not resolution to punish the offence* :” it would have exposed the Government to the derision of all the malcontents, and held out the prospect of impunity to further insults. To have passed such an Order, through the new Commander in Chief, according to Mr. Elphinstone’s idea, would have still more degraded the Government, and placed General Gowdie at once in a state of unpopularity with the Army. These Gentlemen argue as if General Macdowall’s act had been an hasty insulated thing, which interested nobody but himself, and, if let alone, would have died out of memory in a very short time. The Government considered it, however, as a daring advance upon many preceding aggressions, in which numbers sympathized; and in this light we also view it. The whole tenour of Mr. Petrie’s “ *Statement*” and reasoning leaves it to be inferred, that the character and honour of the Government were out of his consideration, and that he had also lost sight of the duty and necessity of maintaining the rights and authority of Government unimpaired; or took it for granted, that this was to be done by a non-resisting kind of management, by yielding, temporizing, and we presume, conciliation. The example of preceding times, however, leads to a different conclusion. With the impunity which former instances of disrespect and violence have experienced, may be connected the
recent

recent evils ; and Mr. Petrie's short Government of three months could not afford a test of his opinion on this head. But to suppose that the spirit of faction and encroachment is to be allayed by passiveness in a Government, is also contrary to reason and to human nature, by the knowledge of which Mr. Petrie represents himself to have been influenced. In fact, the expedients to which he would have trusted, are the expedients of weakness ; and when weakness is evinced nothing can be maintained, nor can any thing yielded have the grace of bounty or prevent further demands. Mr. Petrie's system might have averted off, for a time, an open conflict between authority and usurpation, but must have ended at last either in the establishment of a military despotism, or a contest for the maintenance of legitimate Government. Adventitious events were fully as likely to strengthen military pretensions as to weaken them ; and it must be a miserable state of Government, which would remain depending on contingencies, while a mass existed of discontent and disaffection, ready to break out at the time most favourable for them.

In our opinion, therefore, the Government would have acted most weakly and unwisely, had it not asserted its legitimate authority. There was no room for compromise, and its conduct stands upon the solid basis of adequate facts and unquestionable principles. Could it even have been foreseen that the punishment of General Macdowall would drive the army into open resistance, the Government would not have been justified in passively submitting to its own degradation. But in this, as in every other measure adopted by Government, it ought to be judged according to the circumstances existing at the time, and not by subsequent events which could not then have been reasonably apprehended.

The review of this affair has served to develop the grand principle upon which the Government professes to have acted throughout the whole of the disputes with the Army ; a principle which we certainly hold to be sound and indispensable, namely, that the legitimate constitutional authority of Govern-

*Grand principle
on which the
Government
acted in the dis-
putes with the
Army.*

ment

*Suspension of
Col. Capper and
Major Boles.*

The account given of the conduct of Mr. Petrie's statement, and in the Disent.

Mr. Petrie's answer is not, "I did in Council oppose the suspension of Major Boles, &c." but "I did in various conversations state clearly my opinion of the impolicy of these measures." Besides, General Macdowall's order, censuring Colonel Munro, became known to Government on the 30th January; and their orders for his dismission, and the suspension of Major Boles, were published on 31st, therefore antecedent to these measures; it would seem there could be little room for private conversation, which, however, is not the point in question; but Mr. Petrie says, in his Statement, "It was my duty to state my opinion to Sir G. Barlow, and to use every argument which my reason suggested to prevent the publication of the Order; &c." this is completely false." This account is certainly considerably different from the one given in the Minute.

—Printed Statement, p. 22, and Minute, same publication, p. 26.

ment must, for the sake of the public good, be with temperate firmness of mind maintained entire against insubordination, insult, and encroachment. It will, therefore, be less necessary for us to dwell particularly upon it in considering the subsequent transactions.

The next of these is the suspension of Colonel Capper and Major Boles. It is to be observed, that Mr. Petrie did not oppose this measure in Council*, and in his Minute delivered into the Board, there is no separate specific discussion of it; but in his *Statement*, (pp. 19—23) prepared before the Minute, and since published in this Country, he expatiates upon it in terms of severe censure. To this "fatal" act he ascribes "effects of incalculable magnitude on the security of our power in India," and says, it "has called forth feelings and passions in the military mind, which have shaken the authority of Government to its centre, disorganized and convulsed the Army, brought our most valuable interests into imminent danger, and, he fears, insuperable difficulties." These gentlemen, (Colonel Capper, suspended the 1st February, and Major Boles), were, according to him, "*mere instruments of office*." They transmitted General Macdowall's Order in the "*usual ordinary forms*": the illegality of the Order which was "*assumed could not certainly be known to them*; and a pernicious example of insubordination, a precedent of incalculable mischief, was introduced."

The sentiments of Mr. Elphinstone on this subject very much coincide with those of Mr. Petrie. He says, "the suspension of Officers without a trial (of which, however, Mr. Petrie admits the legality), could not fail to alarm the whole Army; who thus find themselves dependent on the will of a single individual" (meaning the Governor; the Counsellors being considered

* Mr. Petrie's answer is not, "I did in Council oppose the suspension of Major Boles, &c." but "I did in various conversations state clearly my opinion of the impolicy of these measures." Besides, General Macdowall's order, censuring Colonel Munro, became known to Government on the 30th January; and their orders for his dismission, and the suspension of Major Boles, were published on 31st, therefore antecedent to these measures; it would seem there could be little room for private conversation, which, however, is not the point in question; but Mr. Petrie says, in his Statement, "It was my duty to state my opinion to Sir G. Barlow, and to use every argument which my reason suggested to prevent the publication of the Order; &c." this is completely false." This account is certainly considerably different from the one given in the Minute.

considered by Mr. Elphinstone as ciphers), and in the same paper he frankly shows that *he points to the removal of Sir G. Barlow, and the conferring both of the Madras Government and command of the Army upon a General Officer.*

Mr. Bannerman considers the suspension as *illegal*, *Mr. Pattison* as *unjust*. All these gentlemen censure the Government in terms like those already quoted, for want of temper or judgment : and the two former distinctly ascribe to this measure the whole or a great part of the evils that followed.

Declamatory assertion is not the proper matter for argument. Though Mr. Petrie, whom gentlemen seem to follow, ascribes in passages just cited almost every thing to the suspension of those two Officers, he soon after makes the admission above noticed, that *before* their suspension “ the flame was ready to burst forth in every division of the Army.”

The merits of this question, on which the Court has long ago passed a judgment, are, we think, fairly stated in Lord Minto's letter of the 5th February 1810 : and our opinion coincides with the view therein given, both of its justice and its policy ; on which last point, in particular, as we have not expressed ourselves concerning it elsewhere, we desire to be understood as holding the sentiments his Lordship has delivered. *The merits of the question.*

The main point of inquiry is, whether these Officers acted in an insubordinate, factious spirit, well knowing that General Macdowall's publication was calculated to insult the Government and inflame the Army, and cordially co-operating to those ends? Accumulated facts leave no room to doubt that they were the willing, zealous instruments of General Macdowall in his criminal proceeding, and that, without their co-operation, without their transgression of the rules of their office, his purpose would have been frustrated. It is in vain, therefore, that Mr. Petrie and others plead for these Officers, the implicit obedience due to the command of a superior, and their *merely* trans-

mitting, in the usual way, an order which they did not know to be illegal, and saw no right to question. The legal part of this case, is, in our opinion, settled in the letter from the Supreme Government to Fort St. George, of the 27th May 1809, which completely answers Mr. Petrie's reasonings. The cloak of official duty cannot be allowed to cover faction and sedition. Supposing a man desirous conscientiously to perform his duty as Deputy Adjutant General, and to be at the same time equally conscientious to maintain the respect due to Government, and to preserve the subordination of the Army; suppose even such a man to have a persuasion, (hardly indeed to be conceived in this case), that the principle of military obedience might require him to publish a General Order, so plainly insulting and inflammatory, would he, on its coming to him from a Commander no longer within reach of appeal, instead of carrying it in the first instance to Government, *as the rule*, (besides the circumstances of the case), *demanded of him, purposely withhold that communication, not wait for the ordinary means of transmission, but use extraordinary means and extraordinary dispatch to circulate it to the different divisions of the Army, before Government could come to the knowledge of it?* It is not conceivable that he would. But that Major Boles acted in this way is proved by the various documents * noted in the margin, to which we beg leave to refer. That, though the Government were willing, in the spirit of conciliation, to overlook his misconduct on receiving any acknowledgment of it, Major Boles refused such acknowledgment, and gloried in what he had done, is also proved: and the subsequent Address of the Officers to him is conclusive evidence that they regarded him as a meritorious sufferer for their cause. We, therefore, consider him to have been an intentional confederate with General Macdowall, in stirring up sedition in the Army, to have been a grand link in the chain of causes which produced the rebellion, and with some others who promoted the seditious writings which more immediately led to the actual revolt, to be pre-eminent in the guilt of that lamentable and disgraceful period.

* Military Letter from Fort St. George, 28 February 1809. Governor General in Council to Do. 27 May 1809. Lord Vant's to the Secret Committee, 5 Feb. 1810.

The conduct of It is true that the suspension of those two Staff Officers appears

appears to have further inflamed the Army, and precipitated their advances in the course of insubordination and opposition ; but where did the blame lie ? If, as we think we have already proved, it was the duty of Government to preserve itself from degradation and insult, could they, after having most justly inflicted punishment on General Macdowall, who was no longer on the scene, overlook in silence the confederates in his crime still present, and thus leave it to be understood, that they were resolute only against the absent ? It was impossible, without yielding to that seditious contumacy which had brought the question to a trial, whether military intemperance and insubordination should prevail against legitimate authority. They were here again shut out from any fair means of conciliation, and reduced to one alternative. Upon the sound principles of government and of policy on which Sir G. Barlow and his coadjutors acted, they were necessitated to resist the openly factious and persevering contempt of Major Boles. We have no hesitation in affirming, contrary to the supposition of Mr. Petrie,* that, if the Government had pursued another course, its authority *would* have been weakened, and consequences produced fatally injurious to discipline and subordination. But Mr. Petrie's mode of arguing in this case, by supposing that to overlook misconduct would not have been attended with certain specified evils, and, in the case of General Macdowall, that his dismissal did not produce certain specified advantages, seems to us nugatory, and evasive of the essential considerations in question. Supposing that General Macdowall's dismissal " did " not intimidate nor convince, did not improve the subordination of the Army, nor strengthen the bonds of obedience," &c.† the measure was nevertheless a measure of duty agreeable to the principles of good government : sedition is not to be cured by leaving it to itself, or by yielding to it. The issue only proves that the disorder was inveterate and progressive, needing stronger remedies. And we must here protest against that principle on which many now argue, and which lies at the foundation of all the Dissents before us, that is, to charge to the Government the consequences which have followed from its maintenance of its lawful authority against military insubordi-

the Government in respect to Col. Capper and Major Boles, considered.

* Statement, 20.

† Mr Petrie, 30.

nation and arrogance. According to this preposterous and pernicious doctrine, the more audaciously a military body advances in the paths of disobedience and opposition, the more culpable is the Government in resisting them. And such, in truth, is the import of Mr. Petrie's reasoning.

Obliged as we are by a sense of duty to deliver these opinions, we cannot continue our subject without deploring the astonishing excesses to which the Military proceeded. It was in an evil hour indeed, (to use Mr. Petrie's expression) that they first listened to the poisoned discourses of General Macdowall, and the criminal suggestions of those connexions of his, who, after his departure, by combinations and writings, carried on the infatuated work of sedition which he had begun.

Had it even been indisputable that the Government were wrong in their conduct towards Colonel Capper and Major Boles, it did not belong to the Army to enter into cabals, combinations, and remonstrances against that proceeding. They should have left it to those Officers, individually to apply to their superiors, and have patiently referred to their decision. But "from this period," says Mr. Petrie, "to the publication of the Order of the 1st May, including the space of near three months, every day produced some new manifestation of their feeling, communicated in letters, addresses, appeals, and manifestoes. Their writings breathed a spirit of insubordination and resistance, which could only be tolerated on grounds of expediency, policy, or necessity."*

* Printed Statement, p. 24

Seditious Address of the Officers, to Major Boles.

Among those writings, was an Address from the Officers of the Madras Army, to Major Boles, publicly and strongly condemning the conduct of the Government towards him; settling a provision for him to the full amount of the pay and Staff allowances of which he had been deprived; making, moreover, his cause their own, and undertaking for similar mutual support to be given and received by all Officers, who might suffer through any such exceptionable measures on the part of the Civil Government.

Another

"Another Paper, still more remarkable, was a Memorial, or more properly, a threatening remonstrance to Lord Minto, from the Officers, in which all their claims, and those of General Macdowall, are repeated; the conduct of the Court of Directors and the Government is censured: the pretension to a seat in Council for the "Representative of the Army," and to an independent Military authority, is advanced; and the Governor General in Council is required, in order to save "the extreme crisis of their agitation," to remove the Governor placed over them."

Seditious Memorial to Lord Minto, prepared by the Officers.

The principles and views publicly advanced in these Papers, which were circulated for signatures in the principal divisions of the Army, have been, on former occasions, so fully considered, and are indeed so plain, that it must be quite unnecessary to dwell upon them. Military Officers combine to support each other against the Government which they are bound to obey; they form themselves into a deliberative body, to arraign and controul the proceedings of their superiors; arrogate Military rights, independent of what they term the Civil power, and, in the moment of professing loyalty to their Country, revolt against its laws, by requiring the removal of the Governor, placed over them by virtue of those laws, with a threat, that if this is not done, they will proceed to act for themselves.

* Note. — If the Government, in writing of the framers of this Paper, had used the term *conspirators*, as Mr. Patten seems to say they did ("charging and condemning, *say, as you use words such as the Madras Government*) the Officers therein named as *conspirators* to subvert the Government does not seem that they could be accused of much inaccuracy.

Mr. Petrie, in his Statement, (page 25) treats the demand of removing of Sir G. Barlow, as a "wild, extravagant, foolish attempt, receiving no support from the general sentiments and approbation of the Army." However the attempt may deserve those epithets, it does not follow that it was not mischievous and highly seditious, had it even been proposed only, as he says, by "some divisions of the Army;" but its being comprehended in terms of menace in the Memorial generally circulated, gives a different view of it.

Mr. Petrie * also observes, "it was satisfactory to find, except in those *intemperate* and highly *disrespectful* productions, there was no apparent disposition shown to disobey or oppose " the

* Statement, p. 29.

"the constituted authorities;" that is, we suppose, by open actual resistance to the orders of Government, (of which, however, one prohibited all combinations); but we really conceive, that when an Army had gone so far as to circulate seditious writings, in direct opposition to the Government, and in them, besides setting up many other claims, to demand, that in order "to prevent the extreme crisis of their agitation, their Government might be removed," they were well advanced towards open disobedience; and that it would have been unwise in the Government to have waited until they had actually arrived at that extreme. These circumstances, therefore, must be considered as very important additions to the "alarming symptoms" of an *organized determination to compel Government to grant* "a redress of grievances," which, Mr. Petrie * says, had been "formed in most of the principal stations of the Army," before the 1st of May; though such a determination, doubtless, involved in its principles every other evil, supposing Government not to submit to their demands, which would have more certainly led to its final subjugation.

* *Statemehl*, p. 25.

Mr. Petrie's account seems to import, that matters were come to extremity *before* the 1st of May. Government certainly thought that disaffection and sedition had spread so far, as to require immediate measures for their suppression. What hope remained on the side of Government, for rational or honourable conciliation, we cannot discover; but General Gowdie's circular letter, of the 5th March, to the Commanding Officers of Divisions, calling on them to suppress all improper addresses and memorials, and his other circular letter on the subject of the address to Major Boles, were intended to prevent the progress of sedition, and the necessity of interference on the part of Government. These strong calls from the Head of the Army had no material effect. The address to Major Boles was forced upon the notice of Government. It was an act of open sedition. The memorial to the Governor General, a still more desperate measure, had been more concealed; and the decided support which Lord Minto was found to give to the proceedings of the Madras Government, stopped the progress of it; but,

as that Government very justly reasoned, those Officers who had been most active in framing and circulating that dangerous paper, "which had not failed of its design from any want of boldness or malignity on their part, could not be considered as any longer fit to be intrusted with the command of men and arms, which they insinuated the intention of eventually turning against the State."

These principles led to the suspensions of the 1st May, which were confined to those Officers of superior rank, few in number, who appeared by evidence, in our judgment sufficiently conclusive, and of which, though Colonel Bannerman * has arraigned it, no part has, to our knowledge, been disproved, to have been most active in the formation and circulation of the Memorial. For the address to Major Boles, Captain Grant, who had ostentatiously proclaimed himself to Government a subscriber to it, was the only person who suffered suspension from the service. The incontrovertible grounds of these proceedings were explained in the General Order announcing them. The Memorial, it is there said, "is not more hostile to the authority of this Government than to the first principles of all government. It maintains opinions directly adverse to the Constitution of the British Service, and is calculated to destroy every foundation of discipline, obedience, and fidelity." And the address to Major Boles is justly said to be "incompatible with the military character, and repugnant to the fundamental principle of military discipline and government."

Suspension of certain Officers, on the 1st May, 1809.

* Dissent of Col. Bannerman.

To these proceedings, the accusations so frequent in the Dissents,† of arbitrary and violent conduct in the Madras Government, probably in part refer; but they are particularly arraigned by Colonel Bannerman as "oppressive," and by Mr. Pattison as "unjust and impolitic;" as "setting fire to the match already prepared by preceding aggravations," &c. Surely, gentlemen who accumulate such terms of condemnation on this and other acts of the Madras Government, do not mean that the seditious proceedings which were assigned as the grounds of

View given in the Dissents of this proceeding.

† Particularly those of Sir F. Baring and Sir H. Inglis, Mr. Elphinstone, Mr. Pattison, and Col. Bannerman.

the

the measure of the first of May were not realities, or that the Government should have taken no notice of them, but have passively suffered sedition to advance from one step to another? They have blamed the course pursued, but no one has intimated what was to be done in such an alarming conjuncture, excepting indeed to appeal to a Court Martial; to which point we shall presently speak. It is in vain to resort here to the word *conciliation*, unless concession (and concession at the very worst time) be really meant. It is sufficiently obvious that nothing else would have produced even a temporary calm.

• Dissent by Col.
Bannerman.
Ditto by Mr.
Faulstich.

*The question
concerning the
trial of seditions
Officers by
Courts Martial.*

It is stated, as a distinct ground of objection, by the two gentlemen just named, * that the Officers accused were punished without a trial, which, according to the constitution of the Army, they ought to have had before a Military Tribunal. To that proceeding, of which there will hereafter be occasion to take further notice, the same objection has been urged in other Dissents. We must own the necessity, and therefore the propriety, of the measure adopted by Government, appears to us very clear. The martial law seems to pre-suppose the great body of the Military, by whom it is to be administered, to be in a state of loyalty and subordination to Government, and prepared to punish the violation of those duties; but the Legislators could not mean, nor can the safety of any Government admit, that, if the military body in general are engaged in a course of measures hostile to the State, it is to be left to those so confederated to determine upon the guilt or innocence of each other. Common sense revolts at this idea, which would require an adherence to the form, at the sacrifice of the substance of justice. Whenever the Military body, which is formed only to serve and protect the state, shows unequivocal symptoms of a disposition to resist or controul it, the State must have a perfect right to remove that body from its service; and the same in respect to individuals, without even, in their case, resorting to a Court Martial; and still less is this resort to be expected when the offenders, from the generality of the offence, can hardly be referred to judges who may not be parties in the same guilt. This, we presume, is the practice in all countries; and

if the propriety of it needed any illustration, we have only to look at a large body of the Madras Officers soon after, publicly demanding of Government that Lieutenant Colonel Innes, who had maintained his loyalty in the command of Masulipatam, and had been deposed by the revolted Officers of that garrison, should be brought to a Court Martial for his general conduct there. In circumstances such as these, in which the Madras Government and the Madras Army were placed, it is entirely probable that the demand for proof would have been unusually rigorous, the means of furnishing it, even in cases of certain delinquency, unusually difficult, and the delay great; so that a reference to Courts Martial in such a crisis of extraordinary agitation and resistance to Government, was, in the opinion of the Governor General, more likely to produce triumph than restraint to sedition; and the Madras Government felt itself reduced to the necessity of opposing its own power to that of the malcontents, or to expose to subversion that authority with which it had been entrusted.

Decided friends as we are to freedom of opinion justly exercised upon public subjects, we cannot on this principle help thinking, that, on such affairs as we are now discussing, affairs remote from the observation of persons here, considerable attention is due to the judgment of the Indian Governments. Sir G. Barlow had the strongest motives, personal as well as public, to deter him from entering needlessly or wantonly into those scenes of peril in which he has been an actor. He had a much greater stake depending, and much nearer opportunities of judging of persons and things than any of those who, in this country, sit in judgment on his conduct; and every authentic information, public and private, satisfies us that those who conceive him to be of a rash and violent temper, utterly mistake his character. Mr. Oakes, one of the Members of the Madras Council, is known to be a man of ability who thinks for himself, and Mr. Casamaijor has the reputation of an honourable man and a good servant of the Company. The unanimous judgment of the Bengal Government too, so near the scene of action, and having so deep an interest in it, is surely entitled to

*Observations on
the proceedings
of Government
on the 1st May
1809.*

Construction given in one of the Dissents to the commendation bestowed by Lord Minto on Sir G. Barlow; and Observations thereon.

• Sir F. Baring and Sir H. Inglis.

regard. No responsibility can well be greater than Lord Minto's in respect to the measures that have been pursued by the Fort St. George Government. He has given them his cordial approbation, has defended them by his reasonings, and bestowed the highest commendations upon Sir G. Barlow. One of the Dissents * indeed takes the extraordinary liberty of advancing, "that Lord Minto's opinion as well as his conduct, in upholding, and applauding Sir G. Barlow, *must be considered as purely political*; as what, in his opinion, would produce the best possible effect on the mind of the Army." But Lord Minto, in all his letters to the Court of Directors and to the Secret Committee, in those written from Bengal as well as at Madras, all of them unknown to the Army, has expatiated, in still stronger terms, and with evident pleasure and cordiality, upon the merits of Sir G. Barlow, and has warmly recommended that those merits be distinguished by public honours and rewards. By such glosses as this, all facts and characters may be explained away. But if the authors of the Dissent think that the Governor General, "surrounded by a mutinous Army, acted wisely in holding up and applauding Sir G. Barlow, as what, in his opinion, would produce the best possible effect on the mind of the Army," may we not ask whether they think it also wise, whilst it is too well known the ferments in that Army have not yet subsided, and are likely to be excited again by auxiliary agitations in this country; whether they think it wise in Directors to take a quite contrary course, in written opinions intended to be made public, to vilify and degrade Sir G. Barlow and his measures? Will this likewise "have the best possible effect on the mind of the Army," or the tranquillity of the country?—The same Dissent represents Sir George Barlow himself as dealing in a way still more extraordinary with his own character, as having "broadly stated to the Madras Army," when in the height of rebellion, "that every measure" (meaning obviously every measure characterized in the Dissent as severe, oppressive, &c.) "he had adopted, from the first order respecting General Macdowall to the unhappy expedient of the 26th of July, *had directly and immediately been the cause of the increased discontents of the Army, their intemperate*

“ remonstrances, and subsequent acts of violence.” The scope of the able Paper * here alluded to is directly contrary to all this. It sets before the Officers the long series of their seditious proceedings, with a view still to bring them back to reason, loyalty, and obedience. It refers to various means used by Government in the way of counsel, admonition, warning, moderation, and forbearance under strong provocations, to lead them to a sense of their duty, and of the danger of the course they were pursuing. It expresses deep regret that these measures of moderation, these repeated and urgent appeals to the discipline, duty, national attachment, and professional honour of the Company's Officers proved ineffectual; that seditious Memorials still continued to be circulated, and sentiments of sedition to be openly declared in many parts of the Army; and then it goes on to state “ that the further forbearance of Government would have “ encouraged the progress of these evils; that a course of “ explanation and exhortation had been pursued in vain, and it “ became imperiously necessary to check, by a salutary example “ of punishment, a spirit of insubordination that threatened “ the most dangerous consequences to the prosperity of the “ Empire.” This example (of the 1st May) confined still to a small number of leading offenders, did not arrest the progress of sedition, which equally resisted measures of forbearance and punishment. A systematic course of aggression and insubordination, a determined spirit of revolt at length forced the Government to adopt decided measures for the support of its own authority; having only the alternative of pursuing this course, or being guilty of the most criminal dereliction of duty in confirming the evils of sedition and Mutiny, by submission to a body of men placed by law under its authority.

• General Order
12th August 1879

Such is the tenour of this paper, still intended to bring the Officers to reflection: but the Dissent would pervert the whole, and place to those measures of prevention, which the aggressions of the Officers forced Government to adopt in self-defence; measures entirely approved by the Supreme Government, and known to the Army to be so (though the Dissents in general quite overlook these material facts) it would place to them those

evils produced by the inveterate, persevering spirit of sedition and revolt. We hope to be pardoned in some repetition for the sake of illustrating this method of judging of the conduct of Sir G. Barlow. It extends to small things as well as to great. We are told by gentlemen who have not been within 12,000 miles of Sir G. Barlow during all these transactions, "that, " excepting in a very few favourites, in every look and every " gesture he perceives treason and rebellion."

† Discant of Sir F.
Barlow and Sir H.
Ligon.

Further Observations on the Government proceeding of the 1st May.

The preceding observations may serve at the same time to convey our sentiments of the measure of the 1st of May, to which stage of the history we now come. It appears to us that Government then met an evil which would have become greater by delay, and that they judged wisely in taking this resolution.

The Government might have been run down, and made contemptible and inefficient merely by the continued unpunished licentiousness of the disaffected. They would have rendered more easy the prevalence of military usurpation, the immediate consequence of which would have been the abrogation of all measures of retrenchment, probably the establishment of all the extravagant claims of the Army; and the restoration of a constitutional paramount authority to the Civil power would hence have become a work of great difficulty. It may therefore admit of doubt, whether the measure adopted on the 1st of May was not deferred too long, since, whilst Government was exercising forbearance, the spirit of sedition was becoming stronger. It evidently left no means of fair conciliation on the part of Government, which, on the contrary, states expressly, "that the " General Order of the 1st of May could not have been delayed " without hastening the arrival of an extreme crisis."

It seems to have retarded that crisis; but the Hyderabad Subsidiary Force, rejecting the compliment paid to their conduct in the General Order of the 1st May, circulated on the 18th of that month an address to the Army, declarative of their approbation of the seditious proceedings which had been adopted by the disaffected Officers, their condemnation of the acts of the Government,

Government, and their adherence to the measures of the rest of the Army. Colonel Bannerman * says, "the local effect of * Dissent.
 " this measure, the Order of the 1st of May, is distinctly
 " marked upon our records. The portion of the Army, highly *Other Objec-*
 " complimented in that Order for its allegiance and fidelity, *tions to it in*
 " felt the ties of allegiance dissolved by this act of extreme *the Dissents*
 " oppression, flew at once into rebellion, and instantly de- *noticed.*
 " manded its repeal."

Having already, as we think, vindicated the act and the non-reference of the conduct of the accused Officers to a Court Martial, the only objection urged by Colonel Bannerman against it, we must be permitted to say, that the "local effect of the "measure" seems to us unhappily urged, as either proof or illustration of the measure having been wrong. It is another instance of that unjust mode of arguing against which we have before protested; charging upon Government, acting in defence of its own legitimate authority, the rebellious acts to which the Officers proceeded. Supposing even the Government to have gone beyond its proper powers on this occasion, was there not an appeal to the common superiors of the Government and the Army? Were the whole body of Officers warranted to combine upon this occasion to make themselves judges of the case; to judge the ties of allegiance, even of those who did not suffer, dissolved; to make war against the Government, and then to dictate the repeal of their act? We do not say that Colonel Bannerman means to approve of these proceedings; but we must be of opinion, that to introduce them in the solemn judgment of a person in authority, apparently for the purpose only of criminating the Government, and in language that may be thought even apologetical, without expressing any feeling of that abhorrence which their enormity ought to call forth, is liable to very strong objection. The same honourable Director has connected with this article a sweeping condemnation of the measures of Government, recited in their General Order of 12th August, which he terms "a series of acts of despotic oppression;"—"a systematic course of aggression, and of aggravated indignity:" retorting thus upon the Government the language

language used by it with respect to the Officers. Assertions of this criminating nature, utterly unsupported by proof, introduced long after the general subject had been considered, and applied to measures which all the Indian authorities abroad and at home have approved and sanctioned, appear to us of a most injurious tendency, and entitled to very serious disapprobation.

*Progress of the
Revolt.*

Government took no immediate step upon this proceeding of the Hyderabad Force. It had a powerful effect on the body of Officers; and the example was very generally followed. "Committees of Officers were established at all the military stations. They assumed the exercise of the highest power, and commenced an active correspondence with each other, for the purpose of forming and combining their plans of revolt." The ostensible objects of the disaffected Officers were a redress of alleged grievances (none of which had the appearance of foundation, unless the question concerning the distribution of places of emolument between King's and Company's Officers, which was in reference to the Court of Directors) the obtaining of Bengal allowances, the dismissal of unpopular Officers from their official situations, and the restoration of Officers who had been removed from stations, or suspended the service. The Government of Madras, however, say, "there is every reason to believe those projects were considered only as preliminary to the accomplishment of more extensive and dangerous views, particularly the subversion of the present Government." The Hyderabad Force, emboldened by impunity, on the 15th June transmitted an Address to the Government, with 186 signatures; in which, after stating the impending danger of a separation of the Military from the Civil Authority, and of the loss of the country; and declaring that the whole Army is united in one cause, they require that the Orders of the 1st May might be rescinded. They had first inserted in their paper an intimation that the scenes of Vellore might be re-acted with increased effect; but that intimation was afterwards omitted. This Paper of course became known to the whole Army.

On the 25th June the European Regiment at Masulipatam
mutinied,

mutinied, and Colonel Innes was put under arrest by Major Story, the leader of that revolt. The revolted Officers received from most of the stations of the Army applause, and promises of effectual support.

Lieutenant Colonel Malcolm, an Officer of known talents, and very popular with the Army, was sent to take the command of Masulipatam, in the hope that he might be able to induce that garrison to return to a sense of its duty. He was with difficulty admitted by the Officers, but found it impossible to restore them to obedience, or, as he thought, to avert the most dreadful calamities, unless all the obnoxious demands in which the Officers of the Army were combined and pledged to each other, were granted.

On the 5th of July the Force of Jaulnah prepared an Address to the Governor General of such an intemperate nature, that Colonel Montresor, their senior Officer in that quarter, declined to forward it.

On the 5th of July also, the Officers of the Hyderabad Force, in a body, refused to permit the march of a battalion which Government had ordered to proceed from that station to Goa, because, “ *having united among themselves, and with the whole Army, they deemed any attempt to divide them destructive of that Resolution; and that the assistance of that battalion might soon be necessary to them, and their attachment they were assured of.*” Orders issued on the 9th of July, for the march of three battalions from Travancore, and for the march of a detachment from Seringapatam to Bangalore, were also disobeyed.

On the 21st July, the Officers at Hyderabad presented what they called the *Ultimatum* to Government. They required the public repeal of the Order of the 1st of May; the restoration of every Officer who had been removed or suspended; the trial of Lieutenant Colonel Innes* for his general conduct at Masulipatam; the removal from office of the Officers of the General

* Note. — Who had adhered to the Government.

Staff;

Staff; and a general Amnesty for the measures which the Officers of the Coast Army had adopted. On the 26th of July, a detachment ordered by Government to march from Seringapatam to Bangalore, refused to move. This might have been known at the Presidency about the 30th.

*Conduct of the
Government upon
the rebellious
Proceedings of
the Officers.*

The open resistance or revolt of considerable portions of the Army—the combinations which united with them, in sentiments and views, other divisions of the Army—the failure of Colonel Malcolm's mission to Masulipatam—and the intelligence received from various quarters, reduced the Government to the alternative of either subduing the Officers by force, or making to them the concessions they demanded—"Concessions which," we concur with the Madras Government in thinking, "would have effectually confirmed the spirit of sedition, have established an ascendant power in the Army, uncontrollable by the Government—would have strengthened the presumption, contempt of authority, and confidence in their power, already too prevalent in the Army, have made that body independent of the law; and, if it had not actually caused the subversion of the Government, would have reduced it to a degree of weakness which would have led to the most fatal disorders." Was conciliation practicable here? It appears that Government still thought of it, but thought of it as out of their reach, in which we must agree with them. "Any attempt even," say they, "for the purpose of conciliation in the existing state of things, would have been productive of equally pernicious effects. To have endeavoured to conciliate when the conduct of the Army demanded signal punishment, would naturally have produced the conclusion, that our measures were dictated by a consciousness of our weakness, and would have borne the appearance of submission to the outrageous conduct and menacing language of the Army. These considerations derived force from the peculiar nature of the demands of the Army—the repeal of Orders for the punishment of Officers who had committed great offen-

* General Letter to Fort St. George, 10th Sept. 1800, para. 20
"ccs,"* &c.

Matters could not remain in the state they were in, and the Government, having maturely deliberated on the whole of their situation and duty, resolved to avoid concession, being confident they could, by a due exertion of authority, maintain unimpaired the just rights and powers entrusted to them, and that this course " would involve no consequences which were not infinitely less dangerous to the national interests than those " which would have inevitably resulted from submission to the " menaces of a revolted Army." In our opinion the Government judged wisely, and displayed great firmness and vigour, under very trying circumstances, both in the resolution they adopted, and in the measures with which they followed it up. One of the first of these was to remove, as far as should be found practicable, disaffected Officers from command; to explain to the native troops the ground of this proceeding; and to impress upon them, at the same time, the paramount duty they owed to the Government. The particular precautions and directions given for carrying those Orders into effect, may be seen in the Fort St. George General Letter of the 10th September 1809. To accomplish these objects, the Officers commanding the principal Divisions of the Army were, on the 26th July, first instructed, after suitable explanations, to require from the European Officers under them, a declaration of fidelity to the Government, according to the tenour of their Commissions, and to remove from the immediate execution of duty those Officers who should decline such a declaration; their ordinary allowances being still continued to them. The commanding Officers were next enjoined to make the proper communications to the native Officers.

*Declaration of
obedience to Government,
proposed to Officers
on the 26 July.*

In the circumstances in which the Fort St. George Government were placed, no measures could, in our opinion, be more natural, judicious, and unexceptionable than these, and no objections have surprised us more than those advanced against them. " A Test," says Colonel Bannerman †, " pre-supposing " *disaffection and seditious combination*, was consequently useless " if the supposition was true,—a gross injury and insult, if " unfounded, and productive of no consequence but the sub-

*Objections stated
in the Dis-
sents to that
measure, and
answers.*

† Dissent, Objec-
tion 5th.

“ version of discipline by the removal of the Officers from their
 “ men, and the further excitements in the native troops of agi-
 “ tations.” He adds (very truly), “ that the public Records
 “ do not contain the details which might be required to establish
 “ this objection;” but says, “ the Government Gazette exhi-
 “ bits only 150 names as taking the Test, out of a body of
 “ 1,300 Officers;” and then complains of the “ absence of
 “ public documents,” denouncing the Government “ for call-
 “ ing on the Court to decide on its garbled statements, and
 “ withholding the series of documents which would have led to
 “ opposite results and conclusions.” The same objection as
 to the number of signatures is made by Sir F. Baring and Sir
 H. Inglis ‡ they speak also of “ the unhappy expedient of the
 “ 26th July,” and say, “ the bond of union between the
 “ Officers and Sepoys has been too roughly treated for such
 “ delicate machinery.” Mr. Elphinstone § is afraid “ Sir G.
 “ Barlow has ruined and disorganised the Army”—he has
 shown the native troops, says that honourable gentleman,
 “ our weakness and their strength—has placed the European
 “ Officers in a disgraced situation before them,” &c. We shall
 briefly observe, in answer to these objections, that the propo-
 sal of a Test did not, as Colonel Bannerman assumes, suppose
 universal guilt or universal innocence, but a seditious combina-
 tion of many indiscriminated individuals; and that as in such
 a case nothing can be more obviously just and proper than to
 distinguish the guilty from the innocent, so it cannot be an
 insult to any man to desire that he will do what is his duty, that
 is, to declare himself. Whilst the public documents were not
 arrived, Colonel Bannerman could not know that those sent
 home were “ garbled,” nor that the full series would have led
 to opposite conclusions. The documents in regular series are
 since come; they lead to no opposite conclusions. Those first
 received prove not to have been “ garbled;” the implied
 intention, therefore, to withhold the Records is found to
 have had no existence, and the delay to have been owing to
 other causes.

‡ Dissent of Sir F.
 Baring and Sir H.
 Inglis.

§ Dissent of 24th
 April, 1810.

If the number of Officers who signed the Test or Declaration
 of

of Obedience was comparatively small, (though we doubt the accuracy of that stated in the Dissents) of so much greater importance was the measure, since the speedy effect of it under the overawing presence of King's troops was to remove the disaffected Officers from all the centre and southern divisions of the Army; from the corps in the ceded districts; in Travancore, Malabar, Canara, and Bangalore: and the native troops at all those stations professed their loyalty and attachment. These effects were the main objects of the measure; and they disconcerted at once the counsels of the seditious Committees, and signally contributed to render the cause of legal authority triumphant. Nor could Officers reasonably complain of not being entrusted by Government with an authority they would not promise to use in its support. With respect to the native troops, if inconveniences arise from the appeal of Government to their loyalty, those inconveniences are wholly to be charged to the Officers who rendered it necessary for Government to make that appeal. No proposition can be more intolerable than that the Officers should, on any pretence whatever, be allowed to retain a power of deluding or seducing the men placed under their command, into rebellion against the Government that pays them, and to whom they owe allegiance. No evils apprehended from undeceiving the men could approach to this: and the example of the great Lord Clive, with whose judgment and experience it can be no disparagement to the objectors to say that their's are not to be compared, ought to be decisive on this point. In the mutiny of the European Officers in 1766, he not only informed the native troops of the true state of the case, but employed them in seizing and putting some of the Officers in confinement; and none of the evils predicted from the late milder proceeding followed. The measures of the 26th July were, in a word, calculated both to uphold the just authority of Government and to prevent the horrors of a civil war.

But it must be concluded they were among those which, Mr. Petrie says, in his *Minute*, he represented in conversation with Sir G. Barlow to be, in his opinion, "inapplicable, hazardous,

Mr. Petrie's Account of the points in difference between him and Sir George Barlow, examined.

“and totally disproportioned to the object and to the magnitude of the emergency.” It may be proper, therefore, at this advanced stage of the transactions, to attend to the observations he has recorded. “I thought,” says he, “that, rather than conciliate the Army, we were endangering the security of our Indian Empire. To Sir G. Barlow it seems to have appeared that, almost under any circumstances, concession must be the greater evil; whereas to me it seemed a feather when placed in the scale against the revolt of the Army, a civil war, and the probable loss of the country.” “He (Sir G. Barlow) thought it better to risk an immense stake, an Empire, than rescind an Order. I wished to yield to form rather than endanger the substance.”

In the contrasted view here exhibited of the opinions of Sir G. Barlow and Mr. Petrie, we think there is a misrepresentation essentially unjust. It is evident from the whole current of the public documents from Fort St. George and Bengal, that Sir G. Barlow, the majority of his Council, and the Government General, did not mean to contend, nor did actually contend, for punctilios or forms, but for interests of the highest importance; that the question with them was not between “hazarding an Empire and rescinding an Order” or “yielding a form,” but between surrendering the lawful authority of the Civil Government and resisting military domination; that they did not maintain concession *under any circumstances* to be the greater evil, but *such concessions as were required, under the circumstances in which they were required*; and that the Government acted not as it did “*rather than conciliate*,” or in the belief that they were *hazarding the Indian Empire* by resistance, but because they saw no means of conciliation, except concessions which would have exposed that Empire to the greatest dangers.

We cannot allow to Mr. Petrie, that the refusal of concession or the probable loss of the country was the alternative Government had before them: and we think, moreover, that Mr. Petrie has taken for granted a proposition of immense importance, not

to

to be conceded without proof, of which an atom has not appeared—that, “in yielding” (what he calls) “the form, the substance would not have been endangered.” After clearing away these incumbrances, the plain question comes to be, whether, under a comprehensive view of all circumstances, resistance was to be chosen by the Government rather than concession? We have already given the reasons which have determined us to vote with all the Indian authorities in the affirmative.

The plan of this Paper does not require us to trace minutely the progress of the rebellion; and we are glad to be exempted from the afflicting details of open revolt in different corps in the Army; of the seizure of public treasure in various places; of one actual conflict in the field, to which the Company's Sepoys had been led by the deluding information of the Officers, to the sacrifice of many lives; of the unworthy arts used by the Officers to keep the Sepoys ignorant of the real state of things, to prevent the Proclamations addressed to them by Government from reaching them;—to persuade them that Government entertained designs against them;—and of the operations which the revolted Officers either attempted or seemed to have in view against the public authority. It is a more pleasing task to advert, though briefly, to the system of measures * by which a wise and energetic Government, unappalled by the most threatening dangers, crushed a widely extended rebellion before it could bring on the horrors of a civil war.

*Progress of
Rebellion—
Fort St. George
General Letter, 10
Sept. 1809.*

* Fort St. George
General Letter, 10
Sept. 1809.

The Orders of the 26th July, so much decried by some, had the effect of securing the services of all the native troops to the southward of the river Kistnah, with the exception of the garrison of Seringapatam. The King's troops, to their lasting honour, had been stedfastly loyal; and reinforcements had been obtained from Ceylon and Bombay, which considerably increased their numbers. The only troops in rebellion, which could oppose resistance in the field, were those at Hyderabad, Jaulnah, and in the northern division of the Army. For many reasons it had become important to reduce these troops at the earliest moment;

*And of the
measures oppos-
ed to it by Go-
vernment.*

moment ; and very able and powerful arrangements were made for this purpose. A public Proclamation, addressed to the native troops on the 3d of August, at length made an impression on the corps at the stations just mentioned, where the Sepoys had hitherto been kept in ignorance and delusion. The choice of Colonel Close, whose weight of character is so great among the Natives and Europeans, to command at Hyderabad, and his intrepid and masterly proceeding during the one day, (the 3d of August) in which the Officers allowed him to exercise his command, had a very material effect in opening the eyes of the Sepoys, to whom, at the head of the line, in the midst of appearances of hostility, he explained the real state of things, and their duty and interest to remain loyal to the Government. The consequence was that, in a few days after, the native troops at Hyderabad expressed to their Officers their determination to adhere to their allegiance to Government : and this occurrence, with the movement of a large force towards Hyderabad, and the declared determination of Government to maintain their authority, presented to the view of the Officers their desperate situations. Hence the resident at Hyderabad, in a Letter to the Governor's Military Secretary of the 6th August, states, that the Officers saw nothing but ruin from persevering in their criminal course, and that, in his opinion, a general amnesty would induce them to return to their allegiance.

*Submission of
the revolted Of-
ficers.*

In reply, the Resident was informed that there was no intention on the part of Government of listening to any terms but unconditional submission to authority ; and, on the 11th August, (probably before the answer to the Resident could have reached that place,) all the Officers of the subsidiary force at Hyderabad spontaneously signed the Declaration of the 26th July, and offered their unconditional submission. This example was followed by the forces at Masulipatam, Seringapatam, and Jaulnah, which completely terminated the revolt.

Their submission

It has been industriously asserted and propagated, that the submission of the Officers was entirely owing to the approach of Lord Minto to Madras.

Mr.

Mr. Petrie, in his Statement, (pp. 60—64) has laboured at great length to establish this point, and has taken much credit to himself for predicting the good consequences that would result even from the knowledge of Lord Minto's *intention* to repair to that Presidency. After setting forth the enormities committed by the revolted Officers, as so many evidences that the system pursued by Government was wrong, and to show that what he is pleased to call "*intimidation and coercion had completely failed, and that, by a perseverance in the same system, every reflecting mind trembled for our Empire in the East,*" he adds—"In this crisis, on this volcanic ground, the Army received the communication of Lord Minto's notification to the Army in Bengal, and of his intention of proceeding to Madras, with enthusiastic pleasure. Every measure of violence, which had been either adopted or contemplated, was immediately abandoned. The force at Hyderabad and the garrison at Masulipatam, who had been the first to resist the orders of Government, took the lead in returning to the allegiance of duty and obedience. Their submission was unconditional, but to the Governor General, and not to the Governor of Madras. Their example has been every where followed."

not owing to the approach of Lord Minto to Madras—

as Mr. Petrie
Mr. Petrie's
Statement, p. 46.

It is not to be wondered at, that gentlemen who adopt the views and representations of Mr. Petrie, should follow him in this instance. "We are distinctly of opinion," says Sir Francis Baring and Sir Hugh Inglis,* "that the sword of revolt was sheathed when the Governor General announced sentiments of moderation, justice, and lenity, and not less than 30,000 men who were then in opposition to Government, surrendered at discretion." This is a considerable improvement upon Mr. Petrie; for the *men*, probably in all not more than 12 or 15,000, were not "in opposition," but in the dark; and, when they discovered the truth, refused to oppose Government. "All Sir George Barlow's firmness," says Mr. Pattison, "could not have saved him, had not Lord Minto's approach led to a hope in the Army,"† &c. "The Officers," according to Mr. Elphinstone, "had shown unequivocal signs of a return to
" their

and the Dissents affirm.

* Dissent of Sir
F. Baring and Sir
H. Inglis.

† Dissent of Mr.
Pattison.

“ their duty, and a desire to submit their claims to the Governor-General, who might be soon expected.” This is partly the language of Mr. Petrie’s Minute—“ The Army had then “ manifested unequivocal proofs of returning subordination and “ obedience.” But let it be observed, that Mr. Petrie refers here not to Lord Minto’s approach, but to the time at which it was proposed to him (Mr. Petrie) to sign an Address to Sir George Barlow—(and here too it will afterwards appear that he was mistaken)—Mr. Petrie, in his Minute (laid before the Board) does not say one word of effects produced by Lord Minto’s approach, on which he so much enlarges in his *Statement*; a paper, which, as we are now about to take leave of it, we must declare to be, in our opinion, of a very mischievous tendency, but of which the publication is, we conceive, to be ascribed to his friends rather than to himself.

Nothing indeed could be more adverse to Mr. Petrie’s whole theory and conduct, respecting the commotions in the Madras Army, than the triumph of the system pursued by Sir G. Barlow. It is not unnatural, therefore, that he should be disposed to ascribe the successful result to another cause. But a recurrence to facts will show that they are at irreconcilable variance with his representation.

In the first place, the Letters of the Bengal Government of the 20th February and 27th May 1809, which were published to the Army of Fort St. George, and in a style admonitory, authoritative, and impressive, fully set forth Lord Minto’s sentiments of the insubordinate proceedings of the Officers; and the motives of duty and obedience which ought to regulate their conduct, had not the effect of stopping the progress of sedition among them: nor had his more pointed private communications to some of the suspended Officers,* which must probably have been made known to the Madras Army, any better success. Lord Minto’s General Order of the 20th July, announcing his intention of proceeding to Madras, is therefore the first document on the present subject to which Mr. Petrie and the authors of the Dissents can refer. This General Order was written when

* See his General Letter, 12 Oct. 1809, para. 40.

when Lord Minto had heard of no other act of open disobedience in the Madras Army than the deposition and imprisonment of Colonel Innes, commanding officer at Masulipatam; and it dwells particularly on that affair. It was not framed, therefore, with the knowledge of any subsequent events. It must have reached Masulipatam long prior to the 7th August, and its effect may be seen by an Address of that date from the Officers who usurped the command there. Conceiving that Lord Minto meant to hold forth conciliation to them upon their own terms, they considered his General Order as consoling; but they so little knew what became the situation of the Governor General or their own, that they inform him, the *violent, oppressive, treacherous* conduct of the Government of Fort St. George to their brother Officers has led *them* to take measures for *their own security*:—they accuse the Government of *seducing the attachment* of the native troops from their *European Officers*, which they denominate a *species of treason* against the nation, and an act of the *greatest treachery* to them, which has destroyed all confidence, and warranted their precaution against further efforts of the same kind:—They say that the *redress required by the Army*, to retrieve them from that state of degradation into which they were plunged by the Order of the 1st May, is *absolutely necessary*. Such were the first fruits of Lord Minto's General Order. The garrison of Masulipatam continued in rebellion till the 16th August, when the Officers having received intelligence of the submission of the Hyderabad Force, Major Storey and Captain Andrews stated, in a letter addressed to General Pater, that the time was arrived when they found that they could no longer oppose the authority of Government without injury to the interests of their country. Let us now inquire into the effects of Lord Minto's publication in other places. It might arrive at Madras about the 6th August; and as the separation of the Bengal post to Madras and Hyderabad takes place at Masulipatam, and the distance is 120 miles less to the latter than to the former station, the presumption is, that Lord Minto's Order of the 20th July must have been known as early at Hyderabad as at Madras. On that very day, the *sixth of August*, Captain Sydenham, the Resident at Hyderabad, informs the

Government, that the Officers there look on their affairs as desperate, and are desirous of submitting upon an amnesty. It was not, however, until the 11th of that month, that the submission of the Officers of the Subsidiary Force was declared, when they solicited an amnesty from the Governor General, and circulated information of this proceeding to the several stations of the Army, and earnestly entreat their brother Officers to follow their example. They do not assign the expected approach of the Governor General as any reason for their conduct, but say that *imperious circumstances and mature reflection* had induced them to sign the declaration. The Jaulnah corps received this information on the 15th, when actually on their march to join the Hyderabad Force, and when Lord Minto's approach could be no secret: but though they were, in consequence of the resolution of the Hyderabad Officers, compelled to submit also, yet it is a generally reported fact, that they were so offended with the conduct of those Officers, as for a long time afterwards not to be on speaking terms with them. On the other hand, though the knowledge of Lord Minto's approach must have reached Seringapatam in four or five days after it came to Madras, that is, about the 12th at the latest, yet it was the 23d before that garrison surrendered, and then only on finding the other revolted corps had submitted; so that when we examine the conduct of the four principal revolted stations of Hyderabad, Jaulnah, Masulipatam, and Seringapatam, the Officers of the first were influenced by *imperious circumstances*, and the other three did not submit till necessity also compelled them. Those "*imperious circumstances*" are explained by the Madras Government,* as already intimated, to have been the refusal of the Native Troops to act with the disaffected Officers at Hyderabad, and their inability, even had the Native Troops better supported them, to meet the force collected against them. To this account Mr. Petrie has set his hand, without recording any counter-declaration. And the statement given by Lord Minto himself, extremely different from Mr. Petrie's, must finally settle the question.† "Many assurances," says his Lordship, "had reached me (in Bengal) that my arrival would be the signal of submission; and although I might reasonably suspect that

"such

* General Letter,
10th Sept. 1801,
para. 13.

† Lord Minto's
General Letter,
10th Oct. 1801,
para. 47-48.

" such a disposition, if it existed, might be founded on expect-
 " tation of concession, which I should certainly have disap-
 " pointed, yet it did not seem impossible that men advancing
 " by such rapid and alarming strides to their own destruction,
 " should catch at the pretence of a new authority, in order to
 " retreat from the fearful course they were pursuing, with some
 " salvo for their pride." His Lordship adds, as another mo-
 " tive, the unjust malignity of the Officers against Sir G. Barlow,
 and the following paragraph, assigning the genuine reasons for
 their addressing their submission to the Governor General.
 " It happened that this paper (the General Order of 20th July)
 " reached the Hyderabad Subsidiary Force and some other sta-
 " tions of the Coast Army at the critical period already referred
 " to, when the Officers began to waver in their designs; and
 " the last paragraph appears either to have favoured the new
 " dispositions to *which other and more cogent reasons had given*
 " *birth*, or to have been employed as an additional means of
 " persuasion by those who wished, late indeed, *but earlier than*
 " *the rest*, to abandon themselves, and recal others from the
 " dangerous and fatal course they were running." *

* See also much
 more to the same
 purpose, and very
 apposite to the
 present point, in
 paragraph 2 of the
 conclusion of this
 letter.

The " critical period " alluded to in this passage by his Lord-
 ship, is described in the preceding part of the letter, to have
 been that which succeeded the several effectual measures above
 noticed, of the Fort St. George Government, for the suppres-
 sion of the revolt, which his Lordship explains at some length.
 We shall give but one short extract from this part of the letter.
 " The final and unqualified submission of the revolted Officers
 " has been more immediately brought about by the wise energy
 " of the later measures, the object of which was two-fold :
 " first, to separate the faithful from the disaffected ; secondly,
 " to withdraw the Native troops from the Controul of Officers
 " who were in open rebellion, and to replace the Company's
 " Army at the disposal and under the orders of Government."

After explaining the object of these measures, his Lordship
 goes on to state the influence produced by Colonel Close's effort.
 " All that Colonel Close had it in his power to do at Hyderabad,"

says Mr. Petrie, "had no more effect in reclaiming the refractory Officers, than in producing the revolution in Portugal." His Lordship gives a very different account. "The natural effect of these circumstances was much enhanced at the principal station of the Hyderabad Subsidiary Force, by the appointment of Colonel Close to that command, and by the courageous and vigorous attempt he made in the very face of revolt, to detach the Native Battalions from their Officers. He was overborne, it is true, on the spot; but the impression appears to have been made, especially on the Native Officers, and to have afterwards matured itself into dispositions which increased the alarm of the Officers."

Mr. Petrie himself has subscribed to a similar account in the Fort St. George dispatches.

† General Letter of 12th Oct. 1860, para. 17.

We shall close this article with another more general and very decisive testimony from Lord Minto.† "But my satisfaction was much increased by the important circumstance of this result having been obtained by the counsels and resources of Fort St. George itself, that is to say, the very Government whose power had been defied. This sentiment struck me forcibly in the first moment, and has been confirmed by every hour's reflection since. I have thought it, indeed, of so much moment to the public interests, that, in addition to the pleasure I personally feel in doing justice to Sir G. Barlow's public merits, and to my strong sense of the signal services he has, on this trying occasion, rendered to his country, the circumstance to which I have alluded has become a fresh motive to mark, as I have been careful to do, in every public document that has a reference to these events, the obvious and decisive influence of his character and measures, in producing that happy issue which is the subject of the present communication." Thus the magic influence, the instantaneous effect, which Mr. Petrie ascribes even to the report of Lord Minto's approach to Madras, is completely dissipated and destroyed by the concurring force of irresistible facts, and of the testimony of Lord Minto himself.

We

We have now gone through the review which we proposed to ourselves, of the origin and progress of the disputes between the Officers of the Madras Army and the Government of that Presidency. And we trust that it has been demonstrated, by the great body of facts and evidences which we have produced, that the aggression did not begin on the part of Government, but on that of the Officers; that the progress of disaffection and hostility among the Officers was owing essentially, not to the want of conciliation in Government, which acted constitutionally in defence of its own rights, but to an inveterate spirit of insubordination and pretension, which seditious acts had inflamed, in the Officers, who aimed at unallowable or illegal objects by criminal means; and that the suppression of the revolt was effected by a wise and vigorous application of the resources of the Fort St. George Government.

Concluding Observations on the origin, progress, and termination of the Revolt of the Madras Officers.

Of the many instructive lessons which the history of this remarkable affair furnishes, lessons which we trust will not be disregarded, it may be permitted to us to advert to one or two connected with the scope of this Paper: the first is *the importance of maintaining in unimpaired rigour the authority of our Indian Governments*. Ever since we have possessed territory in India, there has been a disposition in the European body there, particularly the military Officers, to enlarge their own powers and privileges. The great Lord Clive was very early sensible of this truth, and, in the year 1765, thus delivered his sentiments upon it to the Court of Directors: “ This regulation (to increase the number of military Officers of rank) beneficial and necessary as it is, will, notwithstanding, be productive of one dangerous evil, if not constantly guarded against by the authority of the Governor and Council, supported and enforced by the higher powers at home. The evil I mean to apprise you of, is *the encroachment of the Military upon the Civil jurisdiction, and an attempt to be independent of their authority. A spirit of this kind has always been visible*: our utmost vigilance, therefore, is requisite to suppress it, or at least to take care that it shall not actually prevail. I have been at some pains to inculcate a total subjection of the Army to the Government,

“ and

“ and I doubt not you will ever maintain that principle.” And early in 1767 the same distinguished man, then taking his leave of the Government of Bengal, thinks it important to inculcate the same sentiment still more forcibly, and in relation to the Civil as well as Military servants. “ No regulation can be carried into execution, no order obeyed, if you do not make rigorous examples of the disobedient. Upon this point I rest the welfare of the Company in Bengal. The servants are now brought to a proper sense of their duty. If you slacken the reins of Government, affairs will soon revert to their former channel ; anarchy and corruption will again prevail, and, elate with a new victory, be too headstrong for any future efforts of Government. Recall to your memories the many attempts that have been made in the Civil and Military Departments, to overcome our authority, and to set up a kind of independency against the Court of Directors. Reflect also on the resolute measures we have pursued, and their wholesome effects. *Disobedience to legal power is the first step to sedition ; and palliative remedies effect no cure.* Every tender compliance, every condescension on your parts, will only encourage more flagrant attacks, which will daily increase in strength, and be at last in vain resisted.” “ I repeat that you must not fail to exact the most implicit obedience to your orders. Dismiss or suspend from the service any man who shall dare to dispute your authority. If you deviate from the principle upon which we have hitherto acted, and upon which you are conscious you ought to proceed, or if you do not make a proper use of that power with which you are invested, I shall hold myself acquitted, as I do now protest against the consequences.”

The Legislature since his Lordship's time has, by various Acts, happily and wisely placed a great degree of power in the hands of the administrators of British India ; both the administrators abroad and those to whose controul they are subject at home. But vigilance and resolution in the exercise of that power are still and ever will be necessary. The maintenance of it in its form and spirit, both in India and England, is, as we conceive,

conceive, necessary to the preservation of our Eastern Empire. If the will of the community in India, Native or European, Military or Civil, come, either by compulsion or influence on their side, or by relaxation on the part of Government, to dictate in the choice of public measures and public men, there is an end of the supremacy of this Country and of the Company over India. That supremacy stands or falls, is preserved or impaired, as the local Governments are maintained in due vigour, or decline into feebleness: and all advances to a preponderance of local influence, either by undermining or overawing the constitutional authority of those Governments, must proportionably diminish their efficiency, and the security of that system of administration on which the welfare of both countries so much depends. There is a tendency in every community, especially of Europeans settled in distant dependencies of their mother country, to prefer the local interests of those dependencies, to aim at local influence in their public affairs, and to make the voice and opinions of their community the standard of right and wrong in respect to those affairs. Wherever their opinions come in opposition to the local Government, they should be regarded with great caution. Local Governments are to be punished for misconduct, especially that which tends to alienate the affections of the people; but rarely indeed should the judgment of the local community be allowed any lead in this matter. A Governor may render himself obnoxious to the people under him, by a steady adherence to public duty, at the sacrifice of the private interest of others, and his own popularity; and the consequence may be, a combination to run him down, and, by discrediting his measures or embarrassing his Government, to effect a change. Such an effect would in reality strengthen the local influence, and proportionably diminish the power of the Constitutional authorities. The legal authority, therefore, of Government in India, ought to be maintained in its full vigour; not in view to the interest of the individuals who may happen to be in the Government, but to the interest of the State. The popular voice may speak truth and reason, and there it ought to be attended to; not because it is popular, but because it is just. The popular voice of Colonial Establishments

blishments will generally be for local interests. It is certainly the easier and more popular way for a Governor to lend himself to private or partial interests, when in opposition to those of the public, or to temporize and bend when a steady adherence to duty appears to be attended with conflict or danger: and he may then too be tempted to think the most convenient way also the safest. But when a numerous body is united in the pursuit of important interests, particularly when a great body of European Military Officers of our Indian Armies are combined to struggle for favourite objects, they are not to be diverted by words of complaisance. To hold a temporizing conduct is but the preliminary to concession, and concession in such circumstances is defeat—the defeat of legitimate authority—and the triumph of a body which ought to have whatever is reasonable by voluntary grant, but not even what is reasonable through the instrumentality of encroachment or usurpation. In maintaining these sentiments we think we consult the permanent interest of the Community, Military and Civil, as well as that of the Indian Governments and of this Nation. We, not less than those who have used the language of indulgence with respect to all the late excesses of the Army, are sincere well-wishers to their lasting welfare and fame. We are aware that the malignant arts of a few designing persons, and the rashness of many inexperienced ones, have essentially contributed to produce the astonishing spectacle which has lately been exhibited. We deeply lament the errors of the military, and wish perfect amity to be restored between them and their superiors: but these sentiments do not require, nor can any thing induce us to compromise the unalterable principles of good Government, on the maintenance of which the true happiness of all society must depend.

From the preceding doctrine a question naturally arises, concerning the influence which the *unpopularity of any Indian Government* ought to have upon the judgment and conduct of the Indian Authorities at home. It is obviously extremely desirable on various accounts, particularly for the easy transaction of the public business, and the satisfaction of those living under

under the Government, that its character should be popular; but it is obvious also, that popularity ought not to be purchased at the expense of principle or of the public interest; and that as it may be acquired by improper sacrifices, so it may be lost by an adherence to the obligations of duty. When dissensions arise in any State or community, it is to be expected that the party which is in opposition to the Government will represent its proceedings in an unfavourable manner. At such a case, the mere fact of its being unpopular determines nothing. Before that fact is adopted here, as a charge against a Government, the causes of the unpopularity ought to be fairly investigated. If the stability of the Governments abroad is to depend on the voice of local faction or party, or on the opinions, more or less generally, which local communities may be induced to adopt, and not on the reason of things, there is an end of the supremacy of the Executive Body at home. On this account, even when Governments are wrong, and are seen to be so by the unbiassed sense of those around them, it should be demonstrated that the Authorities here act from their own deliberate judgment, and not from extraneous influences.

In the case now before us, of Sir G. Barlow, against whom the charge of unpopularity is often and vehemently urged in this country, it is manifest that the causes whence his unpopularity at Fort St. George has chiefly sprung, are the affair of Mr. Sheron, the proceedings connected with the Carnatic debts, and the discontent of the Officers of the Army. In all these cases, the objects for which he and the majority of the Council contended were public principle and public justice, the just interest and authority of the Company in opposition to private interest, which was deeply concerned in every one of these cases. He had also to carry into effect the difficult but necessary work of great retrenchments, which hardly any efforts on the part of a Government can render palatable; and it has appeared what an extraordinary combination of factions he had to resist. He is not, as far as we know, accused of having acted from selfish or interested views—the charges against his personal character respecting chiefly his temper and manner. He is represented as

Application of these observations to the case of Sir G. Barlow.

The view of his temper and manners, by Mr. Petrie, and in the Dissents.

• Mr. Petrie's
Statement.

† Dissents of
Mr. Elphinstone,
Sir F. Baring,
Sir H. Inglis, and
Mr. Pattison.

cold and repulsive,* then, (not very consistently) as violent and harsh; and it would seem from all these accounts, as if his manners had no small influence in producing the rebellion. But we do not understand that Sir G. Barlow has, in fact, been impelled, as frequent† expressions in the Dissents before us might lead the reader to conceive, from any thing violent, harsh, or irascible in his character. We are led to believe that he is a man of a calm, temperate mind; and though he is unpopular with those to whose ambition or interest his sense of duty has placed him in opposition, or with others influenced by their representations, yet we cannot easily express our sense of the injustice done him, when he is described in the language of Mr. Pattison,‡ himself entirely unacquainted with the scene, as “held in execration by a whole Settlement, civil and military;”

§ Dissent, Mr. Pattison.

§ Do. Mr. Elphinstone.

Some other
charges brought
against him in
the Dissents.

§ Dissent of Mr. Elphinstone.

•• Mr. Pattison.

†† Do. and likewise Sir F. Baring, &c. and Col. Bannerman, as to keeping the Records.

‡‡ Dissent of Mr. Pattison.

§§ Do. Mr. Elphinstone.

and by Mr. Elphinstone,§ who, taking occasion to speak of another gentleman, Lieutenant-Colonel Leith, an Officer highly distinguished by his talents, and his faithful able discharge of the difficult obnoxious office of Judge Advocate General, is pleased to say, “that he is a man almost as much detested as “Sir G. Barlow himself.” Nor can we forbear remarking here, that it is in papers wherein passages of this nature are not unfrequently found, wherein Sir G. Barlow is charged with *intentionally* keeping back the Records,|| (when, as it now appears, there was nothing kept back or concealed,**) with monstrous absurdity, with folly and wickedness;††—that he is also represented, on the ground of his public writings, which, in our humble opinion, are conspicuous for temperate manner and official style, as dealing “in violent malignant invective”—†† “in abusive language without measure, attacking “respectable characters, without either proof or probability to “support his assertions.”§§ Though these last charges are founded on Sir G. Barlow’s writings, of which, as they are now printed, the world will judge; the opinion in general delivered by the Authors of the Dissents respecting his character must have been adopted from the reports of others, as these gentlemen themselves have no personal knowledge of him. Those opinions, however, entirely coincide with the representations of his adversaries; as do the views of the transactions

at Madras, given generally in the Dissents, which, in our apprehension, furnish a very remarkable instance of judging against the great mass of recorded evidence, and according to the tenour of anonymous, interested, unproved accusation. This appears still more striking, when a fact, which we believe to be undisputed, is considered; namely, that every one of the Authors of those Dissents voted, a very short time before the date of them, for the continuance of Sir G. Barlow as Governor in a new Commission for the Government of Madras.

But after all, Sir G. Barlow appears to have lived in entire cordiality with a most respectable part of the community of Fort St. George, including the eminent person who presides in the court of justice there, two of the Members of Council, the successor to General Macdowall in the command of the Army, and other distinguished servants, Civil and Military, as well as to have carried on the public business in great harmony with the Supreme Government and the other Presidencies, and with the Commanders of His Majesty's squadron.

If, in pursuing through thorny paths, those laudable objects which have been described, he had even somewhat erred in his course, he would still be entitled to our respect; but if, from principle and duty, he has, unswayed by all the influence with which he was surrounded, and unawed by the most formidable combinations any Governor had to contend with, sacrificed so many personal considerations, and hazarded all personal consequences; if he has also, by extraordinary fortitude, energy, and ability, crushed faction, subdued rebellion, and established the just authority and dignity of Government, he has exhibited a high example of public virtue and public service, as honourable to the country as it would be disgraceful to it to reward such a man with obloquy and condemnation.

We come now to the question of the removal of Mr. Petrie from the Council of Fort St. George, and the reasons on which that measure was founded.

The causes of the removal of Mr. Petrie from Council stated, and that measure justified

Concerning the time and manner in which the question was brought forward in the Court of Directors, the circumstances and the motives which led to the introduction of it at that time; the manner in which the votes were given upon it; and an unbiassed majority finally decided for a new Commission of Government, wherein the name of Mr. Petrie was omitted, the late Chairman and Deputy Chairman, in opposition to the representations given in the Dissents, have laid before the Court a justificatory statement, to the accuracy of which, as far as it describes what passed in the Sitzings of the Court, we must bear our testimony, and we trust it will be found effectually to settle all these preliminary points.

But to some other points, also of a preliminary nature, we must ourselves particularly speak.

The Dissents generally assert, in substance, what has been peremptorily affirmed in print, in the introduction of Mr. Petrie's *Statement*, that he "has been dismissed from his situation in Council, for no other reason than his having presumed (in compliance with his duty and with the repeated orders of the Court of Directors to the Members of their different Councils) to record, in decorous and modest language, his dissent to proceedings which he considered to be subversive of the law and dangerous to the public service." To this assertion we must oppose the most positive and distinct denial, as we did to the same allegation when first advanced in the discussion in Court. And we must also combat a dangerous principle, which may be implied in or deduced from the unfounded account here given. True it is, the Court of Directors have encouraged and required that the Members of their Governments shall state on the Minutes of Council, in temperate and decorous language, their reasons for dissenting to measures of importance adopted by the majority. We approve of these instructions, and intend to abide by them; but it never was the meaning of the Court of Directors, that a gentleman recording his opinion in opposition to any measure should exonerate him from responsibility for that

that opinion, and for the line of conduct followed by him in respect to that measure. Such a construction would afford an easy refuge from the consequences of the most 'exceptionable proceeding, and destroy one great use of the regulation, which is 'not only to bring before the Court of Directors all the arguments against as well as those for great measures, but to afford them the means of judging more strictly of the conduct, principles, and talents of every Member of Government. And it is further to be observed on this head, that, in the encouraging the exercise of a decent freedom of opinion, the Court of Directors have utterly prohibited all factious opposition.

We therefore totally deny also the unwarranted conclusion assumed in the Dissents *, that the Councils of our Governments abroad will henceforth be reduced to a cipher, and the Governor possess the sole power, whereby the Government will be rendered arbitrary. The conclusion being deduced from unfounded premises falls of itself: but, besides that the present measure is not likely to lead practically to any such doctrine in India, it will always be true that a Counsellor cannot divest himself of responsibility any more in supporting than in opposing the measures of a majority.

* All the Dissents.

Secondly. It is to be carefully remembered that the real question before us, was not simply whether Mr. Petrie should be removed from Council, but whether he who, through the whole progress of a most arduous period, had opposed that course of measures which the authorities at home have judged to have been proper and necessary, or either of the other two Civil Members of Council, who had uniformly supported that course of measures, should be continued in the Council. There was a necessity of removing one, Sir Samuel Auchmuty, the newly appointed Commander in Chief, having been nominated to be second in Council, and the whole number of Counsellors being by law limited to three. *The question then was, whether Mr. Petrie, who had opposed those measures, or one of the other two Members, both of whom had supported them, should be removed.* The Dissents, in discussing this measure,

have

have introduced, we think improperly, allusions to personal motives which may have biased in the adoption of it. We trust that we might safely leave our characters to speak for themselves against any allusion of that nature; but in a time of so much misrepresentation, we think it not amiss to declare, each from consciousness for himself and from belief for the whole, that we have been governed in this affair by the great motives of public duty and public good. "That Mr. Petrie's defence has not been heard," and "that he has been removed on clandestine evidence," we are surprised to see some of the Dissents* asserting, when his Minute is a professed defence, delivered by himself to the Board of Madras, in answer to the charges brought against him by Sir G. Barlow; and when it was acknowledged by some of his supporters, in the discussion of the subject, that there could be no doubt of the authenticity of the copy of that document, laid before the Court under the signature of the Secretary to the Government of Fort St. George. We acted upon the Statement of those charges by Sir G. Barlow, and that defence by Mr. Petrie, not upon anonymous publications of any description, as seems to be idly surmised, nor upon private application, nor to gratify any individual. And as to the objection made, when those documents so authenticated were laid before the Court; "that the Madras consultations were not then arrived," an objection which was overruled from the exigency of the case, and the apprehended sufficiency of those documents, particularly the evidence from the defence of Mr. Petrie himself, it has been found that those Consultations, since received, contain nothing more upon the subject.

* Sir F. Baring
and Sir H. Inglis;
Mr. Elphinstone.

The Dissents have also introduced a comparison between the merits and services of Mr. Petrie and Sir G. Barlow. The measure of removing Mr. Petrie, which a sense of duty imposed on us, we adopted with reluctance, but with no wish to say or do any thing which might add to the pain he must naturally feel on such an occasion. Those gentlemen who espoused his cause have, by arraigning that measure, forced us into a defence of it, and hence into an examination of Mr. Petrie's conduct, which we should otherwise have avoided. We think this comparison

was still less expedient. Had the arduous task been accomplished of establishing by argument, (a mode which has not been adopted,) that Mr. Petrie was right in the line of conduct he held respecting all the controverted questions, it would still have remained an undertaking of no small difficulty to prove that Mr. Petrie's preceding services had surpassed in importance and merit those of Sir G. Barlow. But we do not feel ourselves called upon to occupy time in discussing a question, upon which we confess, without meaning any disrespect to Mr. Petrie, we were not aware, until we saw the Dissents, that the opinion advanced upon it in them had been at all entertained. Only as to the extent of time and the employments in which the two gentlemen have served the Company, we should just observe, that it is indeed above forty years since Mr. Petrie entered the service, but that he has passed only twenty-eight years in India, having been, since his first appointment, four times at home, twice for six years at a time; whence it is natural he should be better known here than Sir G. Barlow, who has never been in England since he first entered the service in 1778, a period of thirty-one years. With respect to employments, Mr. Petrie, after having held several respectable offices for short periods, became incidentally a Member of Council for six weeks in 1787.

*In 1788 the Court passed some animadversion on one part of his conduct in a paragraph to Madras, which was struck out by the Board of Commissioners, and an approbation substituted. In 1789 he came back the third time to England with a recommendation from the Madras Government "that he might be" (not extraordinarily remunerated or distinguished, but) "allowed to return to the service when his health should permit." In 1791 he went again to Madras, with the appointment from home of third in Council, and to succeed *pro tempore* to the Government in case of vacancy: but in 1792 he came home the fourth time. In 1798 he returned to Madras with the appointment from England of a seat in Council, and the temporary succession to the Government. In 1802, Mr. Petrie was presented by the Court, as is stated in one of the Dissents,* with the sum of 10,000 pagodas, "as a mark of the high sense they entertained of his long and faithful services." His time of

* Sir F. Baring
and Sir H. Inglis.

actual service then amounted in all to about 20 years; and as this present, which was given when Lord William Bentinck was appointed successor to Lord Clive, is quoted to aggravate the alleged injustice of his late removal, we must fairly say, that if it is intended to adduce the present as a "proof" of the superiority of Mr. Petrie's services, in length or in value, to those of many other servants not so remunerated, a review of facts will not, in our opinion, support the intention. Mr. Petrie has remained in India since 1798; and the course of his service under the Governments of Lord Clive, Lord William Bentinck, and Sir George Barlow, with the short period of less than four months in which he held the Government himself, is sufficiently known. Sir G. Barlow is known to have devoted himself through the whole of his service, to an uninterrupted course of public labours, by which he has been, ever since the beginning of the year 1787, that is, soon after Lord Cornwallis entered on the Government of India, eminently distinguished. In the year 1788 he was appointed to the charge of the Secretaryship of the Revenue Department, and held it during all the period in which the great institutions of Lord Cornwallis, respecting the Land tenures of Bengal, and the administration of justice were framed. In 1796 he was called to the arduous employment of Chief Secretary to the Government, and in 1802 appointed a Member of the Supreme Government. He has been twice nominated successor to the office of Governor General, has filled that office two years, was removed from it only by His Majesty's Warrant, and was in 1807 appointed to the Government of Madras. So far are the testimonies in favour of Mr. Petrie from being "unprecedented in the annals of the Company"—an expression which surprised us—that, if the public Records are consulted, those in favour of Sir G. Barlow, both from home and from India, will be found more numerous and more strong.

Fourthly. As, in the course of the preceding Review, we have been led to advert to certain facts and documents, which were not under the notice of the Court of Directors when the measure of removing Mr. Petrie was adopted, we desire to be understood

understood as not resting this measure in any degree upon them; but as quoting them only to illustrate the propriety of it; and the merits of the general questions under discussion. But having in the same review, taken frequent occasion to deliver our sentiments upon particular points in the opinions or conduct of Mr. Petrie, which are either professed in his Minute, or fairly deducible from it, or are elucidated by other facts publicly known at the time of his removal, we must request that, though our observations of that nature cannot be recapitulated here, they may be considered as having then influenced our judgment, and as being now urged in support of it. And whenever our conduct in relation to this affair shall be examined, we protest against excluding, in the consideration of it, the foregoing observations; more particularly, though not exclusively, those which relate to the questions concerning General Mardowall, Colonel Capper and Major Boles, the discontents of the Officers, the suspensions of the 1st of May, the Test of the 26th July, and the causes which terminated the revolt.

Fifthly. We shall therefore, after these introductory remarks, proceed to state in a summary way, under general heads, the grounds upon which our opinion was formed, and we think is justified, that the removal of Mr. Petrie from Council was proper and necessary.

1st. Mr. Petrie was, in our judgment, totally wrong in his whole system of policy with respect to the Officers of the Army. We do not mean that conciliation is not at all times desirable, and ought not to have been preferred if it had been practicable; but that the insubordinate seditious conduct of the Officers left no means of conciliation on the part of Government, unless passive submission to insult and degradation be called such; and that these means would only have increased the measure of military usurpation, and rendered the Government incompetent to the proper performance of the high duties entrusted to it. Mr. Petrie, in the whole of his conduct and reasonings, seems not to have seriously taken into his contemplation, the credit, efficiency or security of the Government. He has indeed spoken

of "dignity, firmness, moderation," of an "appropriate General Order," (which would, as we have shewn, have been an act of imbecility) of "producing happier effects at less expense;" and the authors of the Dissents, who have coincided in his views, have held much general language of the same kind; but neither Mr. Petrie nor they have given us the least definite idea of the manner in which he would have acted, had the conduct of affairs been in his hands, unless it were by concession: nor from the nature of the case does it appear that there was any possible mode of action, except by resisting insubordination and sedition, or in one form or another, by concession, connivance or passiveness, yielding to them. The ill success of attempts to gain the Army by forbearance, temporizing, and patience under open revolt, was fully exemplified in the conduct of Colonel Montresor, Commandant at Hydrabad, and Colonel Malcolm at Masulipatam. And in fact, it appears that Mr. Petrie looked chiefly to concession. But whilst no real attention was manifested by Mr. Petrie to the interest and the character of legitimate authority, he seemed to set no bounds to the lengths to which he would permit the Army to go, rather than enter into serious contest with them, nor to consider what the effects of unrestrained military licence and encroachment must be. Whilst he was alive to infinite dangers on the one side, he seems to have adverted to none on the other. To that the foresight ascribed to him does not appear to have been turned. The Officers, on his principles, must have had their will; the public disgrace of Government in its compelled rescinding of its own Orders passed for the suppression of open rebellion; the removal from office of individuals, whose merits had rendered them obnoxious to the Officers: the establishment of the "Rights of the Army;"—the recommendation at least of Government for the "appointment of the representative of the Army" to Council; the overthrow of retrenchments, &c. We mean not that Mr. Petrie has said this, but that it would be the result of his system. He thought that if an open conflict was prevented, the grand point was secured; and to obtain this it would seem, for any thing that appears, he would have abandoned to chance all other consequences. "To my judgment,"

says Mr. Petrie, "the repeal of every Order passed for the last " eight months," (his meaning is probably the same as in his Statement, where he says twelve months) "would be a lesser " evil than shedding a drop of British blood in a civil contest." "To me concession seemed as a feather when placed in " the scale against the revolt of the Army, a civil war, and the " probable loss of the country." He seeks to justify his opinion by saying, "that greater Powers than ours had conceded to " expediency or necessity." The allusions which it would appear he had in view here, namely, the proceedings of the Volunteers in Ireland, and the mutiny in our Fleet, were cases utterly different, not threatening the subversion of the British Government; and, in assuming that concession was dictated to the Fort St. George Government by "expediency and necessity," he has begged the whole question. The result has at least proved that concession was not *necessary*. But Mr. Petrie does not appear to have had an idea that revolt could have been successfully resisted; and, after he had seen the contrary, he has (dangerously we think) assigned to "great and singular good " fortune," what was the effect of the real strength and rational measures of Government. It would seem, indeed, that he apprehended no danger from the largest concessions. He thought that Sir G. Barlow hazarded every thing for a form, and that his own course would have secured the *substance*. And here it is that we hold Mr. Petrie to have been essentially wanting in the judgment required in the station and circumstances in which he was placed. It is our decided opinion that Mr. Petrie's system would have sacrificed the *substance*, would have weakened and degraded the Government, and have given an ascendancy to the military power, which must either in the end have been opposed with more disadvantage by an open struggle, or have been productive of confusion and danger, internal and external. The effect of Mr. Petrie's mode of thinking on this subject is not to be confined to his own conduct only. The general tenour both of his sentiments and conduct must have been known to the Army and the public, and without supposing any factious view on his part, have produced an influence prejudicial to the Government. And having not only acted upon, but published.

to the world, those sentiments in favour of indefinite concession to the Army, and against all serious resistance to them, we think it was unfit that a person known to hold such sentiments should remain a Member of Government, in the station too next the Chair, and more especially at a time when unanimity in the Government upon this great question of the line of policy to be held with the Army was so requisite, and when the unequivocal and decided support of the measures of that Government by the Court of Directors was so important.

2d. Upon the principles or opinions Mr. Petrie himself has avowed, his conduct appears to us to have been extremely culpable.

In the month of October 1807, when he was in the Government he stated repeatedly and forcibly to the Court of Directors, " that a very dangerous spirit of insubordination " and cabal had lately shown itself in the Army, (which must " be dangerous to all armies) which, after the events that had " agitated the Native Army of that Presidency, might lead to " consequences of the most fatal nature: and we are satisfied," continues the public letter of his Government, signed by him, " that nothing but a firm determination to resist and to punish " every appearance of disrespect to the public authority, can " uphold that degree of discipline which is essential to the " existence of your Army."

We hear no more of this language or tone from Mr. Petrie in the Government of his successor, although the spirit of insubordination was progressive, originating, as was observed before, from no act of Sir G. Barlow's, and had become ostensible in cabals, combinations and factious proceedings, before General Macdowall had commenced his public outrages against the Government. M. Petrie appears wholly to overlook the course of highly insubordinate, factious conduct pursued by that Officer, without reserve, among those under his command in the progress of the year 1808; a course of which, as it was generally known, Mr. Petrie could not have been ignorant. And
when

when General Macdowall went to a length no other man had ever ventured upon, in publicly insulting the Government, Mr. Petrie gives the General Order of that Officer the mild epithet of *disrespectful*, is for passing it over without any exercise of severity, as he expresses it, to General Macdowall, and, in all the subsequent insults publicly offered to the Government by the Officers, he is utterly forgetful of his own declarations, that "*insubordination may lead to the most fatal consequences, and that the discipline essential to the existence of the Army cannot be upholden without a firm determination to resist and punish every appearance of disrespect to the public authority.*" He throughout extenuates the proceedings of the Officers, whilst the language of his Minute throws the chief blame on the Government. Instead of hearing any more from him of the necessity of supporting the public authority and the discipline of the Army, he appears to be uniformly for suffering every thing, and yielding every thing, rather than enter into contest with the Officers, which, as the general tendency of his opinions and disposition must have been known, could not fail to animate the disaffected. Perhaps it may be expected, that in justice to him, we should notice a distinction introduced on this head in his Statement; "that, if turbulence in the Army was confined to a part, and did not extend to a majority, it was our duty to meet the case with exemplary punishment; but that, if the whole or a great majority was disaffected to Government, the measures Sir G. Barlow proposed were totally inapplicable." Upon Mr. Petrie's own reasoning, he is censurable in not joining with Government to suppress the earlier stages of insubordination, before it could be said that general disaffection existed; but in fact, the distinction here so broadly stated terminates in this; that if the seditious in the Army can only make their combination general enough, they must not be resisted; a principle which, if Governments were to adopt, there must be an end of the supremacy of the Civil Power over the Military. "The grievances of the Army," a phrase become common among the Officers, is a phrase repeatedly employed in Mr. Petrie's reasonings, and apparently with a degree of admission; but he enters into no explanation or discrimination

tion touching those grievances. Now it is known that the unreasonable and inadmissible claims contained in the very improper Memorial of the Officers, pressed on Government by General Macdowall, made up at least a considerable part of their "grievances." These claims, as well on account of their nature, as because they were made in opposition to the acts of former Governments in which Mr. Petrie had concurred, or to the acts of the Court of Directors themselves, it was the duty of Mr. Petrie openly to resist. Instead of seeming to tolerate their being set up, and remaining as grounds of complaint, he should have fairly and publicly expressed his disapprobation of them, in order clearly to inform the Army of his sentiments on this material subject. He could not, to be consistent with himself, allow that the claims were founded; nor does it appear that he thought them so. He has subscribed to the Fort St. George letter of the 10th September 1809, which states the Army had no grievances; but there is an indiscriminating toleration and indulgence respecting "grievances," visible in his Minute, very different from his style in October 1807; and, in the temper and circumstances of the Army very incongruous to his duty as a good member of Government.

It cannot be doubted, that whatever Mr. Petrie's opinion of the proceedings of Government towards the Army might be, it was incumbent on him to use his utmost efforts to restrain their criminal excesses, especially when they were advancing to open insubordination and revolt. He has mentioned his endeavours with individual Officers; and it would have been satisfactory to have seen something of his correspondence, and more of his proceedings on this subject: but we think this was not enough. In so great a crisis, it would have become a man in his high situation, and possessing influence, as he says himself, with Officers, to have interposed with them more publicly and zealously for the prevention of the evils he feared. Delicately circumstanced as he was, it would have been proper and useful in him to have declared in a public Minute, his reprobation of insubordination and sedition, and of all agitations tending to them. From such an act, solemnly performed and made known
by

by a man whom the Army looked upon as friendly to them, some good would probably have resulted, and at least, it would have been a defence against misrepresentation.

We think Mr. Petrie's conduct in Council, and towards the Court of Directors, in relation to the discontents of the Army, liable to objection. It does not appear that he fully debated at the board the measures there proposed; but he refers to private conversations with Sir G. Barlow. On such momentous subjects it was, on his own principles, his duty to state his opinions openly in Council. Private conversations are no record; and such an ambiguous course of private objection and ostensible passiveness, leaves an opening for maintaining afterwards, according as events turn out, either that measures were opposed, or that they were acquiesced in. Upon the same principles that Mr. Petrie recorded his Dissents to the measures of Government against individuals, it was his business to enter his objections to the proceedings of Government on great questions which involved the highest interests. Unless Sir G. Barlow's Minute, written a year after the commencement of the Army agitations, had, with Mr. Petrie's reply, produced explanations, the Court of Directors probably never would have known the opinions or the line he held respecting those subjects; but seeing his signature to all the Letters relating to them from the Government, without any counter-declaration, they would of course suppose he acted with his colleagues; unless subsequent censure from the Court should have drawn forth exculpatory information from him: whereas he himself admits,* "that the Court will require to know the causes which have exposed the State to such dangers, and that he has an opinion of them very different from the President's."

* Minute, p. 11.

3d. We wish that Mr. Petrie had been so guarded in his conduct, as not to have left it liable to the construction of affording countenance to the factious opposers of Government. Whilst it is allowed that members of Government possess the right of maintaining, with decorous freedom, their conscientious opinions on public subjects, even when they differ from the

the majority; it is also to be granted, that however they may oppose particular measures, it is their duty to uphold the general authority and efficiency of Government; because, when these are impaired, the ends of the institution of Government itself are so far frustrated; and, in a time of party violence, and of disputes between the Government and any portions of the community, dissentient members of that Government ought to be very careful, that whilst they adhere to their own opinions, they do not, by their conduct otherwise, throw weight into the scale of factious opposition. We do not think Mr. Petrie has been sufficiently attentive to this material distinction. Supposing it even granted that the supporters of Mr. Sherson, of one party of Carnatic Creditors; of General Macdowall and the subordinate Officers; were all right as to their particular objects; yet, in going beyond those objects, in combining to revile and run down the Government, with the view, at length apparent, of effecting a change in the administration of it, they broke in upon the respect and reverence due to the ordinance of Government, and acted injuriously to the public interests. No appearance should have been admitted from whence they or the Public might imagine that all the members of the Government did not decidedly reprobate all tendencies of this kind. But Mr. Petrie's friendships and intimacies seem unfortunately to have been very much with the persons in opposition to the Government; and to have been kept up after their opposition had become general and notorious. We do not say that he was to have given up his real opinion of the innocence of any individual; because Government had thought him guilty; but certainly, after such individual had been publicly marked by the censure of Government, and had, in consequence, been raised into popularity by the disaffected as a martyr to the injustice of Government, it was Mr. Petrie's duty to abstain from whatever might be construed to countenance such a spirit of faction. But after the suspension of Mr. Sherson, and after his case had become a rallying point for the disaffected, we find, by Mr. Petrie's own account, that he is frequently and familiarly received at his house. Mr. Petrie says, one reason of this was, that he might obtain from Mr. Sherson himself, explanations concerning

concerning his accounts, which he (Mr. Petrie) was then investigating for his own satisfaction, after the Grain Committee and Government had pronounced Mr. Sherson guilty. We cannot but doubt, in the first place, the propriety, under all existing circumstances, of a private examination, of this kind between Mr. Petrie and the accused; but must not Mr. Petrie have been aware, that the Public could not know of the reasons assigned by him for seeing Mr. Sherson so frequently; and that the familiar reception of Mr. Sherson at his house would be interpreted as intended to give him the same countenance and support, which he had from a party, because under the disapprobation of Government? So with respect to Lieutenant Colonel Sentleger, Major Boles, and Captain Grant, of whom the first and last were suspended on the 1st May, and Major Boles on the 31st January. Mr. Petrie, in admitting that these Officers occasionally called upon him, says, that "all the objects of his communications with them was through their influence to allay the alarming ferment which was rapidly spreading from one station of the Army to the other, &c." Now, as here again, the reception given to gentlemen, known to be in hostility to the Government, might easily be misinterpreted by the Army, so we must confess that it seems an unfortunate proceeding in Mr. Petrie to have chosen, for the purpose of allaying discontents in the Army, Officers whom the Government found it necessary to suspend for insubordination or sedition; and against the first of whom, Lieutenant Colonel Sentleger, Mr. Petrie, as we have seen before, had on the 21st October, 1807, made very strong representations on account of insubordinate conduct; namely, that he had "placed himself in the character of a Defender of the general interests of the Company's Army, and that he was eager to promote dangerous discussion; whence Government were impressed with the strongest sense of the dangerous tendency of his inflammatory and factious proceedings." And afterwards, in the same Letter it is stated, "that the dangerous spirit of cabal in the Army had been greatly inflamed by the impunity with which Lieutenant Colonel Sentleger had hitherto been enabled to brave and insult the authority of Government," (Mr. Petrie was

then sensible that impunity added to insubordination) " and " that he was held up at the principal military stations as the " champion of the rights of the Army," &c. Into the defence of Lieutenant Colonel Sentleger, which Mr. Petrie seems to adopt, against the charge on which he was suspended, we shall not here enter, as there will be another occasion to consider that charge, and the proofs by which it is established ; but, passing over also the complimentary strain in which Mr. Petrie, in his Minute, writes of that Officer, we cannot avoid expressing our surprize at his quoting, with apparent satisfaction, what Lieutenant Colonel Sentleger had stated to him as part of his defence ; namely, " that he had endeavoured to discourage in the Officers under his command, every idea of openly " opposing the authority of Government ;" though it appears from Mr. Petrie's Statement, that he understood this Officer, and nearly all those under his command, to have taken *an active part in exclaiming against the measures relative to General Macdowall, &c. and had signed " certain inflammatory papers ;"* which is something of the same nature as the observation Mr. Petrie makes in behalf of Colonel Capper and Major Boles ; that the remotest intention of *creating a mutiny in the Army,* could not be imputed to those Officers.

We certainly could have wished to have seen Mr. Petrie actively and ostensibly associating with men also of another description, known friends to order and obedience, for the purposes of ascertaining accurately, and of allaying the discontents of the Army ; but even when he learnt from Lieutenant Colonel Sentleger, " that a most dangerous combination existed " in the Southern Army, to resist the Orders of Government, " and to insist on a redress of grievances," we do not find that he proceeded to communicate this information, most important as it was, to Sir G. Barlow or his colleagues in the Government.

We are indeed concerned to see, that Mr. Petrie's defence of himself, in answer to Sir G. Barlow, does not exhibit him as living in habits of private intimacy and confidential communication

tion with any description of persons but such as were in a state of hostility to the Government, both in the Civil and Military lines of the service. And on the whole of this head, so far are we from thinking with the authors of the Dissents, that Mr. Petrie has refuted the accusations of Sir G. Barlow, that we are of opinion the facts he has admitted, and very unsatisfactorily explained, establish a great deal; that his house was open to the malcontents (even after Sir G. Barlow's admonition *, though he might not subsequently have asked suspended servants to come to it;) that he was considered as a friend by all those of that description whose names are prominent in that time of commotion; and it must be evident, that in a community violently inflamed by the spirit of party and faction, in which the course held by the second Member of the Government could not be unobserved, his maintenance of opinions which were also held by those hostile to Sir G. Barlow, and his opposition to the same measures of Government which they likewise opposed, might, without much greater precaution than he used, be naturally interpreted by the different parties united against the Government, as a support and encouragement to their

* Minute, p. 99.

Some of the Dissents † lay much stress on the declaration of Lord Minto, that in doing justice to Sir G. Barlow and the gentlemen who supported him, *he did not mean to reflect on the conduct of Mr. Petrie*; but that he thought the conduct of Mr. Petrie wrong, is evident, both from his own opposite course, and from the passage of his letter immediately following the one alluded to; wherein he says, "In a case of crisis, however, when to place the matter on a broad and general ground, a strong Government might reasonably be accounted essential (if I may use that phrase) to the safety of the commonwealth, the Dissent of a Member of Council so considerable in station, character, and talents, must give additional value to the useful and efficient support which Sir G. Barlow and the public cause have derived from Mr. Oakes and Mr. Casamajor."

† Sir F. Baring, and Sir H. B. Esdaile and Mr. Elphinstone.

We, therefore, on the whole of this article, must express our full persuasion, that the conduct held by Mr. Petrie could not but have been, as Sir G. Barlow has stated, “productive of serious impediment to the administration of the affairs of Government, and of injury to the public interests;” and this in a way and to an extent which the maintenance of his own opinions needed not have produced, and for which his right to maintain those opinions forms no valid excuse.

4. The last topic to which we shall advert, is the refusal of Mr. Petrie to sign the Address, framed by a respectable part of the inhabitants of Madras, to Sir G. Barlow.

In order to form a correct judgment on this subject, we must look to the general state of affairs under the Fort St. George Presidency, at the time when the Address was proposed, and to the import of the Address itself.

Mr. Petrie, it appears, refused to sign the Address on the 30th July. At that time the danger was almost at its highest point. It is an essential misstatement which is made in Mr. Petrie's defence, “that the Army had then manifested un-“equivocal proofs of returning subordination and obedience.” The facts stated in this Paper, and the most authentic documents concerning the progress of the revolt, prove the contrary. Colonel Malcolm had but a little before returned from his unsuccessful mission to Masulipatam. On the 30th July, the garrison of Seringapatam broke out into open rebellion. On the 3d August, Colonel Close was driven from Hyderabad. The action with the battalions from Chittledroog, the seizure of the public treasure in the Northern Circars, the mutiny at Ellore, the march of the Jauhmah Force towards the Presidency, all happened after the 30th July; and the first indication of returning obedience, which was the submission of the Hyderabad Force, is dated the 11th August, and could not have reached the Presidency till the 16th or 17th. Thus a great part of the Army was in open rebellion. The allegiance of the rest was at least questionable.

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In times of public peril, the mode of addressing the established Government with professions of loyalty and support is usual and natural. It is proper in Governments, at such times, to accept and even to wish for such testimonies of attachment. Some of the most respectable of the inhabitants of Madras, in a crisis big with danger to that Presidency and to India, thought it their duty to adopt a measure of this kind. The Chief Justice, a man next in rank to the Governor, and no less distinguished by his character than by his station, the two junior Members of Council, the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, and other conspicuous persons, took the lead. The Address went into no discussion of the measures of Government. It only expressed, on the part of the subscribers, a disapprobation of the insubordination that had recently shown itself among the Officers of the Company's Army, so dangerous in its tendency, with assurances of support to the interests of legal government, and a readiness to devote life and fortune to the maintenance of the public tranquillity.

We would ask, whether, in the state of things at that moment, when the "sword of revolt" was unsheathed, and the flames of civil war likely to be kindled throughout the country, every man, and especially every public man, was not called to take his line? whether neutrality was any longer consistent with duty?—whether any loyal man could possibly take the side of opposition to lawful authority? and whether the Address pledged to more than the support of the Government by law established, and resistance to the principles of insubordination and disobedience?

On what grounds then did Mr. Petrie refuse to become a party to this Address? He thought "it might increase irritation, "and produce an unfavourable effect on the disposition of the "Army, which had then manifested unequivocal proofs of "returning subordination and obedience, and that the wounds "were beginning to heal." This reason had not, as already shown, the least foundation; there were not any symptoms of returning subordination nor of begun amendment. The principal

pal reason, therefore, assigned by Mr. Petrie, wholly fails. He thought also "that such a public manifestation of the sentiments of a part of the settlement, so strongly expressed,"—(the expressions are, in our opinion, remarkably temperate)—"could do not possible good, but might add to the difficulties which still opposed the recalling a considerable part of the Officers to their duty." As it appears from various documents that the Officers were conscious they were acting a most criminal part, it is far more probable that the public erection of a standard of duty and loyalty must have struck them with a deeper sense of their criminality, and made their perseverance harder to themselves. The difficulties still "opposing the recal of many of the Officers to their duty," is an idea growing out of the preceding groundless supposition of "*unequivocal proofs of returning subordination*," and falls with it. What means, or what probability appeared of recalling the Officers, then remained, unless to convince them that they had not the power of overawing and controuling the Government which they believed themselves to possess? That only a *part* of the Settlement signed the Address—(many more might perhaps have signed it if Mr. Petrie had set an example)—is, in our opinion, an unsound argument, although it is adopted in some of the Dissents;* for it is precisely in times of faction and division that such Addresses are pertinent. But does the duty of supporting legal government, depend on the numbers that may concur in that object? The duty surely attaches to every individual, whether he has many or few to act with him; and if, on the occasion in question, but a few were found, the greater was their honour, whilst those who refused to join them, were, in our opinion, highly culpable. Mr. Petrie, in the way of objection, alludes to "the means of obtaining signatures;" and one of the Dissents† explains this as if the author of it has been an eyewitness, by saying "the Address was carried from house to house" by an Officer whom he is pleased to stigmatize, and who, according to him, "flattered and threatened as he judged most likely to prevail;—to some he held forth promises of the Governor's favour;—others he threatened with his highest displeasure." On this passage we would observe, that there

* Sir F. Baring and Sir H. Inglis, and Mr. Elphinstone.

† Mr. Elphinstone.

is not the least vestige of authority for it in the public Records, which the honourable writer himself has made the only standard by which our decision should be regulated; nor is it even supported by the slightest shadow of that "*ex parte* evidence" which, he observes, "should not be implicitly believed." and we cannot say how unwarrantable appears to us the whole of this attack not only upon a very deserving Officer, to whose character we have already done some justice, but on the highly respectable individuals who signed the Address, and indeed on the loyal measure of standing forth in defence of lawful government. This honourable Writer further says, "that if any good consequence could have been expected from an Address, a meeting should have been called, and the Address voted publicly." This certainly would have been a most pernicious proceeding. We apprehend it was perfectly competent to any individuals, to set their names to a paper promising support to the constitutional authority, at a time when it was threatened with subversion; but for the inhabitants of Madras to assemble collectively, in order to debate or discuss any of the measures of Government respecting the Army, would have been to assume a very dangerous power to which they had not the least right, and to open a theatre for all the clamours and abuse of faction, to the still deeper injury of Government. Or if, in such an assembly, it were proposed to vote upon any question, the real import of which, however worded, should be whether the legal Government should be supported or not, it would be something like treason. Mr. Petrie has appealed to the result of the Address, which, he says, instead of strengthening the hands of Government, restoring harmony, mutual confidence, &c. &c. increased animosity and contention. This mode of arguing from consequences, (to which he has elsewhere objected), seems to require effects from the measure which it never could be expected to produce. The disaffected were not likely to be reclaimed by the Address; nor is it a wonder that those whose policy it was to await events without taking a decided part, still wished to find excuses for not committing themselves, and at the same time to have their refusal to sign the Address considered as no decision against the Government. But whatever

real

real friends of Government concurred in the refusal, were injudicious friends; and the conduct of all these descriptions of persons does not impeach the propriety of the measure of an Address, nor the mode in which it was conducted, by obtaining signatures, being indeed the only mode that was open. It was still a noble testimony to the principles of order and loyalty, and shewed a band of the very best subjects under that Government to be devoted to its support. If there was a want of attention to Mr. Petrie, as he complains, in not first consulting him upon the measure, it lay with the movers in it to answer that minor objection, which certainly could weigh but little in a question of so important a nature. It is urged in Mr. Petrie's defence, that though he refused to sign the Address, yet he afterwards stated that, "if the Government in Council, or the general sense, attached any beneficial importance to the public interests, or that it could effect the peace of the Settlement, mislead any one, or prevent mischief, it would be his duty to yield his opinion to theirs, and affix his name." But the value and importance of Mr. Petrie's signature depended on its being spontaneous. He had, "after mature and serious consideration," stated his reasons why "he could not, with propriety, give the Address his signature;" and he still "thought his reasons just." A signature affixed at the desire of Government, under all these circumstances, which could not be unknown, would have been deemed an official act, not the offspring of his own judgment and inclination, and would place the Government in the light of soliciting a countenance, which, given in that way, would, after all, do them little or no good. We do not, therefore, wonder that Sir G. Barlow avoided going into the subject with Mr. Petrie, and left him to act according to his own judgment. The offer of Mr. Petrie, as above quoted, seems, however, to indicate some apprehension, at least in his mind, that his signature might be of importance; and we find it very difficult to conceive that he must not have been sensible a declaration like that contained in the Address, voluntarily made by him in conjunction with other distinguished characters, would have produced a beneficial effect upon the minds of the Officers.

At any rate, being called to it as he was, he had this plain question before him—whether he, the second Member of the Government, should appear to the Army and to the world as one of those determined and pledged to support the lawful Government against insubordination, or as one of those who declined to give such a pledge, and to make such a declaration. He chose to appear in the latter class; and let it be recollected this was at a crisis when the Officers were in actual rebellion against the Government, and civil factions were also opposed to it. Let it be recollected also, that Mr. Petrie excused his not entering any Dissent to certain measures which were supposed to have had an influence in producing the Vellore mutiny, because he would not have it appear that there was any difference among the Members of Government at so critical a conjuncture. Must he not then have been perfectly aware of constructions unfavourable to Government, which would be put on his present conduct? What was the lowest interpretation that would be made of this proceeding by the Officers? We conceive this—that he was not to be considered as acting with the Government in their principles or measures respecting the Army; that he bore with all the Officers had done, even to the horrible crime of turning their arms against the Government, and seizing the forts and treasures of the public; that he did not shut out treaty with them upon the basis of their own demands, which included restoration of Officers dismissed for sedition, &c. to which treaty a general amnesty must, of course, be preliminary; that, therefore, he was not disposed to resort to the military means (ample as they were,) which Government had for its own protection; but, in short, looked only to a present compromise, or rather treaty, of such kind as could be obtained, including probably a reference to the arrival and decisions of Lord Minto, who had already declared himself against the whole system of the Officers, or a reference, concerning points already in effect yielded, to the Court of Directors, who would thus be brought into the greatest embarrassment, whilst it would have left the Fort St. George Government in the most humiliated state, and the Officers full leisure to consolidate their dangerous ascendancy.

This course was really, according to all the explanations of Mr. Petrie himself, the one for which he was an advocate; but, in the temper and state of the Army, it appears to us, that it necessarily involved an abandonment of the just principles of all Government, of the authority, credit, and efficiency of the Madras Government, of the proper controul of the Army in future, and thence an abandonment of the highest interests of British India.

We therefore thought, and still think, that Mr. Petrie essentially failed, on this important occasion, in the duty which appertained to his station; that the Court of Directors were consequently called upon to mark publicly and strongly their disapprobation of conduct like his; and that, on this and the other grounds which have been stated in the preceding pages, it was just and proper to remove Mr. Petrie from standing in succession to the Government, and from the seat he held in the Council of the Fort St. George Presidency.

We have the honour to be,

Gentlemen,

Your most obedient humble Servants,

(Signed)

C. GRANT.

R. C. FLOWDEN.

W. ASTELL.

C. MARJORISANKS.

C. MILLS.

I. INGLIS.

A. ROBERTS.

I. BEBB.

G. SMITH.

G. A. ROBINSON.

East-India House, 10th Sept. 1810.

APPENDIX.

THE Nabobs of the Carnatic had carefully kept registers of the bonds granted by them, and payments made on account of them, in offices appropriated to that purpose. After their death, to prevent those registers from being falsified or interpolated, the offices were shut up. An Officer belonging to one of them, whose salary was only sixty rupees a month, having some years ago been dismissed for misconduct, Paupiah Braminy, an intriguing native, a great dealer in bonds, and a man of notorious recorded infamy, as already mentioned in the text, offered the present Nabob a douceur of 10,000 pagodas, or £4000, for the restoration of the Officer so dismissed. Whence the obvious inference is, that he wanted to have an instrument of his own in that department. That Officer, with his successor and another person in office, were afterwards detected in a plan to introduce spurious bonds into the office, which they all confessed; and they were confined by the Nabob. This detection was made by other official servants, but has since been used by the party adverse to the Commissioners and to the Government, to destroy the credit of the office registers as authority for the validity of bonds, and to destroy also the credit of all the Durbar servants. Paupiah, by his English attorney, applied to the Supreme Court for a writ of Habeas Corpus, to discharge those persons out of the Nabob's custody, and also instituted a prosecution against the Nabob's Dewan, for falsely imprisoning them. This fact shows plainly a connexion between Paupiah and these persons. Various informations having been given to

Government, of the fabrication of Nabobs' bonds, and of a traffic in them, the Government, to check this nefarious practice, instituted the Committee of Inquiry spoken of in the text, to whom those informations were referred. This sort of previous inquiry fell within the province of Government, not of the Commissioners for Carnatic debts, whose business lay in examining claims brought before them. Among the communications referred to that Committee, were a charge against Paupiah for forgery, and also one against Reddy Row. We know not which of these charges was prior in point of time. Reddy Row, who had been the late Nabob's head accountant of the Carnatic, had, from his good character and long acquaintance with the bond transactions of those Nabobs, been, after their death, together with Mr. Battley, the English secretary of the Nabobs, consulted by speculators in the Carnatic debts, on the authenticity of bonds offered for sale. The information against Reddy Row was given by a foreign adventurer named Loyd, who did not, on his examination, seem to know what he had stated in his letter, and appeared, in this instance, to be acting under the direction of others. To support this charge, he brought two witnesses against Reddy Row, named Arnachella Row and Beem Row, who proved afterwards to be instruments of Paupiah Braminy. Their testimony was thought so improbable as to be unworthy of belief; and has since, in the most material parts, been refuted even by themselves. The Committee having, on the 25th June 1808, been directed to examine into the charge against Paupiah, for fabricating a bond for 46,000 pagodas, they on the 11th July reported that it was a forgery, and recommended that the parties concerned in it should be prosecuted. The choice of natives to assist the Commissioners in examining the Durbar Registers, in order to ascertain the validity of claims, was evidently a point of great importance. It appears that Paupiah wanted to get a man of his own into that employ. The Commissioners, however, selected for their principal assistant, Reddy Row above-mentioned, as the person most qualified, and likely to get them information. On or about the same day, the 11th of July, Paupiah,

Paupiah, as a creditor, preferred before the Commissioners for investigating the debts, objections to a bond belonging to Reddy Row for 38,500 pagodas, as being a forgery. His witnesses were the persons already named, Arnachella Row and Beem Row. On the 12th July, a letter dated the 9th, was laid before the Commissioners, by Mr. Abbott, containing a list of bonds stated by him to be suspicious, among which was this one of Reddy Row's. The Commissioners, to whom the deed sanctioned by Parliament meant exclusively to confine the judgment of such points, on opening their commission, in the first place examined carefully into the validity of this bond, and were thoroughly satisfied, on what they deemed the clearest evidence, that it was a genuine one; not only the reality of the Nabob's signature, but the reasonable grounds on which the bond was granted, having been proved. It was here given in evidence to the Commissioners, that Paupiah had offered to Reddy Row to withdraw his charge of forgery and settle their differences, if he (Reddy Row) would undertake to support Paupiah's claims (for 25 lacs of pagodas, about one million sterling). On the 20th July, in consequence of the recommendation of the Committee, orders were given by Government, to the Company's law officers, to prosecute Paupiah for forgery. The Commissioners appear to have believed, that there was a design to defeat the object of their appointment, by procuring the removal, through any means, of the Officers most able to bring the truth to light; and having, in the course of their proceedings, discovered, as they thought, an extensive conspiracy for the worst purposes, they, on the 25th July, stated this case to the Government; and requested that, with a view to institute a prosecution against the authors of the conspiracy, their Minutes might be inspected by the Company's law officers. The principal party implicated here was Paupiah. He, on the same day (25th July) charged before the sitting magistrate, Mr. Maitland, Reddy Row and one of his witnesses, Anunda Row, with the forgery of the above-mentioned bond, for pagodas 38,500; of which charge the Commissioners for investigating the debts, to whose jurisdiction this question belonged, had already acquitted Reddy Row.

Paupiah

Paupiah's witnesses here, were Arnachella Row and Beem Row already mentioned. The magistrate who had before sat in rotation, had declined to commit the accused in this business, on the evidence tendered. One of the Commissioners attended Mr. Maitland, and offered to communicate to him the contradictory evidence which the same accusers had given before to them in this matter; but Mr. Maitland refused to receive the depositions taken before the Commissioners, or to examine the deposing parties himself; and, on the *ex parte* evidence of the accusers, who were themselves to have been prosecuted for perjury in support of Paupiah's conspiracy, he, on the 30th July, committed Reddy Row and Anunda Row, who had given evidence in favour of Reddy Row, to take their trial for forgery. Mr. Maitland has since avowed himself to be a prosecutor in the same matter in which he then acted as magistrate, and to be interested in the event. The complaint of the Commissioners against Arnachella Row and Beem Row, for perjury, having been heard by Mr. Taswell, another magistrate, he committed them for trial. But Paupiah, by carrying the accusation just mentioned, before Mr. Maitland, took the start of the other side; and he and his accomplices, instead of appearing in the ignominious light of culprits on the charges of forgery and perjury, placed Reddy Row (a man who had till then passed through life with an unimpeached character) in this situation, and upon a charge too of which the proper tribunal had declared him innocent. On the representation of the whole of this case by the Commissioners, and at their request, the Government directed the law officers of the Company to undertake the defence of Reddy Row and Anunda Row. The Government did not think this merely a "squabble among individuals," as Mr. Pattison expresses it, but a public concern; yet so much clamour has been raised against the Government, for the assistance thus rendered by their order to the defendants, it may not be foreign to that part of the subject to look back to the origin of their having been consulted in regard to the forgeries which were supposed to have been committed. If this is done, it will appear that the first occasion on which

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the Company's law officers were called to act in this business was during the Presidency of Mr. Petrie, when the investigation of the information given by the foreigner, Loyd, was committed to the Company's Advocate General and Solicitor, who thereby became officially connected with the subject of the forgeries before Sir G. Barlow's arrival. Immediately afterwards, that is on the 1st August, an advertisement was prepared, and appeared anonymously in the Gazette of the 4th, inviting "a meeting of the *bona fide* creditors of the Nabob, " on the 6th, on business of the utmost importance." The persons who, in consequence, met, were Messrs. Roebuck, Parry, Abbot and Maitland (the two last partners in business), Mr. Light, as *Paupiah's Attorney*, and two other individuals not named. They elected Messrs. Roebuck, Parry and Abbott, to be *representatives of the creditors of the late Nabob*—a very numerous body dispersed in England and India, who had given no power for any such election. In the first list of Nabob's debts, made up in 1806—(the late Nabob died in 1801)—the amount of claims standing in the names of Messrs. Abbott and Maitland, as principals or agents, was £68,847. The amount standing in the name of *Paupiah* was £620,146. In the last account the claims of these two persons, of Messrs. Roebuck and Parry, and of *Paupiah*, as principals or agents (including a claim by Mr. Abbot, on behalf of a Begum, for 25 lacks of pagodas) amount to 67 lacks of pagodas, or £2,680,000 sterling, being full two-thirds of the whole amount at first estimated to be due to a most numerous list of creditors.

In the character of *representatives of the creditors*, Messrs. Roebuck, Parry and Abbott, on the 20th August 1806, addressed a remonstrance to Government, against the protection afforded to Reddy Row, by allowing him the assistance of the Company's law officers, and against the intended prosecution of *Paupiah* for forgery, which they said would discourage natives from coming forward to give evidence—an allegation soon disproved by the events that followed. It was alleged also, that Mr. Anstruther, the Advocate General, who had been directed

• Dissent, 15th
October, 1809.

directed to conduct the defence of Reddy Row, was himself concerned in the property of the bond which that person was charged with having forged. Mr. Austruther has, in our opinion, completely cleared his own honour in that matter. Mr. Rhipstone * has denied that, in these proceedings, there was any connexion between the four European creditors and Paupiah. But we conceive that the very nature and order of the events above described, irresistibly establish such a connexion; and besides, it is avowed by Messrs. Abbott, Parry and Maitland, that they paid the expense of the suit, brought in the Supreme Court, in the name of Paupiah, against Reddy Row, as it is also known that Mr. Parry was Paupiah's bail in the action brought against him and another person for perjury.

These persons were throughout leaders in the opposition raised against Government and the Commissioners for the Carnatic debts, on account of the measures adopted by them for the due investigation of those debts. Their proceedings tended to throw every thing into confusion,—to discredit the Officers employed in the examination of the Nabab's registers—to discredit those registers themselves (whence, it is probable, they could expect little support to their cause from them)—to discredit the Commissioners and the Government likewise. These persons went at length so far as to apply to the Governor General in Council for the removal of the Commissioners, and also to threaten those Commissioners with a criminal prosecution in the Supreme Court at Madras; which violent course, on the other hand, induced a very respectable body, comprehending the principal commercial characters of Madras, to bear, in a voluntary address to the Commissioners, the most honourable testimony to the uprightness of their conduct, with which also the Madras Government expressed the highest satisfaction. That Government, at last, in order to prevent the entire obstruction of the business entrusted to the Commissioners, and to check the spirit of faction, which had become very general and outrageous in the Settlement, found it necessary to interpose, by removing Mr. Maitland from the magistracy,

magistracy, which his partiality in office justly deserved ;—by requiring Mr. Parry, who remained in India on sufferance, to return to Europe ;—and by appointing Mr. Roebuck, who held considerable offices at the Presidency, to the charge of the Settlement in Visagapatam, said to be one of the most salubrious ~~part~~ of the coast, where his subsequent death, at the age of 60, has been represented by some persons as murder. The opposite charges against Annaahella Row and Heem Row on the one hand, and against Reddy Row on the other, came before the grand jury at the same time. They heard first the charge against Reddy Row, and found a bill ; after which they refused to go into the other charge, as involving a contradiction to what they had already found on oath. The trial lasted near a month, five days of which were lost by the intoxication of some members of the petty jury, which was in general composed of the lowest order of Europeans. The Chief Justice, having adjourned one day, to arrange his notes of the evidence, was afterwards, by indisposition, prevented from attending for several days more ; which was made the ground of an application to the grand jury, then sitting, for a charge of impeachment against that eminent magistrate. The Chief Justice summed up, in a speech of *eight hours*, drawing a result in favour of the defendants, and particularly dwelling on the documents produced by the witnesses on *both sides* from the Durbar Offices, as unanswerable and conclusive. The jury in *twenty minutes* brought in a verdict of “ Guilty.” A new trial was moved for, on the ground that the verdict was against the clear weight of evidence. But, in consequence of that verdict, other bills for conspiracy and perjury were preferred and found against Reddy Row, and Mr. Battley, one of his witnesses, who had been thirty years English secretary to the Nabob with a fair reputation. In the first trial, the prosecutors had insisted that Anunda Row (principal witness for Reddy Row) who was stated by himself, by Mr. Battley, and others, to have been a writer in the Nabob's Durbar in the year 1799, was indeed, at that very time, a clerk in the Cutcherry of Manatgoody, near Cuddalore. It was proved, on the defence,

that Anunda Row at Manargoody was a different person. To investigate thoroughly, in view to the new trial, this fact on which the charge of perjury rested, a gentleman, well versed in the native languages, was sent by Government to the spot. He ascertained, from the unanimous testimony of a considerable number of the inhabitants, that the Anunda Row who had given evidence at the trial, and who was shown to them, was not the person who had resided at Manargoody. This, which seemed to fix the matter, proved, in the temper of the Settlement, adverse to the cause of Reddy Row and to Government. It was openly represented as an attempt to overawe the inhabitants of Manargoody, by the interference of Government, and such reports failed not of their effect on the public mind. On the motion for a new trial, the counsel for the prosecution insisted that it was a violation of the rights of juries, to question the verdict on the ground of any opinion given by the judge as to the weight of evidence; which doctrine, being contrary to the current of authorities for the last half century, was resented by the Chief Justice, as an attempt to influence the by-standers, among whom were many of the special jury already struck for the approaching trials. A clamour for the rights of juries was raised, and every effort used to inspire a distrust of the Chief Justice, who, having delayed a decision on this notion, as the other trials nearly connected with it were coming on, a second presentment against him, tending to impeachment, was laid before the new grand jury. The Chief Justice, on the trial of Mr. Battley, which lasted several days, told the special jury they could not find the defendant guilty, unless they could make up their minds to the proposition, "that the whole inhabitants of Manargoody, and the whole witnesses from the Durbar, were perjured;" and unless the whole body of documents, which were not impeached in evidence, should by mere presumption be set aside as forgeries. The special jury found, however, Mr. Battley guilty of perjury, and recommended him to mercy, which seems not a very consistent proceeding. It is also said that the jury were not, in fact, unanimous in their verdict.

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The Chief Justice declared his determination to pass no judgment in either of these causes ; but to transmit them, as they stood, with his report on them, for the determination of His Majesty.

His Majesty has been advised to grant a pardon to the persons against whom the verdicts were passed, which, as we understand, was the only way open to him of supporting the part taken by the Chief Justice.

F I N I S.

PROTESTS,

&c. &c.

THE
PROTESTS

OF THE

HONOURABLE W. F. ELPHINSTONE,
JAMES PATTISON, Esq.
JAMES DANIELL, Esq.
ROBERT THORNTON, Esq.
JOHN HUDDLESTONE, Esq.
J. A. BANNERMAN, Esq.

DIRECTORS of the EAST INDIA COMPANY,

Against the Continuance

• OF

SIR GEORGE BARLOW

IN THE

GOVERNMENT OF MADRAS ;

Read at a COURT of DIRECTORS held on Wednesday
the 7th of August, 1811.

London :

Printed by WILLIAM THORNE, Red Lion Court, Fleet Street
And sold by SHERWOOD, NEELY, and JONES
Patet Noster Row.

1812.

PREFACE.

THAT the least informed reader of these Papers may understand the transactions to which they refer, it may be right to acquaint him, that in the year 1809, serious disturbances broke out in the East India Company's Army serving under the Madras Government. These disturbances, though the natural fruit of a harsh and bitter policy, were wisely condemned by the Directors, as soon as the intelligence reached them, in a tone of severe reprobation; and their Governments abroad received their sanction and support in the means adopted to quell them.

This support was the more liberally conceded to the Governor (Sir George Barlow), because he had taken care to be the first who told the story. General M'Dowall was lost on his passage, and Mr. Buchan, the hired agent of Sir George Barlow, arrived with his dispatches before any other intelligence had reached England. By degrees, however, the subject was better elucidated. Complaints, memorials, petitions crowded in against him without number. But he had secured

in his favour one or two leading members of the Court; and through their influence, for a time, every thing that breathed a prayer, or led to an inference against him, was heard with unwilling ears. Such, however, is the force of truth, even amongst a body so constituted, that a very different feeling began to manifest itself towards the middle of last year amongst the Directors. It seemed as if they were beginning to suspect, that the continuance in the Government of Madras, of a man who had ingeniously contrived to be hated by all ranks and classes of people, was neither politic nor safe. Accordingly, notice was given of a motion to recall him. It was debated on the 23d of July, 1811, and negatived by a majority of *two*. Nor would this have happened, had it not been for a sudden change of opinion in one or two of the Court; a change at complete variance with the language they had uniformly held since the subject had been first agitated. This problem can only be solved by the influence of the President of the Board of Control, who being a relation of Mr. Buchan, had entered with much personal zeal into the cause of Sir George Barlow. The number of that Board is twenty-four. It seems, therefore, that Sir George Barlow has obtained a triumph, which an exalted mind would consider a disgrace; and that he now holds his place on a tenure, which virtue or pride ought to have taught him to despise. The Protests, signed by six Gentlemen out of those who voted against him, comprehending no

mean proportion of whatever of talent or honour is to be found amongst them, are the subject of the following pages. They are printed from the copy called for by the House of Commons, preparatory to a motion of which notice has been given in that House, for his re-call.

Besides the military affairs, the Protests advert to a passage in his administration, of which little has been hitherto known. It seems that he has been guilty of an alarming interference in the proceedings of the King's Court at Madras. This is a short statement of that interference.

The Advocate General, Mr. Anstruther, had purchased of a man of the name of Reddy Row, a forged bond of one of the Nabobs of the Carnatic, for the liquidation of whose debts an Act of Parliament had been passed. Several creditors, interested of course in wiping away unjust debts, had objected to this claim, and impeached it by a prosecution of Reddy Row and his accomplices. Sir George Barlow, deferring to the mercenary advice of the Advocate General, took the criminals under his protection; dispatched a civil servant, at the expence of 1400 pagodas to the Company, to procure witnesses in their behalf; deprived the Magistrate, who had committed the delinquents, of his office; and drove one of the prosecutors (Benjamin Roebuck, Esq.) from his place and its emoluments from the Presidency, to a reduced allowance and petty situation

at a remote station, where, at the advanced age of 65, he died literally of a broken heart. Another of the prosecutors he ordered home to England.

The verdict of three successive Juries, however, confirmed the justice of the prosecution. But their verdicts were pronounced to be *fictitious*, and the Chief Justice was induced to recommend the persons convicted, Reddy Row and Anunda Row, for the King's pardon. That pardon was granted; but before the pardon arrived at Madras, Reddy Row, protected and caressed by Sir George Barlow, was detected in another forgery, and evaded the consequences of his crime by poisoning himself; and the very day when the pardon thus obtained was read in Court, the other object of it, Anunda Row, was found guilty of another, but a similar offence. The Advocate General has since expressed his acknowledgment of his own error, in terms of the most abject apology. To such an extremity did Sir George Barlow carry his resentments on this occasion, that several persons, who had served on these juries, unaccountably felt his displeasure, by their sudden dismissal from their situations, which was wholly inexplicable on any other ground, than that they were punished for the verdicts they had given.

If these matters, so disgraceful to the British character in India, pass over without inquiry, it may justly be allowed us to be out of humour

with the age we live in. Such things would not have been overlooked in better times. Authenticated charges of injustice and persecution against a colonial Governor, would have provoked, at least, an inquiry. But the present case has hitherto been scarcely complimented with a discussion ; a circumstance, attributable either to its having been forgotten amongst matters of nearer, though not more important interest, or to an ill-omened indifference to all abuses of authority in the *distant* parts of the British Empire.

COPY of the DISSENTS

TO THE

Court's Resolutions of the 23d July, 1811.

AT a Court of Directors, held on Wednesday the 7th August, 1811;—

Four Dissents to the Court's Resolution of the 23d ultimo, as to Sir G. Barlow remaining in the Government of Fort St. George, were read; viz.

One signed by the Honourable W. F. Elphinstone, James Pattison, and James Daniell, Esquires;

One by Robert Thornton, Esq.

One by John Hudleston, Esq.

One by J. A. Bannerman, Esq.

To the Honourable the COURT of DIRECTORS of
the EAST INDIA COMPANY.

Gentlemen,

We dissent from the Resolution of the Court of the 23d instant, negating the Motion,—

“ That on a review of the Proceedings of this
“ Court, on the information received from India, re-
“ lative to the late unnatural rebellion at the Presi-
“ dency of Fort St. George, the Court contemplate
“ with satisfaction the permanency which the mea-
“ sures adopted by the Court are calculated to give to
“ the state of order and tranquillity, into which the

“ Settlement had been brought and was left at the period of Lord Minto's return to Bengal.

“ That any farther inquiry into the causes which led to the disturbances alluded to, is now become unnecessary, and could only tend to a revival of those animosities and erroneous principles, which it is the earnest desire of this Court may be totally suppressed, in order that their baneful effects in producing those evils, which of late there has been so much cause to censure and deplore, may be committed to eternal oblivion.

“ That although the Court approve the zeal and integrity of Sir George Barlow, the present Governor of Fort St. George, they deem his continuance in that station inexpedient, and not calculated for the attainment of the objects above stated, which the Court are decidedly of opinion may be more effectually promoted by a reform of that Government.

“ That as it is always most desirable that his Majesty's Ministers and the Court of Directors, should act with the greatest confidence and unanimity, and most particularly on a business so delicate and important as the present; **RESOLVED**, therefore, That the Chairman and Deputy Chairman be desired to wait upon Lord Melville, President of the Board of Commissioners for the Affairs of India, with a Copy of these Resolutions, and, in concert with his Lordship, to form a new Government for Madras with as little delay as circumstances will permit,” for the following reasons:—

BECAUSE,—The moderate tone of the Motion, and the avoidance of all mention of the causes which have led to the present alienated state of the public mind at Madras, had for their object the securing a measure of great public importance, with as little personality as possible; and while it gave to His Majesty's Minis-

ters their due weight, it at the same time evinced a wish to give credit to Sir George Barlow and the Government of Fort St. George, for the fortitude and zeal displayed by them in the suppression of the rebellion, without pressing into prominent notice upon the records the series of political errors and arbitrary conduct, both in the Civil and Military Departments, which produced general dissatisfaction throughout the Settlement; and by a deplorable chain of causes and effects, led so large a number of brave men to forget their first duties, and tarnish the high reputation they had earned in the field by revolt against legitimate authority.

BECAUSE,—The Motion, if adopted, would have given ample time to His Majesty's Government, in concert with the Chairman and Deputy Chairman, to whom such power was proposed to be delegated, to combine upon a solid basis, and with due deliberation, such a firm, able, and popular Government, for the Settlement of Madras, as Lord Minto himself (on all occasions the strong panegyrist of Sir G. Barlow) declares to be absolutely necessary for the restoration and maintenance of discipline and harmony, and for which, in his dispatch of 5th February, 1810, paragraph 227, *he acknowledges that Sir G. Barlow, under the circumstances in which he is placed, is wholly unfit.*

BECAUSE,—The time is now arrived, when, free from the danger of the appearance of controul from external circumstances, the Court, having duly investigated the causes of the late lamentable events, and having traced them to their true source, may justly appreciate the fortitude and zeal so boastingly attributed to Sir George Barlow's Government; and as the only laudable result of those qualities in their fullest exertion, was the suppression of revolt instigated by its own tyranny and oppressions; we must pronounce

our definitive opinion to be, that the praise due to that Government is at best of a negative nature, its only merit being that of having arrested mischief created by itself in its progress towards the destruction of the Settlement, and perhaps of British India.

BECAUSE,—The errors of Sir George Barlow's Government, which the rejection of the motion compels us to state distinctly, aggravated as they are by harsh and cruel conduct to individuals, stand recorded on the Military and Civil annals in numerous, deplorable, and incontestible instances; and,

Treating first of the Military discontents, and commencing with the case of Lieutenant Colonel Munro, we find as subjects of unqualified reprobation:

1stly. The publicity given to Lieutenant Colonel Munro's Report on the Tent Contract, in disregard of the prophetic declaration of the Adjutant General, Colonel Capper, to whom it had been submitted, that *those very passages* in it, which in effect proved so highly objectionable to the Army, and were in fact the corner-stone of all the subsequent mischief, were of a nature to excite the most lively feeling among the Officers; and therefore required on the score both of justice and prudence, the most deliberate investigation previously to their publication.

2dly. The release of Lieutenant Colonel Munro, by order of Government, on an appeal made by him to that authority, from the arrest under which he had been placed by the Commander in Chief; an appeal which we consider in itself expressly contrary to Military discipline and subordination, but which was rendered doubly objectionable by the circumstances under which it was conveyed; one copy having been transmitted to Government through the medium of its Civil Secretary, while on the *very same day*, under a false show of duty, another was tendered to the Com-

mander in Chief for transmission through the usual and only proper channel.

3dly. The refusal of Government to forward to the Court of Directors a most respectful memorial, signed by a great number of Officers commanding corps; humbly submitting a request, that the aspersions which they conceived levelled at their characters by certain expressions in Lieutenant Colonel Munro's Report on the Tent Contact, might undergo strict investigation; and pledging themselves solemnly to abide patiently and submit implicitly to the Court's decision; which refusal, tending as it naturally did, by the contemptuous manner in which it was returned to them, to exasperate the Officers, was literally acted up to by the Government, and the memorial was withheld from the Court; and this culpable omission, concealing from the Court the moderate view of the case entertained by the Officers, and naturally inducing a belief that the paper was of a highly objectionable nature, has been censured by the Court accordingly.

4thly. The unjust and ill-advised suspension from the Service, of Major Boles, for a strict execution of his duty in the promulgation of the General Order of the 28th of January, 1809, issued by the Commander in Chief, General M'Dowall, on his departure from Madras, which suspension, though at first considered too severe by the Court, afterwards received its sanction under the erroneous principles urged by the Judge Advocate Colonel Leith, and chiefly on account of the address to Major Boles, and the subscription in his favour, acts neither of his seeking nor within his controul; but this act of the Government has been at length declared, after the most solemn deliberation, in the Court's dispatch of the 22d of February, 1811, approved by the Board of Controul, "not to be upheld by the legal authorities advanced

"in support of it," and as such must be considered unjust, unwarrantable, and tending to throw into confusion every principle of Military subordination.

5thly. The suspension from the Service of Lieutenant Colonel Capper the Adjutant General, on his manly and honourable declaration; that Major Boles had acted in obedience to his commands in issuing the General Order above alluded to, aggravated by the refusal on the part of Government to see Colonel Capper, and listen to the explanations he was prepared to offer in justification of his conduct; which explanations, if attended to, might have led to the immediate restoration of both those officers to the Service, and have prevented the extraordinary irritation produced by their unjust suspension.

6thly. The harsh and altogether unnecessary restraint imposed upon Major Boles, subsequently to his suspension, and which has been disapproved by the Court, in their dispatch of the 22d of February, whereby he was prevented from returning to Europe on board the Lady Lushington, after he had engaged for his passage by that ship; a restraint which not only evinced a wanton abuse of power, but gave time for, and led to the address of the Officers to Major Boles, and the subscription in his favour, which indiscreet and reprehensible measures of the Officers were afterwards urged by the Government as proofs of disaffection and insubordination against them, and against Major Boles himself; while, in truth, the cruel persecution of that Officer was the real cause both of the address and subscriptions, as it excited a sense of commiseration for his suffering, leading to the natural results of comments on the measure, and offers of friendly relief.

7thly. The General Orders issued by Government, under date of the 1st of May, 1809, removing from their station and staff appointments, and suspend-

ing from the Service the several Officers therein named, upon vague and undefined charges, preferred on *ex parte* evidence, and against which the parties, thus publicly denounced as aiming to subvert the Government, had no opportunity allowed them to defend themselves; which measure may be truly deemed the parent of the revolt which ensued, as the Officers felt themselves declared thereby to be completely at the mercy of a vindictive Government, apparently determined to subject them to its arbitrary will, without hope of redress from a Court Martial, the only legitimate resort for the Military character suffering under unmerited imputation.

Further, we dissent from the Resolution of the 23d instant :

BECAUSE,—In its Civil conduct the Government of Madras has been guilty of equal errors, and still more palpable injustice, without the shadow of excuse; which is advanced in extenuation of its Military aggravations, namely, the danger and crisis of the moment, whereby the affection and respect of the Settlement have been irretrievably alienated, and sentiments directly opposite have taken place of those feelings. And the following instances selected from the mass, will incontestibly prove the want of prudence, foresight, temper and humanity, in the conduct of this mistaken Government.

1stly. In the case of Mr. Sherson (on whose innocence or guilt we do not hazard an opinion, as it is now at issue in equity before the Supreme Court at Madras) the decidedly hostile part taken by the Government, on a hasty view of the question, against an old, and till the present charge, an unimpeachable Servant, by suspending him the Service during the investigation of the charges preferred against him is known to have produced the first symptoms of agitation in the Civil part of the Settlement, on account

of the manifest partiality it displayed ; while in India, it is peculiarly the bounden duty of the Governments to abstain from any show of hostility towards persons accused, on account of the well known weight and effect on the minds of the Native witnesses of any such demonstration on the part of the Supreme Government.

2dly. The removal of Mr. Cecil Smith from his office of Civil Auditor, on the charge of a flagrant violation of his duty, though no specific offence has been brought forward against him beyond an indiscreet warmth of temper, and his only crime appears to have been the delivery, by order of Government, of an audit of Mr. Sherson's accounts of a more favourable nature than was expected, which removal on such a charge, was coupled with the extraordinary appointment of this gentleman, wholly ignorant as he is of the Native languages, to be third Judge in the Provincial Circuit Court of the Northern Division, establishing by *inference* that in the opinion of the Government " a flagrant violation of duty," and the positive disqualifications above alluded to, are no bar to a seat on the bench of a judicial tribunal.

3dly. The interference of the Government, one member * of which is known to have been the proprietor of a forged bond to a very large amount, in prosecutions instituted against individuals suspected of being, and since unequivocally proved to have been, the fabricators of forged bonds, purported to have been granted by the late Nabob of the Carnatic, and especially by the appointment of the Company's Law Officers, both of whom were proved, and have since acknowledged themselves to have been interested in the *very bond*, the validity of which was the subject of trial, to defend the cause of Reddy Row,

* Mr. Casamajor, one of the Council.

Anunda Row, and Mr. Batley, accused and since convicted of the crimes of forgery and perjury.

4thly. The dispatch of Mr. Saunders, a Company's Servant to Manargoody and Chillumbrum, the former of which places alone was visited by him, for the purpose of collecting evidence in favour of Mr. Batley, charged with, and since convicted of the crime of perjury, the result of which was the production of some miserable wretches, secure in the protection of Government, whose testimony was totally disregarded by the Court. The interference of Government thus to procure evidence for this criminal being upheld at the Company's expence to the amount of 1,400 pagodas.*

6thly. The removal of Mr. Maitland from his situation of Civil Magistrate, for having committed Reddy Row and Anunda Row on a charge of forgery, sworn to by two witnesses; a committal strictly consonant with his duty, but which (favoured as Reddy Row was by the Carnatic Commissioners and the Advocate General) was considered *factionous*, and deserving such a mark of the displeasure of Government; which removal produced an extraordinary sensation in the Settlement, as demonstrating to what blameable lengths the Government of Sir George Barlow was prepared to proceed, against all persons who presumed to exercise even their most sacred duties in opposition to the partial views of the Government.

7thly. The removal from the Presidency of several respectable persons, who had served as Jurymen on

* This sum was afterwards ordered by Sir George Barlow to be defrayed out of the fund, destined by act of Parliament for the payment of the Creditors. So that the Prosecutors, who indicted those persons for committing frauds on that fund, were actually obliged to pay for the very defence of the wretches who had defrauded it!

the trials, without any alleged cause, which was naturally interpreted to have been occasioned by the decision of those legal authorities in favour of the legitimate creditors of the Nabob, who had prosecuted the forgers of the bonds to conviction.

8thly. The removal from his offices of Mr. Roebuck, an old servant of known and tried zeal and ability, especially displayed in the management of the Mint, for which he had received the thanks of the Supreme Government, without any alleged cause, and the banishment of that Gentleman to Vizagapatam, in spite of his endeavours to appease the anger of Government (which he supposed levelled at him for being one of the Prosecutors of the trial of Reddy Row) by a declaration that he had withdrawn himself wholly from those proceedings; in vain did he urge his age and services; his sentence is pronounced; he removes to Vizagapatam, and in that unhealthy climate he dies within a few weeks of a broken heart!! The injustice and cruelty of persecuting to such an extremity, a gentleman of high character, for an endeavour to defend his property against a horde of perjured swindlers are too glaring, and we shall ever consider *the sacrifice of this gentleman an indelible stain on Sir George Barlow's Government.*

9thly. The withholding from the Court the consultations upon these important trials, whereby their true merits were concealed, while the opinions of the Chief Justice and Advocate General were studiously brought forward; in consequence of which, and of the unusual refusal of Government to suffer the trials to be printed, not only was the Court kept in the dark, but the King's Government was induced to advise His Majesty, on the representation of the Chief Justice, though in opposition to the sentence of three respectable Juries, two of which were special, and

composed of Gentlemen who filled the first situations in the Settlement, to grant a pardon to those convicted criminals; which determination must now be a matter of deep regret, as subsequent events, and the suicide of Reddy Row, on the discovery of his numerous crimes and forgeries by the Commissioners, have proved to demonstration, that the sentence of "Guilty" pronounced upon them was a just sentence, and deserving of high approbation, being a manful stand of legal and highly gifted Juries against the single opinion of a Judge, whose notions, to say the least of them, *savoured in these trials too strongly of prejudice and prepossession.**

We dissent, moreover, from the Resolution negating the motion of the 23d instant, because, in two recent instances, Sir George Barlow has shown himself highly deserving of severe censure from the Court, namely:

1stly. In dismissing Mr. Petrie from the Council, on the receipt of a letter from the Secretary, Mr. Ramsay, acquainting him that such had been the Resolution of the Court, while it was his duty as a man, a gentleman, and a governor entrusted with such high interests, to wait till the arrival of the dispatch which should *actually order* such a change in the Council, and not to indulge his petty spleen and malevolent passions at the expence of decency, and in violation of the law, and we consider this removal, in anticipation of clear and distinct orders from the Court, *to have been wantonly and grossly illegal.*

2dly. The delay, not to say refusal, of Sir George Barlow to appoint Colonel Agnew to the situation of Adjutant General, to which he had been recommend-

* The name of this man ought to be recorded. His name is Strange, and a relative of Lord Melville, late President of the Board of Control. The secret history of this business will shortly be published.

ed by the Court in terms too explicit to be misunderstood, and the continuance of junior Officers in that and other high situations on the Staff, in opposition to the declared opinion of General Hewit, who had been called to Madras by Lord Minto, for the purpose of making salutary regulations for the management of the Army, and who had declared it absolutely necessary to appoint to situations of such high trust, Officers of distinguished reputation and *experience*, and of a rank not below that of a Field Officer.

On the whole review of those multiplied errors, blended with harsh and oppressive conduct, we feel it our duty to put upon the record our solemn and deliberate dissent from the Resolution of the 23d instant, which, by negating the Motion for the removal of Sir George Barlow, and a reform in the Government of Madras, virtually declares that Government worthy the confidence of the Court, while it is our firm opinion, that the alienations of the affections of so large a proportion of the Company's Servants, Civil and Military at that Settlement, the lamentable fate to which India was exposed by the late rebellion, and the serious evils which it is possible may yet ensue from the adoption of the extreme measure of separating the Sepoys from their European Officers, a measure which, if justifiable at all, a crisis of the most imminent peril alone could justify, and which was justified *by no such crisis*, as the early approach of Lord Minto was hailed by all, except Sir George Barlow and his Council, as the harbinger of returning order and peace; are calamities which we should not have had either to deplore or apprehend, if the administration of the Madras Government had been conducted on the principles of justice, moderation, humanity, or true wisdom.

The *notorious unpopularity** of Sir George Barlow throughout the settlement is moreover considered by us, if it stood alone, as a sufficient cause for his removal, as we fully agree with Lord Minto in his observations in the letter above alluded to, paragraph 235, "Real grievances, it will be felt universally, should in all cases, and in all circumstances, be redressed; but after revolt has been subdued, and when the motive of healing measures cannot be misinterpreted, it will not deserve the charge of weakness, but appears to me rather a point of true magnanimity, that a Government should study even the passions, the temper, the prejudices, and the errors of those who are subject to their rule." And the petty details of the fruitless endeavours used to induce the Officers of one of His Majesty's regiments to dine at the Government House, and of the march of a regiment of Sepoys 500 miles from the Settlement, on account of the aversion displayed by the Officers in a refusal to partake of Sir George Barlow's hospitalities, would, perhaps, be unworthy of notice under any other view, but that of affording strong additional proof, that genuine harmony and good-will can never be expected to resume their sway under a Government which has provoked such bitter dissensions, and which, though it has succeeded in obtaining a temporary triumph, must, from the nature and causes of the contest in which it has been engaged, despair of ever gaining the least ascendancy over the affections of the community.

We have the honour to be,

Gentlemen,

Your obedient Servants,

(Signed) WM. FULL. ELPHINSTONE,

JAS. PATTISON,

J. DANIELL.

East India House,
6th August, 1811.

* An unpopularity not confined to the Europeans, but diffused amongst every class of our native subjects in India.

To the Honourable the COURT of DIRECTORS of
the EAST INDIA COMPANY.

Gentlemen,

I beg to dissent from the decision of the Court of the 23d instant, negating the Motion,—

“ That on a review of the Proceedings of this Court on the information received from India, relative to the late unnatural rebellion at the Presidency of Fort St. George, the Court contemplate with satisfaction the permanency which the measures adopted by the Court are calculated to give to the state of order and tranquillity into which the Settlement had been brought, and was left at the period of Lord Minto’s return to Bengal :

“ That any further inquiry into the causes which led to the disturbances alluded to, is now become unnecessary, and could only tend to a revival of those animosities and erroneous principles, which it is the earnest desire of this Court may be totally suppressed, in order that their baneful effects in producing those evils, which of late there has been so much cause to censure and deplore, may be committed to eternal oblivion :

“ That although the Court approve the zeal and integrity of Sir George Barlow, the present Governor of Fort St. George, they deem his continuance in that station inexpedient, and not calculated for the attainment of the objects above stated, which the Court are decidedly of opinion may be more effectually promoted by a reform of that Government :

“ That as it always is most desirable that His Majesty’s Ministers and the Court of Directors should act with the greatest confidence and unanimity, and most particularly on a business so delicate and important as the present :

“ Resolved, therefore, That the Chairman and Deputy Chairman be desired to wait upon Lord Melville, President of the Board of Commissioners for the Affairs of India, with a Copy of these Resolutions, and, in concert with his Lordship, to form a new Government for Madrass, with as little delay as circumstances will permit :”—

FOR the Reasons here recorded ;—

Ist. BECAUSE,—Though I lament in common with every individual of the Court, the criminal excesses of a large proportion of the Officers belonging to the Madras Army, and though I am most willing to bear testimony to the great zeal and fortitude displayed by Sir George Barlow in quelling the mutiny, and to the incorruptible integrity manifested in the general discharge of his official duties, I consider the disaffection which prevailed in 1809, at Fort St. George, and throughout its dependencies, as chargeable in no small degree to the following important errors in the conduct of the local Government ; errors which, though not dwelt on in the Motion, for reasons sufficiently obvious, are of too grave a nature to be overlooked in a dissent from the decision on that Motion.

1. The release of Lieutenant Colonel Munro, by order of Government, on an appeal made by that Officer to the Civil authority, contrary to military discipline and subordination, from an arrest under which he had been placed by the Commander in Chief.

2. The refusal of the Madras Government to forward to the Court of Directors, a Memorial subscribed by a number of Officers commanding corps, containing a statement of complaints and alleged grievances, with which it was highly important that the Court should have been early acquainted ; a refusal which, when coupled with the careless neglect,

or wilful and culpable omission of the same Government to furnish the Court by the first opportunity with requisite information, and the indispensable means of judging of the wisdom or indiscretions with which its delegated authority was exercised, at a crisis when the interests not only of the East India Company but of the British Empire were at stake, tended both to aggravate discontents abroad, and to produce indecision at home.

3. The suspension from the service of Colonel Capper and Major Boles, for a strict execution of what they deemed, or might fairly conceive to be, their duty, in promulgating the General Order, 28th January, 1809, issued by the Commander in Chief, the late General Macdowal, on his departure from Madras, a measure of the Madras Government, which has been decided upon, and condemned by the Court.

4. The further aggravating harshness practised towards Major Boles,* in the refusal to permit him to depart from Madras, on the Sir Stephen Lushington, after he had formed an arrangement for coming home in that ship, which arbitrary and unnecessary restraint led to a very improper subscription among his fellow Officers in Major Boles's behalf, and by occasioning new acts of severity against the subscribers, eventually gave rise to a re-action of fresh discontent against the Government.—

Idly. : BECAUSE,—The discontents which were prevalent during the course of 1809; in the Civil part of the community at Madras; as well as the Army (their simultaneous existence offering in itself a strong

* It would be difficult to assign a motive for the wanton and petty persecutions practised by Sir G. Barlow on his victims, without tracing them to a sort of luxury he felt in acts of severity; a pure and unmix'd love of tormenting his fellow-creatures. A full detail of these things is now in the press.

ground of presumption that the disaffection of the Military Officers did not proceed from any circumstances peculiar to that profession) may be traced to the following among other reprehensible acts of the Government.

1. The interference of Government, contrary to justice, prudence, and the obligations of duty, in prosecutions instituted against individuals suspected as the fabricators of certain bonds, purporting to have been granted by the late Nabob of the Carnatic, especially in appointing the Company's Law Officers, themselves interested in the suspected bonds, to defend Reddy and Anunda Row, accused and since convicted of forgery; in assigning the same Law Officers as Counsel to Mr. Battley, who, notwithstanding all the assistance and support he received from Government on his trial, was convicted of perjury; and in dispatching Mr. Saunders, a Company's servant, to Manargoody, to collect evidence at considerable expense to the Company, in favour of Mr. Batley; a measure which, when it is recollected that the witnesses giving this evidence were not believed upon their oaths, amounted to a subornation of perjury.

2. The persecutions which, in various instances, were exercised against those who took a part in the legal proceedings tending to bring these criminals to justice, and to punishment; and, specifically, in the removal of Mr. Maitland* from his situation of Civil Magistrate, on account of what was *strangely* termed "*his factious proceedings*," in having committed Reddy and Anunda Row on a charge of for-

* Mr. Maitland was specifically removed from his office of Magistrate by Sir George Barlow, for having, in the course of his duty as a Justice of the Peace, committed the two persons who were subsequently convicted.

gely, sworn to by two witnesses; in the removal from the Presidency of respectable persons, who had served as Jurymen, without any sufficient cause; and above all, in the removal of Mr. Roebuck, an old servant of the Company, from his office of Mint Master, and the banishment of that gentleman to Vizagapatam, where he died soon after, without any reason being assigned for this extraordinary act of harshness and oppression, and without any other supposable ground for it, than that, with a view to the protection of his own property, as one of the legal creditors of the late Nabob of the Carnatic, Mr. Roebuck had instigated, or supported from his own funds, these prosecutions against the fabricators of the forged bonds.

III^{dly}. BECAUSE,—The vigour for which Sir George Barlow's Administration is admitted, in some instances, to have been most creditably distinguished, has in others been wonderfully misapplied; and on no occasion more than when ignobly employed in breaking up a seminary, and in dispersing the scholars belonging to it throughout India, because they had declined accepting an invitation from Lady Barlow to a ball or assembly; a mind so constituted as to busy itself about such offences seems to me incompetent to govern a great empire, and incapable of maintaining an ascendancy in the affairs of men.

IV^{thly}. BECAUSE,—I am of opinion, that in some recent instances Sir George Barlow has acted in a manner disrespectful towards the Court. The Court's recommendation to appoint Colonel Agnew to the office of Adjutant General has not been complied with, nor has the Madras Government vouchsafed to offer any explanation for declining to appoint him, although the receipt of the letter containing the recommendations has been duly acknowledged; and

the dismissal of Mr. Petrie* from Council, on receipt of a paragraph which stated that the Court had passed a resolution to that effect, and which paragraph was transmitted by the Secretary Mr. Ramsay, with an explanation that it would make part of a future dispatch, to say the least of it, was highly precipitate and indecorous, if not illegal; delicacy towards Mr. Petrie, as well as respect towards the Court, ought to have induced the Government to wait their regular instructions, before they carried into effect a measure of this personal nature.

Vithly, BECAUSE,—According to any views of policy, although the supreme governing power of a State ought neither to be swayed by popular clamour, nor yield to unlawful combinations among any particular class of its subjects, public opinion ought always to be consulted in the choice of those to whom authority is delegated; and I entirely concur in the following analogous sentiment expressed in the 295th parag. of a dispatch from Lord Minto, dated 5th of February 1810.—“ Real grievances, it will be felt
“ universally, should in all cases and in all circum-
“ stances be redressed, and when the motive of heal-
“ ing measures cannot be misinterpreted, it will not
“ deserve the charge of weakness, but appears to me
“ rather a point of true magnanimity, that a Govern-
“ ment should study *even the passions, the temper,*
“ *the prejudices, and the errors of those who are sub-*
“ *ject to their rule.*”

Vithly. BECAUSE,—It is notorious, that though

* Such was Barlow's indecent precipitation to exhibit his triumph over Mr. Petrie, (a triumph for which he was indebted to a majority of one, or according to some statements, to the mere drawing of lots in the Court of Directors) that he took advantage of this letter, which contained no formal, or official dismissal, but a mere intimation of the passing of a resolution to that effect, which might have been rescinded, to dismiss that Gentleman from the Council with every mark of contumely and disgrace.

tranquillity has been re-established in the Madras Settlement, confidence has not been restored between the Governors and the governed; and equally notorious, that the present Government is so exceedingly unpopular, that measures even of a conciliatory and healing nature will in its hands be deprived of all their grace, and lose the whole of their intended effect.

VIIthly. BECAUSE,—Although I am of opinion that Sir George Barlow has justly forfeited the confidence of his employers, I am still more decidedly convinced that, had his conduct been invariably such as to entitle his administration to the unqualified and unreserved approbation of the Court, he ought, considering the rooted bias in the public mind at Madras, both against his person and government, to be recalled on grounds of expediency; particularly as the measure of recall could not, after a lapse of two years from the suppression of the mutiny, be fairly imputed on our part to any dereliction of principle, or abandonment of our just rights.

Lastly. BECAUSE,—Upon all grounds sustaining these reasons of dissent, I consider a change in the Government of Fort St. George as essential both to the prosperity and security of the British possessions in that part of India.

I have the honour to be,

Gentlemen,

Your very obedient Servant,

(Signed) ROB. THORNTON.

India House,
6th August, 1811.



East India House, Aug. 5, 1811.

*To the Honourable the COURT of DIRECTORS.

Gentlemen,

I dissent from the resolution of the Court of the 23d ultimo; by which was negatived the proposition then brought forward, declaring the expediency of a change in the Madras Government;

BECAUSE,—After having survived one of the greatest convulsions that ever endangered a State, by the suppression of the late unhappy revolt in the Madras army, I concur in the opinion of the Governor General, that “the next care is to prevent the return of “the evil,” and I know not how that care can be evinced, or its object secured, but by measures of healing policy, calculated to extinguish the animosities in which the evil originated, and to restore that harmony, union, and confidence, between all the branches of the public Service, which have so long been banished from the Coast of Coromandel.

BECAUSE,—Actuated solely by these views, and by a sense of the danger inseparable from such a state of things, I consider the committing the reins of the Madras Government to hands disconnected with the late convulsion, as a measure dictated by public expediency, and having reference only to its *effects*, in the almost universal feeling and temper, which there is too much reason to believe pervade the public mind towards the existing administration.

BECAUSE,—In the propositions which have been rejected by the Court, no allusion is made to the measures which led to the revolt, nor any censure either expressed or implied on the conduct of Sir

* The reader's attention is particularly directed to this and the following protest of Mr. Bannerman. The latter is a luminous and powerful production, and almost sufficient to redeem the Directors from the general contempt and hatred in which, as a body, they are held, by those who do not know their characters as individuals.

George Barlow, to whose general merit, long services, and the firmness which he displayed in that arduous crisis, I am ready to do every justice. As a general proposition it may be admitted; that the best evidence of a wise and just Government will be found in the respect and confidence with which it is surrounded; but *these* do not invariably follow the most upright intentions: and I am aware, that every allowance should be made for the difficult situation in which Sir G. Barlow was placed; nor do I mean to detract from the merit here ascribed to him, but merely to assign the considerations which influence my judgment on this momentous subject, when I state that if Sir G. Barlow has borne his triumph with moderation, and endeavoured to heal the wounds he had inflicted, and to conciliate his fallen adversaries, there is but too much reason to believe that he has not succeeded. The territory, which has been justly described as the key of our Indian empire, is represented as still a prey to intestine divisions; the Government obnoxious alike to the Civil and Military servants; the Army, once the pride of our Service, and the cradle of its most illustrious Officers, conscious of its past reputation, ascribing its recent crime and consequent abasement to the intolerable severity and oppressive acts of Sir G. Barlow; the latter charging them to the mutinous spirit of the Officers; each criminating the other; and our inveterate Foreign Enemy and the Native States contemplating the unnatural strife, with the hope, that, by shaking the foundations of our power, it may enable them finally to effect its subversion. Such is the gloomy picture* which Madras at this moment pre-

* Nothing more is wanting to heighten this gloomy picture, but to state, that social life is rendered unquiet and insecure by spies and informers. A dark and sullen cloud hangs over the whole Settlement, far remote from tranquillity, and more dangerous than actual insurrection; the stillness of despair.

sents; and, under such circumstances, there can be no hope that the Army can ever be reconciled to *him* whom it considers to be the author of its humiliation, or, that they can be brought to view each other again with cordiality or respect. In the breast of each the sense of injury must be too deep to be eradicated. The victor cannot cease to remember the perilous extremity to which he was compelled to resort: and the vanquished party will pine under a sceptre which it contemplates only as the weapon of triumphant tyranny.

BECAUSE,—Therefore, it is in vain to expect, while the authority continues vested in Sir G. Barlow, that the Madras Army can lift its head again to that cheerful discharge of its duty, on which equally depend the recovery of its former reputation, and the security of the interests it is destined to protect; for I need not point out how wide is the distinction between a forced obedience mixed with discontent and hatred, and that obedience in which the heart participates, and which is given not less from inclination than from principle. The Court of Directors, and especially those Members of it who have served in India, will easily call to their recollection, periods when the utmost efforts that could have resulted from a merely constrained sense of duty would have been unavailing, when the united efforts of every heart and hand, and above all in the army, the most ardent and heroic spirit of enterprize, with a cheerful submission to hardships and privations of every sort, were necessary to enable us to meet the difficulties which assailed the Company on every side. No one can say that we shall not again have similar exigencies to encounter, or that similar exertions will not again be required.

BECAUSE,—Therefore, it seemed to my judgment, that every motive of just policy and every considera-

tion connected with the important interests entrusted to our care, called upon the Court of Directors to extinguish those embers of discontent which are still glowing, and to terminate the animosities which still prevail in every part of the Madras Establishment, and which never can cease while their exciting causes remain; and I concurred in recommending a change in the Government, by the recall of Sir G. Barlow, as the only measure that promised to be effectual for these important purposes; other healing measures may also be advisable, but this only will apply to the root of the existing evils. I am aware that it may possibly be objected to this measure, that it would afford a triumph to the Army, but I can see in the objection no real validity. It might, indeed, be sufficient to urge in answer to it, that the question to be decided is, not whether the Army or the Government shall triumph, but whether dangers which threaten our safety in India shall be removed; but we have, in truth, perhaps, too abundantly guarded against the Army's ascribing any change in the Government to a diminished sense of their misconduct. The Court's dispatch of the 1st May, 1810, (which was published to the Army in General Orders) is an effectual security against any apprehension of that kind. In that dispatch, no terms of eulogy are left unapplied to the conduct of Sir G. Barlow in the suppression of the revolt; and the rejected proposition expresses no censure of the measures which led to it. In reality, whatever may have been the merit or demerit of those measures, whether they were, as I have no doubt Sir G. Barlow believed them to be, necessary for the due vindication and support of the authority of Government, or were, as considered by the Officers, unnecessary and oppressive outrages on every recognized principle of justice, and on those feelings which constitute the best pride and orna-

ment of the soldier's character. The question, though of extreme importance to Sir G. Barlow, cannot, whatever may be the decision upon it, affect the broad principle on which I rely, namely, that where *the Governor of a distant dependency, comprehending one of the most valuable and important limbs of a great Empire, has, from any cause whatever, become so unpopular as to excite not only a general odium against his Government, but open rebellion against his authority, he is no longer in a capacity to fulfil the ends of his trust, and a great public expediency demands his recall.* If he had even incurred the odium only by the pursuit of right measures, the principle would remain the same; the lesser would be absorbed in the greater interest; though in that case a just indemnification would be awarded, and the recall expressed, in terms that would prevent its inflicting any painful sensation.

Such is the sincere result of the best consideration I have been able to give to this momentous question, which I have weighed dispassionately, and with neither the feelings nor the views of party spirit: I disclaim any wish to palliate the dreadful excesses of the Army; and those who most differ from my opinions, cannot more sincerely condemn Military combinations for any purpose or any object, however justifiable in itself if sought by proper means: but I cannot forget that this Army, however veiled by its present cloud, had, (as most truly stated by the Governor General) "to the hour of the mutiny, been
" invariably distinguished by a long and uniform
" display of every Military virtue;" that it has hitherto faithfully preserved to us our invaluable possessions, and that we still must look to it for their further security and defence. The safety of the Carnatic, (the central support of our Empire in the

East), depends on restoring it to its former state of content, confidence and discipline, and removing the schism and estrangement which now separate it from the Civil Government. These desirable ends cannot be accomplished by a Governor, whose administration is held in universal dislike by all descriptions of persons dependent on his authority, and I should therefore feel the deepest conviction of the impolicy of continuing Sir George Barlow in the Government of Madras, even if all his measures had been wise and just; an inference certainly not sanctioned by some of the decisions and expressed opinions of the Court, and I believe hardly contended for by the most partial of his friends. But I view with equal apprehension the danger which his continuance in the Government threatens to the safety of the Company's possessions on the Coast, by weakening all the securities of their defence, and by the hopes of renewed convulsion, which it cannot fail to excite in the minds of our active and inveterate European Enemy, and of the Native States, who are watching for an opportunity to regain their former power and influence.

On these accumulated grounds, I desire to record my dissent from a Resolution, which, by continuing Sir G. Barlow in the Government of Madras, involves the continuance for an indefinite period of evils, the termination of which, after the suppression of the revolt, was an object that, in my opinion, could not too soon have occupied the attention of the Court.

. . . (Signed) J. HUDLESTON.

To the Honourable the COURT of DIRECTORS of
the EAST INDIA COMPANY.

Gentlemen,

I feel called upon as an act of public duty, to record the reasons and arguments I have made use of, in support of the Motion of the Honourable William Elphinstone, on the 23d instant, and at the same time beg this may be considered as my solemn Protest against continuing, in effect, the present commission of Government at the Presidency at Fort St. George.

The lengthened discussions which have arisen out of the several branches of this question, have made it my duty to record my opinions on most of the points connected with it.

I shall, therefore, endeavour to compress into as small a compass as is practicable, the general grounds on which my support has been given to the Motion.

At a very early stage of these discussions, I stated my opinion, that the first fit opportunity ought to be embraced for establishing at Fort St. George, an efficient, respectable, and respected Government; and my judgment is convinced, that a fit period has now arrived. I was restrained at an earlier time, from proposing the removal of a Government notoriously deficient in the qualities which I have named, because the unfortunate course of public events might have given to the precipitate adoption of that measure, the appearance of yielding to the clamours of an insurgent body. That insurrection has been long and finally suppressed, the persons "*intended for punishment*" have been brought to trial, and the law has taken and completed its course.

Partial discontent may arise from unfounded prejudice, and may be directed against an individual who really deserves popularity. *General* discontent

has seldom originated in imaginary causes ; and exclusively of the abstract merits of the question, no wise and benevolent Government has ever hesitated to remove a Governor notoriously unacceptable to the great body of those who are subject to his authority. The most strenuous advocates of Sir George Barlow will scarcely deny, that he is generally unacceptable to the British subjects, Civil as well as Military, who are placed under his Government ; and those who examine impartially, and declare truly, will find the exceptions so few, and those few created by motives which operate so powerfully, however unworthily, on human conduct, that they will see little to qualify the more absolute proposition, that the discontent was not only general, but universal. On these grounds alone, I should feel it to be my duty to urge the recall of Sir George Barlow ; but that duty must become imperative when it is ascertained, that the discontent is not only universal, but that it has arisen from causes more than abundantly adequate to the production of that unhappy effect.

Among the Civil servants as among the Military, one of the first sources of discontent and unpopularity (as is stated by Sir George Barlow in his minute of the 21st August, 1809) against the Government, was its conduct with reference to the prosecutions in the Supreme Court, connected with the subject of the forged Nabob's bonds.

In the investigation of the Carnatic debts, the individuals who had real claims were anxious, in defence of their property, to discredit the immense mass in circulation which were notoriously fictitious. Of those forged securities, one of the Members of Government, and both of the Company's Law Officers and Advisers, were the known proprietors. The chief forger of these bonds, (Reddy Row) was recommended as the official assistant of the Commis-

sioners who were to investigate their validity; and one of the proprietors of forged bonds, (Mr. Anstruther, the Advocate General) was appointed President of a Committee, to inquire whether his own bonds were forged. When the forger was convicted by the verdict of a Jury, a Civil servant was sent express to a distant province, to garble evidence for the purpose of discrediting the verdict; the Company's Law Officers were instructed to defend the forger, and were ordered to continue their efforts in opposition to the solemn verdicts of three Juries, two of them specially formed from the most respectable of the Civil servants. A Magistrate, (Mr. Maitland) who, in the ordinary course of his duty, had been accessory to this triumph of justice, was dismissed without inquiry; one of the agents of the real creditors was ordered from the country to the ruin of his private affairs; another, (although on finding his exertions gave offence to Government, he meekly withdrew from the agency) was ignominiously deprived of all his offices, and banished to a distant Settlement; and, finally, the very Jurors who had given a verdict conformable to the dictates of reason and conscience, but who, in the phrascology of parallel times, "were suspected of being suspicious," were driven from the Presidency for the purpose of breaking up, what a shameless but triumphant cabal have dared to stigmatise as an improper combination. These are strange facts, but they are no longer disputable; the hand of Providence would almost seem to have been abroad to complete the triumph of law over despotism; the facts have become too notorious for denial, and too plain for subterfuge, and the Company's Law Officers have been compelled to admit the forgeries which they defended, and to acknowledge the error into which they were *innocently and inadvertently* led.

The Forger, unable to stem the force of truth, rushed in despair into that tribunal where the pleading of despots has no avail, I will not detain the Court by tracing the history of the sufferings of each, and will only observe with regard to the case of Mr. Roebuck, that Sir George Barlow seems desirous to acquit himself of the charge of the *murder* of that unfortunate gentleman. I do not accuse him of that crime, because the intention to kill is one of its ingredients, and I have no reason to attribute this intention to Sir George Barlow; but whatever may have been his intention, there can be little doubt but his acts were the *cause* of Mr. Roebuck's death.

Whatever may have been Sir George Barlow's knowledge of the state of facts, always obvious to the majority of the community, always considered disgraceful, and now no longer disputable, it was, under the best construction of his opinions, his most sacred duty to have suppressed them; and most assuredly it never will be tolerated by a British public, that any Governor, under any circumstances, himself possessing no judicial authority, shall extend the arm of terror to subvert the regular course of justice; shall, instead of abstaining with reverence from all interference with proceedings, which are polluted by the touch of power, pervert that power to the maintenance of forgery and perjury; shall vilify the solemn verdict of British Juries, punish the Jurors, dismiss Magistrates, and becoming a party in the cause of iniquity, send away the unoffending assertors of their private rights, to poverty, to banishment, and to death. I only require, that we should not tolerate in Sir George Barlow, what the people of England most certainly would not tolerate in any man or set of men, administering even the Government of this country.

In adverting to Military transactions, I shall endeavour to be as brief as possible.

Two facts have been assumed with infinite ease and unblushing confidence in the dispatches from Madras; viz. 1st. That *treasonable* designs were known and *proven* to exist before the 1st May, 1809, or the transactions noticed in the order of that date; and, 2d. That the Army had no grievances. The latter proposition is very abundantly disproved by the facts which they themselves avow; and with regard to the former, it will naturally occur to the Public to ask, why is not all clamour and cavil silenced at once by producing those *proofs* of seditious objects and intentions; the Public will conclude, and Sir George *knows*, that he had no such *proofs*. Subsequently, without doubt, there was abundant guilt and more abundant folly, but at no time any fixed design of subverting the authority of the State; the folly and madness of the day was an attempt to separate the authority of the State from the person empowered to exercise that authority; but Sir George Barlow well *knows*, that if treasonable designs had at any time existed, he would not now be uttering calumnies from the seat of power; he knows that even so late as the 26th July, Officers, meditating treason, would not have become the willing dupes of a shallow artifice, by peaceably retiring to the places appointed for their residence; many of them for want of any European to take charge, delivering over their commands in due form to the astonished Native Officers. Will it be contended, that because from time immemorial some few examples of discontent, whether with or without cause, did really exist, that said discontent was actually expressed by one, two, or three Military persons at different times, and therefore that the whole Army was, and of course always had been, in a state of sedition? To all these assertions and argu-

ments I will oppose the direct evidence of Sir George Barlow and Lord Minto; the former in his General Order of the 1st of May, 1809, refers all the unjustifiable proceedings of the Army to a date posterior to the departure of General Macdowall; and Lord Minto, in his General Order of the 20th of July, 1809, says, "have hitherto been the theme of just and unqualified applause;" and in his General Order of the 25th of September, 1809, says, "which a long and uniform display of every military virtue had, till this calamitous season, so well justified."

Representations, whether justifiable or otherwise, were however meditated and known to Sir G. Barlow for some time previous to the departure of General Macdowall; but with the exception of what relates to the complaint against Colonel Munro, there was not one subject of grievance less earnestly pressed by His Majesty's Officers than those of the Company; but although the signatures of the former were by due management withdrawn, the feeling remained; and at a comparatively late period, it became the subject of formal apology to withdraw the signatures of a regiment which had subscribed for the support of Major Boles. Highly as I respect and honour those Officers individually and collectively, I will not suppress the remark, that their feeling for Major Boles was pure compassion and no more;—that there was strictly speaking no sympathy, no sense of common suffering, no common dread of the oppression which Major Boles had suffered; because Sir G. Barlow was destitute of the power to suspend, or in any manner to punish any one of that body without a legal trial; he did suspend General Macdowall from the office of Commander in Chief of the Company's forces; he could not suspend an Ensign from his right to carry His Majesty's colours. Whatever were the treasons and seditions of the Company's Officers, before the

1st of May, 1809, they were shared by His Majesty's Officers, who have certainly merited all the praise which they have subsequently received. Among these treasons was an intended memorial, praying for equal allowances with their brother Officers in Bengal; a prayer which, with sorrow and shame, I have seen pronounced incompatible with reason and justice. Among those exclusively attributed to the Company's Army, was an insane production, purporting to be the draft of a memorial to Lord Minto, praying, among other things, for the removal of Sir G. Barlow. It is avowed by both those persons, that this memorial was never signed or presented, and it is even acknowledged that the intention of presenting it had been abandoned; yet this nonentity has been made the ground for which punishment was inflicted on the greater part of the victims of the 1st of May 1809. It has been asserted with the same easy confidence which distinguishes the productions of Sir G. Barlow and Lord Minto (for the identity is truly marvellous) that the abolition of the Tent allowance was the cause of the mutiny. Now, in the General Order of the 1st of May, it is very remarkable, that not one allusion, direct or remote, is made to that transaction, not one of the crimes fabricated by that mass of gratuitous assertion, is ascribed to that cause, or to any event arising out of it. The Tent Contract had long been sent to oblivion; but these posthumous recollections are exceedingly convenient, and have been most abundantly employed where the original assertion has proved to be *the thing which is not*.

I will no further detain the Court on the subject of the accusations of the Officers commanding Native corps against the Quartermaster General, than to notice, that Sir G. Barlow did suppress, and Lord Minto

countenance the suppression of their memorial to this Court, who have recognized the fact in their dispatch of the 15th of September 1809. It is in the natural order of cause and effect, that the authors of injustice should seek to prevent appeal; this tendency pervades the whole of these proceedings, and has been brought into distinct operation in this case and that of Colonel R. Bell, who was punished for appealing.

I am not the advocate of the inflammatory proceedings of General Macdowall, of whom, however, it is not too much to say, that an ordinary and decent degree of courtesy from Sir George Barlow would have secured his cordial co-operation. If he had lived to plead his own cause, his memory would probably have been relieved from a large portion of the obloquy, which at present attaches to it; and two facts which the Government of Fort St. George have found it inconvenient to notice, seem to justify the conjecture, that better information would have given a better aspect to his conduct. 1st. It has been lately discovered, that the *direct* appeal, for which the Quartermaster General was reprimanded, was not that appeal through the Commander in Chief, but a previous appeal *not* through the Commander in Chief; a proceeding which the slightest professional knowledge will shew to be subversive of the first principles and rules of military subordination, and which no Commander in Chief could tolerate consistently with his public duty. And, 2dly, That General Macdowall, so far from being influenced by seditious motives to make the Officers umpires in a case they had prejudged, did, in his letter to his successor, distinctly guard him against allowing any Officer of a Native corps, to be a member of the Court Martial for the trial of Colonel Munro, and, with a zeal for fair trial, which has every character of sincerity, recommended

that the Court should be chiefly composed of His Majesty's Officers, as stated in the following extract:

" Lieutenant Colonel Munro, Quartermaster General of the Army, having had charges preferred against him by the greater number of the Officers in command of the Battalions, I was, under a conviction of the necessity of the case, induced to place him under an arrest, that he may be brought to trial under your authority. After much reflection, I deemed this the most eligible course to pursue, as relieving you from much embarrassment, preventing the interference of undue influence, and not only giving Lieutenant Colonel Munro an opportunity for justification, but if he is acquitted, of bringing his accusers before a General Court Martial. As the Officers of the Native Army have in some degree prejudged the cause, it may be improper that any of them should sit on Lieutenant Colonel Munro's trial, but a competent and impartial Court will readily be assembled from the King's troops, the Company's corps of artillery and engineers, and perhaps the Madras European regiment. This, of course, will be left to your own judgment; but as I am clearly of opinion that the Quartermaster General should be tried, I trust you will support this sentiment against every illegitimate interference. The vindication of the character of the principal Officers of the Army from expressions which they consider false and unfounded, I now place with a man of honourable principles and matured judgment; they will not be disappointed in their expectations."

Madras,
3d Jan, 1809.

(Signed)

" HAY MACDOWALL."

I put it to the cool reflection of every member of the Court, whether, under the notorious state of the relation between the late Commander in Chief, General Gowdie and Sir George Barlow, the existence of this letter was known to the latter, and whether a feeling for the reputation of a person unable to defend himself, or what other feeling, has hitherto *kept it in concealment*. It is quite unnecessary to combat the argument so much insisted on — “*That if Colonel Munro was blameable, his conduct was a fit subject of investigation by his superiors, and not by the Officers of the Army,*” because the argument proves infinitely too much for the cause of Sir George Barlow, who, when the Officers had abandoned their demand of military trial, actually suppressed the memorial which they addressed to their superiors in consequence.

It is far removed from the object of the preceding remarks, to defend any portion of the seditious conduct of the Officers at a subsequent period. Their sole object has, I trust, been incontrovertibly attained; and this object consists in the direct proof of a proposition broadly affirmed by Sir George Barlow himself at one time, and with happy versatility and effrontery denied at another; namely, that whatever might have been the prior discontents, all the unjustifiable proceedings of the Army had a date posterior to the departure of General Macdowall, or, in other words, to his own wanton punishment of Major Boles, which, in characters so plain, that he who runs may read, was the sole and undivided origin of the mutiny. The General Order, dated 31st. of January, 1809, by which that punishment was inflicted, has received the just reprobation of this Court in its Military letter to Fort St. George, dated 22d. of February, 1811.

It has already been shewn, that the draft of a memorial, which as a memorial never had existence, and which Sir George Barlow knew to be abandoned, was skilfully pressed into the service, when the Army was known to be agitated by an injury to which he dreaded to attribute its true effects ; but it was a most unworthy and flimsy subterfuge, thus to conjure up the ghost of a nonentity to exhibit a gaudy stage trick, for the purpose of drawing off the attention of his superiors and the public from the sole and undivided cause which then inflamed the minds of the Officers, namely, *punishment and degradation without cause or pretext, or trial, or inquiry*. If, indeed, it be the privilege of a Military man to be exempt from human feelings, to have no sympathy with sufferings directly impending over his own head, to bear wrongs as well as hardships without a murmur, to be the *only* Christian of whom it shall be literally required to bless his enemies, and to pray for those that despitefully entreat him, then are the murmurs without palliation which agitated the minds of those unfortunate men from the 31st of January to the 1st of May 1809.

The events of that day changed the aspect of their cause ; they burst the bounds of reason, and from the wantonly injured and deeply offended, became the offending party.

Of subsequent measures I have already taken some cursory notice, and shall only stop to observe, that under the acknowledged weakness of human reason, it is deemed prudent to estimate the wisdom of human measures by their efficacy in promoting their professed objects. Of the efficacy of Sir George Barlow's measures, he has himself most distinctly, but unwittingly, furnished us with ample testimony ; in an eulogy published to the Army, on what (with an irony somewhat too keen) he is pleased to call *his*

own moderation, he exhausts the language of lamentation in avowing, that every one of his measures had produced effects exactly the reverse of those he had foreseen and intended.

The measure of the Test, adopted on the 26th of July 1809, is one, the consequences of which may be too important to speak of it lightly; it broke asunder the bond by which the Native Soldier and European Officer were united; it destroyed the harmony between the King's and Company's Services; it dissolved the chain by which a handful of Europeans have, hitherto, governed millions of Natives; it humbled the high spirit of that Army which gained and preserved our power in the East against the united efforts of the Native powers and France. These consequences have already resulted from the infatuated conduct of Sir George Barlow.

I have, on a former occasion, found it my duty to allude to the endless persecutions and publications to the Army, year after year, of interminable reproaches; and the recent dispatches from India, afford some memorable illustrations of the treason and disaffection imputed to individuals in the early stages of these events. The individual who was sent to disease and solitude, and afterwards on a distant service, professedly intended as an exile, as the punishment of an innocent and convivial toast, "*The friends of the Army.*" has answered the accusation of treason on the hills of Amboyua, and finally strangled the foul calumny on the ramparts of Ternate, by an achievement which will live when the popy malice of Sir G. Barlow shall have ceased to be important.

The mutiny has been suppressed; but let it never be forgotten, that not one man surrendered to Sir George Barlow, but all, and unconditionally, to Lord Minto, in consequence of his public profession of conciliation and inquiry.

The career of Sir George Barlow's Government commenced with punishment without trial or inquiry, or reason or consideration; the error was discovered when too late. It was in contemplation to restore an innocent man, on the condition of his pleading guilty; he refused to be accessory to his own infamy, and there was not sufficient magnanimity to retract a blind, outrageous, and precipitate error; false measures were necessary for the support of false principles. Crimes did not exist; it was therefore necessary to *create* crimes for the purpose of obscuring the true origin of the question at issue, when, in pursuance of this system, men had been goaded past forbearance by a succession of punishment without trial, to the actual commission of crimes; then, indeed, it was ostentatiously announced, that trial by Court Martial should be restored: but when the sentence of that Court Martial was pronounced, then this most consistent Government bring up their corps de reserve, revert to their first principle of condemnation, (whether without trial or contrary to trial is indifferent to such principles) and pronounce the suspension of Colonel Doveton, for a crime, of which he had been most honourably acquitted by the sentence of a Court Martial.

There are many other circumstances, disgusting indeed to mention, but which tend to shew the unfitness of Sir George Barlow for his present situation. On one occasion, a whole body of young Officers, sent from the Military Institution at Madras, and ordered to join their corps, because they declined holding any intercourse with a young man who had accepted an invitation to the Government House. On another occasion, the Commander in Chief was obliged to exert his personal influence with the Officers of one of His Majesty's regiments to induce them to dine with Sir George Barlow, who was so

unpopular that they refused to accept his invitation. The Officers of a Native corps having declined an invitation, although it was accepted by the Commandant, the Sepoys were punished as well as the Officers, by the battalion being sent to a station 500 miles distant, and particularly unhealthy. Another Native corps was sent from Madras, because Major Boles, after his suspension, had dined at the regimental mess.

Officers, although suspended by an arbitrary act of Sir George Barlow, although censured by him in public orders, surely were not to be branded with infamy, and held up as unworthy to be received into private Society : and yet we find Sir G. Barlow actually expressing a wish that the Officers who had fallen under his displeasure, should not be invited to the houses of the members of Council.

The unusual severity shewn to the Hon. Lieutenant Colonel St. Leger and Captain Marshall, affords further proof of the vindictive spirit by which Sir George Barlow seems to have been actuated throughout this unhappy period, and gives us too much reason to believe, that harmony and mutual confidence never can be restored under his Administration.

To the multiplied causes for the recall of Sir George Barlow, of which only the most prominent have been noticed, I will add his unauthorised dismissal of Mr. Petrie before he had received the new commission of Government, or possessed any legal authority for violating not only the existing commission of Government, but a separate commission, held by Mr. Petrie, to succeed to the office of Governor in case of the death or absence of Sir George Barlow. The legality of this measure may be estimated by supposing an ordinary event, namely, the death of Sir George Barlow, after the dismissal of

Mr. Petrie, and before the arrival of the new commission of Government.

It will hardly be contested, that in such contingency, Mr. Petrie must necessarily have assumed the Government of Fort St. George; and if so, his removal was unlawful, and all the acts of the remaining members void. If there should be any doubt of the illegality of this act, assuredly there can be none of its indecency; as the miserable triumph of a little, and illiberal mind, over a man whom he had injured, past forgiveness.

I will conclude a catalogue, which might still be much prolonged, by adding his disobedience and disregard of the intentions of this Court, officially announced, in the case of Colonel (now General) Agnew.

I have the honour to be,
With great respect,
Gentlemen,
Your obedient Servant,
(Signed) J. BANNERMAN.

India House, August 6, 1811.

The above is a rapid outline of the tyranny of Sir George Barlow's Government, solemnly recorded by one of the body, to whom the Government of India is committed. But the details are still wanting. The Public must have them, and they will shortly be published. They are calculated to make human nature hang down its head in sorrow and shame.

W. THORNE, AND LION COURT, FLEET STREET.

OBSERVATIONS
ON
THE DISTURBANCES
IN
THE MADRAS ARMY
IN 1809.

IN TWO PARTS.

By JOHN MALCOLM,
LIEUTENANT COLONEL IN THE HONOURABLE EAST INDIA COMPANY
MADRAS ARMY, RESIDENT AT MYSORE, AND LATE
ENVOY TO THE COURT OF PERSIA.

LONDON:
PRINTED FOR WILLIAM MILLER, ALBEMARLE STREET;
AND JOHN MURRAY, FLEET STREET.

1812.

J. MOYES, PRINTER,
Greville Street, Hatton Garden, London.

PREFACE.

I HAVE hitherto abstained from controversy regarding the late unhappy proceedings at Madras. The part which I had taken in these proceedings had placed me in possession of much information, and I had given a shape to my sentiments upon the subject; but the knowledge of these was limited to a few intimate friends, and to them only under the strictest injunctions of secrecy. I have been applied to more than once for papers and information upon this subject, but have invariably refused; as I deemed it improper to give publicity in any mode to communications, whether verbal or in writing, which had been, at the moment at which they were made, considered as private, or confidential. Nothing could have led me to a departure from this principle but a perusal of the dispatch under date the 10th of September, 1809, from the Government of Fort St. George to the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors, printed by order of the House of Commons. That dispatch contains an implied censure upon my conduct, which nothing but a conviction of its justice could induce me to pass over in silence.

Injustice is aggravated by the power of the individual or body by whom it is committed, and by the want of ability or opportunity in the person who suffers to repel the attack. Had not this dispatch been printed by order

of the House of Commons, my character would have secretly received a deep and incurable wound : for as it is not likely the Honourable the Court of Directors could have ever thought it possible that so deliberate and grave an authority as the Government of Fort St. George, could (without adequate grounds) have pronounced censure on the character of an officer who stood at the moment as high in rank and trust as the local Government of India had power to raise him*, it becomes probable, that most of those who read this dispatch would be satisfied, without a minute examination of the documents by which it was accompanied : and if any readers went into this detail, and were struck with the remarkable difference between the apparent premises and the conclusions drawn from them, it is more likely they would conclude, that grounds, not yet brought before them, existed, which would warrant the assertions made by Government, than that they should ever suppose the latter had committed such an injustice towards any individual in their service.

I cannot, on this occasion, limit myself to an account of my mission to Masulipatam, which is that part of my conduct to which the Government of Fort St. George exclusively refers : justice to my own character demands that I should give a narrative (accompanied by an Appendix of original documents), which will show, in a clear

* I was, at the moment this letter was written, at Madras, preparing to proceed on a mission to Persia : not a word even of dissatisfaction at my conduct was expressed—no explanation of any of my acts required ; and, consequently, no opportunity afforded of defending myself against the serious charges that were thus secretly transmitted to England. The letter to the Secret Committee is dated the 10th September, 1809, the day before that on which Lord Minto arrived at Madras.

and concise manner, the part I took, and the advice I gave, throughout the whole of those unhappy and guilty proceedings which have lately afflicted our country in India. To render this narrative intelligible to all, I shall prefix a general view of the principal acts of the Government of Fort St. George, from the commencement to the termination of the late violent agitations on the coast. My object in this publication is to vindicate myself, not to attack others. A plain statement of indisputable facts will show, that though my judgment might on some occasions have been wrong, I was invariably actuated by an indefatigable zeal, and an undeviating principle of public duty ; that I predicted at the commencement, and at different stages of the proceeding, every event of importance that occurred ; that if any one of the many slighted suggestions which I offered had met with attention, the most serious evils would have been averted ; and that my efforts were such as ought to have entitled me to the praise and gratitude of those by whom I now find my conduct misrepresented and my character calumniated.

Sir George Barlow has, I observe, from the volume of papers printed by order of the House of Commons, placed upon record a number of my private and confidential communications. This I did not anticipate ; and these letters were written in a less guarded style, and with more warmth, than they would have been, if I had foreseen the public use to be made of them. I do not, however, conceive that I have any right to complain of this act : the letters contain not one sentiment of which I am ashamed : they were all on public subjects : and that alone, when they were addressed to Sir George Barlow or his Secretary, rendered them public. But I must claim to myself an

equal privilege in bringing forward such private documents as are necessary to prove what I have stated, and to defend myself from those imputations which have been thrown upon my character from a partial, and, I trust I sh^l prove, a most unfair statement of my conduct when employed at Masulipatam.

I should feel unworthy of that station which I hope I hold in life, if any motive upon earth had such power over my mind as to make me silent under reflections (which I deemed unjust) upon my conduct : and where those have been, from any cause, (however unforeseen,) brought before the public, my reply must of course be submitted to the same tribunal. This is a circumstance which I by no means regret. Publications in England on the affairs of India have been rare, except on some extraordinary epochs, when attention has been forcibly drawn to that quarter ; and a groundless alarm has been spread of the mischiefs which (many conceive) must arise from such free disclosure, and consequent full discussion, of the acts of the Indian Governments. This practice, in my opinion, will have a direct contrary effect. It must always do great and essential good. The nature of our possessions in India make it necessary that almost absolute power should be given to those entrusted with governments in that quarter ; and there cannot be a better or more efficient check over these rulers than that which must be established by the full publicity given to their acts, and the frequent discussion of all their principles of rule. Such a practice will expose imprudence and weakness, however defended by the adherence of powerful friends in England : and it will be more certain to prevent oppression, or injustice, than the general provisions of law, which may be evaded ; or

the check of superiors, who may, from conceiving the cause of an individual identified with that of authority itself, feel themselves condemned to support proceedings which they cannot approve. This practice, in short, (restrained, as it always must be, by the laws of our country within moderate bounds,) must have the most salutary effects. Its inconveniences are obvious, but trifling when compared to the great and permanent benefits which it must produce : and I am confident that every effort made to repress such discussion is not merely a sacrifice to personal feeling, and to momentary expedience, of one of the best and most operative principles of the British Constitution : but a direct approximation to the principles of that oriental tyranny, which it is, or ought to be, our chief boast to have destroyed.

PART I.



OBSERVATIONS

ON

THE CAUSES AND PROGRESS

OF THE

DISTURBANCES IN THE MADRAS ARMY.



OBSERVATIONS, &c.

Some agitation, though of a trifling nature, had prevailed among the Company's officers on the coast establishment from a period as far back as the publication of the Regulations of the year 1796, which they conceived to entitle them to a complete equalization of allowances with the officers of the Bengal establishment. These feelings had little time for operation in the course of that active and brilliant service in which the Madras army was employed during the administration of Lord Wellesley. The increase of establishment rendered necessary to preserve the great accession of territory acquired by that nobleman, occasioned a promotion, that, for a period, silenced their discontent; but that spirit was revived in the year 1805 and 1806, when, in addition to their former grievance, they conceived that there was an evident and injurious partiality shown towards his Majesty's officers, who were said to be promoted to commands and staff situations to the injury of the officers of the Company's service. Addresses to Government and to the Court of Directors were at this period agitated and in circulation; but none, to my knowledge, were brought forward; owing, perhaps, to the orders from the Honourable the Court of Directors, who, it would appear, had, on private representation, adopted some measures to redress those grievances of which the army at that moment complained. This spirit of discontent might have died of itself; or, at all events, it would have been more easily repressed, had not the flame of

discord burst out in a higher quarter. The quarrel which occurred between the Governor, Sir George Barlow, and the Commander-in-Chief, General M'Dowall, may, no doubt, (as it led to those measures which Government adopted towards the general staff of the coast army,) be deemed the remote source of all the violent and indefensible acts of the army, and in that view merits a short notice. The mind of General M'Dowall was much irritated at his not being appointed to council; and he gave way, in consequence, to a language of complaint and discontent, of which, it must be concluded, he could never have calculated the effect. Every act of Government that affected the wishes or interests of either an individual or a class of officers naturally caused complaints, which the Commander-in-Chief certainly did not discourage. He must have thought that the influence and importance of a seat in council would have enabled him more easily to have satisfied or silenced their murmurs; and he cannot be supposed to have felt much sorrow that Government should have experienced the inconvenience of an exclusion which he considered as so great a personal grievance: and when his mind was further irritated by what he deemed to be slight and neglect, on the part of Sir George Barlow, of his rights in his military character of Commander-in-Chief, these feelings had probably a wider action. In the temper which I have shown the coast army was in at this moment, it is not surprising, when they saw such an example of discontent, and felt unexpressed by that high authority which was immediately over them, that they should have been more bold, and that their violence should have taken a more formidable shape towards Government, against which this spirit was, by the proceeding of the Commander-in-Chief, very unadvisedly and inconsiderately, however unintentionally, directed. But if a want of reflection on one part (few will accuse General M'Dowall of more than want of reflection) led to such consequences, can we say there was much more

wisdom on the other, which, if it did not provoke, never made one attempt to prevent, the occurrence of those evils with which it was threatened? A cold, even, mechanic course of action, which gave great attention to the ordinary rules of public business dignified with the name of public principles, but none to human nature, was opposed at this period to the proceedings of the Commander-in-Chief and the army; and had the effect, which was to be expected, of accelerating that crisis which it was so important to avoid.

It may be here necessary to explain what was meant by the term public principle. It was constantly used at Madras (with some deviation, I conceive, from its highest and most dignified sense) to denote the rules of public business founded either in precedent or in written law, and certainly well adapted for order and convenience in the common course of affairs. But if such rules were sufficient, no talents would be necessary to govern mankind. A copying clerk, or even the regulation-book which he copies, might rule a state. Success in this endeavour (the object of which is to render the task of Government simple and easy) will be always agreeable to the character of the Government. The more despotic that is, the more easily may we preserve inviolate such rules or principles. For though great commotions will occur in the most despotic states, and force their rulers to an occasional deviation from such principles, these deviations will be unfrequent to what must arise in more free and liberal governments, in which that constant attention which it is necessary to pay to men's tempers, and to those pretensions and rights upon which such an order of things is grounded, must produce a much more frequent departure from the exact letter (and sometimes from the spirit) of those unbending rules. It is this fact which renders the task of government so much more difficult in those states than in any others. Any man (who has obsequious slaves to govern) can, if he has memory to recollect the prin-

ciples of rule, be a despot, or a despot's deputy ; but far different qualities are required where the minds of those under authority are of a freer and bolder stamp : over such a society those alone are fit to rule, who, fully informed of all its component parts, can judge the periods when the temporary departure from an established principle will effect more in the cause of authority than its rigid observance ; when lenity is more powerful than severity, and mildness and moderation tend more to restore order and to maintain tranquillity, than all the force of a violent government.

The intelligent reader will perceive, that, in contrasting free and despotic governments, I refer exclusively to rules of administration. Laws are, no doubt, more inflexible in free states than in others. But even respecting laws it may be observed, that the general principle prevails : for the legislative power in free states shows a disposition to repeal or modify laws in reference to the interests, the opinions, sometimes even to the prejudices, of great bodies of the people ; while the despot has no maxim, but that all must be subject to the authority of Government. There is, no doubt, a great distinction in every community between civil and military bodies : the laws for the government of the latter are, of course, more arbitrary and unbending ; but, even in these bodies there is a *national character* that will compel attention. The same principles cannot be applied to an English as a Russian army : and it is when such bodies are in an agitated and convulsed state, that these characteristic distinctions are most prominent and discernible. It is on such emergencies that a statesman will succeed in averting a danger, which will only be increased by every measure of the mere rote follower of public rules. Cicero* has observed, that “ it appears to be the dictate of sound
“ policy, to act in accommodation to particular conjunc-

* Cicero's Letters to his Friends, Vol. I. p. 194. Octavo. London, 1755.

" tures, and not obstinately persevere in one invariable
 " scheme, when the public circumstances, together with
 " the sentiments of the best and wisest members of the
 " community, are evidently changed. In conformity to
 " this notion, the most judicious reasoners on the art of
 " government have universally condemned an inflexible
 " perseverance in one uniform tenor of measures. The
 " skill of the pilot is shown in weathering the storm at
 " least, though he should not gain his port." Public
 merit (agreeable to the extended view of that great orator
 and statesman, as expressed afterwards) consists in "having
 " been inflexible in our intentions for the public welfare,
 " and not by a positive perseverance in certain favourite
 " modes of obtaining it."

It will be unnecessary to trace the petty differences
 which took place between the Commander-in-Chief and
 the Governor: the general character and evil effect of
 these differences have been described. The first act which
 led to serious discussions, was the former placing the
 Quarter-Master-General, Lieutenant-Colonel Munro, in
 arrest. The nature of this case is well known: and few,
 I imagine, can doubt that Government had *a right* to
 command his release: but it will remain a question with
 many, how far a knowledge of the character and actual
 temper of the Commander-in-Chief, the state of the army,
 and other circumstances, would have warranted Govern-
 ment in forbearing to use *this right*. It is nonsense to say,
 that it would, by so forbearing and moderate a proceeding,
 have abandoned an officer entitled to protection. This
 language, if it means any thing, implies that Government
 did not conceive there were at that moment thirteen
 officers, either in the King's or Company's service, on the
 coast, upon whose honesty and honour it could rely.
 This is a proposition which appears too extravagant for
 notice: but, even if this point be conceded, will it be said,
 if Colonel Munro had suffered an additional injustice by
 the sentence of a violent and partial court martial, that the

Government was, in that extreme case, deprived of the right to protect that officer? On the contrary, would not the necessity for the exercise of that right have been, under such an event, much more apparent and unobjectionable. It may be asked, If any circumstances could justify Government in so pusillanimous a conduct, as that of forbearing to exercise an admitted right, and of allowing a court martial to judge upon a public act which it had recognised and approved? It is to be replied, that such conduct might, on many occasions, be the result of prudence and of fortitude. It is weakness, not firmness, that takes an early alarm at danger, and by showing a want of confidence in all the subordinate aids of its power, creates, by its suspicion, that defection which it apprehends. In the recent case of Sir Francis Burdett, the House of Commons did not abandon its exclusive right, but it forbore the exercise of that right, and, with a confidence and wisdom worthy of so enlightened and august an assembly, allowed a question, which involved its rights and authority, to be discussed in a court of law. There can, I should conceive, be no doubt whatever, that had Colonel Munro been tried on the charges preferred against him, he would have been honourably acquitted; and the influence and reputation of his accusers would have been in no slight degree lessened: an object which, in itself, was of consequence at that period to Government.

It is a remarkable fact, that the officers who had signed the charges against Colonel Munro, were, on reflection, and from learning the sentiments of the Judge-Advocate-General, so convinced that the charges they had made were either groundless or illegal, that they wrote to the Commander-in-Chief to suspend the prosecution of them. This certainly proves (if any proof was wanting) that there could have been no doubt of the result of a court martial, grounded on the state of general feelings, as far as that regarded the charges against Lieutenant-Colonel Munro; for if the accusers themselves had shown they distrusted

the cause they had so rashly adopted, there could, assuredly, be no apprehension of the judgment of thirteen officers of rank (all of whom, if it had been thought necessary, might have been chosen from his Majesty's service) giving a biassed or unjust sentence. The Government of Madras, in their dispatch to the Court of Directors upon this subject, draw a directly opposite conclusion from this fact, which, they say, "proves in itself the inexpediency of their having had recourse to such a proceeding;" but they state no grounds for this conclusion. In the whole course of this affair they appear to have been much, if not solely, guided by the opinion of their law officers: and no man can peruse the letter of Lieutenant-Colonel Leith upon this subject, without a just respect for the talents and extensive legal knowledge of that public officer. But those that think great, numerous, and obvious evils resulted from the decision of Government on the case of Lieutenant-Colonel Munro, will not immediately perceive the necessity of its having been governed by rules of law in its decision on a question which clearly involved the most serious considerations of state policy. They will think, and with justice, this was a question not for lawyers, but statesmen: who, in the exercise of their legitimate discretion, are in the situation in which Mr. Burke has so well described legislators; and therefore, like the *magistratus*, "ought to do what lawyers cannot, for they have no rules to bind them but the great principles of reason and equity and the general sense of mankind: these they are bound to obey and follow: and rather to enlarge and enlighten law by the liberality of legislative reason, than to fetter and bind their high capacity by the narrow constructions of subordinate judicial justice."

Several months previous to General McDowall's departure for England, that officer had been called upon by the Governor to repress a Memorial to the Governor General, on the subject of late reductions, which was stated to be in

agitation at the principal stations of the army. General McDowall had written circular letters to forbid such proceedings; and nothing further appeared upon this subject till that officer, on the 23d of January 1809, forwarded and strongly recommended to notice a Memorial to the Honourable the Court of Directors signed by a number of the officers of the army, and containing, in moderate and not disrespectful language, a statement of what they deemed their grievances, which chiefly referred to the equalization of their allowances with the Bengal establishment, the hardship of the several reductions of emolument which they had lately sustained, and the partiality in appointment to commands which they conceived was still shown to his Majesty's officers. General M Dowall forwarded, at the same time, another Memorial, which was also addressed to the Court of Directors, and signed by a number of officers commanding native corps, regarding the injury they conceived they had sustained by the abolition of the tent contract. The principle of both these Memorials was strongly condemned by the Government. The former, they informed the Commander-in-Chief, could be sent to the Governor General in Council; and the latter was returned, as relating to a subject which had already been decided.

There were many circumstances connected with these addresses, which confirm the truth of those sentiments I before expressed regarding the feelings by which General McDowall allowed himself to be governed at this moment: but the state of his mind, and the operation that was likely to have upon the officers of the army, was a subject that merited the serious consideration of Government; which, unless satisfied that there was no danger from the progress of such a spirit of discontent as then existed, should either have adopted *at that moment* some decided measures to repress that evil, or have carefully avoided every act of aggravation. If both of these Memorials had been merely permitted to go as numbers of the dispatch to England,

those by whom they were signed would have thought nothing more of their grievances till an answer was received from the Directors: and that, if contrary to their wishes, would have been deemed final, and the Directors would assuredly not have censured Government for a slight departure from established rules at a period when, from extraordinary events, of a nature never likely to happen again, the army was not only in a state of great agitation, but the civil power had lost the aid of that high military authority on which it would in common times have relied to subdue so dangerous a spirit. Few will contend that there would have been any loss of either dignity or of strength in such a proceeding: and how completely, had it been adopted, would the turbulent and seditious be deprived of one of their chief means of increasing irritation *. But this question appears to have been decided,

* As if an unqualified refusal to forward these Memorials was not adequate to produce this dangerous effect, the names of all the officers who had signed the first Memorial were placed on a proscribed list, and deemed ineligible to any promotion in commands or staff situations. One fact will show the impression that this act made upon the most moderate. I wrote to Colonel Aldwell Taylor, an officer of high rank and respectability, expressing my earnest desire to see him placed in a command in which I thought his principles and character would be useful to Government. In his answer, which is dated the 29th of July, he details the causes of his being in a situation of actual retirement. When he had applied for a command to which his services gave him a right to aspire, he observes, that he was informed of the crime by which he had not only forfeited all hope of that particular station, but also (he adds), "that for having affixed
" my signature to a respectful address to my superiors and employers, I
" was placed at the head of a list of names comprising nearly two thirds
" of the army, and thereby marked by the extreme displeasure of Govern-
" ment, and thence deprived of every future hope of situations of honour
" and emolument. Whilst smarting under these most serious injuries, I
" felt it impossible to resume the command of Masulipatam, and made
" application to retire." This case is more marked than others of the same kind, because there can be little, if any doubt, the violent mutiny that took place at Masulipatam would never have occurred, if Colonel Taylor had remained in command of that garrison. The nature of this unavowed punishment (for though there is, I imagine, no doubt such a

like every other, upon an abstract consideration of its own merits as a single and insulated question ; and in that light the decision was *undoubtedly right* : but if it had been viewed, as it certainly should, in its relation to the actual state of the army, *it was as certainly wrong*. It had an evident and malignant action throughout all the troubles that ensued. And this absolute, and, as they deemed it, unnecessary and ungracious refusal to allow their grievances to be even heard by the Court of Directors, combined with the punishment* with which it was accompanied, rankled to the last in the minds of the discontented, and indeed appeared to be one of the few subjects, on the hardship and injustice of which the most moderate of those concerned agreed with the most violent.

The next event of consequence, was the publication of a general order, under date the 28th January, by the Commander-in-Chief, censuring, Lieutenant-Colonel Munro for his appeal to the civil Government against his decision ; an act which General McDowall deemed destructive of subordination, subversive of discipline, and a violation of (what he termed) the sacred rights of the Commander-in-Chief. There can, I should conceive, be little doubt regarding the character of this order. It is certainly indefensible. It in substance arraigned the exercise of an act of authority, the legality of which General McDowall had recognised by his obedience a few days before, and in this view was highly disrespectful to Government, who were justly incensed at the proceedings ; and who, in an order under date the 31st of January, removed General McDowall from the command of the army, which it appeared he had not then resigned, though on his way to

resolution was passed by Government, it was never published in any order.) is very peculiar ; but it is very characteristic of the system of measures pursued. It was teasing and aggravating in its operation, without efficacy in its end.

* Vide the preceding note.

Ceylon for the purpose of proceeding to England. The links that bound the cause of General McDowall to that of the officers of the Company's army on the coast, were neither strong nor durable : a common feeling of discontent against Government had united them for a moment, but there was no cohesion either from similar objects or interests ; and the Government order, as far as related to General McDowall, could have given rise to no serious consequences : but the suspension from the service, in the same order, of Major Boles, the Deputy-Adjutant-General, on the ground of his having given currency to the obnoxious order of the Commander-in-Chief, had an immediate and electric effect over the whole army. There was hardly an officer in either the King's or Company's service that did not doubt the justice of this measure, or that did not feel that it inflicted a vital wound on the first principles of military discipline ; and the universal clamour and indignation that it excited, was no doubt the proximate and direct cause of the rebellion that ensued.

The merits of this unhappy act of power have been fully investigated in England ; and the general opinion seems decidedly against the Government of Fort St. George. The wisdom and expediency of the act is defended by none ; and some of the first law authorities* in England doubt its justice. The subject has been completely exhausted ; and I shall say no more upon it, than that there, perhaps, never was so complete a want of knowledge displayed of the character of military feeling, as in the attempt made to prevail upon Major Boles to degrade himself in his own profession, by making an apology for having performed what he deemed his duty, and what he could not have expressed regret for having done, without an admission of guilt. The urgency with which this apology was sought, is of itself a proof that the Government had been precipitate. How much more manly, wise, and digni-

* Vide Mr. Pigott's Opinion printed with the Report of Select Mag-

fied, would it have been to have rescinded the resolution which had been taken, on the plain ground of a conviction that Major Boles had erred from want of knowledge, and without intention of offence; and such must have been the actual sentiments which were entertained of his conduct, or Government could never have professed itself ready to accept a slight apology. But a little stickling spirit about supposed dignity, more worthy of a wrong-headed individual engaged in an affair of honour, than a great Government, prevented this obvious measure, and produced irremediable mischief to the state.

On the 1st of February, the day subsequent to that on which Major Boles was suspended, an order was issued, suspending the Adjutant-General, Lieutenant-Colonel Capper, for the same offence, that of being concerned in circulating the offensive order of the Commander-in-Chief. The only difference in the facts of this case from that of Major Boles, (they were alike in principle), was, that Colonel Capper, the moment he heard of Major Boles's suspension, made a declaration, that the circumstance of his being with General McDowall was the sole cause that had led to Major Boles's name being affixed to orders which it was his (the Adjutant-General's) duty to sign; and that he considered all responsibility connected with the office of Adjutant-General rested solely with him, as principal. The generous object of this gallant and meritorious officer (who was lost on his passage to England), was to exculpate his deputy. He did not, however, succeed in that object; and his free avowal of the principal share he had in the circulation of the order was instantly taken as the ground for inflicting a similar punishment on him.

From the hour that these measures were adopted, the state of the army underwent a complete revolution. The most discontented had, till this period, been cautious in their measures, and aimed at no more than obtaining some attention to what they deemed their grievances. There is

no doubt, that before these orders were issued a very general spirit of dissatisfaction prevailed ; but there was no danger of that taking any mutinous or rebellious shape. Many, and among these some of the most respectable officers in the army, had up to this date taken no concern in those proceedings that had offended Government : but the suspension of Colonel Capper and Major Boles (particularly the latter, who, it was perfectly known, had no share in the councils of the Commander-in-Chief, and whose act of signing and issuing the obnoxious order was therefore exclusively ministerial,) effected a complete and dangerous change in the general temper. All seemed to be actuated by the same resentment at measures which they deemed arbitrary and unjust ; and many officers of the highest rank and first respectability, both in his Majesty's and the Honourable Company's service, joined in reprobating the principle upon which it was adopted. The subsequent efforts made to prevail upon Major Boles to sign an apology, and the letter circulated by the commanding officer of the forces, General Gowdie, which condemned that officer for not having acceded to this proposition, had the double effect of increasing the indignation at Government and the popularity of Major Boles, who was, after this act, deemed an honourable martyr in a cause which it was the duty of every military officer to support. Before the more moderate, and with them all those officers of his Majesty's service who had given way to their first feelings, had recovered from their error, numbers of the more violent in the Company's service were irretrievably pledged to violent and guilty proceedings, into which there is no doubt they were deluded by the force of example, and the assurance that the cause in which they were engaged was general. The first of their acts which attracted the notice of Government, was the agitation and preparation of an address to the Governor General, remonstrating against the acts of the Government of Fort St. George, and soliciting the removal of Sir George Barlow ; and an address, or letter, to Major Boles, convey-

ing to that officer a contribution for his support during what the addressers deemed his unjust suspension. The Government, in an order dated the 1st of May, 1809, suspended Captain J. Marshall and Lieutenant-Colonel Martin, on the ground of their being principally concerned in preparing the Memorial * (or, as it is termed in this order, "seditious paper,") addressed to the Governor General; and the same punishment was inflicted upon Lieutenant-Colonel the Honourable Arthur St. Leger, on the ground of his having promoted the circulation of the Memorial in the corps under his command. Major J. de Morgan was suspended for nearly similar reasons. Captain James Grant, commanding the body-guard of the Governor, (but then absent on service in Travancore,) had signed the address to Major Boles; and, from a feeling congenial with his candid and gallant character, he deemed concealment of this act dishonourable, nor could he reconcile to his mind the propriety of continuing to hold his appointment with the line he had pursued. He wrote, therefore, a private letter to Major Barclay, (Military Secretary to the Governor,) stating the reasons that had led him to resign the command of the body-guard, and desiring that Sir George Barlow might be informed of his motives; and he enclosed (that the information of the Governor regarding the actual state of the feeling of the army might be complete,) a copy of the letter to Major Boles. He was suspended on the ground of having signed the address to Major Boles: which document, it was stated in the order, he had forced on the attention of the Governor in Council. Lieutenant-Colonel Robert Bell, the commanding officer of the artillery, was removed from all military charge and command, on the ground (as was stated in the orders,) of his having promoted the circulation of a paper similar in substance (to that address) among the officers under his

* This crude and violent address was never transmitted to the Governor General. The crime led to the charge of the officers here mentioned, was being implicated in framing it and in promoting its circulation.

command. Lieutenant-Colonel Chalmers was removed from his immediate command, on the charge of not having reported to Government, or exerted himself to repress, the exceptionable proceedings of the officers under his orders : and Lieutenant-Colonel Cuppage was removed, on the same ground, from the staff situation of Adjutant-General, to which (though he then held a station of command in Malabar,) he had been appointed : while Captain Coombes was deprived of his staff office of Assistant-Quarter-Master-General in Mysore, on the general grounds of being concerned in these reprehensible proceedings. This order concluded by a panegyric upon the discipline and fidelity which the troops in his Majesty's service had invariably shown, and by a compliment to all those of the Company's service who had not taken a share in these reprehensible proceedings, but particularly the subsidiary force at Hyderabad, the conduct of which was stated to have been most satisfactory and exemplary.

Though the right of suspending officers from the service till the pleasure of the Court of Directors was known, is one that has been very properly vested in the local Governments of India, they possess no power which should be exercised with such extreme caution. It never can be wisely exercised in any cases but those of most clearly established guilt, where trial would either endanger the authority of Government, or expose its dignity to the highest insult and degradation : which is indeed one, and perhaps the most effectual, mode of endangering its existence. Every officer is conscious, when he enters the public service, that he subjects himself to military law, but not to arbitrary power. There are, however, (as has been shown), extreme cases, which create exceptions that interfere with his right to this jurisdiction : but when the ruling power is compelled to act contrary to usage, it is bound, in all such cases, to establish the necessity of its so acting, by an exposure both of the nature of the crime and

of the proof of its having been committed*. The King of England may, no doubt, strike any officer's name out of his army without assigning any reason; but his adviser would incur serious responsibility; and an inferior authority exercising this great power should be still more cautious, lest the very purpose for which it was granted be perverted, by the destruction of that general confidence in the justice of their rule, upon which the power of departure (when the safety of the state absolutely requires it) from ordinary forms of law is grounded. No sense of expedience, or desire to strike terror, (by the mere display of arbitrary power,) can warrant the slightest deviation from principles so essential to preserve the temper and order of a military body under this alarming though legal departure from its usual rights and privileges.

It was a remarkable fact, relative to the orders issued on that date, that (unless in the case of Captain Grant, who had come forward to accuse himself † of the act for which he was punished) no proof of the guilt of any of the others was brought forward. They were, indeed, almost all suspended, removed, and disgraced, on the grounds of private information; which, supposing it true, could not, from its nature, and the resentment to which it would expose individuals, be publicly stated. The consequence was, that many of the individuals who had been thus condemned and punished without a hearing, loudly declared their innocence, and brought strong presumptive evidence to support their assertion. They were generally believed; and a series of their particular wrongs, added to the alarm

* There may be some rare exceptions to this rule, which apply to secret confederacies against a state, where the object is to *deprive an individual of power, more than to punish as an example*. This consideration could, on the 1st of May, have hardly applied even as a fair pretext to any one individual of the many that were punished.

† In this officer's case there was no impropriety or disrespect in the letter, that could have aggravated the offence, and the motive which made him state what he had done, was as unduly honourable

ceased by the sweeping use which Government had on this occasion made of its right of suspending officers without trial, greatly aggravated the discontented, who felt an almost maddening motive to action in the immediate contemplation of the ruin and disgrace which threatened some of the most honourable and distinguished of those that had taken any share in their proceedings.

The obvious and acknowledged source of the crimes which Government had at this moment to punish, was its own act—the recent suspension of Lieutenant-Colonel Capper and Major Boles ; and it ought to have been evident, that the orders of the 1st of May would aggravate, in the highest degree, the general agitation which that measure had produced ; and almost every paragraph of this order would appear as if intended for that object. The thanks given in it to his Majesty's troops were no doubt merited, but invidious ; and, being so, could never have been desired by that body ; many of whom, though they had been led (by the operation of the principles of the distinct constitution of the army to which they belonged,) to renounce every share in the proceedings of the discontented officers in the Company's service, still participated in their feelings : but the useless irritation of this part of the order appears a trifling error when compared to that eulogium which it so unfortunately bestowed on the Hyderabad force, whose officers, however much circumstances might have prevented their coming forward, could not possibly, as a body, have a separate interest from the rest of that army to whom they were on this occasion held forth as a corps on whose fidelity Government had peculiar confidence. The operation of such praise was inevitable : the Company's officers at Hyderabad were not only exposed to the reproach of inaction in what were deemed objects of common interest, but to the accusation of being in part the cause of the ruin of some of the most popular officers of the army : for the discontented argued, that if Government had not thought it could rely on their support, it never

would have had recourse to so bold and arbitrary a course of measures. Correct information regarding the temper of this force would have satisfied Government that there was no good ground for this eulogium ; and the slightest reflection on the common motives of human action would have prevented its being made. The Company's officers at Hyderabad treated the praise bestowed upon them with scorn, disclaimed all right to it in an address to Government, and, abandoning that moderation which had before characterized their proceedings, they commenced with all the zeal of converts in their new career. In their ardour to make amends for the past, they took the lead in violence. Their numbers and apparent unanimity inspired them with fatal confidence : and this force, who were excited to action by a weak and unwise attempt to divide them from the rest of the army, became the most active promoters of sedition, and gave an example of opposition to Government, in which their repentance came too late to prevent the ruin of many of those who were betrayed, by a reliance on them, into the adoption of the same unjustifiable course.

The general spirit of indignation which the orders of the 1st of May were calculated to excite, must have been foreseen, but it was perhaps expected, that the terror struck by so decided and vigorous a proceeding would repress the effects of this spirit, and alarm even the most violent into order and obedience. If such was the intention, the measure was certainly inadequate to the end proposed. When we bear in mind the inflamed state of the minds of a great majority of the officers of the coast army, was it reasonable to expect, that the suspension from the service, and the removal from their commands, of a few of the most popular (including some of the most moderate*) officers in the service, would strike a panic in a body of men so agitated ? Was it not more likely that they would

* It is, of course, meant the most moderate among those who were at all discontented.

deem this a repetition of what they had before considered injustice, and rush on the extreme of violence? It could have no other effect; and therefore, if it had been resolved to take no steps to conciliate or restore the temper of the army, this was the period (before their combinations were matured,) that a severe and wise Government would have chosen to come to issue; and, had the danger been fully met at this moment, those consequences which resulted from the line pursued would, in all human probability, have been avoided: but if the object of the Government of Fort St. George had been the ruin of its own army, no measures could have been more calculated to effect that object than those pursued. The character of its acts till the 1st of May has been fully shown. It would be as tedious as useless to dwell upon the many trifling but irritating measures to which it had recourse from that period till the 26th of July. These measures were, if not oppressive, all marked by a spirit of the most provoking suspicion, and never contained one particle of that generous feeling of noble confidence, which, by exalting the character of authority, attaches those that are wavering, reclaims the insubordinate to their duty, and, by giving a motive in which they have a pride, recalls the most guilty to the path of honour and virtue. A bare catalogue of a few of the expedients to which the Government resorted will be sufficient to show the nature of the whole. Some officers were removed from the command of corps, and sent to distant stations, without any reason being assigned; others were insulted, by being ordered away from the Presidency and other places at a few hours' warning, upon the ground of private information regarding their conversation or actions. Leave to visit the Presidency was refused to all officers. An institution of cadets (boys) was dissolved, because they had a quarrel with one of their comrades in consequence of his going to Lady Barlow's ball. A corps was removed to a distant and unpleasant (if not unhealthy) station, because its officers refused to dine with the Go-

venor. But the conduct of the officers of the European regiment at Masulipatam, in consequence of a dispute about a toast at their mess-table, and the measures that precipitated a mutiny in that garrison, (the particulars of which will be stated in my narrative,) forms one of the completest examples of the character of that system of irritation pursued by the Government of Fort St. George, during this short but important and eventful period. In viewing this system, we ought not to take any single case, but look at the whole ; and we shall find it, as such, fully adequate to the end which it effected, of making a brave and meritorious though mistaken body of men rush upon their own ruin ; and of greatly weakening, if not destroying, by its probable operation on the attachment and allegiance of our native army, the most essential of all those principles, on the preservation of which must depend the future safety and existence of our empire in India.

The mutiny which an imprudent measure of Government (the particulars of which will be hereafter stated) brought on at Masulipatam, was one of the first acts of open violence committed by the officers on the coast establishment. As the Governor of Fort St. George thought it might be quelled by means short of coercion, he directed me to proceed to that garrison, in the hope that I should recall the officers to their duty. But his other measures ill accorded with the avowed principles of that conciliatory and moderate proceeding. It had long been reported throughout the army, that Government intended to make such a distribution of the native corps as would place them under the complete check of his majesty's regiments. The alarm, and indeed despair, caused by this report, were excessive and general. The numerous officers of the Company's army who had become engaged in guilty combinations, thought their destruction was certain, and that union and resistance offered the only hope of safety. It might not have been the intention of Government to make such an impression ; but is it not clear to the most

common understanding which reflects on what had passed, and the actual state of feeling in the army, that this impression must have been produced *? Was it not evident that the mutiny at Masulipatam had been caused by the mere rumour of this intention on the part of Government? and could it be expected by the most weak, or infatuated, that the actual execution of this plan would not produce the same effect in a situation such as Hyderabad, where the spirit of disaffection was more violent, and the power of resistance as great, if not greater. It is hardly possible to make any other conclusion, but that those who advised this measure foresaw the result, and thought that such an act of open disobedience would give the colour of unavoidable necessity to the extreme measures† which they then contemplated. It produced its natural effect—the order

* I heard this plan mentioned by an officer high on the staff, the day before I sailed for Masulipatam, and protested against its principle, as directly contrary to that on which I had been desired to act, and indeed to every effort of conciliation. The Governor, to whom I immediately stated this fact, appeared to me to accord in my opinion; but, a few days after my departure, he was induced to adopt this measure, and to provoke disobedience to authority.

† The following are the sentiments of Colonel Close upon this subject, as expressed in his letter to Major Barclay under date the 24th of July, 1809, and published in the correspondence laid before the House of Commons:

“ It is generally admitted as a sound maxim, not to hazard the giving
 “ of an order unless there be a fair ground of presumption that it will be
 “ obeyed. From the apparent circumstances of the time, the orders sent
 “ to Masulipatam were perhaps fairly hazarded, but, after those orders
 “ had been disobeyed, to send orders to Hyderabad for the march of a
 “ battalion, might have been regarded as a measure in some degree
 “ exceptionable. The officers, who have opposed the orders sent for the
 “ purpose, are now more forcibly tied together than before. The
 “ extreme of their proceedings is increased, and their danger and fear
 “ seriously heightened. Their impulse to act is become more violent;
 “ and accordingly the loss to the public cause must be in proportion to
 “ all these augmentations. But this is not all. If the measure of moving
 “ the battalion was meant to be useful, in having an experimental effect,
 “ Hyderabad was assuredly the very place at which the experiment

for the march of the 2d battalion of the 10th regiment from Hyderabad to Goa was disobeyed, and the Company's officers at that station forced down a precipice of guilt, at which, in spite of their violent language, they shuddered. This act of open disobedience, accompanied by a violent and seditious paper styled their *Ultimatum**, which they transmitted to the Governor, constituted the immediate grounds upon which Government adopted the extreme measure of the 26th of July, of calling upon all the European officers of the native corps to sign a test of their fidelity, and, on their refusal, of separating the officers from their men.

Though a violent agitation certainly existed at this time throughout almost all ranks of the officers of the Company's army, this agitation had a variety of shades, which it is of importance to consider. Many officers in the Company's service had no share whatever in those proceedings which had met with the disapprobation of Government: but these, though they severely condemned the conduct of the disaffected, and regretted their errors, could not but be alive to the character and reputation of the army to which they belonged; they were, of course, anxious for measures that would retrieve the service from that disgrace and ruin with which it was threatened: and it was the natural wish of this class (who were stronger in influence than numbers,) that Government should endeavour to reclaim the discontented to their duty by some act that mixed as much consideration and indulgence.

* should not have been made, confusion could not be so hurtful any where else."

Those who know the deficiency of this superior man will judge, from this extract, what must have been the strength of his feelings upon the subject.

* The trial of Lieutenant-Colonel Innes, and the removal from the general staff of some officers obnoxious to the malecontents, were among the demands in this paper.

for the errors into which they had fallen, with a vigorous exertion of its authority as it was possible to mix, without a sacrifice of its strength and dignity.

The next, and a very principal if not a numerous class, were officers of some rank and influence, who had gradually, and without reflection, involved themselves in proceedings, the scope and extent of which they had never contemplated till they had gone too far to retract. They had persuaded themselves that Government would yield to the representations of the army; and the hope of success, added to the fear of being accused of defection, had hitherto kept them firm to the general cause: but these men, at the period of which I speak, contemplated their situation with affliction and horror; they saw themselves borne away in a tide that they could not resist: they conceived, from a false but imperious sense of honour, which, from a singular but powerful principle of human nature, was felt to be the more binding because at variance with duty, that they were pledged to support the rest: or, more properly speaking, not to abandon them. They were sensible too late of having lost their authority and control over the younger and more violent part of the service, and regretted their proceedings; but at the same time saw, under the rigid course pursued by Government, no safety but in union. This class of men would have rushed to any door that had been opened to their retreat; they would have made a stand on any ground that the clemency or generosity of Government had afforded them; and would not only have reclaimed themselves, but the rest; for they were, generally speaking, of that rank and character who had the chief influence with the troops; and, if extremes had been resorted to, with them on the side of Government, the others must have submitted, as their efforts at resistance would have been quite hopeless. The last and most numerous, though certainly the least powerful party among the officers of the coast army, were those who, unfortunately for its reputation, had the chief management

of all the criminal proceedings. This party, which consisted of a few wrong-headed and violent old officers, and almost all the junior part of the service, completely took the lead in their correspondence and deliberative committees ; in both of which a very violent and indecent tone of proceeding was adopted ; and the authority of commanding officers of corps was apparently suspended by the principle of equality introduced in their proceedings. But this loss of power was more apparent than real ; for, though the commanding officers may have had little more influence in the committee than the youngest officers, their military authority (generally speaking) remained, and that must have given them, whenever they had the courage to exert it, a very commanding influence over the whole : and this circumstance establishes what has been before stated, that the most numerous, clamorous, and violent, were in fact the least powerful party in the army, though they have assumed a style in the written documents, as if they were the undisputed and uncontrolled leaders of the whole of the Company's army.

The objects of the different classes of officers were, of course, as various as their feelings. The first could have no wish, but such a settlement as should vindicate the dignity of Government, and, as far as possible, spare the character and reputation of the service. They were too well aware of the nature of those causes that had led the discontented astray, not to hope that every effort might be made to reclaim the misguided ; but they were prepared, if such efforts failed, to have acted with a forward and animated zeal in support of lawful authority, and to have contributed their efforts to reduce men who had shown themselves unworthy of kindness and indulgence. The next class that has been described required more aid from the consideration of Government, before they could disentangle themselves from those unfortunate pledges into which they had entered. They felt that, after having proceeded so far, they would have been disgraced if they

had, by their retreat, left their associates to be punished. These officers thought they could not abandon the cause before it was at least ascertained none should suffer for what had passed ; but they had become fully sensible of the deep guilt in which they were involved : and though many of this class had entered into a pledge to have obtained what was termed a redress of grievances (inclusive of a complete repeal of the orders of the 1st of May), they were not disposed to persevere to the extent of disobedience in the pursuit of this object : and had Government, in addition to an act of amnesty, held out the slightest prospect that the officers of the army would, by an immediate return to good order and duty, acquire a claim upon the clemency and consideration of the Court of Directors, which might operate favourably to those officers who were suspended, and who were the object of their painful solicitude, this class would have used their utmost efforts to reclaim the more turbulent, and, in the event of those efforts failing, have employed all their influence and authority with the troops, to have prevented any injury to the state, from the violence or insanity of the rest.

It is difficult to say what were the objects of the last class among the officers of the coast army. This, it has been stated, were the most numerous and most violent, but the least powerful ; though it was probably judged otherwise by Government, from this party having throughout conducted the proceedings of the committees, and correspondence, and having always exaggerated its means, and assumed, from a desire to intimidate, a tone as if it spoke the sentiments of all the officers of the army.

One of the earliest motives to action with this class, was a personal hatred of Sir George Barlow *, and of some

* Lord Minto has, in his letter to the secret committee, noticed this feeling, as forming a strong and operative principle of action in the minds of these infatuated men.

officers on the general staff who were supposed to be his chief advisers. This feeling had latterly absorbed every other. From indulging it, they persuaded themselves that they were compelled to the indefensible extremes they had adopted, and thus found an alleviation of that misery in which a sense of guilt had involved them. It would be difficult to state the objects which men acting under the dominion of such passions had in view. They, in fact, did not well know themselves what they desired: but there were, I believe, very few among this class even, so completely unreasonable, as to approve of that paper called *the Ultimatum*, which the officers of the Hyderabad force had the presumption to send to Government.

Such was the diversified temper of the numerous officers of the Company's army on the coast when the test was proposed for universal subscription. In describing that measure, it is perhaps more essential to attend to the mode in which it was carried into execution, than its substance. The Government of Fort St. George had, in consequence of the information which I gave them from Masulipatam*, assembled a field force near Madras. The majority of this camp was formed of his Majesty's troops; but the junior officers of the Company's troops, who composed a part of this corps, were men of whose violence, in whatever situation they were placed, Government could entertain no apprehension†; and every thing might have been expected, under the slightest management, from their good sense and moderation. Sir George Barlow, it is true, sent for some of these officers, and appeared to treat them with confidence in some discussions he had with them on the state of the army: but one fact will suffice to show the character of this confidence, and

* Vide Appendix.

† The names of the principal of these officers, Colonel Clarke, Colonel Rumball, Colonel Floyer, Major Russel, and Captain Noble, will be received by all parties as full evidence of the truth of this assertion.

the general impressions which his conduct on this occasion was likely to make. Lieutenant-Colonel Rumley (who commanded the native cavalry at the Mount, and was one of those respectable officers who were honoured with his confidence,) received, during this period, an extraordinary communication from Major Russel, of an attempt to excite the native officers of the cavalry against their European commanders. It appears of importance to insert this written report, as drawn up by the Major himself. It is as follows :

“ On the afternoon of the 23d ultimo, Secunder Khan
 “ Sulahdar came to me, on my return from Madras to
 “ camp, and said he had been very anxious to see me for
 “ several hours, as something of a very extraordinary
 “ nature had occurred. That walking in the vicinity of
 “ the lines he had been accosted by a brahmin, who asked
 “ him if he was not the senior officer of cavalry, and said
 “ he had business of the greatest importance to communi-
 “ cate to him. He then proceeded to disclose to him,
 “ that he had been sent by Colonel Munro to inform the
 “ native troops that their officers had sent in a petition to
 “ Sir George Barlow to be put on Bengal allowance,
 “ which Sir George had informed them the resources of
 “ this country would not admit ; and, in consequence of
 “ this refusal, they had resolved to mutiny : that in case
 “ the officers should propose to engage them in seizing
 “ the person of Sir George, it was their duty to say he
 “ was then Governor, and that they would not act in such
 “ a cause. The only way, *he further said, in which the*
 “ *demand of the officers could be complied with, was by*
 “ *taking away a proportion of the pay of the native*
 “ *officers and men.* That if Secunder Khan would under-
 “ take to persuade all the men and officers to act in this
 “ manner, he should receive a handsome pagheer : and
 “ he was further informed, that Colonel Munro had dis-

“patched emissaries or letters to communicate the same to all the native corps in the army. That he had no occasion to apprehend injury from any one, as he might observe Sir George had suspended every person who acted in opposition to his wishes*.”

Colonel Rumley was naturally indignant at a proceeding which he was convinced (from the whole behaviour of Sir George Barlow) could not have his sanction, and which he deemed, at the moment, to be an impolitic and dangerous expedient of a person who, enjoying a large share of his confidence, might have acted on this occasion without his knowledge. With these impressions, he hastened to give full information of the circumstance to Sir George Barlow; but his report was received without either emotion or surprise; and he was forced to conclude, from no notice being taken of it, that the measure of which he complained had been adopted by authority. The circumstance became public after Colonel Rumley returned to camp, and the minds of most of the officers were greatly inflamed at this glaring instance of what they deemed unmanly duplicity.

A short account of the mode in which the test was proposed to the officers at Fort St. George and the camp near the Mount, will convey, better than any general detail, the character of the measure. The following is a copy of that remarkable document:—

“We, the undersigned officers of the Honourable Company’s service, do in the most solemn manner declare, upon our word and honour † as British officers, that we

* Emissaries of a similar character were at and before this period sent to all the native corps.

† Government could not have supposed men very deep in guilt, upon whose solemn assurance that they would fulfil the obligation of their commissions such reliance was to be placed. It was evident, that had they cherished any serious designs against their country, or any of its constituted authorities, they would not have hazarded the failure of their schemes by sticking at the little additional guilt that would have attended the breach of any test so forced upon their acceptance, they

“ will obey the orders and support the authority of the
 “ Honourable the Governor in Council of Fort St. George,
 “ agreeable to the tenor of the commission which we hold
 “ from that Government.”

This test was sent to the commanding officer of the forces assembled at Fort St. George and the Mount, and it was accompanied by a circular letter to the commanding officers of divisions, which was read to the officers of the Company's service before their signature was required.

The substance of this letter was an order to assemble the Company's officers at each station, to propose the test to them, and instantly to remove from their corps all such as declined to sign it. They were directed to be sent to such stations as the commanding officer chose, and that they should there receive their allowances until the situation of affairs and the temper of their minds should admit of their being employed with advantage to the state.

This was, it must be recollected, the first public appeal that had been made to the officers of the Company's service by the Government of Madras since the orders of the 1st of May: and it certainly was not of a character calculated to flatter the feelings of those to whom it was addressed. It spoke to their sense of duty, and pride as officers: but in the same breath told them they were not trusted, and that they were to be coerced into order and submission. The high praises that were given in this letter to the fidelity and loyalty of his Majesty's troops were perfectly just, but quite unnecessary, as far as regarded the allegiance and obedience of that part of the service: and could there-

would have signed, and watched the opportunity of executing their plans. But of this there was no apprehension: they were well-qualified, at the moment this pledge was presented to be men of honour, and aware to all the obligations that word implied. And even if it is argued that men with such feelings, were not to be used for such a duty, or removed from it by other means than such as *almost impossible* is to be *compelled* to sign, as by it only they could avoid the reproach of having been separated, alarmed, and coerced into a promise to perform duties which they owed to the state they served.

fore serve no purpose but to exasperate the feelings of the officers of the Company's army. But the mode in which this measure was carried into execution was the most characteristic of the Government by whom it was adopted, and of itself was sufficient to account for its complete failure, and indeed to make it very doubtful if it ever was wished or intended that it should succeed.

No previous effort whatever was made to dispose the minds of the senior and more reflecting part of the Company's officers in favour of this measure, though such a step (which could have been adopted in many ways without the slightest hazard) seemed essential to its success. A short and peremptory summons was sent to every Company's officer of the garrison of Fort St. George, to attend at the quarters of Colonel Conran, the commanding officer. That officer read the circular letter to which I have alluded to the astonished officers whom he had assembled; and then, presenting the test, informed them they must either sign immediately, or go to Pulicat, the place fixed for their banishment. Can any man the least acquainted with the human mind be surprised, that an almost general and indignant rejection was the result of such a proceeding? Five regimental officers only could be prevailed upon to sign it at this meeting; and the remainder were immediately sent to Pulicat*. At the Mount the rejection was still more general. Colonel Hare had the day before removed his tents across the bridge of Mammalon, where all the officers were summoned at an equally short notice. When Colonel Hare read the circular letter, presented the test for signature, and told them that those who refused their signature would not be allowed to return to camp, they refused with one general sentiment of indignation at

* Captain Moodie, the commanding officer, and almost all the officers of the first battalion of the 6th regiment, were among this number, though that corps had, up to this date, been remarkable for never having joined in any one of the guilty or objectionable measures of the army. It was a sense of their past conduct that made such treatment more denigratory.

the manner in which they had been treated, and were immediately separated from their corps*.

The test was signed by all the staff-officers at the Presidency, and by some officers who were there on leave: at Trichinopoly twenty-two signed it, but few others at any other station of the army. In short, the whole number of signatures did not amount to one hundred out of about one thousand two hundred, which is near the number of officers on the coast establishment in India.

The almost total failure of this expedient (if it ever was intended to reclaim or fix any officers in the Company's service to their duty,) will not surprise any man the least acquainted with human nature, and with the temper of those to whom the measure was proposed. Those officers, who had never departed from their duty in thought, word, or deed, felt this test, which was a mere repetition of the obligation of their commission, as at least an act of superelevation: and it was painful, as it had a taint of suspicion in it. Others, who were in some degree pledged to support their brother officers, conceived that this was an indirect mode of obtaining their individual pledges to act against them; and concluded, from its being proposed, that every hope of an amnesty was at an end†: whilst the more violent only saw in it the pursuit of plans which banished every expectation from their minds of obtaining

* The senior Company's officer at this meeting was Colonel Clarke, commanding the artillery, who was known to be exempt even from suspicion of any share whatever in the violent proceedings of a part of the army, and had been recently selected on that ground to command at the Mount. Was it not natural that a sense of his own conduct should have led this honourable officer to reject with indignation a proposition made in a mode so insulting to his feelings as a man and an officer.

† To many of this class it must have been an agreeable release from the rigid obligations of their commission. It offered a temporary retirement from their duty to the state, and, in doing so, changed in some degree the *character of that duty*. By signing the test they became volunteers against men whose guilt they had to a certain extent shared, and had no longer, to support their minds in so trying a situation, that plea of indispensable necessity which their commission imposed.

personal security, much less the object they had in view, through any means but successful resistance.

The most moderate among these officers argued, that no opportunity whatever had been given to the Company's army of retrieving itself; and, guilty as it might have been, they said the memory of its former fame merited some consideration; and an appeal to its loyalty and duty, combined with an act of amnesty, would, they thought, if it had been made to the officers of the Company's army with that confidence which inspires attachment, have secured the fidelity of a great part of them: and if it had been possible for Government to have gone further, and to have promised, "that in the event of the conduct of the
" army meriting such favour, they would recommend the
" case of the officers who had been suspended to the in-
" dulgent consideration of the Court of Directors*," they were confident all would have been reclaimed to their duty. But had efforts so worthy, in their opinion, of the clemency and greatness of Government failed in bringing all to reason, they would have acted with the most ardent zeal against men whom they should in such event not only have considered as rebels to their country, but as destroyers of the reputation of the army to which they belonged. There can be no doubt these were the sentiments of many respectable officers of rank and influence: and had Government adopted, on the 26th of July, any such measures of conciliation, it would have been completely successful; and not only the hazard of a contest, but all those disastrous consequences which were certain to be the inevitable consequence of complete success, would have been avoided. And can there be a doubt in the mind of any rational being but it might have taken such a line, at the very moment that which has been described was adopted, without any

* This was the substance of the order that I recommended to be issued at this period, the principle of which has been so arranged by the Government of Fort St. George. A copy of this order is inserted in the Appendix.

substantial sacrifice of either its strength or dignity, and certainly with the greatest benefit to the interests of the British nation in India?

The measure that was taken was supposed, by almost all the discontented, to be a completion of that design which the Government of Fort St. George had from the first (they conceived) entertained, of relying solely on the King's troops; and they concluded, from the substance as well as the mode in which the step taken on the 26th of July was carried into execution, that the Company's military establishment on the coast was meant to be destroyed at the first blow; and all were therefore included in one general mass, as fit objects of suspicion and disgrace.

Government had, no doubt, a right to expect success in the execution of this measure; it had a just reliance on the fidelity and attachment of his Majesty's troops. A few regiments, who composed part of the British army, could not have joined in such a confederacy without incurring certain and indelible disgrace: and it had been the policy of the Government of Fort St. George, from the first appearance of dissatisfaction and discontent, to court the allegiance and flatter the feelings of this branch of the service. And though no man can calculate the temper that was lost, or the consequent evils that have been produced by this proceeding, the limited object was undoubtedly attained.

Sir George Barlow appears to have had great confidence in the attachment of the native troops to Government; which, I believe, he always thought was paramount to their attachment to their European officers: and this was consequently calculated upon as one great means of carrying his measures into prompt and successful execution; but certainly the fulfilment of this hope depended upon the course pursued by the European officers who commanded these men. There could be no ground to make such a conclusion upon any general principles applicable to military bodies, and much less so from the constitution, character, or history of the native branch of the military

establishment in India. The difficulty that a body of officers have in any service, is to keep soldiers to their duty : there is little in debauching them from it. They are led by example : and to follow that of their officers, is both a principle and a habit. The native troops of India are perhaps more attached to their European officers than any others. These officers are to them the only representatives they know of the Government they serve ; they are the sole link in the chain of their attachment ; and, with rare exceptions, their men are completely devoted to them. The Governor might, perhaps, expect, that though this feeling would operate in the first instance, it would soon give way to a fear of losing all those solid benefits that the service of the Company offers ; and that the sepoys would never continue to attach their fortunes to so desperate a cause as that of the officers must soon appear. This is a natural conduct for a sensible and reflecting man : but do soldiers think, or reflect deeply ? Would not the increased pay which their officers (if they were serious in rebellion) would be likely to give, or, what is still more attractive to men like them, a latitude to plunder, have more effect than twenty proclamations to recall them to their duty. Besides, had this dreadful contest continued, the passions would have had their way, and a few months might have changed the character of our native soldiery, and rendered them more formidable than all the enemies we ever had to encounter in India.

It will at least appear, from what has been said on the subject, that Government had no right to look to the fidelity and attachment of the native troops, as a certain means of coercing their European officers to obedience. But the fact was, that the sure ground of success, and that on which the Government had more right to calculate (when it resorted to extremes,) than all others put together, was the action of the virtuous feelings and loyal principles of the Company's officers themselves, and the total want of object, accord and combination, in the execution of the

indigested plans of the most violent. It was well known that many of those officers had never brought their minds to contemplate disobedience to the state : and the most guilty even, at first proceeded on the idea that such an extreme would never occur. They certainly had hoped that Government would yield, to avoid it : and when they latterly found that result was not likely, they shuddered at the crisis which they had precipitated. They had no object in view that could justify to their own minds the extremes in which they were involved ; they found themselves on the point of being placed in the situation of rebels, with minds altogether unsuited to act that part which can alone give a hope of success to the cause of rebellion. They could not (violent as they were against the Governor of Madras and some others) bring their minds to believe they were enemies to a revered King and beloved country ; and they consequently wished to reconcile the incompatible principles of opposition to the local Government, with a spirit of fidelity to their employers, and loyalty to their sovereign. There could be no doubt of their sincerity in these feelings : and, from the clashing of such opposite principles of action, Government had a right to expect irresolution, division, and distraction in their councils and measures. It was certain that many would not join in any act of disobedience, and that those who ventured on opposition would proceed with alarm ; and every moment of reflection would make them view with increased horror the guilt in which they were involved, and produce a wavering and hesitation that must soon have the effect of losing them the confidence of their followers and of each other.

Under such circumstances, there could be little doubt of the ultimate success of Government in the measures adopted for subduing the refractory European officers of the army. We shall now examine the dangers by which these measures were likely to be attended. These were

numerous, and all of an alarming political magnitude*. The greatest, was the shock which was given by this proceeding to that attachment between the European officer and the natives under his command, which, from the first establishment of the Company in India to the present moment, had been looked upon as one of the principal, if not the chief, sources of our strength in India. This body of officers has been hitherto justly considered as the great means by which British India was conquered, and by whose fidelity, knowledge and courage, it was to be maintained. They were comparatively a few persons, through whom a large foreign army was not only disciplined, but attached to the present state. Their station was one of more than ordinary trust, their duties very sacred, and they had for a long period of years been distinguished by the manner in which these had been performed. A part

* I might fill a volume if I were to enter into any general reasoning on the vital wound given to military subordination by this measure. The relation of the private soldier to the subaltern has been well termed the key-stone of the arch: an army may survive any other change, but to disturb that relation, is to dissolve the whole: here begins the obedience of the many to the few. In civil society, this problem appears of difficult solution: but there, it is the obedience of the dispersed and unarmed many, it is rare, and in well regulated communities almost unfelt. In military bodies it is the hourly obedience, even to death, of the armed and embodied many. The higher links which bind subalterns to their superior, and these to one chief, are only the obedience of the few to the fewer, and these fewer to one. These relations are easily intelligible. Honor, and obvious interest, are sufficient to account for these: and as a reproach they sustain can be repaired. But the obedience of the whole body of officers to their immediate officers, is that which forms an army, and cannot be touched without the utmost danger of total destruction. It was upon this act of the French Assembly that Burke observed, "They have begun by a most terrible operation, they have touched the central point, about which patches that compose armies are at repose, they have destroyed the principle of obedience on the great essential critical link between the officer and the soldier, just where the chain of military subordination commences, and on which the whole of that system depends." Sir George Barlow, it has been forcibly remarked, could discover no other mode of suppressing a *rebellion* of officers than by exciting a *mutiny* of soldiers.

of them had been seduced, and misled into error, and ultimately hurried away, by their passion and resentment against individuals in authority, to the most criminal extremes. They certainly had merited, in the strictness of military law, the most serious punishment; and it was, no doubt, as far as the principles of that law were concerned, most desirable, for the sake of example, that punishment should be inflicted, particularly as those officers had in this instance endeavoured to pervert that complete obedience which their men owed them, into an engine of faction and revolt; and to render the attachment of those under their command, which had been so long considered the safety of their country, its future bane and danger. That any body of officers should have, or conceive they had, the power of furthering their own views or interests by means so desperate, and so entirely subversive of the foundations of all order and government, was, no doubt, an evil of great magnitude: but it should have been recollected, that the connexion between the native soldiers and their European officers is the cherished plant of a hundred years: and before we can account those men wise who laid the axe to its trunk, it must be proved that the existing spirit of insubordination among the European officers was attended with dangers as imminent and as incapable of remedy, as the evil that has been embraced by the deliberate dissolution of this great bond of our strength and safety. Some persons, who refer to a former occasion * on which the Indian army are supposed in some degree to have overawed the Government into a redress of their grievances, and viewing only one side of this great question, may argue, that it was rather desirable to adopt a measure that would prevent the European officers from having such reliance on the support of their men, and teach the latter that they have a duty paramount even to their obedience to their officers, in that which they owe the state: but it is a great

* 1794 and 1795.

fallacy to conceive that such a feeling can ever exist as an operative principle in the minds of such a class of men; and if it did, it must weaken a devotion and attachment that are quite essential to the preservation of our power in India*.

The next positive evil that was certain to attend this course of measure, was the destruction of that harmony which it had been the labour of years to introduce and maintain between his Majesty's and the Company's service, and which had so greatly contributed to our military successes in India. It could hardly be expected that these would (for some years at least) serve together again with those sentiments towards each other which before inspired them: and nothing can be so dangerous to our interests in India, as feelings of irritation and jealousy being kindled betwixt the two services. Those who have cast away this harmony, which has so long been deemed one of the chief sources of our permanent strength, would perhaps see more security to the Government of India in an irreconcilable division between the King's and Company's troops. But there is no danger of an error, in predicting that the date of our rule over India will be short, if our Government in that quarter can only be supported by such weak and wretched expedients as that of keeping up a principle of division among its own officers.

The last positive and immediate evil which could not but attend this measure, was that effect which it was calculated to produce among the natives of all ranks and

* There can be no doubt of the truth of the observation which a great and well-informed statesman formerly made upon this question. "The European character in India" (Lord Melville observes in one of his letters to the Court of Directors) "cannot be raised too high. If the natives should be accustomed to look upon persons in the British service with indifference and contempt, they will rapidly annihilate our Empire there, and with it the very few Europeans by whom that country is held in subjection." If this is true of Europeans in general, and our Indian subjects, with what particular force must it apply to the relations between the sepoy and his European commander!

classes. Our strength in India has hitherto greatly rested upon the supposed impossibility of any civil commotion among ourselves: and the dissolution of this charm will give rise to a thousand doubts regarding the stability of our power; and, in all human probability, excite ambitious projects to assail it. This effect is of a magnitude that in itself required every exertion should be made to avoid an extreme that could not but make so general and dangerous an impression regarding the character of our power in India. It must show our enemies in that quarter that we are not exempt (as it has long been believed we were) from those internal divisions and civil wars which have accelerated the fate of the other conquerors of the East*.

There is one more consideration connected with this question. The comparative safety which appeared in the gradual removal of those radical causes which created a spirit of discontent, over a system of harsh coercion under the most unfavourable circumstances that could be supposed, whether we consider the situation of Government or the army. It is not necessary in this place to detail all those

* The most violent even among the officers were so alarmed at the evil this impression must produce to their country, that they carefully avoided, till the last extremity, any mention of it to the natives under their command: not, I am satisfied, from any fear of failing in their efforts to debase them from their duty, but from a deep sense of the danger of such a communication: and those who believe that the defeat of this confederacy through the means adopted will for ever prevent the occurrence of a similar evil, should recollect, that it is just as likely to have an opposite effect, and to render that evil, if brought on by similar causes, far more dangerous. The European officers may, in their next quarter with their local Government, be taught by this failure to league with the native officers, and to hold out advantages to them that will secure their most zealous co-operation, and such a conspiracy would lose India. It is dangerous even to hold an opinion that this Empire can be preserved by any means but the action of a wise, temperate, and just Government, which, though firm and powerful, must rule its British subjects with the greatest attention to those habits and principles which are, from the form and character of the constitution under which they are born, inherent in their nature, and which can never be disregarded or offended without a danger of secession or convulsion.

causes. One of them, which excited great discontent (though certainly not rebellion), was undoubtedly that system of reduction which at this time threatened to leave the Company's officers in India without a motive of action. They saw (at the period of its progress) no prospect of any alteration in their condition that would, by elevating the service and facilitating their return to their native country, make amends for what they lost; and their minds gave way to greater despair, from an impression that those who *they believed* were founding their fortune and reputation on the reduction of their allowances, took no interest in obtaining any advantages to counterbalance what was taken from them. This grievance, unallayed by a hope of redress, had an effect upon the general temper of the army that merited the greatest attention.

But the fact is, the Government of Fort St. George never appear to have taken any view of this subject, that comprehended those considerations which have been stated. They seem to have decided every question, as it arose, upon its own narrow ground, and to have always been fettered in the forms of their own proceedings'. The order for the imposition of the test which was pre-

* As a proof of this, the following fact will suffice. At the period the test was promulgated, a direct correspondence, in the native language, was opened by the chief civil and military officers of Government with the native officers. This was equally maintained with those corps, the European officers of whom remained firm in their duty, as others, and a respectable Company's officer—who had signed the test, and was commanding a corps at Madras (on his senior subahdar bringing him letters of this description, which he had received,) made a representation of the circumstance, but was reprimanded for doing so, and told it was a general rule, from which it was not deemed proper to make any deviation. If it had been desirable to make any communications in the native languages to the men, such could as readily have been forwarded to the European officer in command, and the principles of military discipline observed; but an observance of the general rule was the point to which *importance was attached*, even in a case where the operation was *admitted* to be baneful, and consequently where the more *limited* that was, the better for the public interests.

scribed to the Company's officers, was positive, and vested no discretion. In stations where the superiority of his Majesty's troops was decided, this character of the order could do no mischief: but few of those acquainted with the circumstances can doubt, that to the wisdom and forbearance of Lieutenant-Colonel the Honourable Patrick Stuart, of his Majesty's 19th regiment, who took upon himself to suspend the execution of this positive order, and to give time for the action of reason upon minds under the sole dominion of passion, may be attributed not only the safety of that corps, but the tranquillity of Travancore. A similar conduct was observed by Lieutenant-Colonel Forbes, of his Majesty's 80th regiment, who commanded in Malabar: and by Colonel Gibbs, of the 59th regiment, at Bangalore: and the evidence of these respectable officers must be conclusive with regard to the actual temper of the Company's officers under their command, on the day they received the orders of the 26th July, and prove to the most incredulous, how easily men under the influence of such feelings as they describe, might have been reclaimed by means far short of that baneful measure which was adopted.

The force at Hyderabad continued but a short period in a state of resistance; and they committed no act of violence. The impression which Colonel Close's effort (though unsuccessful at the moment) had made upon both the minds of European officers and natives, the effect produced by the perusal of an order issued by Lord Minto on the 20th of July, and the knowledge that his lordship was hourly expected at Madras, deprived rebellion of its chief motive—personal hatred to Sir George Barlow. And these circumstances, aided by the unremitted conciliatory efforts of the commanding officer, Colonel Montresor, and the Resident, Captain Sydenham, made a complete change in the sentiments of this corps, who upon the 12th of August signed the test: and as their example encouraged many corps of the army, but particularly those that formed the

garrison of Seringapatam, in a rebellious resistance to Government, their defection from the cause put an end to this horrid and unnatural contest : and Lord Minto, who arrived a few days after this event, found a complete and unreserved submission to his authority. Had he arrived a month earlier, he would have saved an army from disgrace and ruin : and as it was, it is not easy to calculate the good which his presence effected : but it is not unreasonable to conclude, that the report even of his approach went farther to terminate the partial rebellion that had occurred, than all the violence of the Madras Government.

The whole of these proceedings ought to be held in constant remembrance by all parties in future times. “ As they have existed for our shame, they ought to exist for our instruction *.”

“ The officers of the Indian army they are awfully instructed. They will not consider a few remarks on the subject as unbecoming in one who has been in the service for near twenty-eight years ; who came into the world in childhood ; whose fortune and character have been formed with those whose action and pride have been so deeply interested in their repu-

“ If they dispassionately consider these events, they will clearly perceive the danger of the first approaches towards a military combination, intended only to solicit a Government, but necessarily tending to influence, to overawe, and to coerce it. The purity of intention affords no security against this progress. Men who deliberate and confederate with arms in their hands soon become impatient of the slow course of redress by regular means. Indignant at refusals, or even delays, which they deem unjust, they become familiar with the dangerous idea of seeking more summary justice. They assemble, their passions are kindled by communication of grievances, they are emboldened by a

* Burke.

sense of collective strength, and proceed from solicitations to threats, disguised (from the great majority of those that use them) in the form of predictions apparently flowing from an anxious desire to avert the evils foretold.

Such addresses bring upon them censure and harsh imputation, which they resent the more because they are not yet distinctly conscious of intentions which merit them. Their language becomes still more indecorous and violent ; and some of their most conspicuous leaders are punished. They have then unhappily placed themselves in a situation where they are pushed forward on the road of guilt by the most virtuous impulses of the human heart—fidelity towards each other, honourable attachment to the distinguished members of their body become sufferers in their cause, and indignation against what they (under the influence of self-delusion) regard as insupportable tyranny, impel them onward with irresistible force. Youth, with all its generous feelings, its inexperience and its impetuosity, assumes the lead in their councils. The prudent and the moderate are either banished as traitors, or compelled to be instruments of the more inconsiderate and daring. They find that they have forfeited all expectation of a tolerable pardon. They see no hopes of safety but in victory ; and they are hurried on by fear and despair, as well as anger and resentment, to rebellion.

Thus terminates in guilt the progress of men who begin with innocence and honour ; and of whom each, if the termination had been foretold even when he was far advanced in impropriety, might with sincerity have exclaimed, “ *Is thy servant a dog, that he should do this great thing ?* ”

Any event of such a rebellion would be most unfortunate to those engaged in it, but success would be the greater misfortune, and indeed the most severe punishment with which the justice of Providence could visit their guilt.

Success would every where be a dreadful calamity to a body of British officers betrayed into military rebellion

against the civil authorities of their country. Their success would be the destruction of every source and guard of their own security, and of every thing of which the defence peculiarly ennobles and endears the profession of arms to a British soldier. In India, however, this misfortune of success would have very bitter aggravations. As soon as British officers had oppressed the lawful authority, they would quickly discover what, in the tumult of dissension, their passions had concealed from them, that they had, though unknowingly, raised their arms against their country, which must espouse the cause of her delegated authorities*. They would thus be proscribed and exiled by a country, the hope of revisiting which is the basis of every plan and expectation of their lives.

Apprehending mutiny among their soldiers, revolt among their subjects, irruption from their Asiatic neighbours, or conquest by some European state, no longer guarded by their own country, but the objects of her just hostility, they would find themselves alone and unprotected in the world. In this friendless situation they could be supported by no generous enthusiasm, the child of patriotism and honour, which could awaken no feeling in their bosom but shame and remorse. Their numbers could only be kept up by adventurers, the refuse of the military profession in Europe. The civil wars, inevitable in such a state of things, would be not so much the consummation of their evils, as a refuge from such intolerable calamities.

Happily for the British officers in India, (I speak not paradoxically, but considerably,) no such calamity is pro-

* These are not sentiments formed on a contemplation of the result of the disturbances. I presented a similar picture of their situation to the decided officers at Masnupatan, and circulated a letter containing all the substance of these reflections to the army previous to the occurrence of any deliberate opposition to Government. Vide Appendix, Letter to Lieutenant-Colonel McLeod.

hable. They are sure of being haunted by so many "compunctious visitings of nature," from the thoughts of their friends, of their Sovereign, of their beloved country, as to impair that criminal energy necessary for the success of desperate enterprizes. Their's is not a country, or a state of manners, or a system of religion and morality, which trains men to revolutionary sternness and ferocity. Their failure was, and ever will be, certain. But such convulsions bring dreadful consequences :—the loss of that collective character which was the source of pride to each individual, long regret and remorse, their hearts taught to dread generous and social feeling ; and the most distinguished of them, if not condemned to death, still more unhappily abandoned to a dishonourable life.

In their native land they will meet little or none of that sympathy which supports the sufferers for a general cause. Their discontent appears to spring only from the most ignoble sources. Those who have not visited India will not easily conceive that a pecuniary retrenchment is chiefly felt (*which it really is*) as a degradation, by an army already sufficiently excluded from the higher rewards of valour : first shut out from military honours, and then from that compensation for them which they had found in the prospect of returning home to the exercise of generous virtue. Last, and worst of all, they find that their more glaring and dangerous guilt has almost effaced the remembrance of that misconduct which produced it, and given popularity and character to those they deem their enemies.

To the British Governments of India these deplorable occurrences are not less fertile in instruction. They will learn, that to preserve the obedience of a military body, exiled almost for life in a distant dependency, to civil bodies who are the temporary delegates of a Commercial Company, is one of the most difficult problems of policy : that such obedience is not always to be preserved by a rigid adherence to official rules, nor restored by undi-

tinguishing obstinacy clothed in the garb of firmness. They will be taught by high authority, "*how much ought to be done to avert a contest in which concession does not find its place.*"

They will feel, that the difficulty of their policy respecting the army will always be increased at moments when the necessities of the state require extensive retrenchments. A wise Government will prepare the way for such retrenchments, by evidently showing that they are necessary, and that they are equitably imposed on all classes: they will not disdain more particularly to satisfy those distinguished members of an army, whose influence over their brethren is a principle of natural discipline. They will redouble their vigilance to distribute military honours and rewards with the strictest equity; and they will be solicitous to display the appearance as well as the reality of kindness towards the individuals of a body who are about to suffer.

When the passions of the moment have subsided, no man will believe that a Governor, confessedly unpopular,†, introducing or maintaining systems of retrenchment, necessary indeed, but most severe, and without preparation, without public precaution or private conciliation, did not, by these circumstances, most materially contribute to the unhappy crisis which followed. The total omission of all those means which make reformation popular, or even tolerable, will assuredly be regarded as a great political offence. It will be considered as ridiculous to call for particular proof that a cold and unfeeling manner tended to make privations be felt as insults. No man of common sense will doubt that a popular Governor may reconcile men to retrenchments, which, under a Governor of an opposite character, may produce the most fatal effects. A recent example might be found at no great distance from Madras, (if any examples of what is so obvious were

* Lord Minto.

† Vide Lord Minto's dispatch.

necessary,) of a Governor * who had imposed greater retrenchments than Sir George Barlow, and who, without any sacrifice of dignity, left his government, universally beloved. But it will not be doubted that the Government of Madras thus contributed their share towards maturing the discontents of the army previous to the orders of General McDowall. Still less can it be doubted, that by the suspension of Colonel Capper and Major Boles the spark was struck out which fell on the combustible materials.

In the circumstances of the case, and after the restoration of the surviving officer by his superiors, it is very mild language to call this suspension an act of very doubtful justice. And it is most certain, that an act of authority so harsh, and of such doubtful justice, against officers who had such a fair appearance of mere military obedience, and whose very fault, if they had one, must have sprung from a zeal for military privileges, was of a nature to vibrate through every nerve of an army. When the Government once did an act which made two officers of rank at least appear to suffer unjustly for the army, they entirely changed the character of the disputes. They drove the generosity, honour, and justice of the army into rebellion. They supplied the discontented with the colour of right, without which no leaders are ever able to seduce multitudes to resistance. They exalted pecuniary grievances into the feelings of generous sympathy and wounded honour. They made it be thought disgraceful to abstain from taking a part in a combination to prevent injustice. The moderate, the disinterested, the loyal, even the timid and circumspect, were forced into opposition,—by shame, by fear, by sympathy, by that tumultuous combination of causes, generous and mean, which recruit the ranks of insurgents, and change the murmurs of a few into the mutinous clamour of the many. Whatever the evil in-

* General Martland, late Governor of Ceylon

tentions of a few may be, it is always an act of real or supposed injustice which throws the multitude into the hands of the ill-affected leaders. Before the suspension there existed only discontents ; after it, general disaffection, conspiracy, and sedition.

The necessity of vesting the power of dismissing or suspending officers in the Government will never be questioned by thinking men : but when it is considered, that the operation of the general orders of the 1st of May was, considering the rank and number of the suspended officers, not a much less exertion of authority than if his Majesty were to strike a tenth part of his general officers out of the list of the army, it will not be wondered that this example of the precarious and degraded tenure by which military rank was held, should have diffused universal dismay, and reinforced resentment by despair.

The dispassionate observer, after remarking with wonder that every expedient was omitted or rejected which could detach the misguided from the ill-affected, or open a creditable retreat for the penitent, will pause before the sword was drawn, to consider whether general submission would then have been too dearly purchased by an amnesty which should not have excluded from hope even the officers suspended on the 1st of May.

It will be acknowledged, that the example of a sedition proceeding so far without punishment, is an evil : but it was to be balanced against other evils ;—against the calamities of civil war ; against the mischief of rendering one part of our military force in India the enemies of the other : against the evils of a victory which must be gained over the spirit of the army, and consequently over the strength of the Government.

It will be considered, whether a measure, *not of concession, but of conciliation**, offered a prospect of greater evils

* These words have been, in the course of the discussion regarding the disturbances at Madras, as they were during their existence, greatly distorted

than a plan of division, such as Machiavelian politicians have sometimes employed against the public enemy ;—but which was now to be, for the first time, employed against the only safeguard of the state :—a plan to make the King's troops look down on the Company's with the proud contempt of conquerors, and the Company's army feel towards the King's all the mortified pride and secret indignation natural to the vanquished : a plan for suppressing a rebellion of European officers by clandestinely instigating a mutiny of native soldiers against them : a plan for securing the Government by dividing and dispiriting the army, and for founding general tranquillity upon a monstrous balance of officers against soldiers, and of one army against another.

It will be ascribed to the unbending temper of Sir George Barlow, that he did not perceive the probability of amnesty being at length granted, after open resistance, by the humanity of the British Administration in India and England, almost as general as that of which, before the sword was drawn, he treated the proposal as every thing but a crime.

Future Governments will not be insensible to the dreadful dangers which have been feared, even if the character of British officers should prevent the threatened evils from being realized : and they will see, that though the policy

from their simple and plain meaning. *Compassion, I conceive,* is to grant the original and substantial object of the demands made by the victorious army. To have restored the tent contract, to have promised an effort to obtain an equalization of their allowances with the officers of Bengal, would have been concessions—but if the exercise of a generous clemency, in pardoning those who had offended in a moment of general indignity, and to have held out hope to others of even deeper guilt, be deemed *concessions* which a Government *cannot make*, there can be no such thing as conciliation *in act* : and as to the profession of kindness and consideration, when the conduct observed by the ruling power is inflexible and severe in its measures, it can have no effect but that of aggravating men's feelings into greater crime.

of Great Britain has supported the cause of authority, yet her equitable benevolence has virtually disavowed these measures, by interposing to repair their harsher consequences.

POSTSCRIPT.

AFTER I had written these observations on the late disturbances at Madras, I perused a very able and ingenious article in the ninth number of the Quarterly Review, upon that subject. The first part of that article explains the progress of the violent proceedings of the Company's officers engaged in those disturbances, and enters into very full discussions to prove and establish the fact of their guilt. In almost all this part my sentiments differ little from those of the reviewer. I do not, however, agree with the opinions he has stated on the case of Lieutenant-Colonel Munro. He conceives, that if Government had allowed that officer to have been tried by a court martial, it would have been a base desertion, and a sacrifice of a public servant. I trust I have shown, that although Government had a *full legal right* to act as they did, a contrary conduct might have been adopted without any such desertion or sacrifice, and with every prospect of advantage to the public interests.

The reviewer dwells throughout the article upon the crude and violent Memorial to Lord Minto, and assumes, with great advantage to his argument, that it may be taken as a fair specimen of the sentiments of all the discontented officers at Madras. He is probably ignorant of the comparatively small number of those officers who approved of this intemperate production. He cannot, I think, be aware, that many of those whom he has blended in his general censure, merely because they were blended in the undistinguishing proscription of the Government of Fort St. George, never saw that document till it was published.

I have, in my observations on the disturbances at Madras, said little on the question of the suspension of Colonel Capper and Major Boles; but I conceive all that the reviewer has said upon that subject will be deemed by those who consider it attentively,

as more ingenious than solid. The whole of that discussion would appear to resolve itself into a very short question. The act of disobedience to his superior, in a military officer or soldier, can alone be justified in a case where the civil law would punish his obedience. A great deal must of course be decided by the circumstances of the moment. "To your tents, O Israel!" would, in the present state of Great Britain, be an unobjectionable text. It certainly was not so in the reign of Charles the First. But we have only to suppose Major Boles on his trial before a civil court, for publishing, or aiding in the publication, of a seditious libel. Among the circumstances to be considered in such a case, that prompt and undeiberate obedience which it is the habit of an officer to give to the order of his superiors, would assuredly be one of the most prominent, and an English jury would, I imagine, be slow in condemning an officer situated as Major Boles was. They would probably think, that the great and vital principle of prompt obedience, on which the existence of that armed force which guarded the civil community depended, was of too important and sacred a nature to have its plain meaning frittered away by casuists and lawyers. These reflections would certainly lead plain men to decide, that we ought not to refine too much upon such delicate points, and that no military order should be disobeyed, the illegality of which was not of so obvious a nature as to be clear to the most common understanding. But, after all, the justice or injustice of this act of authority is but a small part of a very large question. The wisdom and policy of the measure, (which is the point on which the character of the Government of Fort St. George is chiefly concerned,) appear, however, to be given up even by those who are the warm advocates of many other parts of that system which was pursued.

The writer of the review traces what he deems an exact similarity of character between Sir George Barlow's measures and those adopted by Lord Clive, in 1766, to quell a sedition among the officers of the Bengal army; and infers, from a general and sweeping conclusion, that the reputation of these two Governors must stand or fall by the same arguments. To those who are satisfied with the superficial and general facts, — that both Lord Clive and Sir George Barlow exercised power in India, that there were

discontents and combinations among a part of the European officers of the native troops during their respective administrations, which terminated, on both occasions, in submission to authority,—the observation made in the Quarterly Review on this part of the subject will be satisfactory, and conclusive: but to such as examine the particulars of these two important events, and trace to its true cause the defection of the officers of the Bengal army in 1766, and then observe the open, military, and manly conduct of Lord Clive, there will appear much more grounds for a contrast than a comparison. The conduct of the officers of the Bengal army, their limited number, and the actual constitution of the native army * at that period of our dominion in India, make a still wider difference in all those considerations, that render the late measures of the Government of Madras, as they affect the personal attachment and fidelity of the sepoys to their European officers, dangerous to our future security. But supposing the difference in this respect did not exist, Lord Clive, when actually engaged in war, might have been compelled, by the conduct of officers, which the situation of affairs rendered doubly disgraceful, to adopt a measure that was most deeply injurious to those principles upon which our empire is founded. We have escaped this danger: but is that any reason for incurring a similar hazard? It has never been stated that the danger from weakening the respect and attachment of the sepoy for his officer was inevitable, and must be destructive to our power within a specific period. Its alarming tendency has been shown: and it is this which must be disproved, and the *absolute necessity* of having had resort to it established, before the course pursued

* The whole power was in the commanding officers of the sepoy battalion, and the native officers had much greater influence than the European subalterns of the corps. *The latter were not even attached to companies.* It has been the labour of near twenty years to supersede the effects of this system, which was deemed bad, and to transfer the influence formerly enjoyed by the native officers to the European: and the eagerness with which the native officers grasped at a prospect of reviving their power, though it might have had a favourable operation for Government under that desperate expedient to which they had resort, must have given rise to dangerous feelings, and produced jealousy and distrust in that important link between the European and native officers, where complete confidence and cordiality is most essential to our safety.

in this instance by the Government of Fort St. George can be efficiently defended.

The reviewer appears resolved to deny every fact that can even palliate the guilt of the officers of the Madras army. He terms their desire to submit to Lord Minto a difference in point of form, "a saving to their pride, not to their consciences," and he is amused with the assertion, that the love of their country had a decided operation in defeating their guilty proceedings. The man who reasons thus coolly upon such events, has probably never witnessed a scene at all resembling that of which he treats; or he would have discovered, that when passion seizes that ground which reason has abandoned, men act more under the influence of feelings than forms; and with minds deluded, but not debased, they make a vain attempt to reconcile the most opposite principles of conduct, and fall, *self-subdued*, by those virtues which are implanted too deeply in their hearts to be eradicated by the sudden action, however violent, or a guilty but transient impulse.

The able writer in the review conceives that he has at once discovered the chief cause of the late disturbances, and the best apology for the Company's officers concerned in them, in the constitution of the Company's service, and the habits of those that belong to it. The atmosphere they imbibe is calculated, in his opinion, to relax all just ideas of subordination, and they are, he infers, predisposed, from such causes, to an opposition to the authority placed over them. Some disposition to resistance may no doubt be found in every community, civil as well as military, that ever existed; and to the existence of this universal and natural feeling every excellence of human government may be traced. But let us suppose that this disposition had, from local circumstances and other causes, attained such a degree among the Company's officers in India, as to threaten the public tranquillity; what does this prove? It is, *if true to the extent stated in the review*, not an excuse for those who produced that crisis which has been described; but an clogum, and a very high one, upon the wisdom and vigour of those rulers of our Indian possessions, who have not only repressed this disposition to opposition, but have rendered those to whom it is ascribed the instruments of the advancement of the interests and glory of their

country: and a reflecting man would probably find much more to admire, than condemn, even in that case* which is triumphantly brought forward to prove this assertion. When events led a wise and moderate Governor-General †, and an able and politic Indian minister‡, to prefer a course which certainly made many and important sacrifices of ordinary maxims of rule, but which led to a quiet and just settlement of all complaints; to the pursuit of a severe, inflexible system, which (anxious only for its own character) defends a principle at the hazard of a state: most persons, when they contemplated the great end, would at least pardon the means by which it was obtained, and perhaps see more of wisdom and generosity, than of "short sightedness and "absurdity," in the measures of those who exercised their powers with such temper, forbearance, and indulgence, upon that memorable occasion. Those who endeavour to heap obloquy upon their names, in order to exalt a contrary course of proceeding, will find no support to their arguments from the conduct of the officers of the Bengal army subsequent to that occurrence: that has been exactly the reverse of what it ought to have been, agreeable to the conclusions of the writer of the review: and the great progress made in the discipline of that army, their strict adherence to every principle of order and subordination, (particularly on the occasion of the late agitations at Madras,) affords a most convincing proof of the wide difference between a spirit of discontent carried even to the extreme of opposition to authority, among a body of officers, (who, however lost to reason and duty for the moment, must soon return, instructed by their deviation, to that order on which their condition depends,† and a mutiny of common soldiers. Men solely educated in civil life are too apt to confound this great distinction: and to that ignorance of the different shades of military feeling which varies from the proud but rational submission of a cultivated mind, to the mere habit of mechanical obedience in one of a more vulgar mould, a great part of the evils which occurred at Madras may be ascribed.

* Disturbances in Bengal in 1794 and 1795.

† Lord Teignmouth.

‡ Lord Melville.

It has always been discovered, on a near view of human affairs, that smaller causes than the self-importance of man is willing to believe, produce the greatest changes in society. The difference between a general view of a subject, and a minute observation of all its parts, is immense: and to this difference, more than to any other cause, I am disposed to ascribe the opposite opinions I entertain, on many points of this large question, from the able writer of the review. He has, with a full sense of the advantage, dwelt upon those general principles that regulated the conduct of Sir George Barlow; and has enlarged, with great force and effect, upon their importance to good order and government. While he maintains this ground he is unsailable; and he seldom quits it; but if truth be the object of our search, we must go deeper. There perhaps never was an administration which exhibited, during the period of which we treat, so extraordinary a mixture of good principles, and a bad application of them; of an inflexible regard to form, and a total neglect of feeling, as that of the Governor of Fort St. George. It is from this reason, that every man of impartiality, who peruses a general statement of the late transactions at Madras, will give Sir George Barlow the highest praise: but if he looks further, and examines with a minute attention, not only his measures, but the season and mode of their execution, his admiration will infallibly diminish. He will be compelled (though perhaps reluctantly,) to abandon some abstract ideas regarding the beauty of general principles, which he may have long and fondly cherished, and to confess the force of that observation which experience taught Mr. Burke to make, upon all such general questions. "I have lost," said that great orator and statesman, "all confidence in your swaggering majors, having always found that the truth lurked in the little minor of *circumstances*."

In the conclusion of the article of the review the writer animadverted on the description given by Mr. Petrie of the cold and repulsive manners of Sir George Barlow; and in observing upon this "deficiency in the charm of demeanour," though he admits it must subtract from the influence of a statesman, he makes an allusive comparison (on the ground of common defects)

between his character and that of some of the greatest names in history[†], who, notwithstanding their defective manners, have, by the force of their superior genius, been able to command the support of mankind; and, to give more effect to this allusion, the reviewer quotes a public dispatch from Lord Minto, in which that nobleman ascribes the great unpopularity of Sir George Barlow to “a pure and inflexible discharge of ungrateful, but sacred and indispensable duties.” Self-defence has alone compelled me to discuss the acts of Sir George Barlow. On his character my opinion was long ago formed. It will be seen, that at the commencement of these disturbances I confidentially stated that opinion †. I then represented him as a man of excellent talent, of unsullied integrity, of indefatigable industry, and distinguished by long and meritorious services to the Company. I still retain that opinion; and no injustice of which he may be guilty towards me, shall ever prevent me from expressing it. I then foresaw that the defects of his character would, in his situation, probably produce very pernicious consequences. My opinion has been confirmed by the event. Experience seems to me to have most fully proved, that the very qualities which eminently fit a man for subordinate situations, may unfit him for the supreme; and that the rules which are necessary to the good order of many of the interior departments, may, in their undistinguishing application, prove destructive in the general administration of a great state.

[†] William the Third, and Demosthenes.

[†] See the letters to Lord Wellesley and Sir A. Wellesley, p. 61, 65.

PART II.



A

NARRATIVE

OF THE

CONDUCT OF LIEUT.-COLONEL MALCOLM

DURING THE

DISTURBANCES IN THE MADRAS ARMY.



A NARRATIVE, &c.

WHEN the first violent agitation appeared in the coast army I was at Bombay, in charge of a force destined for service in the Gulf of Persia. A part of this force was composed of Madras troops; and it became my peculiar care to prevent, as far as could be effected by the influence of reason and discipline, any contagion from spreading among those under my command. That I succeeded in this object is chiefly to be ascribed to the excellent character of the officers of this force, and to the distance at which they were from the scene of agitation. From what I heard before I left Bombay, on the 1st of May 1809, of the transactions on the coast, and the perfect knowledge I had of the character of the Governor of Fort St. George, I early apprehended the most unhappy result; and on the 18th of April 1809, I wrote to Lord Minto in the following terms:—

“ We hear every day the most exaggerated reports
“ from Madras: but matters are, I fear, in a very bad
“ state. It is said a Memorial has been sent to your Lord-
“ ship for the removal of Sir George Barlow. I can
“ hardly credit this, though stated on very respectable
“ authority. I know that there is a personal irritation
“ against him, which exceeds all bounds; and t’ is, how-
“ ever unjust and indefensible, will make it almost im-
“ possible for him to adjust matters by any means short
“ of coercion: and I trust in God such will not be found
“ necessary; for even success would not prevent the ruin-

“ous effects with which any measure of violence would
 “be attended. I cannot but think the great majority are
 “yet to be reclaimed to their duty ; and I should think
 “one principal means of effecting this, would be your
 “Lordship’s presence at Madras : and assuredly there
 “never was an occasion on which the active exertion of
 “the great powers lodged in your Lordship’s hands
 “was more necessary to the welfare of the state.”

The impressions upon my mind at this moment will be still more forcibly shown by the following extract from a letter to the Marquis Wellesley, of the same date as that to Lord Minto, and upon the same subject :—

“Both Lord Minto and the Commander-in-Chief of
 “India should come to Madras ; or, at all events, Lord
 “Minto. Whatever justice may be on the part of Sir
 “George Barlow, it will be ten times more difficult for
 “him to settle the question than any other ; for the degree
 “of personal dislike which all ranks and classes have of
 “him, is not to be described. This may be, and I dare
 “say is, very indefensible : but it exists, and cannot be
 “changed ; and the safety of the state should not be
 “thrown into hazard, if that hazard can be avoided by
 “the adoption of any measures that do not compromise
 “its dignity, or permanently weaken its authority. I am
 “quite satisfied of the purity and rectitude of Sir George
 “Barlow’s character. The public never had a more
 “zealous or more laborious servant ; he is devoted to his
 “duty, and has no enjoyment beyond that of performing
 “it ; but his system is cold and inflexible, and proceeds
 “in its course without the slightest attention to the feel-
 “ings of those on whom it is to operate ; and the present
 “distracted state of affairs at Madras is, I fear, a *comment*,
 “and a *melancholy one*, upon the result of *such systems*.
 “All the reforms which Sir George Barlow thought it his
 “duty to make, might have been made without giving rise
 “to any serious discontent, if he had proceeded with that
 “caution and that attention to the temper of the men

“ which the situation in which he found the army required.
 “ They were in a state of great irritation when he arrived ;
 “ and he was, from his reputation as a *reformer* and a
 “ *retrencher*, received with prejudices. The authority
 “ which should have controlled the army, acted a contrary
 “ part, and consequently made their ebullitions more to
 “ be dreaded. All these were subjects worthy of consi-
 deration ; and relaxation from a severe system, till an
 insubordinate spirit was somewhat subdued, and the
 ruling authority fortified, would have not merely been
 warranted, but have been wise. At all events, the
 means of suppressing a disposition to violence should
 have been correctly calculated, before it was provoked
 “ to action. This, I fear, has not been the case ; and it
 “ is most difficult to discover any means by which such a
 “ general spirit of discontent, as that which now exists,
 “ can be repressed. As it is unmixed with any thing like
 “ disaffection to the country, it will probably, if met with
 “ a firm and dignified spirit of conciliation, correct itself ;
 “ and then every plan should be adopted that can prevent
 “ the recurrence of so dangerous an evil.”

The following is the concluding paragraph of a long
 letter, dated the 16th of April 1809, which I wrote to Lord
 Wellington, on the same subject.

“ I am yet very imperfectly informed of what has
 “ occurred. I shall soon know all. I proceed in a few
 “ days to Madras. *Had I been there at an earlier stage*
 “ *of this affair, I might have done good ; but that expec-*
 “ *tation is over :* matters are too far gone ; and there is
 “ too great irritation on the minds of all parties, to give
 “ hopes of reconciliation. You know Sir George Barlow :
 “ he is a highly respectable public servant. His prin-
 “ ciples of action are all right and correct ; but his
 “ measures are often ill-timed, and consequently unfor-
 “ tunate. He generally leaves altogether out of the ques-
 “ tion, that which would engage the chief attention of an
 “ abler ruler,—*men's minds :* and though his cold system

“ appears excellent in an abstract and general view, it
 “ often proves mischievous in its operation. He has
 “ another great fault, which looks so like an excellence at
 “ first glance, as to deceive most: he is perfectly in-
 “ flexible with regard to every thing that he deems a
 “ principle or rule. Now this is good on most occasions,
 “ but on some it is the height of folly; for, in the en-
 “ deavour to do a little good, are we justified in hazard-
 “ ing a world of mischief?”

Such were my sentiments, and such the view I took of the situation of affairs on the coast, before I left Bombay, from which I sailed on the 1st of May, and arrived at Madras on the 17th of that month. I was received by Sir George Barlow with even more than his usual kindness. He seemed to expect my personal efforts would aid greatly in allaying any little agitation that remained; for, at this moment, he was decidedly of opinion that the orders of the 1st of May had completely settled every thing that was serious, and that what appeared to remain, was merely the reaction of that seditious spirit which he had subdued. After a very few days' residence at Madras I became satisfied of the extent and danger of this error, and I laboured incessantly to convince Sir George Barlow that he was mistaken, and that a new, more extensive, and violent confederacy, than that which he had conquered, was in progress; the object of which was to obtain the repeal of the orders of the 1st of May. His unwillingness to believe this fact may be conceived, when I state, that he would not admit the conduct of the subsidiary force at Hyderabad, who, in a public address, disclaimed the compliment he had paid their fidelity, to be evidence of its truth.

I was not discouraged by that strong disinclination which I observed in Sir George Barlow to credit every information I gave him upon this subject, but continued to press upon him the urgency of the case, and to entreat him to adopt measures calculated to remedy so desperate and general an evil, before it had attained that maturity to

which it was fast approaching. The great and generous object was, I said, to save, not to destroy, a body of brave and meritorious, though infatuated men, who were rushing upon their own ruin. They had (I not once, but a hundred times repeated to Sir George Barlow,) a more serious quarrel than that with Government, they had quarrelled with themselves ; and, unless he could adopt some measure that would restore them to their own good opinion, every attempt to establish order and subordination would be vain, as they were goaded on to further guilt by a torturing sense of that into which they had already plunged. On being, at one of these conferences, desired by Sir George Barlow to suggest what I thought would promote this end, I proposed (if the expedient had his approbation,) to draw up an address to him from the Company's officers on direct opposite principles to those seditious papers that I knew were then in circulation ; and to give, by this measure, a shape to that feeling which still existed in the army, but which was scattered, and, from having no union, was repressed by the combined action of the discontented and turbulent. This address was as follows :

“ We, the undersigned officers of the Madras establish-
 “ ment, trust that the very extraordinary and unprece-
 “ dented situation in which we are placed by some recent
 “ occurrences, will plead our excuse for an address which
 “ has no object but that of vindicating ourselves, as a
 “ body, from those serious imputations to which we con-
 “ ceive it possible we may become liable, from the nature
 “ of late proceedings in the army to which we belong ; and
 “ to assert our devoted allegiance to our King, our un-
 “ alterable attachment to our Country, and our consequent
 “ respect and submission to the laws and acts of that local
 “ Government under which we are placed, and whose
 “ commands it is our duty, under all circumstances, to
 “ obey, as those of a legitimate branch of the constitution
 “ of our country.

“ It would be painful to retrace all those events which

“ have led to the present unhappy state of feeling in the
 “ army, and have compelled Government to those measures
 “ which it has judged proper to adopt : we shall therefore
 “ content ourselves with expressing our conviction, that,
 “ however far they might have been carried by the warmth
 “ of the moment, none of our brother officers who were
 “ concerned in those proceedings which have been deemed
 “ so reprehensible by Government, ever harboured an
 “ idea in their minds that was irreconcilable to their
 “ allegiance as subjects, or their duty as soldiers. Go-
 “ vernment must be fully acquainted with the rise and
 “ progress of all the proceedings to which we allude, and
 “ can refer to its true cause any apparent excess, either
 “ in expression or act, that may have marked the conduct
 “ of any individuals : and it will, we are assured, separate
 “ actions which have their motive in generous and honour-
 “ able though mistaken feeling, from any deliberate design
 “ of showing a spirit of contumely and insubordination to
 “ that authority which it is their duty to obey, and whose
 “ orders they could never dispute, without a total sacrifice
 “ of their characters as good soldiers and loyal subjects :
 “ and we feel perfectly satisfied there is not one officer in
 “ this army who would not sooner lose his life than forfeit
 “ his claim to such cherished distinctions.

“ We cannot have a doubt but it must have been
 “ with extreme reluctance that Government has adopted
 “ the measures it has done, against those of our brother
 “ officers who have more particularly incurred its dis-
 “ pleasure, from the forward share they took, or were
 “ supposed to take, in the proceedings which have met
 “ with its disapprobation : and though we never can pre-
 “ sume to question in any shape the acts of that Govern-
 “ ment which it is our duty to obey, it is impossible for
 “ us to contemplate the present situation of those officers
 “ without sentiments of the deepest concern : and when
 “ we reflect on the general high reputation, and the well-
 “ merited distinction, which some of them have, by their

“ valour and ability, obtained in the public service, we
 “ should be unjust to the characters of our superiors both
 “ in India and England, if we did not entertain a hope
 “ that their case would meet with a favourable and in-
 “ dulent consideration. But we feel restrained from
 “ dwelling upon this subject, as we are aware its very
 “ mention might be deemed improper in an address, the
 “ great and sole object of which is to correct misappre-
 “ hension, and to convey a solemn assurance of our con-
 “ tinued and unalterable adherence to the same principles
 “ of loyalty and attachment to our King and Country, and
 “ of respect and obedience to the Government we serve,
 “ that have ever distinguished the army to which we be-
 “ long.”

The object of this address was to reconcile men to them-
 selves; and it therefore ceded as much as was possible in
 its expression to the predominant feelings of the moment;
 but its principle was not to be mistaken: and the unquali-
 fied and decided declaration which it contained, of attach-
 ment and of implicit obedience to Government, must have
 had the certain effect of separating all those by whom this
 address was subscribed, from persons who cherished con-
 trary sentiments. But the great object of this measure was
 to concentrate and embody the good feelings of the army;
 to hoist a standard to which men could repair, whose
 minds revolted at the proceedings then in progress, but
 who were deterred by shame, fear of reproach, and want
 of union, from expressing an open difference of opinion
 from the more violent. I was assured at the moment that
 I suggested this measure, of its partial success, and not
 without some hopes that it would be general; but I per-
 fectly knew, that if the senior and more reflecting part of
 the officers of the army signed an address that pledged
 them to an active discharge of their duty to Government,
 all danger of the remainder having recourse to desperate
 extremes, was at an end; for the influence of the senior
 part of the army over the native troops was decided; and

this open declaration would at once have drawn a line of separation betwixt the moderate and reasonable, and the turbulent, which would have deprived the leaders of the latter of their chief source of strength, which obviously lay in their being able to deceive the multitude they guided, by persuading them that the cause was general*, and that many, whom prudence made reserved, would join them the moment they ventured on a bolder line of action.

In my anxiety to reconcile his mind to the adoption of this measure, I more than once modified the expression of the address; and softened, and in some instances struck out, those passages which he seemed to think were most objectionable. I also took every pains to satisfy his mind that it should never be known he had been consulted on the subject. It was my intention to endeavour to obtain the high and honoured name of Colonel Close at the head of this address; and after adding those of several other officers of rank and estimation, whose sentiments I knew would be favourable to such an object, to circulate it with an appeal to the good sense of the whole army. Sir George Barlow certainly hesitated regarding this measure, for he kept the draft of the address two or three days, and then returned it with a rejection of the expedient, grounded on his dislike to the adoption of any step that was contrary to the established rules of his Government; to his fear, that receiving such an address in a favourable manner might in some degree sacrifice † his dignity, and, by doing so, weaken that authority to which he trusted for the settlement of that partial spirit of discontent which still existed. It was in vain that I argued that the common rules of Government were adapted for common times, and that in

* These were the persons who fabricated those reports that were circulated and believed by numbers, respecting promises of aid and support from the officers of Bengal and Bombay.

† *This fear of being thought afraid*, is, perhaps, of all motives of human action one of the weakest, though it wears a mask of boldness, and under that is often productive of infinite mischief.

emergencies like the present, which presented nothing but difficulties, those should be chosen which were likeliest to effect the object at the least hazard to the state. All my reasoning was ineffectual; and I was most reluctantly compelled to abandon this project, from which I at that moment expected great success. Every future event has satisfied my mind I was not too sanguine. I conscientiously believe, if it had been adopted, though numbers might, by their obstinacy and violence, have merited and received punishment, yet the large body of Company's officers on the Madras establishment would have restored the character of the army to which they belonged. The extremes which have occurred, with all their baneful, and perhaps irremediable consequences, would have been avoided; and assuredly the prospect even of attaining such ends and of averting such evils, was worth a slight departure from a common rule, and might have justified some small deviation from the rigid system pursued by the Government of Madras.

To show in the most convincing light the correct view I took at that moment of the actual state of affairs, and the very opposite sentiments entertained by Sir George Barlow, I shall here quote some passages from the private letters that I wrote from the 3d to the 15th of June, (which includes the whole of the period of which I am now speaking,) to Lord Minto and his private secretary. The following is a copy of my letter to Lord Minto of the 3d of June.

“ I have delayed from day to day writing to your Lordship, till I could inform myself of the real state of affairs at this distracted Presidency; and I wish I could, in discharging my duty towards you, confirm those impressions which *I believe you have received*, of the general good effect produced by the orders of the 1st of May, and of the return of the officers of this Presidency to the principles of good order and subordination. The very contrary I believe to be the fact: and I am

“ satisfied that general spirit of discontent which has long
 “ pervaded this army, had never more danger in it than
 “ at this moment. I differ with Sir George Barlow (who
 “ has behaved with the most flattering kindness to me, and
 “ given me his complete* confidence,) upon this point;
 “ but I have too good a reason to rely upon my sources
 “ of information. Besides, Can there be a greater indi-
 “ cation of this spirit than has been exhibited in the con-
 “ duct of the subsidiary force at Hyderabad? They have,
 “ in an address to the whole army, disclaimed all title to
 “ the thanks bestowed upon them, and publicly avowed,
 “ that they not only shared the sentiments of the army,
 “ as expressed in their former addresses, but felt deeply
 “ for their brother officers, who had been arbitrarily sus-
 “ pended for just and honourable actions, and were deter-
 “ mined to contribute to their support in a firm, legal, and
 “ moderate manner. These are, as nearly as my memory
 “ serves, the words of this address: but a copy has pro-
 “ bably been sent to your Lordship; as one has, I under-
 “ stand, been received at head-quarters. Nothing can
 “ exceed the present irritation: and it has, I am assured,
 “ gone much greater lengths than Sir George Barlow can
 “ bring himself to believe. I confess I am not without
 “ some apprehension of misfortune: and however reluc-
 “ tant my mind is to believe that men can ever be so des-
 “ perate as to forget their duty to their country, I cannot
 “ resist evidence; and I certainly have seen what con-
 “ vinces me that the most dangerous combinations are
 “ formed, and conducted on principles entirely hostile to
 “ order and good government. I have most frequent,
 “ and indeed daily, communications with Sir George
 “ Barlow upon this subject; and have not only given him
 “ every information I possess, but every opinion I have
 “ formed; and have the highest reason to be satisfied with

* I thought so at that period, though I have been since convinced I
 was mistaken.

“ the manner in which my communications are received.
 “ He is as satisfied as I am, that the best reliance which
 “ Government has at this moment, is the remaining good
 “ feeling of the army itself. We differ a little as to the
 “ best means of bringing this into action. He is adverse
 “ to every expedient that is *not in consistence with usage*.
 “ I think that those means are best which will most speedily
 “ effect the object in a manner that will be satisfactory to
 “ the pride and loyal feelings of the great majority of the
 “ army, and yet not compromise in the slightest degree
 “ the dignity of Government. The irritation that has
 “ been caused and kept up by those acts, which Govern-
 “ ment has taken from private information or reports of
 “ speeches at table, &c. is not to be conceived. The
 “ most extreme emergency can only justify any public
 “ authority opening such dangerous and suspicious chan-
 “ nels, and they should be closed the moment the danger
 “ is past. At present I am satisfied, (and so is Sir George
 “ Barlow,) it is better to incur any hazard than have fur-
 “ ther resort to such unpopular and uncertain means of
 “ detecting delinquency : and he is resolved to let military
 “ law have its free course, in the conviction, that his best
 “ chance of reclaiming a body of honourable though mis-
 “ guided men, to their duty, is by showing he has not lost
 “ confidence in them.

“ Sir George Barlow has hopes this agitation will sub-
 “ side * of itself. I cannot think so. They are maddened
 “ with a thousand reflections, and with none more than
 “ the shame and ruin which their rash proceedings have
 “ brought on some of the most popular of their brother
 “ officers. They have, in fact, not only quarrelled with
 “ Government, but with themselves; and such quarrels

* Sir George Barlow not only thought so, but must, from the Governor General's letter to the secret committee of the 12th of October 1809, have conveyed the same impression to Lord Minto. The merit of foresight will not assuredly be claimed as one among the talents that were displayed by the Governor of Fort St. George upon this memorable occasion.

“ are difficult to settle. Besides, they are secretly goaded
 “ on by a thousand discontented men, who, defeated in
 “ other objects, wish to throw this Government into con-
 “ fusion.”

On the 12th of June I again wrote to his lordship :

“ I wish I could say affairs here were in a better state ;
 “ but I cannot yet agree with Sir George Barlow that the
 “ discontent is subsiding. Addresses have come from
 “ every part of the army to the principal officers sus-
 “ pended by the orders of the 1st of May, containing
 “ assurances of support, &c. These, fortunately, have
 “ not yet been brought under the eye of Government. I
 “ say fortunately ; because it would be impossible for Go-
 “ vernment, in consistence with its past proceedings, to
 “ pass such addresses unnoticed ; and I should regret to
 “ see it obliged to notice them at a moment when the good
 “ sense and good feeling of the army seems lost, and the
 “ whole appears under the influence of blind passion. Sir
 “ George Barlow has put an end to all proceedings grounded
 “ on private information, and has resolved to maintain that
 “ dignified line which never stoops to suspicion, and makes
 “ men worthy of confidence by boldly giving it to them.
 “ *If this is persevered in*, it will do great good ; for it will
 “ excite into action the remaining good feeling of the
 “ army, which, though dormant, must be considerable ;
 “ and which forms, at this moment, the great, if not the
 “ only, strength of Government.”

And upon the 15th of June I wrote to his Lordship's son
 and private secretary, Mr. John Elliott, as follows :

“ With regard to this army I have already written to
 “ Lord Minto. I am satisfied he has never had a full idea
 “ of the danger to which the public interests are exposed,
 “ or I think he would have come to this spot. I am far
 “ from meaning to state that Sir George Barlow has not
 “ communicated all he knew or thought : but, in the first
 “ place, I am satisfied he has been, generally speaking,
 “ badly informed ; and, in the next, he has been endea-

“ vouring to persuade himself that there was no danger,
 “ and even now he tries to think every thing will subside;
 “ though he knows (*for I have told him*) that papers of
 “ the most objectionable nature are in circulation, and that
 “ the most violent measures have been, and are, contem-
 “ plated. It is impossible to convey to men who are calm
 “ and think rationally, any idea of the state of this army.
 “ All the respectable men in it appear to suffer a set of
 “ mad-headed boys to take the lead: and the greatest
 “ merit I see any man claim, is that of being passive;
 “ though all confess it is a period at which one step will
 “ involve the country in all the horrors of a civil war:
 “ and there are numbers (such is the insanity that has got
 “ head,) that desire to accelerate that event.

“ You may be satisfied I would not even hint at a state
 “ of affairs so shocking to contemplate, if I had not the
 “ strongest grounds for what I state: but I have seen the
 “ greater part of their correspondence, *and know, and have*
 “ *informed Sir George Barlow*, of the extent to which
 “ matters have proceeded, and of the increase of irritation
 “ that has been lately produced: particularly by that ill-
 “ judged and unmerited compliment to the force at Hy-
 “ derabad, who, from being moderate, have, with the
 “ customary zeal of converts, become the most violent;
 “ and would (but for the timely exercise of Colonel Mon-
 “ tresor’s personal influence,) have forced a paper a few
 “ days ago upon Government, which it must have noticed
 “ most seriously; and that notice was expected by some
 “ of the maddest to be the signal of some very violent mea-
 “ sures. This remonstrance, as I said before, has been
 “ stopt; but there is, I fear, too much reason to conclude
 “ others of the same character will be forwarded. I know
 “ not whether Lord Minto is informed of all these circum-
 “ stances; but it is proper he should know them, as they
 “ refer to one of the most serious dangers that can assail
 “ the Empire under his charge. I enjoy Sir George Bar-
 “ low’s fullest confidence upon this subject; but he has,

“ I believe, *more congenial counsellors*, who are fonder of
 “ maintaining the consistency of Government upon paper,
 “ than of tranquillizing the minds of a meritorious and
 “ honourable, though misguided body of men : but as-
 “ suredly every means should be adopted which human
 “ wisdom can suggest, to reclaim them to temper and at-
 “ tachment, provided always such means do not compro-
 “ mise the strength and dignity of Government. Conces-
 “ sions cannot be made to demand ; but men may, perhaps,
 “ by management, be reconciled to themselves and the
 “ state by something short of concession. Sir George
 “ Barlow has rather an exaggerated opinion of my per-
 “ sonal influence ; and he thinks, I believe, it will effect
 “ what I only expect from the united good feeling of the
 “ army. I have, however, done all I can ; and shall con-
 “ tinue, under all circumstances, my most ardent efforts in
 “ the cause of good order and government.”

I heard, towards the end of June, of some extraordinary proceedings that had taken place regarding the European regiment stationed at Masulipatam, in consequence of a dispute between the Lieutenant-Colonel commanding and the officers of the corps. The substance of these proceedings* may be given in a few words. Lieutenant-Colonel Innes, the day after he joined the regiment (the 7th of May), dined at the mess, where a toast was given, “ The friends of the army ;” to which he objected, and proposed it to be changed for one of less equivocal meaning—“ The Madras army.” This was not assented to, and he left the table. Next day he wrote an account of this circumstance to head-quarters, but *desired it should not be noticed*, as he expected an apology from those officers whose conduct he considered as most disrespectful. The moment his letter reached Madras, an order was transmitted, directing Lieutenant David Forbes, who was said to

* See Lieutenant-Colonel Malcolm's letter to General Gowdie, in the Appendix.

be the person who had given the toast, to proceed, at a few hours' warning, to the Fort of Condapilly, a solitary and far from healthy post, at the distance of forty miles, and one at which there was not *one* man of the corps to which he belonged. Lieutenant Maitland, who was reported to have seconded the toast, was, by the same order, deprived of his station of Quarter-Master. These measures, combined with an imprudent declaration of Colonel Innes, that the corps would be disbanded if a young officer refused to accept the vacant station of Quarter-Master, (by which probably it was only meant that that event might be apprehended, if such a spirit of insubordination continued,) threw the officers of the regiment into a great ferment, and led to their making a representation to headquarters, earnestly soliciting the benefit of regular military trial, and deprecating the disgrace to which they were exposed from such punishments being inflicted, without the slightest opportunity being given to individuals of vindicating themselves from the private accusations made against them.

I was quite satisfied, from what I heard of those proceedings, of which I have only given the outline, that they were more than severe; and were calculated, in even ordinary times, to produce much irritation; and I therefore was not at all surprised at their aggravated effect at a period of such general agitation. Soon after these events had occurred, I was informed by Admiral Drury, that he had, in consequence of an order from the Duke of York, desiring all the men of his Majesty's regiments employed as marines to be landed, applied to the Government of Fort St. George for some men; and that a detachment had been ordered from the regiment at Masulipatam, for which a frigate and sloop of war were to sail that evening. Many circumstances had made me, about this period, very reluctant to press the attention of Sir George Barlow to a danger, the existence of which he *appeared resolved* not to believe; but I could not help, upon this occasion,

stating to his private secretary, Lieutenant-Colonel Barclay, all I thought upon the subject. The following is an extract of my note to that confidential officer.

“ The great object at present, is not to agitate, in any way, (if it can be avoided,) any of those questions which have disturbed the temper of the army; and to restore that, by every means short of concession, to its proper tone. To effect this, we must trust in large points to the action of the good feeling of the army itself, and small questions will soon die of neglect. Now it occurs to me, the ordering a large detachment of the European regiment at this moment on board his Majesty’s ships, is liable to much misrepresentation, and is calculated to increase discontent. This has not been usual; and, after the conduct of the officers of the regiment, it will be considered as a punishment: and if it is so, it will, from its nature, have no good effect; for it will be referred to a desire to divide a corps, which men will say never could have arisen, if Government had been confident in their obedience and attachment. The corps itself will receive this order as an additional stigma on their character; and, in the heated state they are in, I should not be surprised if they went to greater extremities than they already have gone; and, if the accounts I have heard of their proceedings are correct, they have been bolder in their expressions of discontent than any corps in the service. All this is perhaps very improbable; but still no man acquainted with the present state of affairs can say it is impossible; and why incur the most distant hazard of aggravating men’s feelings by a measure of such trifling consequence? No man could, at this moment, have recommended, as a political measure, such a wretched expedient as that of dividing this corps in the manner proposed; and if it is merely to comply with a requisition of the Admiral for marines, he might take them, as has been the usage, from any one of the King’s regiments, or might go

“ without, rather than give cause to misrepresentation at
 “ such a moment. If all or any of the officers of the
 “ European regiment merit punishment, let them be
 “ punished in an open manner, agreeable to usage, and
 “ my life upon the consequence : but to think of sending
 “ one here, and one there*, is only to show weakness, and
 “ to give grounds to the wicked to circulate aggravated
 “ reports, and to kindle the flame of discord and discon-
 “ tent. Pardon this hasty note, and tear it†. You will
 “ understand what I mean perfectly. *Depend upon it,*
 “ *it is trifles of this nature which merit all the attention of*
 “ *Government at this moment.*”

I did not receive any answer from Lieutenant-Colonel Barclay till next morning ; when, after stating the hurry that prevented him from writing, and the causes which had made Government order this detachment, he states his belief, grounded on his knowledge of Masulipatam as a station, that there will be a competition between both officers and men to proceed as marines ; and concludes by saying, “ I shall only add further, that there is no guard-
 “ ing against wilful misrepresentations, and that those
 “ who are obliged to act, must, in such cases as the pre-
 “ sent, be satisfied with the uprightness of their inten-
 “ tions.”

Every thing that I had foreseen occurred. The arrival of the orders for the marines occasioned an instant mutiny of the garrison of Masulipatam, and precipitated that crisis which it was of such great consequence to avoid. Sir George Barlow felt this occurrence as a serious evil ; and, in a long conversation I had with him upon the

* Lieutenant Martland, the dismissed quarter master, was ordered to command the marines ; and Lieutenant Forbes, who had been banished to Condapilly, was directed to proceed to relieve an officer of the regiment on duty at Prince of Wales's Island. This second punishment was a torturing revival of those wrongs, of which not only the parties but all the officer, of the corps, had before, with some justice, complained.

† Lieutenant-Colonel Barclay afterwards returned me the original note.

subject, he expressed the extremest anxiety to prevent those bad consequences which were to be expected to result, by the adoption of every moderate and conciliatory means that he could use, without a compromise of the authority and dignity of Government. He told me he had rejected all the violent measures that had been proposed, of coercing the garrison into submission by the employment of his Majesty's troops; as such, he was convinced, would cause a general rupture, which he still hoped would be avoided; and which, at all events, it was most important to retard. His anxiety on this occasion was much increased by the receipt, at the same period, of a highly improper address from the officers of the subsidiary force at Hyderabad; and he desired my opinion on the best course to be pursued on so alarming an emergency. I advised a line that appeared to me likely to arrest the progress of men standing on a precipice of guilt. Every hour gained gave time for the operation of reason; and if that should fail, it was still of consequence that Government should be more prepared than it was at that moment for the occurrence of a rupture with its army. On these grounds, I recommended that an officer of rank should be sent to Masulipatam to assume the command, and that he should be appointed president of a committee to inquire into the causes of the mutiny, and report their proceedings to Government, *who would, when the information upon this subject was complete, adopt measures for the prosecution and punishment of the most guilty.* In this proceeding there was an appearance of great temper and moderation; no serious sacrifice of dignity was made; and time (which, for reasons before stated, appeared the great object,) was gained: and all those effects which must have attended the detachment of a force against the garrison, or the equally unwise proceeding of attempting (before either reason had time to operate, or the means of coercion were prepared) to arrest or confine any individual, were avoided. On Sir George Barlow's expressing his assent

to my suggestions, I offered, in the warmth of my zeal, to proceed to Masulipatam. He accepted this offer with great apparent pleasure; and he evidently thought that the appointment of an officer who was known to enjoy his confidence, and who had so publicly professed a conciliatory disposition, proclaimed the character of the act: and the nomination of Lieutenant-Colonel William Berkley and Major Evans to aid me, (two officers who are now no more, but who, while they lived, enjoyed in an eminent degree the love and respect of all ranks in the army to which they belonged,) was a full confirmation (if any had been wanted) of the nature of this measure*. If it had been possible for me to have mistaken Sir George Barlow in the conversation I had with him on the morning he received this intelligence, I was completely confirmed by what passed in the evening after I had been in the fort, and, in the office of the commander of the forces, (General Gowdie,) had a discussion with some of the officers of the general staff upon the whole of this subject. One of those officers, who was known to enjoy the chief share of Sir George Barlow's confidence, stated at this conference, that movements of corps would be immediately ordered that would place the native troops under the com-

* The following paragraph of a letter from Lieutenant-Colonel Montresor to Lieutenant-Colonel Doveton, dated Secundrabad, the 10th July, 1809, is a proof of the light in which this measure was viewed, and the use made of it to reclaim the most violent to duty and submission:—"When the address was forwarded from Jaulnah, the officers could not have known that the Government of Madras had taken such steps as were most likely to quiet the public mind, in consequence of the unpleasant state of affairs at Masulipatam. Lieutenant Colonel Malcolm, whose sound sense, knowledge of the army, and conciliatory manners, peculiarly qualified him for the difficult task of allaying the ferment in the northern division of the army, has already arrived at Masulipatam, and a committee has been ordered to inquire into the late occurrences, composed of three officers among the most popular in the army: therefore I am sure the officers of Jaulnah will see the bad effects of forwarding an address, at this moment, of any nature whatever, as it could only tend to add to the irritation of the public mind." Vide printed Correspondence, No. 2. page 35.

plete check of his Majesty's regiments; and that the Governor should, in his opinion, have no hesitation in throwing himself at once upon the King's army. I could not but treat such sentiments with some warmth, as being altogether incompatible with that ardent wish which was professed of reclaiming the Company's officers to their duty. The very knowledge, I observed to General Gowdie, of such sentiments being held and declared, was in itself sufficient to drive men to extremes. The General fully acquiesced in my opinion. Another officer of the staff, who was also a principal adviser of the Governor, said upon this occasion, that he understood I was a friend to concessions that would degrade the Government; that his advice had been, to send a detachment to attack Masulipatam; and that unless I could, the moment I went there, send Major Storey and the other ringleaders under a guard to Madras, evil, instead of good, must result from my mission. I repelled this gentleman's attack with a warmth that produced interference to prevent a personal dispute, and concluded by telling him, that I was now aware of the true character of those sentiments entertained by the persons who had the chief influence over Sir George Barlow's mind; and that, with that knowledge, I should certainly not proceed to Masulipatam, as I saw the probability of measures being adopted, in my absence, of a directly opposite character to those I was desired to execute; and the only consequence I should anticipate, was failure and loss of character. Some explanations were made, but none that dispelled the alarm I had taken at the sentiments which I had just heard. I went immediately to the Governor, to whom I mentioned all that had passed: and I can most solemnly affirm, that Sir George Barlow gave me, at this second conference, every assurance that could be given to satisfy my mind. He declared he would not listen to any such violent counsels* as I had heard;

* Two days after I went away, and when no event had occurred of any consequence, he was persuaded (as has been before shown) to commence

that he gave me his entire confidence, and vested me with the fullest discretion to act in all respects as I thought proper, in my endeavours to reclaim the deluded men, to whom I was proceeding, to reflection and duty; and that he was satisfied the honour of his Government was perfectly safe in my hands. Not one word was mentioned, at this conference; regarding my commencing my proceeding by an appeal to the men, or by confining those officers who had been most active in the mutiny. It was, indeed, evident that the first of these acts would have caused a desperation in the minds of the officers, that must have led to that instant rupture which *it was the object of my mission to avoid*; and, with regard to the second, a military court of inquiry had been ordered to investigate the whole of the proceedings at Masulipatam, chiefly, if not exclusively, with the view of enabling Government to gain time, without loss of reputation; and any precipitate proceedings against the ringleaders would have been an obvious sacrifice of that great object.

Such were the sentiments of Sir George Barlow at the moment I was deputed to Masulipatam: at least such were the impressions which all his observations made upon my mind. He determined at this moment to return the address from Hyderabad, and to write a letter to the commanding officer of that force in terms calculated to show his forbearance, and indeed to evince to the violent and misguided officers of that station the same spirit of temperate and conciliatory disposition as had led him to depute me to Masulipatam. He desired me to make a memorandum of what I conceived he should write upon this occasion. I instantly drew out the following.

“ Substance of a letter to the commanding officers at
“ Hyderabad and Jaulnah.

the plan for placing the native corps under check of his Majesty's regiments, and the orders were sent to Hyderabad for the march of the 2d of the 10th to Gou.

“ Expressing the great regret and disapprobation with
 “ which Government has received a Memorial from the
 “ officers of the subsidiary force, soliciting it to rescind
 “ the orders of the 1st of May.

“ Pointing out in a calm but forcible manner the
 “ dangerous tendency of such addresses, and the total im-
 “ possibility of complying with such a request; stating that
 “ Government is only fulfilling a sacred duty when it ex-
 “ horts the officers who have signed and forwarded these
 “ papers to reflect most seriously upon the consequences
 “ which a perseverance in such measures must produce.
 “ It owes this warning and exhortation to a body of men,
 “ who, acting under warm and erroneous impressions,
 “ have for a moment forgot what is due to their own high
 “ character, and to that Government under which they
 “ are placed. The motives of this expostulation with the
 “ officers of the subsidiary force will not be misunder-
 “ stood; but it is necessary that they should distinctly
 “ know, that while Government can and does make every
 “ allowance for that momentary delusion and irritation
 “ which a variety of circumstances have been calculated
 “ to produce, that it will never either abandon or com-
 “ promise its authority; and that it will, if compelled to
 “ act, maintain, under every extreme and at every hazard,
 “ those principles of obedience and subordination, with-
 “ out which, it is satisfied, neither it nor the army can
 “ exist.”

With this memorandum Sir George Barlow was perfectly pleased, and desired me to give it the form of a letter, and deliver it to Lieutenant-Colonel Barclay, that it might be dispatched next day*. I did so, and carried the copy of the memorandum with me to Masulipatam,

* Instead of sending this letter, the order for the march of a battalion from Hyderabad to Goa, in prosecution of the plan for dividing the sepoy corps, was sent two days after my departure, and provoked (as was, under such circumstances, to have been expected) open resistance and rebellion.

for which place I sailed on the 2d of July 1809, the whole of the circumstances to which I have alluded having taken place on the day preceding.

I landed at Masulipatam on the 4th of July; and the journal of my proceedings at that place, with the extracts of my letters to Sir George Barlow, General Gowdie, and Lieutenant-Colonel Barclay, and of the letters I received from the latter officer (all of which form numbers of the Appendix), will give the clearest and most faithful account of the manner in which I executed the arduous task that an imprudent, but I hope not an illaudable, zeal led me to undertake. During my residence at that place I continued active in my endeavours to disseminate, by letters to different quarters of the army, such sentiments as I thought calculated to counteract the poison of those inflammatory papers that were then in circulation: and the extract from my letter addressed to a respectable field officer (Lieutenant-Colonel M'Leod), under date the 20th of July 1809, which forms a number of the Appendix, will show the complete and just view I took at that period of the result of the violent proceedings of the army.

I left Masulipatam on the night of the 22d of July, and arrived at Madras on the morning of the 26th, having travelled two hundred and ninety miles in little more than three days. I knew of the flagrant act of disobedience which the subsidiary force at Hyderabad had committed, in refusing to allow the 2d battalion of the 10th regiment to march to Goa, to which station it had been ordered in prosecution of the plan for dividing the native corps so as to place them under the check of his Majesty's regiments*. I thought it probable that this event would give

* This irritating and imprudent order (which has been before noticed) was sent to Hyderabad a day or two after I sailed, and the same influence that obtained the adoption of this measure, prevented the dispatch of the letter to the commanding officers of Hyderabad and Jaulnah, which I drafted, and which Sir George Barlow at the moment approved, and *assured me he would send*.

rise to some strong measures on the part of Government, and I was most anxious to communicate all the information I had collected before any such were adopted: but, though no danger could have resulted from delay, the Governor, who knew I would be at Madras on the morning of the 26th, did not deem it necessary to wait even for a few hours, though strongly urged to do so by Major-General Gowdie*, the commander of the forces; and the moment of my arrival was that of the execution of the orders of the 26th of July for the separation of the officers from their men. I did not see Sir George Barlow till next day: and the cold manner in which I was received, the slighting view which I saw was taken of my efforts at Masulipatam, and the reserve maintained, not only by him, but by others, left me without a doubt that I was no longer honoured with his confidence; which I was now, indeed, convinced I had never possessed but in a very limited degree. I therefore resolved, in future, to confine myself to an obedience of any orders I might receive, and no longer to expose myself to that failure and disgrace which must always attend the person who acts as a confidential agent, on delicate and important occasions, to one with whose proceedings his mind does not accord, whose confidence he does not enjoy, and of whose plans he is but imperfectly informed. But, before I proceed to explain the subsequent part I took in these transactions, it will be proper to offer some remarks on the observations made in the letter, under date 10th September, 1809, from the Government of Fort St. George to the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors, respecting my conduct at Masulipatam. The following is an extract from the letter from the Governor of Fort St. George upon this subject.

“ On receiving intelligence of the mutiny, we appointed
 “ Lieutenant-Colonel Malcolm, in whose zeal and talents
 “ we entertained the fullest confidence, to the command

* The Major-General assured me of this fact.

“ of the Madras European regiment, and the garrison of
 “ Masulipatam, for the purpose of re-establishing the
 “ authority of Government over the troops, inquiring into
 “ the causes of the mutiny, and placing the most guilty of
 “ the offenders under arrest. Lieutenant-Colonel Malcolm
 “ was not furnished with any written instructions : it was
 “ left to his discretion to adopt such measures as circum-
 “ stances might render advisable, with the view to the
 “ accomplishment of the objects of his deputation.

“ Lieutenant-Colonel Malcolm immediately proceeded
 “ by sea to Masulipatam. On his arrival he found that
 “ the officers of the garrison had formed themselves into
 “ a committee, in which every officer had a voice. The
 “ greatest anarchy and confusion prevailed ; and it was
 “ with difficulty that he prevailed on the officers to
 “ acknowledge his authority.

“ As it never was in the contemplation of the Govern-
 “ ment to disband the European regiment, it was expected
 “ that Lieutenant-Colonel Malcolm would have taken the
 “ earliest opportunity to communicate to the men a distinct
 “ and public disavowal of that intention on the part of the
 “ Government, and have employed the most strenuous
 “ exertions to recall the men to a sense of their duty, by
 “ impressing upon their minds the degree of guilt and
 “ danger in which their officers, for purposes entirely per-
 “ sonal to themselves, had endeavoured to involve them.
 “ It was also expected that Lieutenant-Colonel Malcolm,
 “ by establishing his influence and authority over the
 “ troops composing the garrison, would have secured
 “ their obedience, and by that measure have deprived
 “ the officers of the power of prosecuting their designs,
 “ and brought the leaders to trial for their mutinous con-
 “ duct.

“ Lieutenant-Colonel Malcolm appears, however, to
 “ have adopted a course of proceedings entirely different
 “ from that which we had in view in deputing him to
 “ Masulipatam. He abstained from making any direct

“ communication to the men : and when we authorized
 “ him, with the view of detaching the troops from the
 “ cause of their officers, to proclaim a pardon to the
 “ European and native soldiers for the part which they
 “ might have taken in the mutiny, he judged it proper to
 “ withhold the promulgation of the pardon, from an ap-
 “ prehension (as stated in his letter to our President, dated
 “ the 18th of July) of irritating the minds of the European
 “ officers, and driving them to despair.

“ To this apparent unreasonable forbearance and atten-
 “ tion to the feelings of the officers, who had, by their
 “ acts of violence and aggression, forfeited all claims to
 “ such consideration, may, we conceive, be ascribed
 “ Lieutenant-Colonel Malcolm’s failure in the establish-
 “ ment of any efficient control over the garrison : and he
 “ appears to have been principally occupied, during the
 “ period of his residence at Masulipatam, in negotiations
 “ with the disorderly committees ; calculated, in our
 “ opinion, to compromise rather than establish his au-
 “ thority ; and in fruitless attempts to induce them, by
 “ argument, to return to their duty, and abandon the
 “ criminal combination in which they had engaged.
 “ Lieutenant-Colonel Malcolm’s reasons for pursuing this
 “ line of conduct, and for recommending to us the
 “ adoption of conciliatory and temporizing measures, are
 “ detailed in his letters to our President, dated the 4th,
 “ 5th, and 6th of July. In those letters he states, that
 “ the officers at Masulipatam had received assurances
 “ from most of the military stations of the army, applaud-
 “ ing their conduct, and promising them effectual sup-
 “ port ; that the whole army were united in a resolution to
 “ oppose the authority of Government ; that there was
 “ not a single corps, from Ganjam to Cape Comorin, which
 “ was not prepared to break out into open rebellion. The
 “ measures recommended by Lieutenant-Colonel Malcolm,
 “ as constituting, in his opinion, the only means of averting
 “ the most dreadful calamities, consisted of a modified

“ repeal of the orders of the 1st of May; the restoration
 “ to the service, and to their appointments, of all the
 “ officers whom we had found it necessary to suspend or
 “ remove; with an intimation to the army, that their
 “ claims to Bengal allowances would be brought to the
 “ notice of the Honourable the Court of Directors. Lieu-
 “ tenant-Colonel Malcolm returned to Madras, on the
 “ arrival of Major-General Pater at Masulipatam to assume
 “ the command of the northern division of the army,
 “ having succeeded no further in accomplishing the ob-
 “ jects of his mission, than in preventing the officers from
 “ adopting any flagrant acts of outrage to authority during
 “ his residence at Masulipatam.”

The first charge is hardly less than a direct accusation
 of disobedience of orders. It is stated, that as it never
 was in the contemplation of Government to disband the
 European regiment, it was expected I would have taken
 the earliest opportunity to communicate to the men a dis-
 tinct and public disavowal of that intention. In the suc-
 ceeding paragraph I am accused of having adopted a
 course of proceeding entirely different from what Govern-
 ment had in view in deputing me; and I am positively
 charged with “ *having abstained from making any direct*
 “ *communication to the men.*” My letter to Lieutenant-
 Colonel Barclay, of the 18th July, is a number of this
 dispatch, and has been printed with it. This letter con-
 tains the following passage: “ You will satisfy Sir George
 “ Barlow, that one of the first things that I did, after I
 “ came on shore, was to satisfy the minds of the officers,
 “ and, through them, of the men, of the intentions of Go-
 “ vernment in ordering a party of marines from the corps;
 “ and you will see, by the enclosed extract from my
 “ Journal, that I took the first good opportunity that
 “ offered of STATING THIS FACT in the most public and
 “ impressive manner to the whole regiment.” I may ask,
 with great surprise and some indignation, Why the extract
 alluded to in this letter was not transmitted to the Honour-

able the Court of Directors? This extract was a copy of my speech made to the European regiment under arms on the 15th of July. The whole of this speech is in my Journal*. The following is a part of it.

“ I consider it my duty to declare to you at this moment, that it never was in the contemplation of Government to *disband* or disperse this corps ; and that it never meant to employ any officer or man of the regiment in any manner, or upon any service, but such as was suited to the character of British soldiers ; and which it, of course, conceived both officers and men would be forward to proceed upon.”

Is it possible that any disavowal could be more distinct, or made in a more proper and military manner? Yet I am directly charged with *having abstained* from making any such communication to the *men*! It is possible a charge so completely unfounded may have originated in mistake or neglect : but where there exists, as on the present occasion, an evident desire to criminate ; where the secret nature of the blow afforded no opportunity of defence ; such mistake, even if proved, neither can nor ought to disarm honest resentment. It is too much to have a character, that has been obtained by the struggle of a whole life, assailed in such a manner. But the knowledge which the Governor of Fort St. George had of my proceeding, upon this point, was not limited to this communication through Lieutenant-Colonel Barclay. The day after my return to Madras, I read to him the whole of my Journal. It is true he did not pay much attention to it : and the little value he attached to the detail of my proceedings was the cause of my not loading my public report with a copy of its contents. I had neither received at that moment, nor at any subsequent period, the slightest official notice of even dissatisfaction ; and the probability of my conduct being misrepresented to my superiors in

* Vide Appendix.

England in the manner it has been, never once entered into my imagination.

In answer to the charge, “ That I did not employ my
 “ strenuous exertions to recall the men to a sense of their
 “ duty, by impressing upon their minds the degree of
 “ guilt and danger in which their officers, for purposes
 “ entirely personal to themselves, had endeavoured to in-
 “ volve them,” I must reply in the most solemn manner, that I was not withheld from acting in the manner the Government here state they expected I would, merely because I had no orders to do so, but because I considered that such a proceeding would have had an operation directly opposite to all Sir George Barlow’s intentions, as expressed when I left Madras. His desire then was, (as has already been shown,) to conciliate and reclaim the officers of the Company’s army, not to render them desperate. I was particularly instructed to point their views to England, to persuade them by every effort to await the decision of the Honourable the Court of Directors, and to prevent their precipitating themselves into a guilt from which they could never retreat. Sir George Barlow appeared satisfied I could effect this through the influence of my general character, and the power of reason, aided by the justice of the cause I had to support : and I most solemnly affirm, that if the Government of Madras desire to insinuate (as the substance of these passages in their letter would imply) that I acted contrary to the instructions of Sir George Barlow, communicated to me in private, that the charge is not founded in fact : and it is fortunate for me that the subsequent communications made by Sir George Barlow’s Secretary, and all the circumstances of this case, completely corroborate and establish the truth of that unqualified assertion, which I have deemed it due to my character to make on this point. A letter from Lieutenant-Colonel Barclay*, dated the 12th of July, and written by

* All the letters from this officer to me while I was at Masulipatam, are in the printed Correspondence.

the Governor's order, in reply to my communications from Masulipatam of the 4th, 5th, and 6th of July, in which I had required further orders, repeats nearly the same sentiments in the same language Sir George Barlow had used before I left Madras. "You cannot," he observes, "render a more acceptable service to the public interests, than by the exertion of your influence and ability in keeping the garrison of Masulipatam firm to their duty, and *satisfying the officers* that it is not less for their interests than it is consistent with their duty, to await the decision of the authorities in England on the several questions which have occasioned so much agitation in the minds of a considerable portion of the army of this establishment."

The same officer wrote to me a short letter on the 20th of July, in which he repeats these sentiments, and concludes by stating, that the greatest service I could render my country, in the actual situation of affairs, was "to keep the garrison in order, and bring the *minds of the officers back to reason.*"

I was authorized, through the same channel, to proceed with the inquiry, (if I thought it advisable,) without waiting for my colleagues, reporting *the result, for the orders of Government*: and a discretion was vested in me to grant a pardon to the non-commissioned officers and privates of the garrison, if I should judge it necessary: but this was evidently in reference to the possible occurrence of a case of extreme emergency, which Colonel Barclay stated the Governor felt assured would not arise.

It will certainly not occur, on a perusal of what I have stated, that there existed the slightest ground for the Government of Fort St. George indulging those expectations which they have declared they did in their letter to the Secret Committee. Is it possible that they could, at the moment, have expected that an officer, instructed as I was, should have commenced his proceedings with "strenuous exertions to excite the men against officers," whom he

was directed to reclaim to their duty by the efforts of reason and argument? And when he had been commanded to carry on a military inquiry, in order to ascertain the nature and degree of the crimes of different individuals, was it reasonable to suppose he would disappoint the very object * for which that was instituted, by a premature attempt to seize and bring ringleaders to trial, on whose guilt he was expressly told "it was his duty to report, and to await the orders of Government?"

It is sufficiently obvious, from what has been stated, that when the Government of Fort St. George wrote those paragraphs (which have been quoted) to the Secret Committee, the object was more to preserve a character of consistence, than to give a correct view of the actual situation of affairs at the moment of the occurrence of those events which are described. The Government, in a subsequent part of the same dispatch, gives a more just account of the character of this proceeding. "We had hitherto," they observe, "continued to expect, that the firmness of our measures, and the good sense of the officers of the army, would have finally succeeded in restoring order: but we were convinced, by the failure of Lieutenant-Colonel Malcolm's mission, by the addresses received from Hyderabad, and by the intelligence received from other quarters, that it was necessary to calculate on the possibility of the officers proceeding to the last extremities of rebellion; and to consider the means of preventing, or finally of meeting, that arduous state of things. The moderate course of conduct pursued by the Government, and which was founded on a favourable opinion of the loyalty of the army, had failed; and we were reduced to the alternative of making the concession demanded by the officers, or subduing them by force."

Is it not evident from this paragraph alone, if other evidences were wanting, that the Government considered

* One of the chief objects for which this proceeding was recommended and adopted, was to gain time.

my mission to Masulipatam as a proceeding which was calculated, by its moderation, to reclaim the officers to their duty; and in no degree whatever related to that course of measures which was subsequently adopted? A most desperate remedy was ultimately applied to the existing evils: and in having recourse to the expedient of exciting the men against their officers, and in impairing the strength if not destroying that link by which almost all are agreed we hold India, the Government of Fort St. George might perhaps be justified by the emergency of the moment; and the controlling authorities in England may be satisfied that this operation, however terrible, was necessary and politic; but assuredly (even if all this is granted) no person can believe that any authority but Government could adopt such a measure. It appears too much to have expected, that an officer sent to moderate the minds of a body of officers, and to reclaim them to their duty by argument and reason, should (*acting upon his own discretion, and without orders*) have adopted this desperate expedient; and that he should have commenced his efforts to persuade the officers to return to their duty, by exciting their men to throw off their authority.

The Government of Madras proceed to state, that it ascribes my failure to an apparent unreasonable and unwise forbearance and attention to the feelings of officers who had, by their acts of violence and aggression, forfeited all claims to consideration; that my time was occupied in negotiations with disorderly committees, and in fruitless attempts to bring officers back to their duty by argument. A reference is made to my reasons for this conduct, as stated in my letters * under date the 4th, 5th, and 6th of July. The measures which I recommended are there stated. These, the Government observed, “ consisted of
“ a modified repeal of the orders of the 1st of May: the
“ restoration to the service, and to their appointments, of

* See Appendix.

“ all the officers whom we had found it necessary to sus-
 “ pend or remove ; with an intimation to the army, that
 “ their claims to Bengal allowances would be brought to
 “ the notice of the Honourable the Court of Directors.”
 It is stated in the conclusion of this paragraph, that I
 returned to Madras, “ having succeeded no further in
 “ accomplishing the objects of my mission, than in pre-
 “ venting the officers from adopting any flagrant acts of
 “ outrage to authority during my residence at Masulipa-
 “ tam.” As my failure is ascribed to an apparent un-
 reasonable and unwise attention to the feelings of officers
 who had by their acts of violence forfeited all claims to
 consideration, may it not be asked, What was the situation
 of these officers when I was deputed by Sir George Barlow
 with instructions to restore them to better feelings, and a
 juster sense of duty, by the efforts of reason and argument ?
 Were they not in a state of outrageous mutiny ? Their
 commanding officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Innes, had been
 placed under sentries, and it was hourly expected they
 would openly throw off even the show of obedience ; and
 yet at such a period I received instructions from Sir George
 Barlow to use every effort of reason and argument to
 reclaim the officers to their duty. When I had, as appears
 from my Journal * and letters, in a great degree succeeded,
 having released Colonel Innes from his arrest, prevailed
 upon a mutinous garrison to abandon its design of imme-
 diately throwing off its allegiance, and of marching to
 Hyderabad, obtained from them a reluctant recognition of
 my authority, and was proceeding with the inquiry which
 I had been directed to make : when all these changes, I
 say, had been effected without *one concession*, by the force
 of that reason which I was directed to employ : and I had
 reported all that I had done ; I received a letter from
 Colonel Barclay, written by order of Sir George Barlow,
 approving of my measures, desiring me to continue my

* Vide Appendix

efforts to reclaim the officers, and to direct their attention to the decision of the authorities in England : and yet, when my success within the few days I was at Masulipatam had been as great as it was possible to expect such means could produce, (for changes in men's minds that are effected by reason and argument must be gradual,) I am accused, in a secret dispatch to my superiors in England, of having failed in my mission, from a forbearance, which, though subsequently termed unreasonable and unwise, I have shown Sir George Barlow deemed, or professed to deem, at the moment of my departure from Madras, wise and politic ; and from an attention to the feelings of those very officers, to whose feelings and reason, when their crimes were at the greatest height, I had been directed, by the verbal instructions of Sir George Barlow, *and the letters* of his secretary, to address myself.

It is stated, that my time was occupied in communication with disorderly committees. To this I reply, that I never recognised any committee in any public or official manner that could either compromise my own authority, or commit the dignity of Government. I communicated, it is true, chiefly with those officers who, from their rank or ability, appeared to have most influence over the rest. Not to have done so, would have been to neglect the employment of those means to which I have shown Sir George Barlow exclusively trusted for my success. I learnt, that there existed a garrison committee, of which every officer was a member, and which could never meet without danger of a mutiny that in its consequences would have precipitated a rupture between the Government and most other parts of the army : an extreme which it was my constant labour to retard, if I could not altogether avert. This committee I endeavoured, by my influence with the senior and more reflecting officers of the garrison, to dissolve ; and I considered my success in this point as a great step towards the restoration of order. The control of the proceedings of the whole became vested in a few senior

officers of comparative moderation, whose minds were more accessible to reason, and whose small numbers rendered them less liable to those violent impressions which produce such mischief in large and turbulent meetings. But all the communications I ever had, either directly or indirectly, with any individual or bodies of officers at Masulipatam, are stated in my journal : and, it will be seen from that, I never made the slightest concession to the repeated demands of the officers of that garrison. That my proceedings were not such as is prescribed by an observation of the regular course of military discipline there can be no doubt : but Government had itself decided that question. They had refrained (for the reasons stated in the dispatch to which I have so often referred) from resorting to the usual means, the employment of force for quelling the mutiny at Masulipatam. I was deputed on what is termed in this very dispatch *a mission*, (a word in itself including a volume,) in order that I might reclaim to duty, by the efforts of reason and argument, the officers of a garrison which were known to be almost to a man unanimously bent on mutiny and opposition to authority ; and yet I am subsequently condemned by the Government that sent me, for having used the only means by which it was possible I could accomplish that object.

The statement made in the same paragraph of this dispatch regarding the character of those measures which I recommended, with a view of terminating the agitation of the army, will, I am assured, not be considered as either fair or liberal, by any person who gives an attentive perusal to my secret and confidential letter to Sir George Barlow upon that subject. I saw, immediately after my arrival at Masulipatam, that some conciliatory measures must be instantly adopted by Government, if it intended to avoid the desperate extreme of a contest with its own army. A contest which, it will be recollected, I never doubted would early terminate in favour of the former : but success, I was convinced, would bring dangers of a hundred fold greater

magnitude than any that could result from issuing the order* that I recommended.

On the succeeding day I wrote another letter†, which contained the following paragraph :

“ I can think of no improvement to this order, except
 “ you conceive the great object of avoiding hostilities
 “ would justify the following addition to it. ‘ Govern-
 “ ment received a representation from a number of the
 “ officers of the coast army, in which they solicit the
 “ equalization of their allowances with those of the offi-
 “ cers of the Bengal army : This is a subject, the con-
 “ sideration of which must exclusively rest with the
 “ Honourable the Court of Directors, under whose notice
 “ this application will, *in course*, be brought, and by
 “ whose decision it will be the duty of the officers of the
 “ coast army to abide.’ ”

I may ask, Whether the order I suggested in my letter of the 5th of July justifies the assertion in the letter from the Madras Government, that I recommended “ the resto-
 “ ration to the service and their appointments of all the
 “ officers the Government had removed.” The terms of the order I suggested were only, that *in the full confidence* that the officers of the coast would immediately abandon their proceedings, Government would *recommend the officers suspended to the Court of Directors*. That it restored Colonels Bell and Chalmers to command, from which they had been removed, and also one or two staff officers who were in a similar predicament. There is assuredly a wide difference between the immediate restoration of all the officers suspended from the service, and the conditional promise of a favourable recommendation to that authority by which, under every circumstance, the fate of these officers must have been decided. With respect to Colonel Bell, I conscientiously believed at the moment, from what I

* See a copy of that order in the Appendix, in a letter to Sir George Barlow, dated 5th July.

† See Appendix.

knew of the case of that valuable officer, that Sir George Barlow would not be reluctant to consent to his restoration; and with regard to that of Colonel Chalmers and one or two others in nearly similar predicaments, I conceived that if any measure of this kind was adopted, it should be as complete as it was possible to make it, without affecting the principle which was to carry *conciliation in act* (words, after what had passed, could be of little or no avail) as far as was possible, without serious injury to the authority and dignity of Government. It was this consideration which led to the communication already quoted from my letter of the 6th of July regarding the first Memorial forwarded by General M'Dowall. What I recommended was nothing more than what had, I believe, been done as an act of course, and was stated in a mode which, though conciliatory, reminded the army of their duty, and gave them no reason to believe more, than that the Court of Directors *would see* the document in question. I think at this moment, as I did at that in which I recommended this measure, that nothing could have been more fortunate than its adoption. I know I differ on this point from very high authorities, who believe that any concessions, (and such they would appear to deem *every act* of conciliation,) however modified and corrected, would have been ruinous to Government: but, in spite of these imposing opinions*, I

* I always thought, and always must think, that there is a wide difference between the seditious combination of a body of officers and a mutiny of soldiers, and that the two cases require a distinct treatment. With the latter there can hardly be two modes of proceeding; with the former there may be various, and all equally safe. They may be restored by the influence of reason, and subdued by the operation of their own feelings. Their minds may be reclaimed by many modes that could not be applied to their men; and there is, in the worst extremes, a character in their opposition that admits more of the application of such remedies than the mad and instinctive action of a mutinous soldiery. These two cases were certainly confounded at Madras; and most of the evils that arose may be imputed to the fallacy of treating a seditious combination of officers as a mutiny of soldiers.

must ask reflecting men to look near the subject, to examine the evil which this measure could have produced, consider the ills that were at that moment to be expected, and to think on those that have resulted from the complete success to authority that the most sanguine could have anticipated, and then to pronounce their cool and deliberate judgment. There certainly could be no apprehension entertained that this order would have strengthened, to any purpose of immediate violence or opposition, the discontented and turbulent: but the danger stated is, that those would have deemed it a victory. Let us for a moment suppose they had been led, by their first feelings of joy at their escape from a punishment which they had merited, to have considered it as such, what permanent effect could such a feeling produce? what had they gained? *Nothing*. The fate of the officers who had been suspended remained to be decided by the Directors; with whom it must, under all circumstances, ultimately rest. Their Memorial for an increase of allowances was to be brought before the same body, but without even a promise from Government of any recommendation. There was an end to their combinations and committees*, and, with them, to all those threats they had thrown out against the local Government, which, it was evident, would acquire such a vast accession of strength by the spirit of moderation and conciliation which it had shown, as would fully enable it to enforce the most severe discipline, and particularly in all cases which were attended with a danger of the recurrence of evils of a similar character to those it had so recently encountered. The majority, indeed, of the officers of the army, and all the most re-

* The danger that had been incurred was sufficient to authorize Government to take the most decisive measures to guard against the revival of such combinations against authority: and though numbers who might have merited punishment had escaped, *not one object of benefit to either individuals or the army at large had been attained*; and it is therefore quite extravagant to assert such a termination could ever have tended to encourage future proceedings of a similar nature.

spectable, had seen at this moment the desperate situation into which they had unwarily suffered themselves to be led. They would have had no sentiments but those of gratitude to a Government, whose consideration had presented them with the means of escape. All these would, if such an indulgence had been shown to their errors, have ranged themselves with enthusiasm on the side of Government, and would have been the most forward to retrieve the character of the service, by the punishment of those whom a hardened spirit of disaffection and turbulence had led to continue in opposition. That such a class would also have remained, there is no doubt; and Government might have been satisfied, at the moment this measure was taken, that future punishments would have corrected any erroneous opinions regarding the true motives that had induced so generous and politic a proceeding.

The situation of affairs at the period stated was such, that though there could be little doubt of the ultimate success of Government even under the violent course it pursued; yet that did not appear likely to be attained, if extremes were resorted to, without bloodshed. His Majesty's regiments at Hyderabad* and Travancore would be, if a contest was precipitated, in the utmost danger; and if the combat between our European and native troops had once commenced, feelings would have been instantly engendered, the dreadful action of which no man could calculate. That these results were averted, was owing to a variety of causes, very little, if at all, connected with either the foresight or vigour of the Government of Fort St. George.

* The account of what occurred at this station on the day General Close made the noble effort he did to carry the orders of the Government of Madras into execution, shows the desperate hazard that was incurred. If, says an officer of high rank, during the period that between four and five thousand troops were in a state of mutinous violence and uproar, "one musket had gone off by accident, not a man of his Majesty's 33d regiment would have been left alive, and a general massacre of almost all Europeans would have been the most certain result."

But, passing over what was likely to be the probable results of the desperate extreme to which the Government of Fort St. George had resort, (though it is by a consideration of these results that the merit of my suggestions should be tried,) let us contemplate what has occurred, from the most favourable issue that could have been anticipated. The officers of the coast army must long continue to feel that degradation which they have endured. Years must elapse before the action of this feeling will cease to produce disunion and discontent in that establishment. But these are comparatively light considerations, as all questions must be, connected with a body of men over whom we must always have such strong ties and efficient control as the European officers of our armies in India. It is the firm allegiance and continued obedience of the natives of which the strength of those armies is composed, which forms by far the most important principle in our government of this great Empire. This can never be denied: and it is as true, that in that almost religious respect with which the sepoy of India has hitherto regarded his European officer, consisted what has been always deemed the chief link of this great chain of duty and obedience. That link (as far as relates to the sepoys of the coast establishment) * has, if not broken, been greatly shattered and impaired. A temporary object of importance, no doubt, has been gained by a sacrifice of one a thousand times the value of the object. The dignity of the local Government of Fort St. George has been saved from an imputation of weakness, by a measure which threatens the most serious danger to the future safety of our whole empire in India. An evil, for which there were many and certain remedies, has been averted, by incurring one, the progress of which (from its character,) cannot be

* No consideration of this question can be local or limited. If a successful example of disobedience or rebellion was exhibited by our native troops on the Madras establishment, its baneful effects would not be limited to that part of our possessions.

calculated ; which is, from its nature, irremediable ; and of which we know nothing, except that it is efficient to our destruction.

The Government of Fort St. George appear resolved to withhold the expression of their sense of that benefit which the substance of their dispatch obviously shows flowed from my observation and conduct. Sir George Barlow, through his secretary, Lieutenant-Colonel Barclay, to me, under date the 12th of July, states, that, “ *in consequence of the “ information which I had communicated”* from Masulipatam, he had ordered the assembling of a considerable force near Madras ; and it is to this precautionary measure, adopted upon my information, to which the Government of Madras ascribes in a great degree the success of its subsequent proceedings : and it seems also to have entirely escaped the recollection of the Government, that if I had not, by my exertions, reclaimed the garrison of Masulipatam from their design of marching to join the Hyderabad force, and prevented from the 4th till the 22d of July their committing any outrage, that a great part of the army would, during that eventful period, have been precipitated into a rupture before the Government had time for executing any plan for the defeat of their designs. I do not mention these circumstances with a view of claiming any merit from my exertions at that period ; but to show that the same principle, which led to an unfounded insinuation against my character, has caused an omission of every fact that could bring my services to the favourable notice of my superiors.

I shall resume my narrative, and state shortly what share I had in the transactions at Madras, from my return from Masulipatam till the arrival of Lord Minto at that settlement.

I have already stated that Sir George Barlow directed me, before I went to Masulipatam, to write the draft of a letter to the commanding officers at Hyderabad and Jaulnah, and had approved of what I had written: I had

carried a copy of that draft to Masulipatam, and had, on my first violent discussion with the officers of that garrison, adduced it as a proof of the moderation and temper with which the Governor had acted. In a short period, however, it appeared that no such document had reached Hyderabad, and I was exposed to the charge of intended deception. I addressed a note to Colonel Barclay the day after I arrived at Madras, stating this fact, and begged that he would, by his answer, enable me to repel such a charge*. I received the following reply, dated Fort St. George, 28th July 1809.

“ DEAR MALCOLM,

“ I have just received your note of
 “ this date. I recollect perfectly well, that before your
 “ embarkation for Masulipatam you put into my hands,
 “ to be delivered to Sir George Barlow, a paper in the
 “ form of a draft of a letter to be written to Colonel Montresor, on the subject of addresses from the Hyderabad
 “ subsidiary force. I delivered the paper according to
 “ your desire. I know that Sir George Barlow did not
 “ approve of it; and I believe that no letter of the nature
 “ of it was sent to Colonel Montresor.

“ I remain, &c. &c.

(Signed)

“ R. BARCLAY.”

* I spoke to Colonel Barclay before I wrote upon this subject, and he said he would show my note to Sir G. Barlow, and obtain me an answer that would vindicate my character from the charge to which the Governor's change of resolution had made me liable. This circumstance left me without a doubt that the cautious reply I received from that officer was by the direction of Sir G. Barlow. Indeed, I was satisfied that this excellent and respectable officer, for whom I have always entertained the same sentiments of esteem and friendship, never acted in any part of those transactions, in which his name appears, but by the specific instructions or orders of the Governor.

Greatly surprised at this answer, I wrote the following note :

“ DEAR BARCLAY,

“ There must be a mistake, as the
“ draft I gave you was written, by direction of Sir George
“ Barlow, from a memorandum now in my possession,
“ which I had read to Sir George not half an hour before,
“ and of which he at that moment approved, or he would
“ not have desired me to put it in the shape of a letter.
“ I beg the nature of the request I made in my note of
“ yesterday may not be misunderstood. I am aware Sir
“ George Barlow, when he asked my opinion on the
“ question of the reply to be made to the representation
“ from the Hyderabad force, might, even if he approved
“ my suggestion at the moment, be led by a thousand con-
“ siderations to alter his sentiments before the tappal* was
“ dispatched ; but as I sailed for Masulipatam under the
“ impression that no change had occurred in his opinion,
“ and made use of the information I had upon the subject,
“ to satisfy misguided men that they were in error regard-
“ ing his disposition towards them, and by doing so have
“ subjected myself to a charge of *intended deception*, I
“ was naturally anxious to clear my character from this
“ imputation; and the circumstances were evidently such,
“ that it appeared in my mind I would be enabled to do
“ so without the slightest embarrassment to either you or
“ Sir George Barlow. If, indeed, I had not been satisfied
“ of this, I should never have written, at a moment like
“ the present, upon such a subject. Your note conveys
“ no idea but that I had, without any previous communi-
“ cation with Sir George Barlow, sent a draft of a letter
“ to him through you, of which he disapproved : and so
“ far from answering the object for which it was solicited,

“ could make no impression but that my assertions were
 “ founded on an ill-grounded presumption of my possess-
 “ ing an influence over the judgment of Sir G. Barlow.
 “ *This, you must be aware, is exactly opposite to the cir-*
 “ *cumstances of the case, as I have stated them to you at*
 “ *the period of their occurrence ;* for I told you it was by
 “ desire of Sir George Barlow I gave you the draft.

“ I have felt it due to myself to say so much, but am
 “ not desirous a word more should pass on the subject.
 “ I trust it never has and never can be supposed, that I
 “ could either in word or deed do any thing that could
 “ occasion the slightest embarrassment upon any question,
 “ much less upon one of so personal a nature.

“ Your's sincerely,

(Signed)

“ JOHN MALCOLM.”

To this communication I received the following more satisfactory reply :

“ DEAR MALCOLM,

“ I have been so busy for the last two
 “ days, that I could not refer to the answer which I wrote
 “ on the 28th ultimo to your letter of that date, respecting
 “ the draft of the letter which you gave me for Sir George
 “ Barlow previous to your embarkation for Masulipatam.

“ I now find that it is not mentioned in that answer that
 “ you had prepared the draft at Sir George Barlow's de-
 “ sire, after a long conversation with him on the subject ;
 “ *but I recollect perfectly well that you told me so when*
 “ *you gave me the draft.*

“ I remain, &c. &c.

(Signed)

“ R. BARCLAY,

“ M. S.”

“ Fort St. George,
 1st August, 1809.”

This trifling but irritating circumstance confirmed me in the resolution I had taken regarding my own conduct. I had come from Bombay with the intention of joining my station at Mysore ; but I had received, when at Masulipatam, a letter from Lord Minto reappointing me to Persia ; and I had, since I reached Madras, been directed by a letter from his Lordship, under date the 15th of July, to await his arrival at that place. With such orders I could only offer my service as a volunteer to Sir George Barlow ; and I had little encouragement to do that. He had, it is true, at the interview I had on the 27th, expressed in a cold manner his wish that I should go to Mysore ; but that wish had never been repeated : he had made no further communication to me since my return ; nor had I even been required to give that information which he knew I possessed. Under such circumstances, I felt that it was my duty to obey the orders of the Governor-General, and not to intrude my voluntary services when they were evidently not sought. In consequence of this determination I addressed a private letter to Sir George Barlow on the 1st of August ; in which, after explaining very fully the sentiments by which my conduct was regulated, I offered the following observations on what had passed, and what might be expected from the measure he had adopted :

“ You are no stranger to that enthusiasm with which I
 “ embarked in the present scene : and, whatever has been
 “ my success, I am assured that you are satisfied I have
 “ not been deficient in zeal in the exertion of my humble
 “ endeavours to reclaim my brother officers to temper and
 “ to the path of duty : and I indulged, to the very moment
 “ of my arrival at Madras from Masulipatam, a hope that
 “ this great object of your solicitude would be effected
 “ without having recourse to coercive measures ; or at
 “ least that a great proportion of the officers of the Com-
 “ pany’s army (including almost all who had weight and
 “ influence with the men) would be recovered, and that

“ the early submission of the rest would have been a cer-
 “ tain consequence of the return of their seniors to their
 “ duty.

“ The highly criminal violence of the force at Hyder-
 “ abad, which is known to the whole army to be guided
 “ by weak and wrong-headed men, has unfortunately
 “ precipitated a very different issue to that which I was
 “ so sanguine as to expect. That force has declared that
 “ they speak the sentiments of the whole, or at least those
 “ of a great proportion of the Madras army ; though it is
 “ evident, at the moment they made such an assertion,
 “ they could not have received an answer from any
 “ station to that absurd paper which they term an *Ulti-*
 “ *matum*, which they have had the audacity to forward
 “ to Government ; but which, I conscientiously believe,
 “ would, if it had been publicly promulgated, have been
 “ disowned and disclaimed by great numbers of the senior
 “ and most respectable officers at every station in the
 “ army. I can speak positively with regard to some,
 “ indeed all of the senior officers of the garrison of Masu-
 “ lipatam upon this subject, and they have lately been
 “ considered as the most violent of the whole. I am far
 “ from meaning (such meaning would, indeed, be as con-
 “ trary to that high respect I have ever entertained for
 “ your character, as to the duties of my situation) to offer
 “ even an opinion on the wisdom and policy of that step
 “ which Government has lately adopted with the Com-
 “ pany’s officers of this establishment. The test these
 “ were required to sign was, as far as I understood it, a
 “ mere repetition of the obligations of the commission
 “ that every one of them held ; and the only rational ob-
 “ jection that could be made to it by men who were
 “ devoted to their duty, and who had never deviated
 “ from it in thought, word, or deed, was, that it was un-
 “ necessary ; that it was, with regard to them at least, an
 “ act of supererogation, and one that had a taint of suspi-
 “ cion in it. These were, indeed, the feelings that passed

in my mind when this paper was first put into my
 hands ; but they were instantly subdued by a paramount
 sense of public duty ; and I signed it to show (as far as
 my example could show) my perfect acquiescence in a
 measure which the Government I served had thought
 proper to adopt : but I am satisfied it was not the terms
 of this paper which led the great majority of the Com-
 pany's officers both in camp and at the Mount, and in
 the garrison, to refuse their signatures ; it was the man-
 ner in which it was presented, and the circumstances
 by which the whole proceeding was accompanied.
 The minds of the most honourable, and of those most
 attached to Government and to their Country, revolted
 more at the mode than the substance of the act : they
 felt (perhaps erroneously) that they were disgraced,
 because the manner in which their consent was asked
 showed they were not in the least trusted : and this was,
 I am assured, one of the chief causes of their almost
 general rejection of this proposed test of fide'ity. It
 appears to me of the greatest importance that you
 should be aware of every feeling that this proceeding
 excited ; and it is in discharge of the duties of that
 friendship with which you have ever honoured me
 that I have stated my sentiments so freely upon this
 subject. I am very intimately acquainted with a great
 number of the officers of whom I speak : some of them
 would, I am certain, have given their lives for Govern-
 ment at the very moment they refused to give a pledge
 which they thought, from the mode in which it was
 proposed, reflected upon their honour ; and others, who
 had unfortunately gone to a certain extent in the late
 culpable and unmilitary proceedings, but who viewed
 the criminal excesses of some of their brother officers
 with undisguised horror and indignation, would, I am
 assured, if it had been possible for Government to have
 pardoned what was past, and to have expressed, in in-
 dulgent language, its kind intentions for the future,

“ have been the most forward in their efforts to punish
 “ those who, by an unwarrantable perseverance in a guilty
 “ career, merited all the wrath of the state : but, unfortu-
 “ nately, (though such an intention, I am assured, never
 “ entered into your mind,) an almost general sentiment
 “ prevailed, that it was meant the service should be
 “ destroyed by the first blow, and that all were therefore
 “ included in one general mass, as just objects of suspicion
 “ and disgrace.

“ I am far from defending such an interpretation of this
 “ measure of Government ; I have only stated what I
 “ consider to be the fact, and explained, as far as I could,
 “ those causes by which I believe it to have been pro-
 “ duced : their operation is, I fear, now almost irremedi-
 “ able, and events must take their course. I know (and
 “ my personal conduct has proved it,) that my brother
 “ officers are deeply wrong ; and I am quite heart-broken
 “ when I reflect on the consequences to themselves and
 “ country which the guilt of some of them is likely to
 “ produce. I need not assure you of my sincere happi-
 “ ness at the success which has hitherto attended the exe-
 “ cution of the measure you have adopted, and I
 “ anxiously hope it may meet with no opposition. I
 “ have never doubted the success of this measure, if it was
 “ resorted to, as far as related to the accomplishment of
 “ its immediate object ; and I most earnestly pray that
 “ my judgment may have deceived me with regard to the
 “ collateral and remote consequences by which I have
 “ always deemed it likely to be attended.”

The only reply I received to this communication, was
 by a note from Colonel Barclay, under date the 2d of
 August, to acquaint me, that, for the reasons I had stated,
 “ Sir George Barlow would not press me to go to Mysore,
 “ and that it was the Governor’s intention to reply to the
 “ other parts of my letter at more leisure.” He never,
 however, condescended to make such a reply, or indeed to
 honour me with any subsequent communication whatever,

either personally, or through the medium of any of his staff: and an event occurred sometime afterwards, which produced such irritation upon his mind, as to make him deny me the common civilities due to an officer in my public station. Some time after my return to Madras, an address* from the inhabitants of Madras to Sir George Barlow was drawn up, and sent in circulation. This address was said to have originated with a staff officer of rank. None of the usual forms of convening the inhabitants had taken place; and the mode adopted to obtain signatures was still more extraordinary than this glaring departure from common usage. Gentlemen of the first respectability in the civil service informed me, that when they had testified an aversion to sign this address unless parts of it were modified, they had received such plain intimations regarding the consequences with which their refusal would be attended, as left them in no doubt but that they must either sacrifice their opinions, or bring immediate distress, and perhaps final ruin, upon themselves and their families. Under these circumstances some had signed; while others had actually absented themselves for days from their own houses, to escape the painful importunities to which they were exposed. It is necessary here to state, that almost all ranks were ready at this moment to come forward with a public declaration of duty and attachment to Government, and of their readiness to sacrifice their lives and fortunes in its defence; but a strong objection was entertained by many to that part of the circulated address which cast reflections upon that body of officers who had embraced the alternative of retiring for a period from their duty, rather than sign the test which Government had proposed. It was said, and with great truth, that at the moment when Government professed its desire to reclaim these officers to a more active allegiance, nothing could be more unwise and useless than exasperat-

* See a copy of this in the Appendix.

ing their minds to a sullen perseverance in error, by an abuse of them in an address signed by a few civil and military inhabitants of Madras ; and that it was perfectly evident such an expression of sentiment could only have the effect of widening a breach it was most desirable to close, and of creating (by exciting discussion) further dissensions and difference of opinion among those of whose devoted attachment to Government there could be no doubt. Such were my own sentiments regarding this address : and while I foresaw the mischief it was calculated to produce, I could divine no possible good from its agitation. It was sent for my signature, with the following note from Colonel Leith :

“ The accompanying address is submitted to Lieutenant-Colonel Malcolm for his consideration, which, as soon as he is done with, it is requested he will return to the bearer.”

To this I immediately sent an answer, as follows :

“ Lieutenant-Colonel Malcolm returns the address to Lieutenant-Colonel Leith. He has not signed it, for reasons very foreign to any want of respect and regard for Sir George Barlow, or of duty, obedience, and attachment to that constituted authority of his country under which he is placed.”

I cannot recollect that I ever in my life took a step in which my mind was more decided respecting its propriety, on every public and private principle, than upon this occasion. I considered the address, both from the irregular mode in which it was brought forward, the unbecoming means resorted to in order to obtain signatures, and the expressions contained in it, as an unwise measure, which had originated in that spirit of undistinguishing violence which I conscientiously believed had been the chief means of producing a crisis that this act was calculated to inflame. It did not appear to my mind to be attended with the slightest benefit, for it brought no new friends to Government : and though it could not shake the

attachment to the legitimate authority of [their country of any persons whose principles were fixed, its tendency was to excite jealousy and division among those who were most warmly attached to order and Government : and among these, however actuated by a sense of public duty, it was natural that a difference of *private opinion* should exist. Some were, no doubt, more disposed than others to approve violent and unqualified proceedings, or perhaps less disposed to maintain that independence of mind which no man should ever be censured for maintaining upon such points ; otherwise addresses of this stamp would not only lose their value, but become tests of the most odious and invidious nature that a tyrannic Government could invent, to degrade or alienate the minds of its subjects.

I certainly was most reluctant to believe that this measure had Sir George Barlow's sanction : it seemed to me of a character opposite to all the principles and habits of his life : nor could I forget those grounds which he had assumed when he recently refused to permit me to frame an address of a very opposite tendency, and one that would, in all probability, have prevented those evils which this seemed calculated to inflame. I never was more surprised than when (some days subsequent to my note to Colonel Leith) I was informed by a confidential officer of the Governor's staff, to whom I mentioned what I had done, and the reasons by which I was actuated, that the address, from the first, had the Governor's complete sanction and approbation.

In closing this subject, it may be necessary to state, that this address, after all the unbecoming efforts that were used to obtain signatures, had only fifty-seven names affixed to it ; among which, twenty-four only were civilians and inhabitants of Madras : the remainder were officers of his Majesty's service, with a few of the staff of the Company's army. If all those who did not sign it were not actually considered as disaffected, they were deemed by those whom this measure had formed into a party, as lukewarm in the public cause. This species of injustice is too

common to such times, to afford any individual a right of complaint ; but there should be a difference between the momentary feeling of a violent party during a period of commotion, and the deliberate sentiments of a public ruler. I have already mentioned, that the crime of having presumed, though in the most respectful manner, to act conformably to the dictates of my own judgment on a question which was referred to me as a private individual, subjected me, at the moment, to the loss of those civilities from Sir George Barlow to which I had a right from my public station ; and I did not require the evidence I have now obtained, from the publication of the letter from the Government of Madras to the Secret Committee, to satisfy my mind that my character has since had to war with all the weight that belongs to the influence and opinion of Sir George Barlow : but, great as this odds may appear to many, it can excite no apprehension in a mind fortified as mine is by a conscious sense of never having deviated from the path of private rectitude, or public duty.

Though, subsequent to this transaction, all personal intercourse between Sir George Barlow and me had ceased, I could not look with indifference on the events that occurred ; and when the mad desperation of the officers of the two corps which marched from Chittledroog to proceed to Seringapatam led to an action, I thought the opportunity favourable to close this horrid scene in a manner every way suited to the dignity of Government. I first communicated my sentiments upon this point to Lieutenant-Colonel Barclay, and afterwards ventured to address the following note to Sir George Barlow, expecting that the importance of the subject, and a consideration of former acquaintance and regard, would at least obtain a pardon for such a liberty.

“ DEAR SIR,

“ I wrote a note to Colonel Barclay some hours ago, which he informed me he sent to you for perusal.
 “ I have since received a letter from Masulipatam, at

“ which place they are between hope and despair ; but
 “ have refrained from further guilt, and mean to refrain,
 “ unless called upon by those who have now, thank God !
 “ shown them an example of returning to their duty. I
 “ am assured you will not blame that extreme anxiety
 “ which makes me intrude, unasked, my opinion at a
 “ moment like the present. I have, I am satisfied, the
 “ fullest information of the real temper of this army at this
 “ present period ; and, if I am not the most deceived man
 “ in the world, there is an opportunity given, by the con-
 “ duct of the Hyderabad force*, which enables you to
 “ combine the immediate and complete settlement of these
 “ afflicting troubles with the advancement of the reputa-
 “ tion, power, and dignity, of Government. I am aware
 “ of the very deep guilt into which almost all have gone ;
 “ some in intention, others in act : but the force at Hyder-
 “ abad, who, since the 1st of May, have been the cause
 “ of all the present evils, and who lately insulted Govern-
 “ ment with demands, are now supplicating clemency : a
 “ dreadful † example has occurred in Mysore, which will
 “ make a lasting impression on both officers and sepoy,
 “ of the horrors to which such illegal combinations lead.
 “ If it were possible to close the scene here, an impression
 “ must be made that will for ever prevent the repetition of
 “ such crimes ; and the effect of shame and contrition,
 “ which the clemency and magnanimity of Government
 “ must produce, will have more effect upon the minds of
 “ liberal men than twenty examples. Men’s minds will
 “ be at once reclaimed, and they will be fixed in their
 “ attachment by a better motive than fear. But this is
 “ not all. The officers at Hyderabad, like those of other
 “ stations, act at the present crisis entirely from the im-
 “ pulse of passion and feeling ; and they fly, as I have

* The officers of that force had signed the test.

† It was considered, at the moment when this note was written, that almost the whole of the two corps from Chittledroog had been destroyed.

“ witnessed, from one extreme to another, with a facility
 “ that is not to be credited by persons under the influence
 “ of calm reason. Such persons can never be depended
 “ upon, whatever pledges they make, while any strong
 “ causes of agitation remain : and no act, therefore, which
 “ does not embrace the whole, can give that complete
 “ security and tranquillity which is the object of desire.
 “ If a single question [of irritation and inflammation be
 “ left, it is a spark which may again create a general ex-
 “ plosion.

“ You will, I am assured, pardon this communication.
 “ Nothing could have induced me to the freedom, but a
 “ conviction that this is one of those happy moments
 “ when all the dangers that threaten us may be dissipated.
 “ If you can, on the grounds of your granting that
 “ clemency to supplication, which you never would to
 “ demand ; of military justice being satisfied, and the
 “ army lessoned, in the dreadful example that has been
 “ made in Mysore ; and of your thinking it not deroga-
 “ tory, at such a moment, to grant a general amnesty,
 “ and to bury the past in oblivion : desiring all those who
 “ mean to perform their duty to join their corps, and
 “ those who do not, to consider themselves out of the ser-
 “ vice ; and proclaiming every man a traitor, and liable
 “ to immediate military execution, who opposes legal
 “ authority one hour after the receipt of this order, I will
 “ answer with my life for the immediate re-establishment
 “ of the public authority on more secure grounds than it
 “ perhaps ever rested. Such an act as this will, I am
 “ assured, while it advances the fame and dignity of
 “ Government, raise your own reputation in the highest
 “ degree ; and you will receive, as you will merit, the
 “ blessings of thousands, with the applause of your
 “ country.

“ I have perhaps already said too much upon this
 “ subject ; and I could adduce many more equally for-
 “ cible reasons to those I have urged ; but I shall not

“ trouble you further. If you think the suggestions I
 “ have offered worthy of any attention, I shall attend
 “ you, and state them. With regard to the success of
 “ this measure I cannot have a doubt. If all did not im-
 “ mediately submit, they would be completely disunited :
 “ and those that ventured to oppose (if there were any
 “ such), would be the proper objects for example.

“ I am, with great respect,

“ Your obedient servant,

(Signed)

“ JOHN MALCOLM.”

The receipt of this note was not even acknowledged ; and it was, of course, the last communication I made to Sir George Barlow. When Lord Minto arrived at Madras, I laid every part of my conduct before him. I gave him every information I could regarding the actual state of affairs ; and submitted with freedom my sentiments of those principles which should govern his final judgment on the important points that remained for his decision. He expressed no dissatisfaction at my conduct ; he thanked me for my information ; and though he differed with me in many of the opinions I stated, he did not condemn me for that difference : on the contrary, he appeared pleased with the liberty I took in offering my advice with such boldness and freedom. The whole of the manner, as well as the substance of the conduct, which this able and virtuous nobleman observed towards me on this occasion, had the effect of reconciling my mind to further exertions in the public service ; from which, I confess, it was, before his arrival, much, if not wholly alienated. I had been employed, as I have shown, in a confidential manner, without being trusted. I had been deputed on a delicate and arduous mission, and recommended to pursue a system which mixed firmness with conciliation, while it proposed to reclaim by reason more than by terror ; and before any time was given for the operation of the measures I had

taken, a new course was adopted, grounded on coercion alone : and because I had not by inspiration divined that such would be the ultimate result, I now discover that I have been most unjustly censured, as disappointing the expectations of the Government : and it has been insinuated (a direct charge would have been too bold) that I acted contrary to orders. I trust I have refuted every charge of this nature : and if some should continue to think I have committed errors ; none, I am assured, can accuse me of crimes. Let it be recollected that I was placed, throughout all the transactions I have described, in a most painful and difficult situation. I had no prescribed or distinct duty to perform ; I was called upon by Sir G. Barlow to exert, in the manner I thought best adapted to the end, all the influence of my character to reclaim men with whom he thought I had great weight ; and he appeared for a period to give me his confidence, and to trust implicitly to my discretion and judgment. I was all along sensible to the full danger of the situation in which I placed myself ; but was too earnest in the cause to attend to prudence : and I may conscientiously add, that I never was more assured of meeting approbation from Sir George Barlow than at that moment when I found myself estranged from all share in his confidence, and treated with the most pointed neglect. But I had myself to reproach. I should certainly have foreseen that my efforts would have been useless, when combined with a system of measures to which they bore little or no affinity ; and I was (I must confess it,) wrong in supposing, for a moment, that my advice, or any arguments I could adduce, could, under any circumstances, permanently divert the Governor of Fort St. George into a course that mixed feeling, and consideration for human failings, with the established maxims of his ordinary rule. I should have known better ; and in fact I did, as my letters * before I went to Madras prove :

* Vide letters to Lords Wellesley and Wellington, pages 64, 65.

but, when on the spot, my heart conquered my head, and I tried an impossibility : but I never shall regret the attempt, nor blush for having recommended principles of action that are congenial to the best feelings of human nature, that are calculated to make Government an object of rational attachment, and to give the mind a generous pride in submission and obedience ; and which, so far from being of dangerous example, and subversive of order, are familiar in the practice to every free state, and have never been rejected in the most despotic, when such have been governed by great and wise rules.

APPENDIX.

No. I.

*Copies of Letters from Lieutenant-Colonel MALCOLM
during his Stay at Masulipatam.*

TO SIR GEORGE BARLOW.

Masulipatam, 4th July, 1809. .

DEAR SIR,

I ARRIVED here early this morning. Nothing can be worse than the state in which matters were. Major Storey seems a weak man, and the garrison was commanded by a committee of violent spirited young men. They deliberated, after my arrival, on the measures they were to pursue; and were at first, I am assured, disposed to resist my authority: they next made a demand of an act of amnesty for all late proceedings in the garrison of Masulipatam. This, I told them, it was quite impossible for me to grant; that a regular military proceeding had been instituted, to inquire into late proceedings; and that I could declare, it was the intention of Government to order a court martial to try any person this court thought ought to be tried; but I could say no more. They had, I found, pledged themselves most deeply to resist Government, to almost all the stations in the army*, and had

* I have not complete evidence of this fact.

received the strongest assurances of support from Hyderabad ; and I believe a movement towards that quarter was intended in a day or two. The public avowal of their determination to resist Government made them feel reluctant to relax their opposition ; and their fear of suffering for what has past, rendered them quite desperate. They, however, after a conference of some hours, became more reasonable, and professed their obedience to my authority, and their acquiescence in the inquiry that had been ordered. I issued the general orders, and directed the instant release of Lieutenant-Colonel Innes from arrest. I saw him. He is no doubt a very good, but he is a weak man. He feels naturally very indignant at what has passed, but will be moderate in his conduct. I could have had no idea of the length to which matters have proceeded, before to-day. An organized opposition to Government was to have commenced as the day after to-morrow ; and, in the present temper of men, I know not if that event can be avoided. Nothing can be so unfortunate as the occurrences of the mutiny here, as numbers have been hurried into guilt, from which they see no escape but in all being equally involved. This is a melancholy state to have minds in. I have certainly succeeded in making them abandon their violent measures for the moment ; but a relapse is to be apprehended ; particularly as it would appear difficult, if not impossible, to tranquillize them by an act of amnesty. What am I to do, in case of an extreme ? The combination is general. Excuse this hurried note. I have not a moment.

I am, with great respect,

Your obedient servant,

(Signed)

JOHN MALCOLM.

TO SIR GEORGE BARLOW.

Masulipatam, 5th July, 1809.

DEAR SIR,

I wrote you a hurried letter last night. I have since come to the knowledge of many additional facts, and have had some time to reflect on what I have seen and heard; and I should be as wanting in my duty to you as to my country, if I was withheld, by any motive whatever, in stating my sentiments in the most undisguised manner on the present state of affairs: and whether you coincide in my opinion or not, you can have no doubt regarding those motives that lead me to express, in that sacred confidence, which your knowledge of my character authorizes me to use, the conviction of my judgment on the steps necessary to be taken upon the present unfortunate crisis.

I have now seen the concerted plans of almost the whole of the army against the authority of Government; and can say, with almost an assurance that I am correct, that there is not one Company's corps, from Cape Comorin to Ganjam, that is not implicated in the general guilt, and that is not pledged to rise against Government, unless what they deem their grievances are redressed. Be assured, that no commanding officer, whatever they may write, has any real authority over their corps¹: and though in some places (where there are King's regiments) they are more guarded, their resolution is the same; and they mean to act, the moment the example is shown by those parts of the army whom they consider as most likely to be successful in their first efforts. The Hyderabad and Jaulnah force are chiefly looked to, and the northern division of the army; and the European regiment has, from what they style its regimental grievances, become the corps from which they expect the first act of opposition. Its late proceedings

* This chiefly alludes to the officers of the corps.

are applauded and confirmed by the force at Hyderabad : and I know it was intended, if there had been the slightest indication of any coercive measures, or even had the Commander-in-Chief arrived, to have marched this corps and the two sepoy battalions in the division to effect a junction with the Hyderabad force, in order to organize an army to commence hostilities with Government. Their march was to have taken place as to-day ; and it was, for five hours after my arrival, a subject of warm discussion, Whether I should be recognised or not as their commanding officer ? And, after stating every thing a man could state to reclaim them to better feeling, I was obliged to give them the choice of the extreme, of either immediately submitting to the order of Government, or of opposing it. They chose at last the former ; but placed it on the grounds of that general respect which was paid by them, and all their brother officers, to my character. I did not think it necessary to fight regarding the grounds of their obedience on this point, being satisfied with the substance, and particularly as I had received this proof after they were informed of my sentiments and intentions. Though an immediate open rebellion against Government has been prevented by my arrival at Masulipatam, the danger is not past ; and we must not deceive ourselves, or any longer evade this serious question. The officers of the Company's army on the coast are no doubt at this moment in a state of actual insurrection against the Government ; and this combination against authority is every moment maturing and spreading wider. I have seen the letter * from the Bombay army to that of the coast, and it is unqualified in its condemnation of the orders of the 1st of May, and its promise of support. Several private letters have been received from Bengal. An address from that army, to the same effect as that of Bombay, is expected : at all events they appear certain that no human power will lead the Bengal

* This was afterwards discovered to be a forgery.

troops to act against them. They calculate upon opposition from the King's army, and their plans are concerted to meet it. These deluded men are aware of the ruin they are bringing upon themselves ; but their infatuation is so great, that they are reconciled to their ruin, in the expectation that it will equally involve that Government against which their rage has been so industriously and so successfully excited. All attempts to reason with men in the state of mind they are in, appears vain. Even the circulation of the able letter from Bengal is, as I apprehended, likely to inflame, instead of appeasing their passions. It is so true, that when men's minds have gone completely wrong, that which ought to put them right has, in general, a direct contrary effect : and the fact is, that all those correct principles and loyal feelings, which are so eloquently expressed in the letter from the supreme Government, but serve to impress them more forcibly with a sense of that guilt into which they have so precipitately rushed, and to render them more desperate in their proceedings, as they can (after what has passed, and particularly late events at this place,) only see individual safety in all being equally involved in the deepest guilt. I entreat you to be persuaded that these sentiments are quite general ; or, at least, that the few who do not entertain them have neither the means nor the courage to oppose their progress ; and allow themselves, with an indefensible passiveness, to be borne along with the tide. Under such a state of circumstances, all hopes of this spirit of insurrection subsiding must be at an end. Some steps must instantly be taken ; and no good can result from the application of any partial remedy. The disease is general, and the remedy must be so also. It remains with you to decide on the measures that are to be adopted. The first and most military, though not, perhaps, the most political, that suggests itself, is the employment of actual force. In such a contest, however, not only the means must be calculated, but the result ; and, as far as I can judge, success, even in this

extreme, would not save us from the most baneful consequences. It seems therefore not wise to have resort to such a measure, till every other that it is possible for Government to take, without the annihilation of its own power and dignity, has been tried and failed. Unqualified concession to the demands of the army, either in dismissing public servants of Government, or in rescinding its orders, would be a virtual resignation of its power, and cannot therefore be made. It would, indeed, be better and more honourable, if *matters were at the worst*, that Government should fall by any hands than its own. Should Government not resolve on having immediate resort to force, one line only remains that could at the present moment afford a rational hope of the necessity of having recourse to that extreme being avoided, or at least of its being resorted to with advantage ; which is, to meet the crisis at once, by a general order to something of the following purport :

“ Government finds, with concern, that it can no longer
“ indulge that sanguine hope which it once entertained,
“ that the irritation which a variety of causes have combined to produce in the minds of the Company’s army
“ on the coast would subside ; and as it is satisfied that the
“ evils which must result from the existence of those combinations against its authority, that are now formed in
“ almost every station, will, if suffered to continue, be as
“ injurious to the public interests, as if those by whom
“ these proceedings are carried on were in a state of open
“ hostility to Government ; it feels compelled to anticipate every extreme that can occur, and to publish to
“ the army at large the final resolutions which it has
“ adopted under this extraordinary and unparalleled
“ situation of affairs : and these resolutions will, it is satisfied, be found to combine as much attention to the feelings of the army as it is possible to show without a
“ sacrifice of the public interest, and an abandonment of
“ the authority and dignity of Government. The Go-

“ verner and Council can and does make every possible
“ allowance for feelings so strongly excited as those of the
“ officers of the coast army have been, and is disposed to
“ refer that great agitation of mind into which they have
“ been thrown by a concurrence of causes which must
“ greatly mitigate, if they do not altogether extenuate,
“ that degree of criminality which must always attach to
“ such proceedings : and, under such impressions, he can
“ view their extreme solicitude regarding those of their
“ brother officers whom he has thought it his duty to
“ suspend the service, with that consideration which is
“ due to a highly meritorious body of officers, acting under
“ the strong impulse of warm and honourable, but mis-
“ taken feelings. And with such sentiments he cannot
“ deem it derogatory to Government to state, that he in-
“ tends, in the full confidence that the officers of the coast
“ army will abandon their present dangerous course of
“ proceeding, to recommend to the Honourable the Court
“ of Directors the restoration to the service of those officers,
“ whose suspension, and the reasons which led to it, have
“ been reported to them, and who are consequently the
“ only authority by which that act can be repealed : and
“ he can have no doubt, but the earnest desire of their
“ brother officers, combined with the high character which
“ most of the officers under suspension formerly held, will
“ induce the Honourable Court to overlook their late con-
“ duct, and comply with this recommendation. Acting
“ upon the same principle, Government is pleased to
“ appoint Colonel Bell to the charge of the battalion of
“ artillery at the Mount, and Colonel Chalmers to the
“ command of the subsidiary force in Travancore. Lieu-
“ tenant Maitland is appointed quarter-master of the
“ European regiment of infantry.

“ The committee of inquiry ordered to assemble at Ma-
“ sulipatam is repealed ; and no act, either of any body,
“ or of individual officers in the Company’s service, of
“ which no cognizance has yet been taken, and which

“ occurred before the present date, will be made subject of
“ future notice, or even operate to the disadvantage of
“ such body of officers or individuals, unless they should,
“ by a perseverance in the same course, and a répétition
“ of the same conduct, forfeit all claim to such lenity and
“ consideration at a moment when Government has taken
“ such steps to tranquillize the agitated minds of the army,
“ and to leave even the most mistaken without a plea for
“ perseverance in their present dangerous course. It
“ must declare its positive and final resolution neither to
“ alter nor modify this proceeding. It will yield no more
“ to the entreaties or demands of the army : and if any
“ officers are so infatuated, and so lost to every considera-
“ tion of the public good and the general prosperity of
“ their country, as not immediately, on the promulgation
“ of this order, to abandon their present course of proceed-
“ ing, Government must, however much it may deprecate
“ such an extreme, meet it with that firmness and courage
“ which becomes a constituted authority of the Empire
“ of Great Britain. It has contemplated this possible,
“ though, it trusts, highly improbable event ; and the
“ different officers entrusted with command are directed,
“ should any spirit of turbulence and insubordination appear
“ among the officers of the troops under their command,
“ to punish the individuals with all the severity of martial
“ law. And should the operation of the regular course of
“ justice be impeded, either by a combination among the
“ officers or men, such will instantly be proclaimed rebels
“ against the legal authority of Government and their
“ country ; as Government is perfectly satisfied that the
“ public interests will receive more injury from any effort
“ to conciliate men who persevere (after what has passed)
“ in principles so opposite to the restoration of order and
“ discipline, than it even can meet from them as open
“ enemies to their King and Country.”

I am aware that a thousand objections may be made to
an order of this nature ; but it must only be tried by the

times ; matters have arrived at such a crisis, that something decided must instantly be done. There is not an hour for delay. And what I have suggested is only the first proclamation in a war that seems to me, even with this step, almost unavoidable. If human means could avoid it, this act will ; for it holds out every motive that can incline men to good and deter them from evil. It concedes, no doubt, in some points ; but the case is urgent, and the spirit of concession is corrected by the firmness and resolution which is mixed with it. But your own mind will suggest every thing. I am, as you know, devoted to the cause of my country. It will depend upon you where I am to act, if matters draw to an extreme. I should prefer my station at Mysore, as that in which I have most influence, and could, in consequence, contribute most to the support of the public interests. I cannot conclude without again entreating you not to allow yourself to be lulled into security, and to be satisfied of the absolute necessity of taking some steps or another to save the state from the imminent danger to which it is exposed. But inaction, even dangerous as it is, may be better than the commencement of a coercive system, before steps have been taken to gain more friends to Government than it has at present in the army : and I confess I can see no mode of doing this but by a measure which is completely decided and final ; and which, while it grants every indulgence even to erroneous feelings, looks to the close of this great question with a moderate and conciliatory, but a firm and manly spirit. I shall be most anxious for your sentiments, as soon as possible, on the line I am to pursue at this place. The question of the marines, and the removal of some of the officers, had, I find, (for they have shown me all their papers,) been anticipated by the other stations ; and the opposition here was in part by instruction : and subsequent letters sufficiently show, that this case is no longer that one, nor of the garrison of Masulipatam, but of the whole army ; and that they are most deeply pledged to the sup-

port of each other. Indeed *there cannot be a doubt* but the punishment of any one would cause the whole to break out. This I feel it my duty to avoid, as well as to prevent their marching, which ~~was~~ their intention, and which they expect to be called upon to do, till I know the general line you mean to pursue.

I am, my dear sir, &c.

(Signed)

JOHN MALCOLM.

TO SIR GEORGE BARLOW.

(*Private, and Secret.*)

Masulipatam, 6th July.

DEAR SIR,

AFTER my letter of yesterday I have little to add. I can only again implore your most serious consideration to the whole question, and your instant decision on the line that is to be pursued; not merely here, but with the whole army. No half measures will at this moment answer: and unless some effort is made to appease the minds of the deluded officers of this army, you must make military preparations to reduce them to order, and these must be directed against every station under your Presidency: for though success may be various, an effectual opposition will be made at all; and none are more violent than some of those nearest the Presidency. If you adopt a measure of the nature that I recommended yesterday, it should be *quite final*; and therefore embrace every concession and act of conciliation *that you can make*, without a substantial sacrifice of the dignity of Government.

I can think of no improvement to this order, except

you conceive the great object of avoiding hostilities would justify the following addition to it :

“ Government received a representation from a number
“ of the officers of the coast army, in which they solicited
“ the equalization of their allowances with those of the
“ officers of the Bengal army. This is a subject, the
“ consideration of which must exclusively rest with the
“ Court of Directors, under whose notice this application
“ will, *in course*, be brought, and by whose decision it
“ will be the duty of the officers of the coast army to
“ abide.”

This order, which is only a repetition of facts added to what I suggested yesterday, would, I think, *if firmly acted upon*, completely end the present agitation ; or, at all events, you would only have a part to combat instead of the whole. Every man who was not lost to reason and loyalty would be recovered ; and the few that resisted, if any did, would soon be reduced. This mode of settlement would, it may be stated, give a triumph to the army, establish a dangerous precedent, and violate fundamental principles of the Indian Government : but it is not principles, but an empire, that is in danger : and what other course can be adopted ? No man can calculate the consequences of a contest between Government and its army. The delusion which prevailed, that the officers would never proceed to extremes, is now completely dissipated. I have read papers, from almost every division, calling upon this garrison to commence opposition ; and I, two hours ago, read another paper from the Hyderabad force, approving of the proceedings of the garrison at this place in the cases of the marines and Colonel Innes, declaring it to be the cause of the whole, and promising full support. I knew papers of the same kind will be received, as fast as the tappals can bring them, from every station in the army, and that they are all pledged never to let a man or officer of this garrison be punished for a proceeding which they consider (and with truth) to have been

caused by the general state of discontent and turbulence in the army. The garrison here are equally impelled to action by a sense of their danger from what has passed, and a desire to obtain credit with their brother officers for being the first to step forward in the common cause. My authority was at first disputed; and they have subsequently tried, by every means that men could use, to obtain from me promises of amnesty and of inaction, in the event of their being forced to move at the call of their brother officers. Such promises I have, of course, steadily refused; and I have taken advantage of every moment to diffuse better sentiments: but I should deceive you if I stated that my success went further than to keep them quiet. For the moment they are quiet; and, unless a movement is made by the Hyderabad and Jaulnah force, I think they will remain so, till some general measures are adopted by the whole: and I have (I hope not erroneously) considered, that to keep them, by any means that do not compromise my own authority or that of Government, from acting at such a moment, is an object of the greatest importance; for if any one corps begins, there is no remedy but in a war. If this was only a mutiny of the garrison of Masulipatani, it would be an easy question, and I should be proud to hazard my life in an effort to quell it to-morrow morning: but one step, of any description, taken in this affair at the present moment, would undoubtedly cause a general rise in the army: and it is, I conceive, of ultimate importance, that you should know and prepare for this great political danger; and I have consequently laboured incessantly, and I hope with success, to prevent its breaking out at this most inflammable of all quarters.

The officers here have written to other stations to know whether they are to submit to the investigation of the committee. They were greatly disappointed at my not coming up, as they first expected, with powers to treat with them. They would, no doubt, have been highly

flattered at such a result to their violence ; and I am assured I need not state to you, that any mode would be less injurious to the interests of Government, than that of its even entering (as it once did) into a discussion with the officers of its army upon this great question. If you think you have not means to reduce the officers of this army, or if you should not like to resort to them, there is only one mode, that of issuing an order, conceding all you can, without hazard to your authority, then coming to issue in a bold and prompt manner. This, though it may be thought a concession of some points, is still an act of authority ; and that character of the measure will maintain the dignity of Government, which would be altogether lost in a negotiation with its own officers.

I am aware that the opinions which I have expressed are very different from those you have heretofore maintained ; but the case is altogether changed. Steps of too bold a nature have been taken, for the officers of the army to retreat ; and they will immediately proceed, unless some measure is instantly adopted to arrest them in their infatuated career of guilt. The question has become entirely a practical one, and must be tried as such, as much as if the country was suddenly invaded by an enemy against whom we could use the means most calculated to repel him, without any reference to general principles or to precedent.

The fact is, that course has been tried and has failed, and another must be resorted to ; and measures must be taken, when the state is in less danger, to infuse better principles, and to establish a more efficient control over our Indian armies.

TO LIEUTENANT-COLONEL BARCLAY.

(Most Private.)

Masulipatam, 7th July.

MY DEAR BARCLAY,

You will hear the substance of my late communications to Sir George ; and you probably will not quarrel with the opinions I have given, though others may, who think more of maintaining consistency upon paper, than of practical Government.

I have no fear now of this garrison doing any thing, unless other parts of the army break out ; and that will not, I hope, take place immediately*. But something must be done, as the danger of leaving them in this fermenting state increases every hour. They are, in fact, afraid to retract : and shame, despair, and hope, combine to impel them forward. I know they are hastening to their own destruction ; but is it politic to let them destroy themselves, even supposing that operation did not hurt Government ? Certainly not. And if that extreme can be avoided by any measure which does not substantially affect the authority of Government, it should be adopted. Let us look near this bug-bear principle of consistency, at which some men are so alarmed. The order of the 1st of May was intended to break up a desperate conspiracy against Government, which was in progress. It effected the object : and now that a conspiracy has got head of a more extensive nature, are we not to use the means which seem likely to destroy it, because they are of a different character from those used on the 1st of May, and in some respect abrogates part of that proceeding ? It is assuredly the effect which should be our chief and sole object, and

* I mean not in two or three weeks,

we should quarrel with no means that do not *actually* impair our strength or injure our dignity. Those I have recommended would, I think, raise both.

Tell Sir George I am incessant in my endeavours to infuse better principles. I talk with all; and can hardly myself believe the change which has in some respects been produced. I have given them no promises, I have made them no pledges; but I have told them I would take no steps but in an open manly way, and that I expected they would make no secret attempts against my authority. In this they acquiesced. I have given them all my letters regarding this unfortunate crisis, that to Doveton, &c. to read; and I have painted to them, in the strongest colours, the horrors and destruction which must follow an act of any open departure from their duty. The facts I have stated are not denied by the few among them who have sense and moderation; but even they declare to me, that they are pledged beyond the power of retracing their steps.

I wish some of those who are such resolute chamber-counsellors had gone through the two first days I did with these poor misguided men: it would have been a lesson during life.

I thank God I have established, without any compromise or concession, the authority of Government over men who had almost completely thrown it off: and I am pleased at having done this in a manner that has led those very deluded men to express gratitude for the consideration I showed to their agitated feelings. I have referred every thing to the wisdom of my superiors; and, happen what will, I can never have cause for self-reproach.

TO LIEUTENANT-COLONEL BARCLAY.

Masulipatam, 8th July.

MY DEAR BARCLAY,

THE only thing I have seen to day, is a letter from the committee at Jaulnah, intimating their approbation of their proceedings here, and their resolution to march the moment it became necessary to support them.

I saw a private letter from Hyderabad, stating that it was the general opinion and wish there, that Masulipatam should not be abandoned, and that two battalions and a regiment of cavalry would be sent to support the troops of this division. They consider themselves pledged to show me all papers; and they do so: but the fact is, that it is a new and important feature in this conspiracy, that they no longer think any concealment necessary. Some measures must instantly be taken with these deluded men, and Government must go as far, the first step, as it ever can go, to try and reclaim them. If little expedients or half measures are taken, all will be confusion and trouble. Depend upon it, the first King's corps that is moved, the whole commences. Their private correspondence with Bengal is now very active. I am personally here going on smoothly and well, and lose not a moment in giving better impressions: but though this may calm for the moment, and dispose them to receive any thing like a considerate decision, it will never stop proceeding.

P.S. Our little party of artillery is true; but it is the only party I yet know that can be depended upon.

TO LIEUTENANT-COLONEL BARCLAY.

(Most private.)

Masulipatam, 10th July.

MY DEAR BARCLAY,

I SHALL be glad to see Sir Arthur's papers. When I wrote to Sir George, and proposed that he should, along with every decided step, make some *reappointments*, I, of course, meant to include several that I did not mention by name : but if this principle is acted upon, Government cannot be too large in their first order : any *thing little* will spoil all. Gentlemen who lose by these arrangements, should be declared, in public orders, to have the right of succession to the first vacancies.

There are more letters, advising Masulipatam to be kept : and in one of to-day from the committee at Hyderabad, I find they are equally public there in their proceedings ; so I suppose you must have heard from that quarter, no order for the movement of a corps in any of these divisions will be obeyed, nor even the removal of an officer ; so that the necessity of some measures being adopted is quite indispensable. Perhaps Sir George Barlow will wish to see me at Madras, with the report of the committee ; but this will be, perhaps, too great a delay. Taylor or Irton should command this regiment.

I saw a letter from Hyderabad to day, written under a conviction that the Bengal army had taken up their cause. This, I have told them, is one of a thousand dangerous errors into which they are led ; but I do not think they believe me, for they are completely infatuated.

TO SIR GEORGE BARLOW.

Masulipatam, 17th July, 1809.

DEAR SIR,

I HAVE this moment received a letter from Lieutenant-Colonel Barclay of the 12th instant, from which I observe, that you deem it impolitic to adopt any measures of the nature I suggested in my letters of the 5th and 6th July from this place. If I did not consider the present as one of the most serious crisis that ever this Empire was placed in, I certainly should not again intrude myself upon your notice; but I feel bold in the consciousness that I am performing a duty of the most sacred nature; and you will, I am assured, pardon the earnestness with which I solicit leave to be allowed to report to you personally the result of the proceedings here, and of all I have seen or heard connected with the general combinations in the army, as well as those means by which I think it may be averted, or its objects (if it does occur) in some degree defeated. It is quite impossible for me to convey to you in any letter the extensive information I now possess upon this subject; and I should only be four days in going to Madras, and could return, if required, with equal celerity. Little time would be lost by my making this journey; and I feel satisfied its result might be of the utmost consequence to the public interest.

Major-General Pater will be here the day after tomorrow; and no inconvenience would result from the want of a high military authority: but I would not, of course, proceed, if he thought there was any urgent call for my remaining here. But such a trip would, I am assured, tend to calm, instead of irritating men's minds, as they would suppose I had gone to make a full representation of all that had passed, all that I have observed.

I entreat you to pay attention to this earnest request : and if you do that, you will order Lieutenant-Colonel Barclay to station bearers as far as Ongole. I shall lay them to that place, in the confidence that your kindness will not deny me this opportunity of endeavouring to promote the public interests by important communications.

I beg you will not conceive that I am so presumptuous as to hope to change any of those principles you have laid down for the government of your conduct : but I am convinced I can give a detailed information that will be useful, under every aspect which the present danger may assume.

I am, with respect,

Your's faithfully,

(Signed)

J. MALCOLM.

TO SIR GEORGE BARLOW.

Masulipatam, 18th July, 1809.

DEAR SIR,

I WROTE last night, to request you would allow me to post to Madras with the proceedings of the committee, which I expect will be closed about the time I get your answer. I am most solicitous that you should comply with my request. There are circumstances connected with what has taken place here, of a nature too delicate but for personal explanation : and there are points not only relating to what is likely to be done by the deluded officers of this army, but to measures which Government may adopt to counteract their designs, that I feel satisfied I could give you the most useful information.

Should any circumstances lead you to deny my request, I hope, if you contemplate extreme measures, that you will

early place me in a situation where I am conscious I can, under all circumstances, be useful on the largest scale to Government. I mean at my station of Mysore. The army of that state is strong, and can be increased at a moment to any number; and I hope you will consider that at its head (should any serious misfortune occur) I am in my proper place. Here, after I have executed the objects of my mission, (which I understand to be, to prevent men rushing into open rebellion, and to make inquiry into the causes and reasons of what had passed,) I am only a regimental officer at the head of a corps, with the officers and men of which I can have no more influence than any other commanding officer would have. There is a general officer commanding on the spot, and the senior officer in the division.

I have already done all it is possible to do in disseminating good feeling among these deluded men; but they are lost to reason; and, except one or two, and those of little influence, they appear (such is their delirium) to desire the occurrence of that crisis which must end in their ruin.

I entreat you not to think that it is from any doubt of the power of Government that I am so anxious for some measure that will prevent the evils that are impending: it is from a near contemplation of all the horrors of the scene that is about to occur, and a conviction that both humanity and policy require every effort to be made, to save a brave and meritorious class of men from destruction.

If any path was opened by which men led away by a false sense of honour could retrace their steps, I believe numbers would return to Government. If nothing is done, and measures of a serious preparation or actual coercion are taken, no human power can prevent the occurrence of the most shocking scenes: and the name and reputation of this army will, whatever is the event, be lost for ever.

You will, I am sure, make allowances for my feelings: they are communicated only to you. I am distressed and

unhappy to an extent I cannot describe ; but I, of course, maintain a different tone to those infatuated men under my command, from whom I have not concealed my sentiments with regard to the destruction they are bringing on their own heads.

General Pater is expected to-morrow. It will now be his duty to report the state of this garrison. I shall intrude no more upon this, or any subject connected with it, until I have the honour of seeing you, which I trust will be at an early period.

I remain

Your's faithfully,

(Signed)

JOHN MALCOLM.

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TO LIEUTENANT-COLONEL BARCLAY.

Maubpatan, 18th July, 1899.

MY DEAR BARCLAY,

I LAST night received your letter of the 12th instant, and am most happy to learn that Sir George Barlow approves of my first proceedings.

I expect that Berkeley and Evans will be here the 21st or 22d ; and it is my decided opinion no investigation should be made till they arrive. This inquiry must be considered by the whole army as a regular military proceeding : and the impression made by the appointment of such a committee would be lost, if I was to execute its duties : besides, the delay is trifling. If Sir George adopts no measure which supersedes the object of this committee, I should wish to be authorized to carry the report to Madras. I will travel Dawk ; and can, if required, return in the same way. General Pater will be here ; and Berkeley can,

if necessary, be appointed to the temporary command of the regiment; if Taylor* is not brought down, *which I think he ought*, from Vizagapatam. Believe me it is of the utmost consequence I should personally communicate with Sir George Barlow upon the whole of this important subject.

I am glad Sir George Barlow has placed it at my discretion to pardon, if I thought it necessary, the non-commissioned and privates of this garrison: but no circumstance short of an open attempt to throw off my authority can ever lead me to think of such a step, as it would immediately drive to despair the European commissioned officers, on whose temper and moderation depends, at this moment, the allegiance of almost all the officers of the Company's army on the coast: for *one line* from this garrison would, to my *positive knowledge*, at this moment spread the flames of mutiny over the peninsula.

Under such circumstances, of what consequence would even a triumph over a few officers at Masulipatam be, supposing that certain, unless you were prepared for contest every where? I will never abandon my authority, or fail in the performance of my duty; but I never shall (*unless positively ordered*) take any step that I conceive likely to involve my country in a civil war. Such an extreme it must be the wish of Government to avoid as long as it possibly can. Nothing, indeed, can justify its commencement, but the total failure of every possible means to prevent its occurrence.

The present combination of the officers of the Company's army against the Government has hardly a feature common with an ordinary military mutiny; and therefore the principles that would apply to the one, are by no means applicable to the other. It is not the reduction of a corps

* Taylor is an excellent *steady* officer, has great weight with the regiment, (particularly the men), and *though* he signed some papers, is, I feel satisfied, true to his country and the Government.

or garrison to order and obedience, but the reclaiming a large body of men to their attachment and allegiance to the state they serve, which is the object; and this never can be done by partial measures, whether these are of a lenient or a coercive nature.

I have no doubt but Government would ultimately triumph in the contest, if it commenced this moment; but it would be a triumph over its own strength: and the occurrence of such a rupture must produce consequences that will shake our Indian Empire to its base.

From the progress of the present agitation I fear Government will not have much time for consideration*: and it should always be recollected, that in a crisis like the present every thing depends on the moment at which measures are adopted; and the same act which would be successful to-day, would perhaps totally fail of producing the desired effect if adopted a month hence.

You will satisfy Sir George Barlow, that one of the first things I did, after I came on shore, was to satisfy the minds of the officers, and, through them, of the men, of the intentions of Government in ordering a party of marines from the corps: and you will see by the enclosed extract from my journal†, that I took the first *good* opportunity that offered, of stating this fact in the most public and impressive manner to the whole regiment.

I am most anxious to hear from Sir G. Barlow, subsequent to his receipt of my letters of the 5th and 6th instant, as my mind is in a state of the most distressing anxiety. I have, however, to support me, the con-

* There are two distinct measures now in progress, one, an *appeal to Bengal*; and the other, a *plan* to obtain, by operation of a combined nature, if they cannot by remonstrance, the repeal of the order of the 1st of May.

† I sent Colonel Barclay a copy of my speech to the regiment on the 15th of July; and yet *I am accused* by the Government of Fort St. George of not making this communication.

sciousness of having fulfilled my duty to him and to my country.

Your's ever sincerely,

(Signed)

JOHN MALCOLM.

P. S. I am again ordered to Persia by Lord Minto. When will this life have an end ?

TO LIEUTENANT-COLONEL BARCLAY.

Masulpatam, 18th July, 1806

MY DEAR BARCLAY,

A most violent letter was received from the committee at Hyderabad yesterday, abusing the garrison for suffering me to enter, and desiring my instant removal, unless I promised that the orders of the 1st of May should be rescinded. I have had a dreadful struggle all day ; but they are at last moderated in some degree. Their present resolution is, to wait two days ; but as I mean to commence the inquiry to-morrow, agreeable to the authority I have from Sir George, I trust they will agree to-morrow to remain in their allegiance till the result is known. I shall finish it in four days ; and probably, if General Pater acquiesces, carry it myself to Madras. I beg you will post boys as far as Ongole. I shall return, if necessary, instantly ; and I can lose nothing by the journey : and the information I shall have it in my power to give, will be of ultimate importance under every resolution Sir George takes.

Your's ever, most truly,

(Signed)

JOHN MALCOLM.

TO SIR GEORGE BARLOW.

Masulipatam, 19th July.

DEAR SIR,

I WROTE a short note to Colonel Barclay last night, informing him of the change that had taken place here, in consequence of the communication received by the officers of the garrison from the different committees of the other stations, and particularly that of the Hyderabad force, in which they were instructed to call upon me for an instant assurance that the orders of the 1st of May would be rescinded : and, if I refused to give it, to throw off their allegiance and obedience to Government ; and they were assured their example would be instantly followed by every corps in the service : and part of the Hyderabad force was, they were told, ready to march to their support. The ferment which the receipt of those letters occasioned is not to be described.

I sent for some of the senior officers, and communicated my sentiments regarding the irretreivable step this garrison was on the point of taking ; and pointed out, in the strongest colours, all the horrors to which it would lead. I told them I must proceed to do my duty if I found any rash resolution was taken, and that it would prove the commencement of the most horrid and unnatural contest that ever occurred. The truth of my arguments were admitted by some of those to whom I spoke ; and their efforts, after a great struggle, calmed the minds of the others so far, that they agreed to wait for six days further. This, I stated, was nothing. It was, in fact, better to come to issue at once. That it had been my intention to have proceeded (in consequence of authority I had received from you) instantly into the inquiry of past transactions ; and that I had meant, if I had thought there was no fear of this garrison throwing off its allegiance while I was absent, to have gone to Madras, and made this report in person ; but, if their

sentiments did not alter, I could not carry that resolution into execution. They stated their belief that the officers of the garrison of Masulipatam would be most reluctant to refuse assent to any proposition of mine that did not go to detach them from that general cause to which they had sworn to sacrifice their lives ; and that though they knew, from what had passed, that I would give them neither promises nor pledges, nor even communicate my opinion of the probable measures of Government, they hoped there would be no objection to my proceeding ; and a pledge would be given, that unless other parts of the army moved, or threw off their allegiance, that the garrison of Masulipatam would remain dutiful and obedient till I returned to communicate the resolution of Government, or till that was intimated through some other channel.

I have considered it of great importance to delay that open opposition to which this garrison has been excited by every station in the army, as I was certain, under whatever circumstances it might occur, it would be the signal for the whole to throw off their obedience. The garrison here is not more than 1,100 effective men (exclusive of the artillery) ; and if an effort had been successful to detach the men from their officers, who are, to a man, combined against Government, it would not have prevented the explosion ; it would but have increased that despair and madness which are impelling men to these acts of disobedience : and no partial benefit that could have arisen, would have counterbalanced the general effect of this measure. Besides, I cannot speak with confidence of the success of this attempt : the *men even* of this garrison have been already debauched from their duty ; and as it has been hitherto my object to reclaim the officers to their allegiance, and at all events to delay the execution of their plans, it was incompatible with the success of such a line of conduct to attempt to sound their men, or to make any private efforts to shake their attachment to their officers. Such attempts would have produced an instant open

mutiny : and this, for causes before stated, I was anxious to avoid. Besides, such an expedient would have been baneful to the service, and was not to be resorted to while a hope remained of reclaiming the officers to a sense of their duty.

I hope these reasons will satisfy you of the wisdom of the part I have taken ; and you must see, that unless I wish to precipitate the general revolt of the whole of the Company's army, I could not, if I remained here and waited your answer to my report, take any steps with the men to secure their fidelity : and I shall (if it is your wish I should) return to this command with your final orders, as strong, and probably stronger, in influence, (as coming direct from the seat of authority,) as I should have been, had I remained till your answer was received.

There is little chance of any thing occurring when I am away, as most stations look to this ; and the result of your proceedings on the report I make will be awaited. Thus the Government will gain time, which, under every plan you can mean to pursue, must be an advantage to you, and a disadvantage to those combined against your authority. Their insanity is at this instant at its height ; and every moment that action is delayed, reason has a chance of operating. Besides, their committees are likely to differ in opinions ; and this is a proof of weakness some of them already begin to discover.

I have not lost a moment, as I will show you by my journal, and letter book, when I arrive, in disseminating correct sentiments, and in exposing to them in the boldest manner the true nature of that deep guilt on which they are rushing.

I have drawn their attention to a very different picture of the dangers and ruin that will attend their perseverance in this course from what they have hitherto contemplated ; and though the proceedings have brought a thousand calumnies upon my head, I know great effect has been produced in the quarters where it is most essential ; among

the senior and thinking part, whom it has been my object to rouse ; as I am satisfied, if extremes are resorted to, they will command the men.

When to all the reasons I have stated for my proceeding to Madras immediately, (that is, in three or four days from this date,) is added the advantage you may receive from the very extensive information I can give you of the temper of the army, and of their general plans of combination and action, I cannot but anticipate your approbation of this step. At all events, you must be satisfied nothing but a conscientious conviction of its being essential to the public interests could have led me to take it without your previous sanction.

I am, with respect,

Yours faithfully,

(Signed)

JOHN MALCOLM.

P. S. I have, since writing the above, seen some of the senior officers, who assure me that they and their brother officers are as jealous of my honour as they would be of their own ; and that if I think it necessary to go to Madras, they will pledge themselves for the orderly and dutiful conduct of the whole till my return, unless in the very unlikely case of other stations rising in arms, which they will do every thing in their power to prevent, by representing to them the pledge they have made, which they will assure them is voluntary, and has been made without the slightest promise from me. I have, indeed, cautiously avoided any communication that could lead them to believe I entertained an opinion that Government would make any concession ; and the same language is held, in the private letters I have communicated to them, with regard to the actual situation of the army at this moment.

I feel now much more assured of the continued subordination of this garrison during the period of my absence than if I was present.

TO LIEUTENANT-COLONEL BARCLAY.

Masulipatam, 21st July, 1809.

MY DEAR BARCLAY,

AN account has just arrived of the opposition of the 2d of the 10th to obey the orders of Government. This has caused little sensation in the garrison, and is not expected to be followed by any movement at Hyderabad; and I feel confident now, that nothing but one of the divisions marching will make this deluded garrison stir a step further. I shall be with you on the 26th. I wish I could fly, as I am assured I can give Sir George Barlow the most complete information regarding the whole character of this wide disaffection.

Yours sincerely,

(Signed)

JOHN MALCOLM.

Private Letter from Lieutenant-Colonel MALCOLM to Lieutenant-Colonel M'LEOD, dated Masulipatam, 20th July, 1809.

DEAR M'LEOD,

I HAVE received your kind letter of the 8th instant; but fear your hopes of my success will be disappointed. The voice of passion is alone heard; and every man that speaks with temper and reason is condemned and calumniated.

The crisis, in fact, if not arrived, appears now near at hand, when every officer in the Company's service must determine whether he will maintain his allegiance to the Government he serves, to his King and Country, or decidedly throw it off; and assuredly there is no individual who claims a title to any spirit of independence, who will

not exercise his judgment upon a question which must so deeply involve all his future prospects and happiness.

If ever there was a moment in which it was important for men to look at those consequences which are likely to ensue from one step more in their course, it is the present ; and it is assuredly worth while to pause for a moment, and examine coolly the nature of our grievances, and the length we are justified in going to obtain redress of them, and the probable consequences to ourselves and to our country of throwing off our allegiance to the state.

There were accounts by the last dispatches that the existence of grievances in this army was already a topic of public discussion. General McDowall and Colonel Capper have no doubt arrived before this in England, and they would be soon followed by Colonel St. Leger, and the other suspended officers. Is it not evident, that, with all the aggrieved parties in England, the public records which must be transmitted there, and the voluminous private correspondence which every ship, since those transactions took place, has carried home, that every one of the topics of complaint will be a subject of warm discussion ; and will not the agitation they have created in the army be brought fully forward ? and have we not reason to conclude, from all these circumstances, that an early settlement of these questions will be made by those authorities, by whom they must at all events be ultimately judged, unless this country should permanently throw off its allegiance and obedience to England ? As far as we can judge from the past, there appears reason to anticipate a fair and liberal decision from the controlling authorities at home, who have certainly hitherto judged questions of this nature with great attention to both the feelings and the interests of the Indian army. With this prospect, can we be justified in resorting to such desperate extremes, because we are discontented with the acts of a temporary local Government, and not only involving ourselves in ruin, but injuring, in the deepest manner, our country, at a moment when it is

the duty of every man, who has a spark of patriotism in his breast, to support her against the numerous and powerful enemies by whom she is assailed.

But we proceed, it is said, in the certainty that Government must see those evils, and that it will give way, in order to avert them ; and that, indeed, it has no power, if it wished, to oppose our spirited and united demand of a full redress of grievances. Let us examine those points. Government may see great evils in our resistance of its authority, but it may perceive still greater in yielding to the peremptory demands of an armed body confederated for the purpose of intimidating it into concession. It is the extreme of the pressure, in cases of this nature, which too often causes the resistance ; and as to its power of opposing any attack upon its authority, it is perhaps much greater than we at this moment calculate. There can be no doubt of the fidelity of all the King's troops to Government. It has a large body, not less than ten thousand disciplined infantry, four thousand horse, and sixteen thousand peons, belonging to the Mysore Government, all perfectly at its devotion : and it will, whenever a rupture takes place, gain, through the influence of some of the older officers, many of the native battalions. It will raise more troops. It will be compelled to promote officers from King's regiments ; to give commissions to serjeants ; to raise young men at once to rank, and reward with promotion all who leave their brother officers before a certain date : after which, those in arms against its authority will be proclaimed rebels ; and their men, both Europeans and natives, tempted to desert and betray them by every inducement and encouragement that can be offered. All the means of Government, whatever they are, will be organized and regular ; and with such it will probably triumph : but, alas ! its triumph will be over its own strength. It will be in the destruction of those who are its support and glory ; and, as such, must be ten times more mournful than the most signal defeat from a foreign enemy.

Let us view the other side. When men had once passed the Rubicon, and commenced opposition to Government, what would be their plans? They must be settled by distant and probably divided committees: and every young officer would feel, in such a situation of affairs, a right to examine the actions of his superiors: and could any man, under such circumstances, when the chain of discipline was broken, rely on the order and fidelity of his troops? What could be offered to induce them to resist the temptations held out by Government? And if they did not desist, would they be equal to encounter the army of the state? But say they are superior; that they were led on to victory, and all our mad passions were gratified: at what point would we arrive? Could we expect our King and Country to receive us again into favour, when our hands were red with the blood of British subjects, that we had led and assisted the natives of India to shed? And could we expect those natives would allow a few officers to continue their rule over them, after they had been taught to condemn the authority and slaughter the soldiers of the British Government? But it is stated, that we have gone so far, that to retreat would be to expose ourselves to shame and degradation. Gracious God! what an argument is this? Would men, recollecting themselves on the verge of guilt, and stopping, under the action of loyal and patriotic motives, in a career to which they had been led by strong feelings of injury, be subject of reproach or disgrace? Would it not raise their reputation higher than ever, and entitle them to look for a redress of their grievances, with a proud confidence, to that Country to which they had so strongly proved their attachment? Could it fail of exciting feelings even in the local Government, which must lead to those very conciliatory acts, which will be in vain expected, if sought with the bayonet?

This is the picture which presents itself to my mind of the scene now before us. I contemplate it with horror. And you may judge my present feelings, when I declare

to God, that though I must part with those of my brother officers who are so deluded as to rush into an open warfare with the Government they serve, and their Country, I shall, I am satisfied, be happier if I fall by the first ball that is fired in this horrid and unnatural contest, than if I lived to see it terminated.

I see no possible mode in which the impending evils can be averted, but by the action of the good and loyal feelings of the majority of the officers of the army ; and of this action I do not yet despair. I must, indeed, to the last continue to hope that this noble spirit will show itself, and snatch us from the gulf of destruction. I am now busy with an inquiry into past proceedings at this place, with the report of which I shall proceed in a few days to Madras ; and may God grant my efforts may be useful in averting the shocking calamities that are impending !

At all events, I shall have fulfilled my duty to my brother officers, to Government, and to my Country ; and that reflection will, under every event, be a consolation during my existence.

I am yours sincerely,

(Signed)

JOHN MALCOLM.

N. B. An extract from a letter from Hyderabad, dated the 12th of August, 1809, from Lieutenant Watson of the artillery, to Major Morrison, at Madras, will show the effect this letter produced among the most violent at that station.

“ In these troubled times it requires the full exercise of
 “ a man’s judgment upon a question which must so deeply
 “ involve all his future prospects and happiness. Colonel
 “ Malcolm has written at this crisis a very able and elegant letter, to which a liberal consideration, I am
 “ happy to say, has been given.”

And the following passage from a letter lately received

from Lieutenant Little, at Madras, conveys a testimony, which, though probably exaggerated, is a strong corroboration of this fact.

“ You may recollect, during the late unhappy disturbances at this place, having wrote a long letter to Colonel M^cLeod, pointing out the melancholy consequences that would finally ensue if the army continued to persist in their opposition to Government. A copy of this letter was sent to Captain Carfrae, at Hyderabad, and by him shown to the force ; the greatest part of whom, a short time afterwards, declared to Major Agnew, that they were chiefly influenced by this letter to sign the test of obedience to Government.”

No. II.

*The JOURNAL of Lieutenant-Colonel MALCOLM,
at Masulipatam, from the 4th to the 22d of
July 1809.*

4th July. LANDED from the Victor sloop of war at 10 o'clock A. M. Was received by several officers, Major Storey, Captain Andrews, Captain Cotgreve, and some others, at the pier-head. As I went in at the Fort gate the European sentry stopped me, apparently to take my sword, but was ordered to desist by one of the officers. As I went to Captain Andrews' quarters I showed the orders appointing me to the command of the regiment and the garrison, as well as those for the military committee. Captain A. said he hoped I would not insist on taking the command, in the situation affairs were then in. I said I must, and desired the fort-adjutant to be sent for, to publish the orders. After we arrived at Captain A.'s house we were joined by several officers. Among others were Major Hazlewood, 24th, Captain Kelly of the 19th, and Messrs. Forbes, Nixon, and Lieutenant Spankie, of the European regiment. A long, desultory, and warm discussion took place, in which I stated all those arguments that I thought could moderate their minds and bring them to a better feeling. I particularly insisted on the consequences that must attend any of those desperate measures they had intended; and entreated them not to rush into a course which was likely to be so ruinous to themselves, and to have such dangerous consequence to their country

at a moment when every man should feel it his duty to die, rather than promote, by any act, the designs of her numerous and implacable enemies. I called to their recollection, that the inquiry that was instituted was quite of a military nature, and such as they had themselves required ; and that to oppose my authority, or to object to this investigation, was at once to declare war with Government. I added to this declaration an assurance, that no proceeding that was not in consistence with military usage would result from the investigation. Their answers were, for the first two hours of this discussion, made under the strong influence of passion. They had already, they said, taken their line: they knew they had gone too far to retract ; and they were certain of support from the whole army, to whom they had pledged themselves. They had first expected, they said, force would be employed ; and their preparations had been made in concert with the Hyderabad force to meet that emergency. They could, they said, show me the plan. I replied, with great warmth, I did not desire to see it. Such were my feelings, that I would not for the world have the guilt of such knowledge upon my mind. They recounted at great length, and with much heat, all the grievances they shared with others, and those that particularly related to the European regiment, which had been, they said, calumniated and stigmatized ; one officer removed, and another banished, without a hearing : and when they remonstrated, they were told from head-quarters they *were to be disbanded* : and, after this communication, they were driven to mutiny by a large party (100 men) being ordered, professedly as a punishment, to act as marines on board his Majesty's ships. I told them, I was aware that much misrepresentation had taken place, and they might have some reason to complain ; but the merits of the case could never be known without a full and temperate investigation : and it was on that account the committee was ordered, *even before the Government insisted on the*

marines embarking *. They had therefore, as a body of officers, their choice, either to recognise my authority and allow this proceeding to take its course, or to place themselves at once in opposition to Government: there was no medium. They wished me to promise an amnesty for all that had been done here; or, at least, that I would recommend one. I said I would do neither; I would do my duty, and what I was ordered. I had thought it, I added, no departure from my duty to speak to them in the manner I had done, and should be happy if any thing I had said brought them to reason and reflection. They retired to another room; and I was informed by Major Hazlewood, that I had wrought such a change in them, that he hoped they would abandon the violent resolution they had taken.

They soon returned, and said they had done so, and submitted to my authority. Government had, they said, by the act of selecting me, taken the only step that could have stopped for an instant the course of operations which they, in concert with the whole of the Company's army, had resolved instantly to commence, in order to obtain redress of their intolerable grievances: and they desired me to understand, that it was consideration for a brother officer, who held that high place in their esteem, which he did in that of the whole army, that induced them to lay aside for the present all their schemes, and to yield him their obedience: and, as a proof of the truth of this sentiment, they declared I was the only officer of rank in India they would have admitted into the garrison; and that it had been resolved to have shut the gates on the Commander-in-Chief, had he arrived, as was once expected. I was too well satisfied with the substance of their submission to authority, to quarrel about the form of it. I in-

* This was in accordance with the instructions I had received, and most assuredly marks the character of the proceeding. Yet it has been stated, I was immediately, *before investigation*, to seize the persons of the principal offenders. •

stantly ordered the sentries to be taken off Lieutenant-Colonel Innes, and waited upon that officer, who I found (as was to be expected) much irritated at what had occurred : but I discovered, from his communications, too much cause for those excesses that had taken place. He is, I make no doubt, a good and a conscientious man ; but his imprudence, combined with the impressions he brought from Madras, and the unguarded private communications he has since received, and made public, from a very high authority, were calculated to goad men into mutiny in common times, and could not fail of producing that effect at a moment like the present, when the whole of the Company's army is in a state of open disaffection to Government. I explained to Lieutenant-Colonel Innes the reasons that had led to my appointment, and advised him to be moderate and guarded, which he promised me he would.

I dined this evening with the mess of the regiment. There were a great number of gentlemen of other corps present. Their usual toast of " the friends of the army " was given with three times three, and I joined in it, with an observation, " that it was a very general toast, as I was " assured it included most men both in India and Eng- " land." After we had sat some time, and had a number of songs, a gentlemen sung a sea-song, in which the expression " common cause " was frequently repeated. This was caught at by some of the younger officers, who were heated ; and, at their motion, the whole rose to drink the " common cause." As I could not mistake the meaning they attached to this toast, I felt for a moment embarrassed, but, rising and filling a bumper, I immediately repeated, in as loud and as warm a manner as I could, " *the common cause of our Country ;*" and my amendment was received and drank with acclamation. I soon afterwards left their table, and heard, as I retired, my health toasted with three times three. Thus closed the most anxious day I ever passed in my life. May my

efforts be successful in reclaiming these men from the errors into which they have plunged!

5th July. I had a visit from several of the gentlemen I saw yesterday, at Mr. Savage's Gardens, (my place of residence). They seem yet to be uneasy and unsettled in their minds. They showed me several papers from different stations in the army, by most of which they were called upon to act instantly, and with a decided spirit: the strongest assurances given them of support and co-operation. Arrack for the Europeans had, I found, been sent to Gundoor, the first march towards Hyderabad; and every thing was prepared to move as to day. They again repeated their wish for some general assurance of not suffering for what had passed; and this was accompanied by some hints on the line they might be forced to pursue regarding me; though they expressed the concern with which they would have resort to such an extreme. I smiled, and said, they could not expect, from the knowledge they had of my character, that any motive on earth would ever induce me to deceive them, or to evade my duty; that to give them a promise of amnesty that I was not authorized to give them, would be deceit; and to be deterred from doing what I conscientiously thought my duty, from any fear of consequences, was, they must be satisfied, altogether unworthy of that reputation I had hitherto supported. They went away (after showing me some further papers, which they had just received, of the same character I had seen before) apparently satisfied with my answer. They communicated to me a report that had been drawn out of my conversation of yesterday, which they meant, they said, to send to Hyderabad, &c. and begged I would correct it, lest they should have misstated any of my observations. I thanked them for their candour, and corrected the paper; the circulation of which appeared to me calculated to do good.

The senior officers in this garrison are impelled to throw off their allegiance from a consciousness of having already

gone too far, and seeing their only hope of individual safety in all being equally involved in the deepest guilt; while their juniors are flattered by the importance which they obtain in times of anarchy and trouble, and see nothing but distinction in being the first to step forward in what they deem the general cause of the army. I have written Sir G. Barlow my full sentiments on the present unprecedented and alarming situation of affairs.

6th July. I went into the Fort to-day, and saw the regiment under arms. I also visited the hospital and barracks. I had afterwards a long and serious conversation with an officer (A.), who spoke not his own sentiments, he said, but those of the garrison, when he entreated from me a pledge that I would not oppose any proceedings this garrison might feel itself forced to take, in co-operation with other parts of the army. I smiled at this proposition, which, as I told the gentleman, required a concession which it was altogether unworthy of me to make; and that the gentlemen who had desired him to make it would be sensible that it was so, if they gave it a second thought. I added, "I shall, however, put your minds at rest, if you will put mine." I will take no step relative to the officers of this garrison, except in a fair, open, manly manner; and I expect, in return, they will make no secret attempts, or underhand efforts, to injure or oppose my authority. He went away, after assuring me that he was convinced what I had stated would give satisfaction, and that the officers under my command would be solicitous to show me they were deserving of that temper and consideration with which I treated them. I spoke to a number of officers to-day, and circulated a number of my private letters among them. This mark of confidence would, I knew, please; and the sentiments expressed in these papers were calculated to bring them back to reason and reflection. I wrote again fully to Sir George Barlow.

7th July. I went early into the Fort. From conversations I had with several officers, I found that I had suc-

ceeded in my efforts to restore the temper of the garrison ; that they felt grateful for the moderation which I had shown ; and some were sorry they had been so warm in their expressions^t at their first interview. I saw this day a communication from Hyderabad, and one from Jaulnah ; both of which forces were prepared to support the garrison in the event of their acting in opposition to Government.

8th July. Nothing particular occurred this day. Some further communications from the westward were shown to me ; one of which strongly recommended Masulipatam being kept, and not abandoned ; and a force of two battalions of sepoys and one regiment of cavalry were promised to support the garrison, and the corps of the district, all of whom they appeared to think would join. I entered at great length this day into the whole subject with M. H., who, I knew, was in intimate communication with all the senior officers, and had some influence even with the junior. I pointed out to this officer what must be the consequence of the whole or any part of the Company's army plunging down that precipice, on the brink of which they were now standing. I exposed the falseness of that confidence on which numbers were proceeding ; how they would be deserted by their brethren and their men, when Government was compelled to declare them in rebellion. I pointed out how wretched their means, how unconnected their plans ; and demanded, if even they had double the numbers, if he thought, after the chain of discipline was once broken, and when they were commanded by committees, and every boy thought he possessed the right to question the authority of his superior, whether it was possible to oppose the organized army that must, under all circumstances, remain with Government, and which must every day gain strength from their ranks ? The whole of the king's army was, I said, decidedly with Government ; and if the last step was taken, many of the Company's officers, and those probably who had the most influence with the native troops, would range on the side of authority. I knew this, I said, to be

fact, because I had letters, fully expressive of their sentiments, from some of the best and most popular officers in the army. I was myself, I said, of that opinion, and proud to state it. I had been in this army since I was twelve years of age ; and such was my regard for my brother officers, that I would give my life to see the present unfortunate disputes happily adjusted : but if any circumstances whatever led these officers to rise in rebellion against their King and Country, and such they would do the moment they threw off their allegiance to the legal constituted authority in India, I must stand in the opposite rank : and I was convinced so many would be found of the same sentiments, that Government must triumph, though I allowed such a triumph would be one over its own strength, and consequently more mournful than the most signal defeat from a foreign enemy. I added, that I would, for the sake of argument, suppose, what I conceived impossible, that Government was destroyed in the conflict, what would be the consequence of this victory to a few officers who had led the natives of India to the murder of their countrymen and to the destruction of the British Government ? Would these natives allow them to live and rule over them ? or would they not be tempted to practise, for the last time, the lesson they had been taught, and get rid at once of a race whose rule they had been taught to consider as oppressive and tyrannical ? Supposing they did not, would the King and people of England be ready to make peace with men whose hands were red with the blood of their countrymen ? Would they not rather, if they did not abandon this quarter of India altogether, attempt its reconquest ? And to what consequence would that lead ? You say, I added, that your grievances are intolerable, and that if you abandon your attempts to obtain redress the coast army will be disgraced, while, if you persist with firmness and spirit, Government (which must be aware of all the consequences I have stated) must give way. To this I answer : No grievances of the description this army now

has, can warrant its having recourse to arms, because they are such as must come under the cognizance of the controlling and legislative authorities in England, who are alone competent to notice and redress them : and this army, so far from being degraded by a moderate proceeding at a moment like the present, would raise its reputation higher than ever ; because it would prove to all the world that it possessed a spirit of the highest loyalty and patriotism ; and that when a variety of circumstances had combined to throw it into a flame, the action of these feelings had subdued every other, and it was contented rather to suffer, till the superior authorities in England could judge all those questions on which it thought itself aggrieved, than endanger the general interest of the country. Would such sentiments, I asked, redound to the disgrace or to the honour of this army ? With respect, I observed, to the probability of Government giving way, if assailed with unanimity, firmness, and spirit, there was, I feared, a great and dangerous error. Government could not give way, as it was termed, beyond a certain point, without destroying itself ; and it had better fall by any hands than its own. It was the very pressure, I added, that was brought against it, that forced it to resistance : and, besides, what were the points which it was required to yield ? In the present agitated period of the army, every committee, every individual, had a different opinion ; and if it were possible to collect the general sense of the army, I believe, in their present irritated state, concessions would be required that would amount to the virtual abolition of the existing local Government of this Presidency. It was no doubt, I observed, the duty of Government to take every step that it could take with dignity to restore temper, and to compose men's minds ; but I, for one, would never blame it for refusing its consent to its own death ; and such I should consider any act that made a substantial sacrifice of its strength or authority. From the answer of the gentleman to whom these observations were made, I could perceive that he

and many others had been led on from step to step, without contemplating the extreme which was now so likely. It was also evident that the younger part of the army were no longer manageable: they had run away with the rest, who considered themselves too deeply pledged to retreat; and they appeared afraid of the instant obloquy that was cast on every person who withdrew himself.

9th July. As this was Sunday I went to a dressed parade of the regiment, and afterwards visited the hospital and barracks. Nothing particular occurred to-day: all the officers I saw seemed to have returned to good temper; and I can have no fear of this garrison breaking out into any extreme unless the example is given by other parts of the army.

10th July. I went early into the Fort. A singular instance occurred to-day, to show how little men reflect whose minds are in a state of agitation. I was told, before I went to the Fort, that accounts had been received of every thing in Madras being in a state of confusion, and that some great event had happened there. When in the Fort, the letter that gave rise to this belief was shown me. It was dated Hyderabad the 5th July; and said a letter had that moment been received from Madras reporting the confusion which had arisen at that place; and stating that his correspondent, no doubt, "had heard of the remarkable event" that had occurred to give rise to it." The moment I saw this communication I pointed out the date; and observed it was an evident allusion to what had occurred at Masulipatam on the 25th June, which had reached Madras the 30th; and the bustle it created had been termed confusion, and sent round again, *via* Hyderabad, to Masulipatam. This was so clearly the fact, that the only astonishment that was left, was how it had not struck somebody before. By letters from Hyderabad it appears they make no secret of their proceedings. One corresponding officer writes, who says he had received a most extraordinary communication, from good authority, that the officers of the

Bengal army had sent in a Memorial to Lord Minto, praying the removal of Sir G. H. Barlow. I laughed at this unfounded assertion, and assured the person who told me, it was one of a thousand reports circulated to inflame their feelings and mislead their judgment. They have received great confidence from the address of the Bombay army*, which promises their warmest support in any measures they may take in consequence of what they deem the unjust and arbitrary order of the 1st of May.

By a letter from the committee at Hyderabad received to-day, this garrison are advised to defend Masulipatam if they can. A junction is proposed at Ongole or Condapilly. From the former station being mentioned, it would appear as if a forward movement upon Madras had been contemplated by some of the most violent.

11th July. I was with the officers of the regiment almost all this day, and dined at the mess, of which I have become a member. Our dinner was pleasant, and like that of a private party of gentlemen. I have been particularly pleased to observe, that although they communicate to me in confidence when I require it, no officer of the garrison ever begins, when I am present, any conversation on the present situation of the army; and when I speak to them upon it (as I frequently do), they are much more moderate than they were. I have seen some of the principal natives of this place, and find the events of the 25th ultimo caused a very serious alarm, which was not dissipated before my arrival. The defenceless inhabitants ascribe more influence to me than I possess, and think nothing wrong can occur as long as I remain.

12th July. Very severe rains. I did not go into the Fort, and heard nothing of consequence from any quarter.

13th July. Went into the Fort, inquired particularly from the adjutant of the regiment, and found, from his report, that the privates not only conceived they were to be

* This was afterwards discovered to be a fabrication.

dispersed and disbanded when the order came for them to go as marines, but a report was even current in the barracks, that they were going to Botany Bay. They were, he assured me, now fully satisfied of the misrepresentations that had been made to them ; and he believed no discontent remained in the corps excepting that which had long existed among the men enlisted for life ; and which, they had hopes, would have been altered before this, as Captain Andrews had published an order, more than a twelvemonth ago, with a view of quieting their minds ; in which he stated, that Government had referred the question to England. I desired Mr. Nixon to tell the sergeants that I should inquire into this point, and do any thing in my power towards obtaining them information of what had been done upon the subject.

14th July. I this morning inspected Captain Gibson's company of artillery, and was highly pleased with their appearance. I addressed them on parade, and told them the gratification I had received from their steadiness under arms, and correct movements ; adding my conviction, that they would maintain, under all circumstances, the high reputation they had acquired during the late Mahratta war. No tappal * for the last three days, owing to the rain.

15th July. A regimental court martial sat yesterday on four men, and the regiment was under arms at half past six, to see the sentences carried into execution. I judged this a favourable opportunity of addressing the corps ; and, after the crimes and sentences of the prisoners had been read, I made the following short speech :

“ Regiment ! As this is the first time I have met you
“ upon such an occasion, I forgive these men : but I
“ desire you will not mistake the motives of this act of
“ lenity. It is my intention, as it is my duty, to enforce the
“ strictest discipline : and I must punish those that merit

“ it, not only to maintain the character of the corps, but
 “ to enable me to grant indulgences to the good men of it,
 “ which I never can do unless I punish the bad : but I
 “ trust, from what I have seen of your conduct, I shall
 “ have little occasion to exercise severity. It is, indeed,
 “ you must all feel, most incumbent upon you to preserve
 “ the utmost regularity and order at the present period. A
 “ late occurrence in the regiment, which has, I am satis-
 “ fied, been solely produced by misapprehension and
 “ misrepresentation, is on the point of becoming a sub-
 “ ject of investigation before a military court, who will
 “ inquire into the causes by which it was produced. I
 “ shall therefore say nothing on that subject : but I con-
 “ sider it my duty to declare to you at this moment*,
 “ *that it never was in the contemplation of Government to*
 “ *disband or disperse this corps, and that it never meant to*
 “ *employ any officer or man of the regiment in any*
 “ *manner or upon any service but such as was suited to*
 “ *the honour and character of British soldiers, and which*
 “ *it, of course, conceived both officers and men would be*
 “ *forward to proceed upon. It was, soldiers, from a full*
 “ *conviction that a serious misunderstanding alone of the*
 “ *intentions of Government could have caused what has*
 “ *passed, that made me receive with pride and gratifi-*
 “ *cation my nomination to the command of this regiment :*
 “ *and I am convinced, from what I have already seen,*
 “ *that I shall (whenever I quit that station) have to make*
 “ *a report which will add, if possible, to the high reputa-*
 “ *tion which the corps already enjoys ; and satisfy all, that*
 “ *as it is the first in rank of the infantry of this establish-*
 “ *ment, it is also first in fidelity, loyalty, and attachment*
 “ *to the Government it serves, and to its King and Coun-*
 “ *try.*”

* I had watched an opportunity of making this communication in the manner I thought would have most effect. I am accused by the Government of Fort St. George of never having made it.

This address appeared to be received by both officers and men of the corps with satisfaction ; and I make no doubt of its effect. I was withheld, by many and serious considerations, from haranguing the men, or publishing any explanatory order to them, on my first arrival. Such would, in the agitated state of the whole garrison, have been completely misconstrued, and would probably have produced the very opposite effect from what was intended.

16th July. I dined yesterday with the mess of the 1st battalion 19th regiment N. I., and sat till a late hour. No toasts were given ; and not a word relating to the present situation of affairs escaped the lips of any man present. I could not but be pleased with such good feeling, and felt gratified at this mark of personal respect. The evening passed in the utmost hilarity and good humour.

17th July. Some of the officers of the garrison waited upon me to-day with letters of a most violent tenor that they had received from Hyderabad and other stations, in which they were reproached with weakness for having admitted me. I was described in some of these letters as a consummate politician, and consequently as the most dangerous man Government could have sent among them. The garrison were told I would *tamper with their men, cajole them*, and in the end ruin the general cause. I was happy to find the sentiments of the gentlemen who waited upon me were not in unison with those of their correspondents ; but they hinted their fears of the violence of the younger officers of the garrison, who, they said, had been hurt at the speech I made to the men on the 15th, which they thought was calculated to excite the men against their officers. I appealed to an old officer of the regiment, who was present, Whether he thought the speech had any such tendency ? He said it certainly had not struck him as in the least objectionable. I observed, that the testimony of an officer like him should satisfy others ; and if it did not,

I could not help it ; for in such times a man could not put his foot over the threshold without a misconstruction of the manner in which it was done. The officers who waited on me this day gave me a paper, the purport of which was to learn what assurances I could give them of a disposition of the Government of Madras to redress their grievances ; and, in the event of my declining, to inform them what I thought the intentions of Government were. It was signified, that if I did not, the confidence of the garrison would be withdrawn from me, and they would consider themselves released from all promises they made. I told them I could make no communication of the nature they required, and that they might act as they thought proper : I should, under all circumstances, do my duty to the Government I served.

18th July. This morning M. H. waited upon me, and showed me a communication from the established committee at Hyderabad to this garrison, which called upon them to demand from me an assurance that the orders of the 1st of May would be repealed ; and, if that was refused, instructed them to throw off the authority of Government, and make me leave Masulipatam. I went over all the grounds I had done before with this officer ; and told him, that if the garrison was so lost to all sense of duty and propriety as to act upon this instruction, I must judge for myself, and take those steps which the emergency demanded. He said, the senior officers, who had sent him, were not disposed to attend to the call made upon them by the Hyderabad Committee ; but they, he added, had now little or no control over their juniors, who were decidedly for having recourse to immediate violence. I asked him to what lengths men (who had still some reflection) meant to allow themselves to be borne away with the tide ? The hour, I added, was come, when they must decide. I then pointed out the ground on which I thought they might, without injury to their honour, make a stand, and rescue the deluded young men of the army, as well as themselves, from

destruction. I expressed my conviction of the men remaining with the senior officers, and that the young men must be reclaimed to reason, or at least be prevented from becoming rebels, if those who were their seniors acted with a becoming spirit. This conference lasted two hours, and M. H. went to communicate with the rest. There was, I understood, a warm discussion for several hours; after which, two of the senior officers waited upon me, and said they had with difficulty prevented the rest from coming to extremes that day; but they had at last agreed to wait six days (till the 24th), when, if they heard nothing favourable to their hopes, they meant to take such steps as they thought calculated to forward the objects they had in view. They at the same time said they had, in consequence of the opinion of their brother officers at other stations, determined to admit no investigation into their past conduct. I observed, that if these were their resolutions we must come to issue at once, and I must take those steps I judged best to counteract their measures, as I considered their proposition of adhering to their duty for a limited period of six days, was nothing less than an open defiance; and their refusal to admit investigation was a measure of the same stamp. I had meant, I said, in conformity with authority I had received from Government, to have entered into the investigation immediately (before the arrival of my colleagues); and I had entertained an intention of proceeding to Madras with the report, in the conviction that this garrison would have remained steady in its duty: but I must now, I added, abandon all such plans, and meet with that firmness which it was my duty to meet it, that dreadful emergency which this garrison had so rashly precipitated. I then read them a letter to Colonel M'Leod*, pointing out all the horrors of the crisis to which they were rushing. They appeared forcibly struck with what I said and read, and expressed their hope that their brother

* Vide page 149.

officers would alter their resolution, and not impede the course of proceeding which I intended to pursue. It might, they said, afford some ray of hope of the present distractions being ended ; for though they knew my sentiments differed widely from theirs, and that I was devoted to my duty to Government, they were also sensible that I had warm feeling for the situation of my brother officers. I went, immediately after this interview, to dine at the mess of the regiment, and (strange inconsistency!) received every mark of respect and kindness from men who had been debating all the morning whether they should enter into a contest with me for the authority of the garrison !

19th July. I went into the Fort early this morning, and called upon Colonel Innes to give me a full statement of all that had passed relative to the origin of those discontents that terminated in the mutiny of the 25th ultimo*. I also called upon Major Storey, Captain Andrews, and Mr. Nixon, the adjutant of the regiment, to give me every information they had relative to these transactions. I was waited upon, soon after I went to the Fort, by two of the senior officers, who were, they said, desired by all to state that a general confidence and respect for my character had induced the garrison to change their resolutions, and that they hoped I would follow the course of inquiry I intended ; and, after making the investigation, proceed, if I thought it advisable, to Madras. They would, they said, during my absence be as jealous of my honour as of their own, and promise not to depart in the slightest degree from the path of duty and order, unless a rise in other stations was to take place ; of which, they said, they thought there was no probability, particularly as they would write to inform them of the pledge they had made, and entreat them not to make any call upon them before my return to my command. I told them I felt obliged by this mark of their

* I had received authority to proceed (without waiting for my colleagues) in this inquiry. Lieutenant-Colonel Berkeley had, indeed, been prevented from attending by a severe illness.

regard and confidence ; but I would not receive it, if I thought it was made under any idea or expectation that I would be the advocate of their cause, or that of the army. They disclaimed any such idea. I would, they knew, from what they had seen, do my duty in the manner I thought best. I was gratified with the pledge I received ; which, as M. H. afterwards privately observed, gave me a stronger tie on the officers while I was absent than I could have had during the same period, if present. The reasons which led me to resolve on going to Madras were fully stated to Sir George Barlow in a letter under this date.

Accounts were received this evening of the assembly of a force at Madras. I anticipated the feeling this would make, and stated to an officer present, when I received the letter, my conviction, that it was in consequence of the many, and perhaps exaggerated, reports of intended mutinies that had been consequent to that of Masulipatam.

20th July. General Pater arrived. I went to meet him, gave him a return of the garrison, and made a full and confidential report of all past proceedings. I found that the officers of standing, to whom I had spoken so much on the danger of allowing young men to take such a lead in the present discussions, had taken advantage of the good disposition of the moment, as to carry a resolution, that the garrison committee, which were mobbish meetings of the whole of the officers, should be abolished, and the proceedings to be entirely carried on by the eleven senior officers, by whose judgment all questions were in future to be decided, and who were entirely to act for themselves, and not to follow the instructions of other committees, or be influenced by the voice of any person not a member of the committee. This measure I considered as the first great step towards a return to reason and temper. I received an invitation from the garrison to dine with them on the 22d. All the gentlemen, civil and military, were invited to meet.

21st July. All was quiet. I received this day the

most unequivocal proofs of the desire of some of the senior officers to return to the right path, if furnished with any ground on which they could absolve themselves from the deep pledges they had made, and assert their right to control their juniors.

22d July. General Pater looked at the regiment on parade, and afterwards went, accompanied by his staff, to breakfast with Lieutenant-Colonel Innes.

Captain Gibson of the artillery informed me, that though he had received his leave to go to Madras, he would remain, if I advised him, at Masulipatam. I spoke with General Pater; and it was his opinion, as it was mine, that Captain Gibson should proceed. If he had been ordered to stay after his leave was made public, it would have excited suspicion, without any adequate benefit. Whether conciliatory or coercive measures were adopted, Captain Moorhouse, who succeeded to the command of the company of artillery, appeared equally, if not better, suited to the charge at that crisis. He was a brave, excellent officer, and had never for a moment even swerved from his duty; and his character was respected even by the most violent of the disaffected. Captain Gibson, on the contrary, having for a short time joined in their schemes, had, when he (very meritoriously) checked himself in his career of guilt, been considered a deserter from their cause, and had become an object of their marked hatred and resentment. General Pater dined with the officers of the garrison; and the best feeling possible was shown at this entertainment. After dinner I proceeded by post to Madras.

JOHN MALCOLM.

No. III.

TO

THE HON. SIR G. H. BARLOW, BART. & K. B.

GOVERNOR IN COUNCIL.

Fort St. George.

HONOURABLE SIR,

I HAVE this day transmitted to the Commander-in-Chief of the forces an account of the inquiry into the proceedings of the officers at Masulipatam, previous to my assuming the command at that station. I now consider it my duty to report every event that occurred during my command of that garrison. It is, however, essential to my own character and to the information of Government, that I should state the peculiar circumstances under which I proceeded on this duty, as well as the impressions which existed at that moment on my mind, respecting your intentions not only regarding the garrison of Masulipatam, but the whole army; as it is with reference to those impressions alone that my conduct in the discharge of this delicate and important duty can be judged.

I received a message to attend at your Gardens on the 1st July; and was informed, when I arrived there, of the mutiny which had occurred at Masulipatam, and of an improper and disrespectful remonstrance which you had that day received from the Company's officers of the subsidiary force in the Deckan. You did me the honour to ask my opinion on both subjects; and I suggested, that an officer of rank should be immediately ordered to Masulipatam, to inquire into, and report upon, the proceedings of the officers of

that garrison ; and that a letter should be written to the commanding officers of the subsidiary forces at Hyderabad and Jaulnah, informing them of your having received, with regret and disapprobation, a Memorial from the officers under their command, soliciting that you should rescind the orders of the 1st of May ; and pointing out, in the most forcible manner, the dangerous tendency of such addresses, and the total impossibility of complying with their request ; and directing the commanding officers to call upon the officers under their command to reflect upon the serious consequences which a perseverance in such measures must produce.

After some discussion regarding the officer it would be proper to nominate to the command of the European regiment and the garrison of Masulipatam, I offered to proceed myself upon that service ; and you accepted my offer with an apparent confidence in my success, of which I could not but be proud. The emergency gave no time for the preparation of instructions, and I was immediately appointed to command the garrison of Masulipatam and the Madras European regiment ; while two respectable officers, Lieutenant-Colonel W. Berkeley and Major Evans, were nominated to act with me, as members of a military committee that was directed to investigate the conduct of the garrison.

I was repeatedly assured by you, at the last interview with which I was honoured, that you committed the dignity and interests of Government (as far as those were implicated on this occasion) into my hands with perfect confidence, and that you gave me the fullest latitude of action : adding, that I was fully acquainted with your sentiments upon the whole subject of the existing discontents among the officers of the Company's army. I certainly was, from the confidence with which you had honoured me, fully aware of your sentiments. I knew that you were most solicitous to allay the ferment that had arisen in the army, and that you were at that moment resolved to

use every means in your power to effect that object, but such as you deemed derogatory to the honour and dignity of the Government with which you were charged. You regarded, I knew, the occurrence of a rupture between the state and any part of its army, as one of the most desperate evils that could arise, and thought every moment that such an event was delayed was of ultimate importance, as it gave time for reflection and the action of better feeling, and strengthened the hope that deluded men might yet return to that path of duty and good order from which they had so widely departed.

The act of my appointment to Masulipatam of itself proclaimed these sentiments; and I was confirmed in them from the approbation you gave to my suggestion regarding the mode of treating the Memorial you had received from the officers of the subsidiary force, which you desired I would put into the form of a letter, and send to you; which I did, through the medium of your military secretary, Lieutenant-Colonel Barclay. Impressed with these sentiments, I sailed for Masulipatam early on the morning of the 31 of July, and arrived there on the 4th. I found the officers of that garrison in a state of open and bold mutiny against Government, with every thing prepared to march towards Hyderabad, to effect a junction with the subsidiary force at that place, by whom they had been promised complete support in the opposition they had commenced to the authority of Government. The most violent among the officers of the garrison saw, in recognising my authority, a complete suspension, if not a total discomfiture, of their plans, and argued loudly against my being acknowledged: and it was not till after a discussion of near five hours that I was enabled to bring these deluded men to a sense of all the perils of their situation, and of the consequences that must ensue from their throwing off their allegiance to the state. They at last were subdued by the force of reason; for no other means were used, as I thought it equally my duty to avoid any promise of amnesty for

the past, or of consideration for the future : and they, after repeated and fruitless trials, desisted from all applications upon these points. A repetition of the discussions which occurred at this scene (accompanied, however, with less violence) took place next day : after which, the question of disputing my authority was abandoned.

I was happy to find, by a letter from Lieutenant-Colonel Barclay, under date 12th July, that the mode as well as substance of the proceedings that I adopted on my arrival at Masulipatam was honoured with your entire approbation.

I took every opportunity of mixing with the officers of the garrison, and circulated among them a variety of letters, which I had written with a view of reclaiming the more violent of my brother officers to better feelings and better sentiments ; and I found that my conversation, and the perusal of these papers, had soon a very visible effect ; and that though they continued to share the general proceedings of the army, they no longer (as they had done before my arrival) thought it incumbent upon them to take the lead in an insurrection against Government, though they were excited to that measure by the most violent letters from almost every station in the army, and were also impelled to it by their own sense of danger from what had passed, which they thought would be greatly diminished when the majority of the officers of the army were sharers in the general guilt. I considered, that by effecting this change in the temper of the garrison of Masulipatam, one of the chief objects which you had in contemplation when you sent me to that garrison, was accomplished. The rupture which had recurred, and which was likely to be followed by an insurrection of a great part of the officers of the army, had been arrested in its progress, without the slightest sacrifice of the authority, or compromise of the dignity, of the state ; and time was gained, which, under every view that could be taken of

the subject, appeared of the greatest advantage to Government.

The first serious interruption to this progressive improvement of good feeling among the officers of the garrison of Masulipatam, was caused by a letter from an established committee at Hyderabad, which reached that garrison on the 18th July. This letter, which, like all other papers of a similar tendency, was shown to me, reproached the officers at Masulipatam with want of wisdom in having admitted me to assume the command of the garrison. The committee desired they would instantly demand from me an assurance that the order of the 1st of May would be rescinded; and, if I refused it, recommended that measures should be immediately taken to oblige me to quit Masulipatam. A paper of demands, which the Hyderabad committee termed their *Ultimatum*, and which they said they intended to forward to Government, accompanied this letter. These papers were shown to me by an officer of some rank and influence, with whom I was in the habit of confidential intercourse. He told me the senior officers of the garrison were far from approving of the sentiments of the Hyderabad committee, but much was to be feared from the violence of the juniors. I took this occasion of exposing all the fallacy of the grounds on which they were proceeding, and of impressing, in the most forcible language I could, the dangers into which many of the officers of the Company's army were precipitately rushing. As the substance of the communication I made to this officer was afterwards circulated in the form of a letter, I enclose an extract from my journal, in which it was immediately entered: and this extract will show you the nature of those arguments I used to reclaim men from their deep delusion. This communication had evidently a great effect upon the person to whom it was addressed; and he promised me he would not only communicate my sentiments to some of the most reflecting among the offi-

cers of the garrison, and obtain, through their means, the rejection of the proposals from Hyderabad, but would endeavour, in concert with them, to effect an arrangement that would exclude the younger part of the officers from any right of deliberation on the questions with which the army was now agitated ; which I agreed with him would be a point of the greatest importance, and the first step towards a final settlement of existing evils.

All these measures were happily effected. An answer was sent to Hyderabad, that the officers of Masulipatam must assert their right of judging for themselves, and that they could not comply with their demand regarding me ; and the garrison committees, which were mobbishi meetings of the whole of the officers, were dissolved, and all future proceedings entrusted to a few of the senior officers, who were (it was agreed) not to be influenced either by the opinions of other committees, or by the opinion of any officer in the garrison not included in their number, which was limited to eleven.

I had at this period received a report that Lieutenant-Colonel Berkeley was too unwell to come to Masulipatam, and there was likely to be some delay in the arrival of Major Evans. I also found that formal examinations before a regular committee would be likely to excite an irritation, which it had been, throughout, my study to avoid. I therefore took advantage of the authority conveyed to me by Lieutenant-Colonel Barclay's letter of the 12th of July, to commence myself the investigation of the conduct of the garrison previous to my arrival.

I had always intended (provided I had obtained your permission) to have proceeded with the report of the committee to Madras, as I was sensible I should never be able to convey to you by letters the whole of that important information I had obtained of the real state and temper of the majority of the officers of the Company's army on the coast, who, though apparently united in one confederacy, were actuated by widely different motives, and took very

different views of the nature of the scene in which they were engaged : and of these different shades in their situation and intentions it appeared to me most essential you should have the fullest information,' as this knowledge was evidently the only basis upon which any arrangement could be made for the settlement of the whole question, without having recourse to an open and declared rupture, which I ever understood it was your earnest desire to avoid till the last extremity. As I found the changes which had been effected left me without any fear of the garrison of Masulipatam departing from their duty during my absence, I thought it my duty, after I had completed the investigation with which I was charged, to exercise that discretion which you had given me before my departure from Madras, and proceed in person to report the result of my investigation. I communicated this intention to Major-General Pater, the commander of the division, who arrived at Masulipatam on the 20th July, and it met with his fullest concurrence and approbation.

I heard, before my departure, of the 2d battalion of the 10th regiment of native infantry having refused to march ; but as that event did not appear likely to be immediately followed by any open act of contumely or disobedience in the Hyderabad force, and as it produced no commotion whatever in the garrison of Masulipatam, it was an additional excitement to the resolution I had adopted, as I expected to have arrived at Madras (by travelling in the rapid manner I did) before any determination had been taken upon this act of mutiny and disobedience, and to have furnished information that might have aided your judgment in deciding upon that important question.

As I always conceived that it was the object of Government to reclaim, if possible, the minds of the officers, I directed my whole attention, during the period I was at Masulipatam, to this great object. I therefore

cautiously abstained from any attempt to discover the sentiments of either the European or native soldiery. Such an attempt must have been instantly known, and would have inflicted an irremediable wound on the minds of the officers, and have been certain to precipitate that crisis which it was my labour to avoid.

To evince that I have not been deceived in the expectations I formed of the change of feeling in the affairs of the garrison of Masulipatam, I enclose an extract of a letter from an officer, in whose correctness I place entire confidence. The resolutions which the committee of Masulipatam have agreed to consider, are such, no doubt, as it would be impossible for Government to have acceded to; but they exhibit a most important change from former violence to comparative temper and moderation; and their agitation shows that these officers reject all share in the demands made in that paper which is termed their *Ultimatum* by the Hyderabad committee. It must be recollected, that in cases like the present, where the minds of a large body of men have been greatly disturbed, that their return to reason is likely to be as gradual as their departure from it: and I can have no doubt, from what I know of the present temper and inclination of some of the senior officers in the northern division, as well as in other quarters of this army, that had not the recent acts of the force at Hyderabad led to those measures which Government has thought it its duty to adopt, they would have seized with avidity any opportunity that the indulgent considerations of Government for their past errors had afforded them, of reclaiming themselves and others from the deep crimes into which they had plunged, and of restoring to its former name and glory a service which the rash madness of some of its members threaten with ruin and destruction.

It remains for me only to state, and I do it with deep regret, that, as far as I can judge, late occurrences have annihilated every hope of the garrison of Masulipatam (I

speaking with the exception of the artillery company) remaining faithful to its duty ; and I fear there are several corps in the division, the officers of which will be disposed to follow their example.

I entreat you to pardon the length of this letter, as well as the freedom with which I have stated my sentiments. I can have no desire but to show that I have not been false to that confidence by which I was honoured ; and that I have laboured with zeal, and not without success, (at least as far as the scene in which I was employed was concerned,) to promote the public interests.

I have the honour to be,

Honourable sir,

Your most obedient servant,

(Signed)

JOHN MALCOLM.

Madras,
1st August, 1809.

No. IV.

Address of the Inhabitants of Madras to
Sir GEORGE BARLOW.

TO

THE HON. SIR G. BARLOW, BART. & K. B.

GOVERNOR, AND PRESIDENT IN COUNCIL, OF

FORT ST. GEORGE AND ITS DEPENDENCIES.

HONOURABLE SIR,

WE, whose names are hercunto subscribed, impressed with a deep sense of our duty to our Country, and of the necessity of good order and obedience to the constituted authorities, beg leave to render you, at this moment of difficulty and danger, our assurances of support to the interests of Government, and of our readiness to devote our lives and fortunes to the maintenance of the public tranquillity in any way in which to you, in your wisdom, it may seem meet to command them.

We desire to take this opportunity of publicly expressing our fullest disapprobation of that spirit of insubordination which has recently shown itself amongst the officers of the Honourable Company's army serving under the Presidency of Fort St. George: fully convinced, that it is the duty of every good subject to yield obedience to the commands of those whom the will of his Sovereign and the

laws of his country have placed in authority over him, and patiently to await the result of a reference to Europe for the redress of real or supposed grievances. Any conduct, impatient of the period of such appeal, and backward to the calls of professional obedience, we regard as subversive of all good order and discipline, hostile to the constitution of our native country, and big with danger to the existence of the British empire in India.

And we therefore, honourable sir, beg to repeat the assurances of our firm determination to resist the operation of such principles, which we are convinced must be equally reprobated and condemned by all good and loyal subjects.

Fort St. George,
9th August, 1809.

No. V.

Letter from Lieutenant-Colonel MALCOLM to Major-General GOWDIE, Commander of the Forces in Chief, Madras.



SIR,

I HAVE before informed you, that in consequence of instructions received from the honourable the Governor, through the medium of Lieutenant-Colonel Barclay, military secretary, I proceeded (without waiting the assembly of the committee that was ordered) to make an inquiry into the conduct of the garrison of Masulipatam. I considered that the best form in which I could make this inquiry, was to collect from Lieutenant-Colonel _____ every information he could give, and to obtain such evidence from the officers of the garrison as appeared necessary to establish the leading facts of the transactions it was my object to investigate. I judged that a minute and formal personal examination of the parties was equally unnecessary to the object of the preliminary inquiry with which I was charged, and unsuited to the temper of the times, or to the fulfilment of those objects which I conceived the honourable the Governor to have had in view at the time I was appointed to the command of the garrison of Masulipatam.

The officers of the garrison whom I called upon for information, were of course cautious in committing to writing, or indeed in verbally stating, any thing that might criminate themselves : and I was induced, by many reasons, to avoid any examination of the men of the European regiment, or native battalion. Such evidence was not necessary to the establishment of the principal facts ; and it could not have been obtained without a complete sacrifice of that temper which it was my object to maintain until the Government was in possession of the general result of my inquiry, and of that important information regarding the state of not only the garrison of Masulipatam, but of other stations in the army, which my employment upon this duty had enabled me to collect.

I enclose a statement given in by Lieutenant-Colonel Innes, with an Appendix, and two private notes in reply to queries I put to him, subsequent to his delivering me his first statement.

I also enclose a paper, which contains the substance of the information given me by Captain Andrews of the European regiment, and Captain Kelly of the 1st battalion 19th regiment of native infantry, and which was corroborated by several of the officers of the garrison. I transmit a paper from Lieutenant Nixon, the Adjutant, whom I examined relating to the different causes which had led to agitate the minds of the men of the European regiment, and to make them, as well as their officers, forget their duty.

You are in possession of Major Storey's public letter, stating the nature of the situation in which he was placed, and the steps which he adopted. In addition to that document I enclose the substance of a verbal declaration which Major Storey made to me upon this subject, and which shows the leading consideration which he states to have governed his conduct upon this occasion.

These enclosures will throw complete light upon the conduct of both Lieutenant-Colonel Innes and the officers

of the garrison of Masulipatam : and I shall, in the course of the few observations which I feel it my duty to offer upon their contents, state such additional facts as came to my knowledge from verbal communications upon this subject.

It is not possible to contemplate the conduct of the officers of Masulipatam throughout the different stages of this transaction, without constant reference to the general discontent and disaffection to Government which, at the moment of their proceedings, prevailed in the minds of a large proportion of the officers of the Company's army on this establishment, and which must be considered as one of the chief, if not the sole cause of their excesses.

Lieutenant-Colonel Innes appears, from his statement, to have joined the corps he was appointed to command with an impression that the officers of it were disaffected to Government, and with a resolution to oppose and correct such improper principles in whatever place or shape he met them.

He landed at Masulipatam on the 7th May, and was invited on the same day to dine at the mess of the regiment; and it was after dinner, on this first day of their intercourse, that the ground-work was laid of all their future disputes. The only substantial fact adduced by Lieutenant-Colonel Innes on this occasion, and admitted by the other parties, was, that "the friends of the army" was given as a toast, at this meeting, by Lieutenant D. Forbes, and seconded by Lieutenant Maitland, quartermaster of the corps. This toast Lieutenant-Colonel Innes requested might be changed for "the Madras army;" but his proposition was not acceded to, and he, in consequence, left the table. This appears to be the only proved fact. Several observations are stated by Lieutenant-Colonel Innes to have been made by officers at the table, that were disrespectful to Government, and contrary to the principles of subordination and good order : but the only one of these observations that he specifies, is ascribed to Lieutenant

Maitland in a letter to that gentleman, which forms a number of the Appendix. In that letter, Lieutenant-Colonel Innes, after regretting that Lieutenants Maitland and Forbes had not made the apology he required of them for their conduct on the evening of the 7th May, adds, "I will still forward any explanations you may state to me with respect to the *observations you made* at the mess on the 7th instant so *publicly*, with respect to the Nizam's detachment, and officers who are not friends of the army." Lieutenant Maitland, in his reply to this letter, states his hope that Government will not decide upon Lieutenant-Colonel Innes's report until he has an opportunity of defending himself: and further observes, "Until I received your letter this day, I never knew for what words or actions of mine an apology was required; for I *most solemnly deny* ever having given any opinion, in any manner, regarding the Nizam's detachment and its officers, that night, or at any other time, in your presence."

When Lieutenant-Colonel Innes left the mess-room, which he did, as has been before stated, in consequence of their refusing to change the toast to "the Madras army," as he had proposed, it appears the officers proceeded to drink their original toast in the manner they were accustomed to drink it, with three cheers: and these, it is not unlikely, may have been mistaken by Lieutenant-Colonel Innes for further marks of disrespect to him, and consequently to the authority by which he was appointed: but the officers of the regiment, who were present at table, deny the existence or expressions of any such sentiment.

These different statements cannot be deemed surprising, when the nature of this meeting is considered. The parties could, indeed, hardly have been personally known to each other: and although no doubt can be entertained of the goodness of Lieutenant-Colonel Innes's motives, and the laudable character of his zeal for the Government he served, it is perhaps to be regretted that his first effort to correct the principles of the officers of his corps should

have been made at a convivial scene, where it was to be supposed men would be less under restraint than in any other situation, and therefore less disposed to attend to either the voice of counsel or authority.

But Colonel Innes, from his statement, appears sensible of this fact. He observes, after recapitulating the motives that led him to report *privately* the conduct of the officers of the regiment at the dinner on the 7th of May, to a confidential staff officer, from whom he received what he terms 'his original instructions,' " I at the same time particularly requested, that no *public notice* might be taken of what I found it expedient to state, unless I should be compelled subsequently to bring the business reluctantly forward officially ; having intimated that I expected an apology to be tendered to me by Lieutenants D. Forbes and Maitland for their improper conduct on that evening, when the general orders of the 1st of May last were commented upon at the mess-room of the Madras European regiment. '

That such was the impression upon Colonel Innes's mind, is confirmed by a note from him to Mr. Nixon, the adjutant of the regiment, in which he asserts, that he made no official report of the occurrence. It appears, however, that, contrary to Lieutenant-Colonel Innes's expressed expectation, you considered it your duty to notice the private communication he had made of the occurrences of the evening of the 7th May ; and the letter which the Adjutant-General wrote to Lieutenant-Colonel Innes upon that subject, under date the 17th May, was immediately put into the regimental orderly book of the corps. It would be superfluous for me to dwell upon the irritation which the measures that were adopted upon this occasion, and the mode of carrying them into execution, excited in the minds of the officers of the regiment. The nature and extent of that irritation are sufficiently explained in the accompanying documents. Its grounds were the supposed incorrectness of Lieutenant-Colonel Innes's private com-

munications to head-quarters ; the neglect with which the representations of the officers of the regiment upon this subject were treated ; the hardship of a respectable staff officer being disgraced by a removal from his station, without knowing of what he was accused, or being permitted to say one word in his defence ; and the unusual and extraordinary measure of detaching (as a punishment) an officer of the regiment to the command of a post where there was not one man of his corps, and the refusal of a court martial to the officer on whom this unprecedented mark of disgrace had been inflicted.

In addition to these subjects of complaint, the officers seem to have considered the publication of the letter from Lieutenant-Colonel Conway in the orderly book, as an unnecessary promulgation of the displeasure and censure they had incurred among the men of the regiment : and Lieutenant-Colonel Innes would appear to have been sensible, sometime afterwards, that this was the fact, as he desired the letter to be expunged from the orderly book.

You will observe, from the documents I enclose, all that took place connected with the appointment of Lieutenant Spankie, regarding which an impression was received by the officers of the regiment, from a communication made by Lieutenant-Colonel Innes, on the ground of a private letter, which he stated to them he had received from you, that it was in contemplation to disband the regiment, and place the officers on half-pay, if they did not alter their conduct ; but that the fate of the corps would in a great degree be determined by the step which Lieutenant Spankie might take ; that is, by his refusal or acceptance of the station of quarter-master. This idea (which I cannot think it was ever the intention of your letter to convey) was directly intimated by Lieutenant-Colonel Innes in the following private note to Lieutenant Spankie.

“ MY DEAR SIR,

“ I believe I forgot to remark, that your
 “ situation and Lieutenant Fenwick’s are very different
 “ now. Under existing circumstances it was equally
 “ proper for him to decline accepting of the quarter-
 “ mastership, as it is absolutely proper and necessary
 “ that you should accede to the General’s wishes, to save
 “ a whole regiment. Think of this.

“ Yours truly,

(Signed)

“ J. INNES.”

This proceeding could not but greatly increase the irritation that before existed: it gave too much ground for the propagation of a belief, that the general punishment of the whole corps might depend upon the conduct of an individual (a young officer in the corps), on a question of a particular and personal nature; and it was not possible for an impression to have been made more calculated to increase the irritation and spirit of discontent which before prevailed in the regiment.

I shall now proceed to a concise view of the circumstances which relate to the order for the embarkation of a detachment of the Madras European regiment for marines, and of the occurrences which took place on the 25th June: regarding which, however, the documents already in your possession are so ample, as to require little further information upon the subject.

When Lieutenant Forbes was directed to proceed to Penang, and a party of marines, under Lieutenant Maitland, to be in readiness to embark on board the Fox frigate, no idea appears to have been entertained of opposition to these orders. Though the officers of the corps felt, that Lieutenants Forbes and Maitland being particularly or-

dered on these duties could only be as a punishment, and to avoid the stigma which they conceived this proceeding would bring upon the corps, they solicited Lieutenant-Colonel Innes to allow other officers to exchange with Lieutenant Maitland and Lieutenant Forbes, and at the same time assured him there was not an officer in the regiment that was not ready to take the tour of duty. This application (which proves the officers had no intention at that period of resisting the orders of Government,) was refused by Lieutenant-Colonel Innes, for reasons stated in his note to me of the 22d July, which forms a number of the Appendix.

Before the orders were received at Masulipatam for an increased number of marines embarking on board his Majesty's ships *Piedmontese* and *Samarang*, the minds of the officers of that garrison had been much inflamed by communications they had received from the different stations of the army. These expressed (agreeable to the statement of Captain Andrews and Captain Kelly) a general opinion of the illegality of the orders regarding Lieutenant Forbes and Lieutenant Maitland, and of the unjust manner in which the Madras European regiment had been treated. It was also reported from a variety of quarters, that the regiment was to be dispersed and disbanded: and these reports obtained, from the nature of preceding occurrences, a very ready belief both among the officers and men of the corps.

There can, however, be no doubt that the garrison at Masulipatam, as well as other stations with which they communicated, contemplated the detachment of so large a party as that ordered from the European regiment, as a serious diminution of their strength, and consequently injurious to the interests of the confederacy against Government, in which they were so deeply engaged; and that this consideration in some degree influenced them to that criminal course which they pursued: but I do not believe

that this motive, unaided by others, would have led them at that moment to so bold and daring an opposition to orders.

The account given by Lieutenant-Colonel Innes of the proceedings of the 25th June, is, I am satisfied, perfectly correct. It is impossible for me to afford any further information than what you will derive from that document. To Major Storey's official letter, and the substance of that officer's verbal declaration to me, (which forms a number of the Appendix,) I can only add my conviction of two facts; 1st, That Lieutenant-Colonel Innes had it not in his power to coerce the obedience of the garrison in the state it was in; and, 2dly, That had bloodshed taken place, it would (as Major Storey states in his verbal declaration) have been the signal for the Company's officers at many other stations throwing off their allegiance to Government.

The accompanying deposition of Lieutenant and Adjutant Nixon is entitled to some attention. There is no doubt of the general facts which that officer has stated; they are indeed proved by the conduct of the men of the European regiment, who gave a ready support to their officers in an act which they must have known was mutinous, which it is not likely they would have done if they had not received unfavourable impressions of the intentions of Government. These impressions, however, were only the predisposing causes: the immediate impulse under which the deluded men of the regiment acted, was a wish to support officers who had been long with them, and a feeling of resentment at threatened coercion; and, under the action of this impulse, they would, no doubt, have opposed any troops that had been brought against them.

Though nothing can justify mutiny, it is impossible, when we consider that the non-commissioned officers and men of the Madras European regiment acted on this occasion at the call of almost all their regimental officers, not to acquit them in a very great degree of that share of criminality which must attach to all the individuals im-

plicated in such proceedings. I am satisfied of the truth of what Lieutenant Nixon states regarding the discontent that exists among the men of this corps who have enlisted for an unlimited period of service. These men gave me a petition upon this subject, and prayed I would bring it to your notice. I communicated this petition to Major-General Pater, as I thought it implied, from the terms in which it was expressed, that they were aware of their situation, and were disposed to maintain their obedience to Government. It was at all events clearly to be inferred from the mode and substance of this representation, that those by whom it was made were sensible of the nature of the times, and thought them favourable for the accomplishment of their object.

It is impossible for me to state what officers have been most culpable in those irregular and unmilitary proceedings into which I have been directed to inquire ; but, with the exception of those stated in Lieutenant-Colonel Innes's letter, (who had, in fact, no means of being useful,) I believe that all the officers present with the Madras European regiment, and the 1st battalion of the 19th regiment, were implicated in the general guilt. Those who took the most forward part, are stated in Lieutenant-Colonel Innes's letters.

The company of artillery stationed out of the Fort had no concern whatever in these transactions, and has remained throughout perfectly faithful to its duty and to Government.

I need hardly state that the native officers and men of the garrison of Masulipatam had no concern in this mutiny. They fell in on their parade, on the day of the 25th June, because a number of the officers of the corps called upon them to do so.

It is a justice I owe to Major Storey and to Captain Andrews, senior officer of the European regiment, to state, that from the 25th June until the 4th of July, the day on which I took the command, the utmost subordination and

good order had been observed by the troops, and the duty of the garrison had been carried on with as great regularity and order as if nothing had occurred to disturb the usual routine of military discipline.

I feel it would be presumption in me to offer any opinion upon the subject of my inquiry, and I have therefore confined myself to the object of bringing before you, in as clear and concise a manner as I could, the leading and principal facts of those proceedings which I was directed to investigate.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your most obedient servant,

(Signed)

JOHN MALCOLM,

Madras,
1st August, 1809.

Lieut.-Col. Com.

STATEMENT of *Lieutenant-Colonel* INNES.

“ TO LIEUTENANT-COLONEL MALCOLM.

“ SIR,

Paragraph 1. “ PREVIOUS to my being appointed to command the Madras European regiment, I was informed that the officers of that corps had given some very improper toasts on the day that Captain J. Marshall had dined at their mess here, which fully expressed their political principles, and how highly they disapproved of the previous measures of Government, adopted after Lieutenant-General M'Dowall's leaving Madras for Europe, whose cause and party they support.

Par. 2. “ Impressed with the recollection of this circumstance, when I went to dine at the mess of the Madras European regiment, the day I landed here to assume the command, I determined neither to permit, or to pass over unnoticed, any such scene as was reported to have occurred on the day above alluded to, so extremely improper, and subversive of that high respect which is due to Government from every officer of the army of Fort St. George.

Par. 3. “ What actually did take place on the evening of the 7th May last, and which rendered it not only proper, but absolutely requisite for me to quit the mess-room at an early hour, I deemed it my indispensable duty next day to communicate, in a private manner, to a confidential staff officer ‘ from whom I received my original instructions,’ in order to show the officer commanding the

army in chief, and the Honourable the Governor of Fort St. George, the violent spirit of discontent, undisguised disapprobation, and determined opposition to the measures of Government, which even then existed amongst the officers of that corps, and which was previously well known at head-quarters.

Par. 4. " I at the same time particularly requested that no *public notice* might be taken of what I found it expedient to state, unless I should be compelled subsequently to bring the business reluctantly forward officially; having intimated, that I expected an apology to be tendered to me by Lieutenants D. Forbes and Maitland for their improper conduct on that evening, when the general orders of the 1st May were commented upon at the mess-room of the Madras European regiment.

Par. 5. " The next morning I went to breakfast with Captain Andrews (who had dined at the mess the previous evening), and requested of him to acquaint the officers composing the mess, that I was under the necessity of declining to become a member of their society, 'as I had proposed,' owing to 'existing circumstances that did not accord with my ideas or sentiments of subordination, which was my imperious duty to restrain.

Par. 6. " Contrary, however, to my expectation, the information I had originally given was acted upon, being considered of such a tendency that it could not be passed over, as I had requested, and which ultimately led to the publication of the orders by the officer commanding the army in chief, reprimanding the officers of the Madras European regiment, removing Lieutenant Maitland from the quartermastership, and ordering Lieutenant D. Forbes to command at Condapillee; as also the appointment of Lieutenant Maitland to command a detail of the corps ordered to serve as marines, and Lieutenant D. Forbes to command a detail of the corps at Prince of Wales Island. Those measures were no doubt adopted with a view of checking any future symptoms of insubordination amongst

the officers of the Madras European regiment. So far, however, from being attended with the desired effect, they only tended to increase the former state of irritation, and their determination on resistance to the orders of the officer commanding the army in chief, and Government, when their fractious arrangements were fully organized, and ready to be carried into execution by the disaffected, as has since been fully confirmed by their late and daring mutiny.

Par. 7. "When I transmitted Lieutenant D. Forbes's application to head-quarters for a general court martial, it was accompanied by my official letter, and report of the circumstances which occurred on the evening of the 24th May last, at the mess-room of the M. E. regiment, and which is now subjoined for your information; as also the correspondence which subsequently passed between me and the officers of the Madras European regiment upon this interesting subject, now under consideration; which I felt it my duty to forward to head-quarters for the consideration of the Commander-in-Chief, for the reasons assigned in my two notes addressed to Lieutenant and Adjutant Nixon. It only therefore remains for me to add, that what I honestly, candidly, and conscientiously stated to have taken place at the mess of the M. E. regiment on the evening of the 7th of May last, was the substance of what actually passed, and, to the best of my recollection, in nearly the same words, (or words to the same effect,) as I most solemnly declare upon my honour, and am ready to confirm upon oath.

(Signed) "J. INNES, Lieut.-Col."

"Masulipatam,
19th July, 1809."

Previous to entering upon the documents alluded to, I will call your attention to the two following paragraphs of the Governor General's letter, addressed to Sir G. H. Barlow, Bart. K.B. Governor of Fort St. George, dated

27th May, 1809; by which you will observe, I was not only *sanctioned*, but *expected* to give every information to the Commander-in-Chief and Government, (from my official situation,) which could tend to check disaffection in this division, and promote the public service either by my own example and exertions, or by applying to a higher authority to suppress it.

Par. 89. " We concur also entirely in the sentiment expressed in your general orders of the 1st ultimo, that it is not sufficient for officers holding commands to avoid a participation in such proceedings, but that it is their positive and indispensable duty to adopt the most decided measures for their suppression, and to report them to the superior authorities. The purposes of tumult and sedition may as effectually be promoted by their negative concurrence as by their active participation.

Par. 90. " The neglect of duty is an offence varying only in degree from a positive violation of it; and any officer who, apprised of the progress of disorderly proceedings among those who are placed under his immediate control, abstains from any attempt to suppress them either by the exertion of his own authority or by an appeal to the superior power, gives to those proceedings one mode of encouragement, and cannot stand absolved of blame, nor found a claim to immunity, nevertheless to a continuance of that implicit confidence which is attached to stations of authority, on the basis of so culpable and mischievous a neutrality."

(A true copy.)

(Signed) " J. INNES, Lieut.-Col."

Letter from Lieutenant-Colonel INNES to the Adjutant-General of the Army.

“ Fort St. George.

“ SIR,

Paragraph 1. “ I HAVE the honour of reporting to you, for the information of the officer commanding the army in chief, and the Honourable the Governor in Council, the particulars of the daring and premeditated mutiny which occurred here on Sunday the 25th June, about two or three o'clock, P. M., when the three detachments of the M. E. regiment were ordered to embark on board the fleet as marines.

Par. 2. “ On the arrival of the Piedmontese frigate, and Samarang sloop of war, at this place, I sent off a letter to Captain Foote commanding the two ships, intimating that the three detachments of the M. E. regiment were ready to embark, was he prepared and authorized to receive them on board his ships. The non-commissioned officers and privates appeared to be highly pleased at going on this duty.

Par. 3. “ About sunset I observed a boat landing with some naval officers ; and having invited Captain Foote on shore, went down to meet and receive him at the sea gate, to conduct him to my quarters, that we might communicate fully on every subject which could tend to promote the public service, in carrying the orders of the officer commanding the army in chief into execution.

Par. 4. “ Just as the naval officers were nearly landed, I was called aside by Lieutenant Charles Forbes of the M. E. regiment, who was accompanied by Captains Kelly

and Harrington of the 1st battalion 19th regiment N. I., Lieutenant and Adjutant Nixon, and Lieutenant and Quarter-Master Spankie of the M. E. regiment. Captain Kelly then read a paper, which they were deputed to communicate to me not only by the officers of the garrison, but those of this division, requesting I would postpone the embarkation of the detachments of the M. E. regiment till they could receive an answer to an address they had it in contemplation to submit to the Commander-in-Chief, and the Honourable the Governor in Council, *demanding a redress of grievances*. To this application I pointedly objected, having no authority to set aside the instructions I received from the Commander-in-Chief.

Par. 5. “ Lieutenant Spankie then boasted of their having the most positive assurances of support from the troops at Hyderabad, Jaulnah, the Bombay army, and every division on the coast. I then observed, that I hoped those expectations would not induce them to resist the embarkation, by being guilty of mutiny, and by trying whether the troops would obey them or me. To order the whole in arrest, was *now my only* alternative. This, however, I could not attempt, or expect their obedience to my authority, under existing circumstances, and ‘ standing alone.’

Par. 6. “ At this instant the purser of the Piedmontese delivered to me a letter from Captain Foote, annexed ; which upon opening, it proved to be an official letter from the chief secretary of Government, dated 22d June 1809, ordering me to embark the detachment of H. M. 59th regiment of foot on board the Samarang with the least delay. I then inquired of the purser if he had not brought any other letter to me from Captain Foote ? He replied in the negative, nor did he hear of any detachment being ordered on board but that of the 59th. This the deputation saw and heard.

Par. 7. “ But apprehending some mistake had occurred, I told the deputation I expected a reply to my.

letter of that day, sent to Captain Foote, which would elucidate the subject. At 10 o'clock P. M. it reached me, referring me to his letter sent by the purser. I, of course, concluded that the one from the secretary of Government was the one he alluded to, and sent Captain Foote's letter to Lieutenant and Adjutant Nixon directly: and we concluded that the detachments of the Madras European regiment were not expected to embark; which I communicated to the officers on parade next morning; adding, that they must be prepared to embark at an hour's notice in any other ships that might arrive to receive them on board, which appeared to give much satisfaction, finding they were not going by this opportunity.

Par. 8. "About 1 o'clock P. M., 25th June, the Purser, and Mr. Midshipman Shepperd, of the Samarang, returned from the Pettah to my quarters; and, to my astonishment, put Captain Foote's first and original letter (alluded to in his second) into my hand, which, by mistake, they had omitted to do the previous evening. I then expressed my regret at what had passed, although I was convinced it made no difference; as I conceived, from what passed the evening before, that the embarkation of the Madras European regiment's detachments would be resisted by the *officers of the garrison* at all events.

Par. 9. "I then sent for Lieutenant and Adjutant Nixon, showed him Captain Foote's letter, (No. 4, annexed,) and directed him to have the parties ready to go on board at 6 P. M., and to send the officers ordered on this duty to receive my instructions. I at the same time observed to the Adjutant, that, from what had passed the previous evening, I had every reason to suppose the embarkation would be resisted; and begged and conjured him to consider of the consequences; and to inform the officers, that if they would pledge their *honour* not to interfere with me in the *execution of my duty*, by carrying the orders of the Commander-in-Chief and Government into

execution, it would afford me the highest satisfaction, and preserve order and tranquillity.

Par. 10. “ If, however, resistance was intended to be offered by the *officers* to the embarkation, I would reluctantly be reduced to the disagreeable necessity of applying to Captain Foote of the *Piedmontese* to land the marines of both ships, and every seaman who could be spared, to see the orders of Government and the Commander-in-Chief *respected*, and to enable me to carry them into execution.

Par. 11. “ So soon as the order for embarking was made public, and shown to the officers, they ran, in a disorderly, tumultuous, and mutinous manner, to the barracks of the Madras European regiment and the 1st battalion 19th regiment native infantry, calling on the men to arm, and prevailed on them to join them in the mutiny, and opposition to my orders, and those of the Commander-in-Chief and the Honourable the Governor in Council.

Par. 12. “ Captain Kelly, Lieutenant and Quarter-Master Spankie, and some other officers, came over to my quarters, conjuring me not to insist on the embarkation, or to send to Captain Foote for assistance, which could only occasion the shedding of much innocent blood, and endangering the loss of the country. All this passed before the naval gentlemen. Their first observation was a most serious one, having got the two corps to join them in the mutiny.

Par. 13. “ Another party of officers came shortly after up to my quarters, repeating what the other officers had done, and upbraiding me with giving incorrect information to Government and the Commander-in-Chief relative to what passed on the 7th ult. at the mess; on which they acted, and dispersed the regiment, on my suggestions, as a punishment, and which they never would accede to. Many other observations passed I do not exactly recollect: but I again intimated to the gentlemen, that, had they obeyed the orders issued, no mutiny could have occurred,

or the public service been impeded, by their conduct and exertions.

Par. 14. "Major Storey, who had been sent for by the officers in the Fort to join in their mutiny, then came to my quarters, told me the two corps were under arms, and would not be dismissed but by a proper authority; and that he was called upon by the gentlemen to assume the command, and put me under close arrest, for the preservation of the garrison.

Par. 15. "I observed to Major Storey, that I neither could or would acknowledge his illegal arrest, and usurped authority, (although he might put me into close confinement,) for which he and the other officers would have to answer hereafter; having not only mutinied, but prevailed on the troops in garrison to do so, by ordering them under arms, (without my authority,) which they prevailed upon them to resist.

Par. 15. "Major Storey then ordered my letters to be seized that were coming from the post office, to be examined by him, and not to allow any to pass out, or any gentleman to visit me, without his permission. He then, 'I hear,' issued a garrison order, assuming the command, (as Captain Andrews did of the Madras European regiment,) and sent off letters to Hyderabad, Bombay, Travancore, and every other station and encampment that had united with them in the diabolical conspiracy against the Government of Fort St. George, as will appear on reference to the register of letters dispatched after the mutiny from the post office here; having completely laid aside the mask, publicly avowing and boasting of the support they depended upon receiving from their friends, in having their grievances redressed, imposed on them by their tyrannical Government.

Par. 17. "Here it is requisite to observe, Lieutenant Cecil, Dr. Anderson, and Mr. Assistant Surgeon Jones, of the Madras European regiment, did not join in the mutiny; nor do I think the non-commissioned and privates of

the Madras European regiment, or the native commissioned, non-commissioned and privates of the 1st battalion 19th native infantry, would, had they not been *misguided* by their guilty officers, *who even then*, 'I hear,' had some difficulty to prevail on them to mutiny against my authority and that of the Commander-in-Chief and Government.

Par. 18. "Lieutenant Cecil, who commanded the main-guard, having declined on every occasion to join the other officers in their disorderly and insubordinate conduct, by resisting the measures of Government, was relieved from the duty of the main-guard by the mutineers; not, however, till he had *twice* waited on me, at the risk of his life; the second time after I was arrested, when I told him to submit, opposition being then of no use, and, being ill, to report himself sick, to avoid future ill treatment from the mutineers.

Par. 19. "Finding my letters seized by the mutineers, I sent a letter secretly to Captain Foote by his purser, with a request that copies of it might be transmitted without delay to the Commander-in-Chief and the Honourable the Governor in Council, for their information, having no other means of reporting to them till I was liberated; when a statement of circumstances would be duly forwarded, which will fully *prove* that nothing was wanting on my part to carry my instructions into execution instantly, notwithstanding the state of affairs here, so frequently reported since my assuming the command of the Madras European regiment and this division; previous to which, their opposition to the measures of Government (and confederacy alluded to,) had commenced with the Madras and Bombay army.

Par. 20. "In justice to the purser of the Piedmontese, I must here observe, that his mistake, in not delivering the letter sooner, was of no other consequence but that of delaying the mutiny a few hours, it being regularly *organized*, and resolved upon for some time past, and my

being arrested, that I might not impede their seditious plans against Government, so actively carried on; *sorry I am to add, with too much success.* Understanding that General Pater will not reach this place before the 15th July, I forward this letter in a private and secret manner, that Government may be in possession of the fullest information on the 3d July, in case I may be put to death by the mutineers before or after the arrival of Major General Pater, commanding officer of this division.

(A true copy.)

(Signed)

“ J. INNES, Lieut. Col.

Commanding Masulipatam,
in charge N. D. of the Army.

*Private Note from Lieutenant-Colonel INNES to
Lieutenant-Colonel MALCOLM, dated Masulipatam,
20th July, 1809.*

MY DEAR SIR,

I AM favoured with your note of this day's date. In reply to which I have to state, that I had no communications with the officers of the Madras European regiment on the subject of reducing the corps. But when Lieutenant Spankie waited upon me, to receive the Commander-in-Chief's letter, I intimated to him, on his refusing to accept of the quartermastership, proffered to him by General Gowdie, that if he did so, it was the General's intention to bring him to a general court martial. I at the same time conjured him to accept of the situation offered to him, as on the conduct of the officers of the regiment much depended, on this occasion; for if they persisted in

the unwarrantable conduct they were now pursuing, the regiment would be reduced, and all those not on the staff put upon the half-pay of their rank. I then told Lieutenant S., that other plans, of a much more pleasant nature, were in contemplation for the regiment, which the officers seemed determined to put a stop to. I therefore begged and entreated that he and his friends would maturely and deliberately consider of existing circumstances, and study their own interest, and that of the public, by acceding to the General's wishes; which nothing upon earth could have induced me to make known to Lieutenant S. but the extreme desire I had to preserve order and tranquillity, in order to promote the benefit of the regiment and the public service. My letter from the General was a *private* one; but, I conceived, couched in such terms, as to authorize my making use of the information it contained, to check the irritation that existed in the corps.

Yours sincerely,

(Signed)

J. INNES.

Letter from Lieutenant-Colonel INNES to Lieutenant-Colonel MALCOLM.

MY DEAR SIR,

WHEN I received the order of the Commander-in-Chief, appointing Lieutenant Maitland to command the first party ordered to serve as marines on board the Fox frigate, I was waited upon by Captain Yard and four subalterns of the Madras European regiment, (in the name of the corps,) requesting I would nominate any subaltern in the regiment to go in the room of Lieutenant Maitland (who was always sick at sea), or permit one to volunteer his services.

I accordingly showed the deputation my instructions and orders, from which I had not authority to *deviate*; but offered to write to the Commander-in-Chief for his permission, which they would not accede to. I at the same time assured the gentlemen, the Honourable the Governor in Council, and officer commanding the army in chief, were ready to forget and forgive every thing that had taken place; and that I would have much pleasure in accepting and forwarding any apology, 'however slight,' which Lieutenants D. Forbes and Maitland might send me; and did not entertain a doubt but should be able to get Lieutenant Maitland restored to his quartermastership, and Lieutenant D. Forbes continued with the regiment. They, notwithstanding, persisted in making *no* apology, and the subject was dropped, to my great regret.

(Signed)

" J. INNES."

" Masulipatam. 22d July, 1809."

ABSTRACT of the Evidence of Captain ANDREWS of the Honourable Company's European Regiment, and Captain KELLY of the 1st Battalion 19th Infantry, which is corroborated by several other Officers of the Garrison.

" ON the arrival of Lieutenant-Colonel James Innes at Masulipatam on the 7th ultimo, to assume the command of the Madras European regiment, he was invited to dinner at the regimental mess, where there were several strangers present. In the course of the evening a toast was proposed, which it was conceived could not be objected to by any

one, whatever might be his opinion of the recent acts of Government that have excited such general discontent amongst the officers of the coast army; viz. "The friends of the Madras army." We were therefore much surprised to hear Lieutenant-Colonel Innes express his disapprobation of it, and his wish that it might be changed to a more general one; viz. "The Madras army." Several observed, that there were officers in this army who were not its friends, and it appeared to be the general opinion of the Company that the toast should be given out as at first proposed. Colonel Innes immediately arose from the table; and as he was going out of the mess-room, the toast was drank with loud applauses. This, we have reason to think, he construes into his being hooted out of the mess. Next day Lieutenants D. Forbes and Maitland were informed, that if they did not apologize for some observations said to be made by them at the mess in the presence of their commanding officer, their conduct would be reported to head-quarters. Those officers were, however, acquainted that they should be furnished with a copy of the report. As no specific observations were mentioned by Colonel Innes, and as those officers had neither said nor done any thing that required an apology, they of course refused to make any. When it was supposed that Colonel Innes intended to recommend himself to Government by informing them of the conversation of a convivial party, the officers of the regiment resolved to have no further communication with him, except in cases of duty. Some days afterwards, Lieutenants Spankie and Hancorn waited upon Colonel Innes, and explained to him fully their motives for declining to hold any private intercourse with him. In the course of a long conversation he repeatedly told them, that he had not reported Lieutenants Forbes and Maitland; and at last assured them, unless obliged to do so by some future conduct of theirs, he would not. With this assurance the officers of the regiment were so satisfied, that they altered their behaviour towards Colonel

Innes. His declarations, however, were equivocal and false, as will appear by the letter No. 1, which was published in the regimental orders of the 22d ult. He has acknowledged by the letter No. 2, that it was written in consequence of information communicated by him in a private letter, but which he pretended he did not think would have been acted upon. Agreeably to the orders, Lieutenant David Forbes submitted to the punishment inflicted upon him; but, previous to his departure for Condapillee, he requested the Commander-in-Chief to give him an opportunity of proving his innocence of the charge laid against him before a general court martial. The answer he received to this was, that 'the Commander-in-Chief deemed his application inadmissible:' but no reason whatever was assigned. Vide letters, No. 3 and 4. Colonel Innes put Lieutenant Fenwick's name in orders, to succeed to the situation of Lieutenant Maitland; but that officer begged leave to decline acceptance of it under the existing circumstances. The quartermastership was then offered to Lieutenant Spankie, who was told, that if he refused the situation he would be brought to a court martial; that the regiment would be disbanded, and the officers placed upon half-pay. Vide the Memorandum, No. 5, written by Lieutenant Spankie in the presence of Colonel Innes, by whom they were dictated. He was also desired to recollect the situation of Captain Yard, a married man with a large family, and to reflect upon the misfortunes he would bring down upon his brother officers; but if he would accept the appointment, there were favours for the regiment in contemplation of Government. Thus the fate of a regiment, and the favours or frowns of a Government, depended upon the will of an individual; and officers of all ranks were to be punished, if his conduct (over which they had no control) proved unsatisfactory!—Vide letter, No. 6, from Colonel Innes to Lieutenant Spankie.—On the receipt of the general order appointing him quarter-master, Lieutenant Spankie did, however, send a letter to the Honourable the

Governor in Council; and upon Colonel Innes's refusal to forward it through the regular channel, he forwarded it direct, in which he requested to relinquish the situation.—Vide letter, No. 7.—To this letter no answer was ever returned. At the same time that Colonel Innes forwarded the application of Lieutenant D. Forbes for a court martial, he transmitted an official statement of what had occurred at the regimental mess, in his presence, on the evening of the 7th ult. When Lieutenant Maitland was acquainted with this circumstance, he applied to him for a copy of such parts as concerned himself.—Vide letter, No. 8.—Colonel Innes refused to comply with this request, stating that Government would be guided by his report of that day, and decide accordingly. He also mentioned, that, as far as he knew, private information would not have been acted upon, had the expected apology been made; and he imputed to Lieutenant Maitland an observation which he said was made at the mess that evening regarding the Hyderabad subsidiary force.—Vide letter, No. 9.—Lieutenant Maitland informed him, in reply, that, until the receipt of his note of this day, he did not know for what words or actions of his an apology had been required, and most solemnly denied having made any observations regarding the Hyderabad subsidiary force on the night alluded to, or at any other time, in Colonel Innes's presence.—Vide letter, No. 10.—The letter, No. 11, was signed by every officer present with the regiment, excepting one, to whom it was not sent. On the receipt of it, Colonel Innes wrote an official note to the adjutant, in which he promised to forward the above letter, and requesting the officers of the regiment, who were present at the mess on the 7th ult., to draw up a statement of the circumstances which induced him to quit the mess-room on the evening of that day.—Vide letter, No. 12.—The letter, No. 13, is a copy of their answer. On the 2d of June arrived an order, directing Lieutenant D. Forbes to proceed forthwith to the Presidency, and there to embark for Penang

for the purpose of taking charge of a few men of the regiment stationed at that island. Lieutenant Maitland was at the same time ordered to hold himself in readiness with thirty men of the regiment to go on board the Samarang sloop of war, as marines. In consequence of this order, a deputation from the officers of the Madras European regiment waited upon Colonel Innes, and earnestly requested him to select two other officers for the above duties. They strongly pressed upon him the impropriety of selecting two officers whose conduct had been branded in orders. If those gentlemen had been guilty of conduct contrary to every principle of military subordination, they were unfit to be sent on command with that stigma hanging over them; and if innocent, as the officers of the regiment asserted them to be, they ought not to be ordered from the coast until an investigation should take place, and the charge as publicly retracted as it had been preferred. It is here necessary to observe, that during the conference between Colonel Innes and the deputation, he read to them an extract from a letter received from the Commander-in-Chief, threatening the regiment's being disbanded. Respecting Lieutenants Forbes and Maitland, he said he could not select two others, as those officers had been nominated by the Commander-in-Chief. He acknowledged that he might have been mistaken as to Lieutenant Maitland's person, and that he now saw the matter in a different light to what he did at first. He also said, that the letter, No. 1, should be expunged from the orderly books; and that if Lieutenants Forbes and Maitland would offer some slight apology, he would endeavour to get the latter reinstated in his appointment. The apology was positively refused.

“ Upon a candid consideration of the preceding circumstances, it will not excite surprise when we state, that alarm and indignation were excited in the minds of the officers. The false aspersions cast upon their

characters might have tended to have lowered them in the opinion of the men, ignorant as they must have been of the circumstances which occasioned it. The two officers were naturally supposed to have been selected for some punishment, as Colonel Innes had publicly declared that such was the intention by their being appointed to those commands. At any rate, their feelings had been wounded by the severe reflections against them, contained in the letter of the Commander-in-Chief, which was published to the regiment. A court martial had been positively refused to the application of one of those injured officers, which was the only means he knew to clear up his character before the world.

“ All the circumstances above stated took place previous to the 10th of June. We afterwards found that two more detachments were ordered from the Madras European regiment, to act as marines. We found that the officers of various stations concurred in opinion with the officers of this garrison regarding the illegality of the order respecting Lieutenants Forbes and Maitland, and the unjust treatment experienced by the Madras European regiment in general; and we heard from different quarters, that it really was intended to disband the regiment, which circumstances rendered extremely probable. On the arrival, therefore, of the Piedmontese and Samarang ships of war, a deputation from the officers of the garrison waited upon Colonel Innes, and requested him to suspend the execution of the orders regarding the three detachments of marines, until we had made a representation on the subject to the Commander-in-Chief, for the decision of the Honourable the Governor in Council. With this request he positively refused to comply, and threatened to enforce obedience to his orders by an appeal to the men. Next day he seemed determined to abide by the resolution he had expressed to the deputation, but appeared to be sensible that the officers ordered to act as marines would not be

allowed to embark, and that the men respected their officers too much to go without them.

“ He therefore stated, his determination to carry his orders into execution, with the assistance of the detachments of H. M. 59th regiment, the artillery, and a body of men which he said would be landed from H. M. ships then in the roads, as more particularly mentioned in the reasons signed by the deputation, and forwarded to head-quarters by Major Storey, with his official account of what occurred here on the 25th June.”

APPENDIX

TO THE

STATEMENT OF LIEUT.-COLONEL INNES.

Copy of regimental Orders published by Lieutenant-Colonel INNES in the Orderly Book of the Madras European Regiment.

R. O. BY LIEUTENANT-COLONEL INNES.

Mafulipatam, 22d May, 1809.

LIEUTENANT DAVID FORBES, of the Madras European regiment, is appointed to command at Condapilly, and directed to proceed to that station in the course of twenty-four hours after the publication of this order. The officer now in command of that garrison is directed to join his corps on being relieved by Lieutenant Forbes, who will not be permitted to be absent from Condapilly unless it becomes necessary for his health.

The following letter is published for the information of the officers of the Madras European regiment, in conformity with which Lieutenant Maitland is removed from the appointment of quarter-master, and Lieutenant Fenwick is appointed to act as quarter-master, and to take charge of the office immediately, till further orders.

*To the Officer Commanding, or Senior Officer in
charge of the Madras European Regiment.*

SIR,

IT having come to the knowledge of the officer commanding the army, that conduct highly indecorous, and contrary to every principle of military subordination, was observed at the mess of the Madras European regiment on the 7th instant, and that Lieutenant David Forbes and Lieutenant and Quarter-Master Maitland were the authors and supporters of it, I am directed to desire that you will express to the officers of the M. E. regiment the officer commanding the army's highest disapprobation of such conduct; and inform them, that a repetition of such irregularity will involve the whole corps in the severest penalty to which such insubordinate proceedings are liable; but which, however, from the benefit of your example, the officer commanding the army is yet disposed to think it will be unnecessary to resort to. Notwithstanding this hope, the officer commanding the army feels himself called upon to mark, by a suitable example, the authors of the exceptionable conduct that has come to his notice; and, with that view, has taken upon himself to anticipate the sanction of the Honourable the Governor in Council for the removal of Lieutenant Maitland from the situation of quarter-master of the Madras European regiment. For this purpose, I am directed by the officer commanding the army to desire that you will remove Lieutenant Maitland from the charge of the appointment of quarter-master of the regiment, and that you will yourself appoint to succeed him the subaltern officer whose conduct you most approve, and forward his name to this office, that the officer commanding the army may recommend to Government to confirm your selection. Lieute-

nant David Forbes you will be pleased to appoint to command at Condapilly, and direct him to proceed in twenty-four hours after the publication of your orders, directing the officer now there to return to join his corps. And it is the officer commanding the army's further orders, that Lieutenant Forbes may not be permitted to be absent from Condapilly, unless it become necessary for his health.

(Signed)

J. H. S. CONWAY,

Adjutant-General's Office,
17th May, 1809.

Adjutant-General.

No. II.

*Copy of a Letter addressed to Lieutenant NIXON,
Adjutant of the Madras European Regiment.*

DEAR SIR,

I PREVIOUSLY intimated to you, and some of the other officers of the corps, that I would not report what passed on the 7th instant at the mess *officially*. That I mentioned the circumstances *privately*, I acknowledge, knowing that if I omitted to do so, other accounts would soon reach Madras. I have now stated the circumstances *officially* to head-quarters.

Yours truly,

(Signed)

J. INNES, M. E. Regt.

Masulipatam,
21th May, 1809.

No. III.

*Copy of an Application from Lieutenant D. FORBES
for a Court Martial.*

TO LIEUTENANT-COLONEL INNES,
COMMANDING THE MADRAS EUROPEAN REGIMENT.

SIR,

As the information which the officer commanding the army in chief has received of my conduct at the regimental mess on the evening of the 7th instant must have been extremely incorrect; in vindication of my character, I have requested, in the accompanying letter, a public investigation, and beg you will forward it to the Adjutant-General of the army.

(Signed)

D. FORBES,

Masulipatam,
22d May, 1809.

Lieutenant of the Madras
European Regiment.

TO THE ADJUTANT-GENERAL OF THE ARMY.

SIR,

HAVING been accused, in the copy of a letter from you, published in regimental orders of the 22d instant, of being one of the "authors and supporters" of conduct highly indecorous, and contrary to every "principle of military subordination," I beg leave to request, that I may be allowed the privilege of being allowed attempting to prove my innocence of that most serious charge before a general court martial; and I have to request that you will lay this my desire before the officer commanding the army in chief.

(Signed)

D. FORBES,

Masulipatam,
22d May, 1809.

Lieutenant of the Madras
European Regiment.

*Letter from Lieutenant-Colonel INNES to the
Adjutant-General of the Army.*

Fort St. George.

SIR,

I HAVE the honour herewith to transmit to you an official note, received last night, from Lieutenants D. Forbes of the Madras European regiment, with one to your address ; both of which I request may be submitted to the Commander-in-Chief.

If Lieutenant Forbes's application is complied with, every young officer under my command will soon be making similar applications to head-quarters.

The gross and public disrespect shown by Lieutenants D. Forbes and Maitland, of the Madras European regiment, at the regimental mess of that corps, on the night of the 7th instant, so derogatory to the dignity of the Honourable the Governor in Council and Commander-in-Chief, from the observations made by these officers on the Government orders and those of the Commander-in-Chief, then received, dated 1st May ; as also on the steady conduct of the native troops at Hyderabad, which was instantly noticed by me, calling upon Lieutenant D. Forbes to change the *toast* he proposed from the *friends of the army* to that of the *Madras army*, which was pointedly rejected, and the former one repeated, with three times three, obliging me to quit the mess-room ; and for which improper conduct Lieutenants Forbes and Maitland subsequently declined to make an apology. I therefore feel it now my duty to report the circumstance officially, for the information of the Honourable the Governor in Council, and Commander-in-Chief.

(Signed)

JAMES INNES,

Masulipatam,
24th May, 1809.

Lieut.-Colonel commanding at
Masulipatam.

*Letter from the Adjutant-General to the Officer
commanding the Northern Division of the Army.*

SIR,

THE officer commanding the army requests you will nominate Lieutenant Maitland, of the Madras European regiment, to the command of the detachment of that corps ordered to serve as marines on board his Majesty's ship the Fox; and that you will direct Lieutenant D. Forbes, of the Madras European regiment, to proceed forthwith to the Presidency, for the purpose of embarking for Prince of Wales Island, to take charge of the corps doing duty there.

(Signed)

J. H. CONWAY,

Adjutant-General's Office,
27th May, 1809.

Adjutant-General.

IV.

*Copy of the Reply to the Application of Lieutenant
D. FORBES.*

TO LIEUTENANT D. FORBES,
MADRAS EUROPEAN REGIMENT.

SIR,

I HAVE the honour to annex, for your information, extract of a letter received from the officer commanding the army in chief.

(Signed)

J. INNES,

Masulipatam,
5th June, 1809.

Lieut.-Colonel in Charge of the
Northern Division of the
Army.

EXTRACT, dated *Adjutant-General's Office*,
31st May, 1809.

“ In reply to Lieutenant Colonel Innes's letter of the 24th instant, I have the honour to inform you, that Lieutenant D. Forbes's letter, applying to be tried by a general court martial, has been submitted to the officer commanding the army, who deems that officer's request inadmissible.”

(A true extract.)

(Signed)

J. INNES,
Lieut.-Colonel in Charge of the
Northern Division of the
Army.

No. V.

*Memorandum written in the Presence of Colonel
INNES, and dictated by him.*

“ 1st. Provided I (Lieutenant Spankie) do not accept of the situation of quarter-master to the Madras European regiment, I must be brought to a court martial for disobedience of orders.

“ 2dly. If I (Lieutenant S.) still persist in refusing the situation, the regiment will be reduced, and every officer not on the general staff placed on half-pay.

“ 3dly. In the event of my accepting this situation, other plans of a much more pleasant nature have been in contemplation for the regiment, which the officers seem determined to put a stop to.”

No. VI.

*Copy of a Letter from Lieutenant-Colonel INNES
to Lieutenant SPANKIE.*

MY DEAR SIR,

I BELIEVE I forgot to remark, that your situation and Lieutenant Fennick's are very different now. Under existing circumstances it was equally proper for him to decline accepting of the quartermastership, as it is absolutely proper and necessary that you should accede to the General's wishes, to serve a whole regiment. Think of this.

Yours truly,

(Signed)

J. INNES.

No. VII.

*Copy of a Letter from Lieutenant SPANKIE to the
Honourable Sir G. BARLOW, Bart. K. B. Go-
vernour in Council, Fort St. George.*

HONOURABLE SIR,

I HAVE the honour to request you to accept my resignation of the situation of quarter-master of the Madras European regiment. I have signed an official paper, in which I have declared, that I conceive Lieutenant Maitland has been removed from his appointment in

consequence of an erroneous report of his conduct having come to the knowledge of the Commander-in-Chief, and this is still my decided opinion. On this account, and to prevent my being removed on private information, without having an opportunity of getting my conduct publicly investigated, I hope you will do me the favour to comply with my most earnest request to be permitted to relinquish a situation which I cannot hold, and at the same time retain the good opinion of my brother officers.

(Signed)

J. S. SPANKIE,

Lieutenant of the Madras
European Regiment.

No. VIII.

*Copy of a Letter from Lieutenant MAITLAND to
Lieutenant-Colonel INNES.*

SIR,

I HAVE this moment understood that you have found it necessary to report my conduct to the Commander-in-Chief. As I am not conscious of any misconduct, it is probable I may have something to allege in my defence; I therefore beg leave to request a copy of your report, or at least to be made acquainted with its purport.

(Signed)

G. G. MAITLAND,

Masulipatam,
24th May, 1809.

Lieutenant of the Madras European
Regiment.

No. IX.

*Copy of a Letter from Lieutenant-Colonel INNES to
Lieutenant MAITLAND.*

SIR,

UNDER existing circumstances, I deem your application inadmissible. Government will be guided by my report of this day, and will decide accordingly. So far as relates to yourself, you may apply to the Adjutant-General of the army for a copy. I am left to regret that you and Lieutenant Forbes did not make the *required apology* for your conduct on the 7th instant. Had you done so, as I requested, private information would not have been acted upon, as far as I know. Matters must now take their course. I will still forward any explanations you may state to me with respect to the *observations you made* at the mess on the 7th instant, so *publicly*, with respect to the Nizam's detachment, and officers who are not friends of the army.

(Signed)

J. INNES, Lieut.-Col.

No. X.

*Copy of a Letter from Lieutenant MAITLAND to
Lieutenant-Colonel INNES.*

SIR,

I AM sorry that circumstances exist to subject me to be condemned unheard for a time. I hope Government will not decide upon your report until I

have an opportunity of defending myself ; which, according to your letter, I must look for from the Adjutant-General of the army. Until I received your letter this day, I never knew for what words or actions of mine an apology was required ; or I most solemnly deny ever having given any opinion, in any way, regarding the Nizam's detachment and its officers, that night, or at any other time, in your presence.

(Signed)

Masulipatam,
24th May, 1809.

G. G. MAITLAND,
Lieutenant of the Madras European
Regiment.

No. XI.

Copy of a Letter from the Officers of the Madras European Regiment to the Adjutant-General of the Army.

SIR,

IT was with the most extreme concern that in our regimental orders of the 22d instant we found a copy of a letter from you, by which we were informed, that it had come to the knowledge of the officer commanding the army, that conduct highly indecorous, and contrary to every principle of military subordination, had been observed at the mess of the Madras European regiment on the 7th instant. We beg leave to assure you, for the information of Major-General Gowdie, that it appears to us that the account he has received of the conduct of those officers, who were present at the mess on that evening, must have been erroneous.

We cannot help lamenting that such a stigma on the character of so numerous a body of officers as we form, should have been thus publicly thrown out, before we had

been furnished with a copy of the report that has been made against us.

We have seen, with the deepest regret, two of our brother officers punished, without being specifically informed what part of their conduct at the regimental mess induced the officer commanding the army to suppose them to have been guilty of the serious crime with which they are charged ; and we naturally feel considerable apprehension lest “ the whole corps should,” in a similar manner, “ be involved in the severest penalty to which insubordinate proceedings are liable.” We trust, therefore, that you will state to Major-General Gowdie our confident hope that he will have the goodness to direct us to be furnished with a copy of the information which he has received regarding the conduct observed at the mess on the night of the 7th instant. When we receive this, we have no doubt of being able to convince the officer commanding the army in chief, that the conduct of those who were present on that occasion did by no means merit the severe censure with which it has been marked.

Signed by all the Officers present
with the regiment, except one,
to whom it was not presented.

Masulipatam,
27th May, 1809.

*Letter from Lieutenant-Colonel INNES to the
Adjutant-General of the army.*

SIR,

I HAVE the honour to forward to you an address from the officers of my corps, which they wish to be submitted to the Commander-in-Chief.

To elucidate the subject, I now transmit a copy of my note written to the officers of my corps the moment I got their letter yesterday ; and when I receive the document called for, it shall be handed to you directly, with every comment I deem requisite to make on it. They go herewith.

(Signed)

JAMES INNES,

Lieut.-Col. M. E. regiment, in
charge N. D. of the army.

Masulipatam,
28th May, 1809.

*Copy of a Letter from the Adjutant-General to
the Officer commanding the Northern Division of
the Army.*

SIR,

I HAVE had the honour to submit your letter of the 28th ult. with its enclosures, to the officer commanding the army, by whom I am directed to acquaint you, that he regrets you should have entered into any correspondence with the officers of the M. E. regiment on the subject, or deemed it necessary to forward their letter to head-quarters, as his decision was not adopted without due consideration, and is final.

If Lieutenant Forbes's presence is required by the Court of Inquiry now sitting at Masulipatam, you will be pleased to order him to attend.

(Signed)

J. H. CONWAY,
Adjutant-General.

Adjutant-General's Office,
8th June, 1809.

(True Copies.)

No. XII.

*Copy of a Letter from Lieutenant-Colonel INNES to
Lieutenant and Adjutant NIXON.*

SIR,

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of an address from the officers of the Madras European regiment to the Adjutant-General of the army, which shall be forwarded to be submitted to the officer commanding the army in chief. I have therefore to direct, that a *statement of the circumstances* which passed on the 7th instant in the mess-room of the Madras European regiment, may be made out by the gentlemen of the corps now present, who dined at the mess-room on that day, which obliged me to quit the mess-room of the corps. No apology was ever subsequently made to me, although required and expected, by Lieutenants D. Forbes and Maitland, (as it was their duty to do,) for the pointed disrespect shown by them to the dignity of the Honourable the Governor in Council, and Commander-in-Chief, in my presence, their immediate commanding officer.

(Signed)

J. INNES,

Lieut.-Col. M. E. regiment, in
charge N. D. of the army.Masnlipatam,
27th May, 1809.

No. XIII.

*Copy of the Reply of the Officers of the Madras
European Regiment to the above Letter.*

TO LIEUTENANT-COLONEL INNES,

COMMANDING THE MADRAS EUROPEAN REGIMENT.

SIR,

AGREEABLY to your orders, communicated to us by Lieutenant and Adjutant Nixon, we have the honour to state, that we were present at the regimental mess on the evening of the 7th instant, and that it was with considerable astonishment we observed you leave the mess so abruptly. We are unable to say what was the occasion of your doing so. "The friends of the army" was proposed as a toast, and we conceived it to be one that would not have been objected to; but as you wished to alter it, and rose from table when it was about to be drank, we conjectured it had given you offence, and that it was on this account you left the mess. So far from observing any pointed disrespect, we did not notice any disrespect whatever, shown by Lieutenant D. Forbes or Lieutenant Maitland to the dignity of the Governor in Council, and Commander-in-Chief, in your presence; and until we see the account you have forwarded on the subject to headquarters, we shall be at a loss to suppose what part of their conduct on the night alluded to appeared to you to be exceptionable.

Signed by all the Officers present
with the mess on the 7th instant.

SUBSTANCE of the *Deposition of Lieutenant NIXON,*
Adjutant.

LIEUTENANT and Adjutant Nixon informs Lieutenant-Colonel Malcolm, that the best opinion he can form, from his communication with confidential men, is, that the non-commissioned, rank and file, of the Madras European regiment, were alarmed in consequence of the measures adopted towards their officers, Lieutenants D. Forbes and Maitland, and the threat held out in the Adjutant-General's letter, (published in the regimental orderly book,) lest the most severe penalty might be inflicted on the regiment; conjecturing that they must either be disbanded, transported, or other ways disposed of, by way of punishment, on a repetition of similar conduct of their officers. To use their own expression, it was a general saying, "that they might as well order out one of us to be flogged or hanged up:" and certainly, in my opinion, from that period great discontent prevailed amongst the men. This discontent considerably increased from the order respecting the marines nominating Lieutenant Maitland in particular, and directing Lieutenant D. Forbes to proceed to Penang; and afterwards by two other detachments being ordered on marine service, to which they said, that they did not enlist to come to India as marines. They were also led to believe, from the ship's boat that landed here, that no marines were required for the ships in the roads, but that they wanted seamen only, and consequently supposed they were to be turned over to the navy. These points were most deeply impressed upon their minds by a communication which was believed to have come from the

high authority of the Commander-in-Chief, that the regiment was to be disbanded, and the officers put on half pay, in case Lieutenant Spankie should not accept of the station of quarter-master.

Lieutenant Nixon further states, that considerable discontent exists in consequence of the great number of men in the regiment who enlisted for general service, "time unlimited," prior to Mr. Windham's act; and that they consider it a hardship that they should not be admitted to the full benefit of the act in point of limited service.

Another cause of discontent is, that the regiment has not its tour of duty in the field, and change of station, with his Majesty's corps.

Masulipatam,
21st July, 1809.

No. XIV.

EXTRACT *from a Letter dated 28th May, 1809.*

TO LIEUTENANT NIXON,

ADJUTANT MADRAS EUROPEAN REGIMENT.

SIR,

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your note of this day's date, with the statement I thought proper to order to be made out in my note of last night to you, for the information of the officer commanding the army in chief. I shall now merely confine myself to remarking to the officers whose names appear to the letter now received, that had they not made observations on the late general orders of the Honourable the Governor

in Council and Commander-in-Chief, and remarks on the steady conduct of the officers of the subsidiary force at Hyderabad, as also on officers "in the army" who are not the *friends of the army*, I should not have quitted the table at mess-room *merely* because "the friends of the army" was proposed as a *toast*, which I requested might be changed to the *Madras army*; and when not acceded to, I felt myself called upon to quit the mess-room. Very fortunately there were many strangers present at dinner, as well as myself, whose recollection of what passed on that day may be able to elucidate this subject, should the Honourable the Governor in Council and Commander-in-Chief deem it requisite to call upon them for this purpose.

(Signed)

JAMES INNES,
Lieut.-Col. M. E. Regiment, in
charge N. D. of the Army.

EXTRACT from *Division Orders*, by Lieutenant-Colonel INNES, dated 1st June, 1809.

"A DETAIL, consisting of a subaltern, 2 sergeants, 2 corporals, and 30 privates, belonging to the Madras European regiment, to be held in readiness to embark at a short notice on board the Fox frigate, to serve as marines. The officer commanding the Madras European regiment will give the requisite orders for the equipment of the above detail, which Lieutenant Maitland is appointed to command.

"Lieutenant D. Forbes of the Madras European regiment is relieved from the command of Condapillee, and directed to proceed forthwith to the Presidency, for the purpose of embarking for Prince of Wales's Island, to take charge of the detail of the corps doing duty there.

“ Ensign Dickson, 1st battalion 19th regiment native infantry, is reappointed to command at Condapillee, and directed to proceed to that station with the least delay, to relieve Lieutenant D. Forbes of the Madras European regiment. The detail above named is to be struck off garrison duty.

(Signed)

“ JAMES INNES,
“ Lieutenant-Colonel, in charge
“ of the N. D. of the Army.”

EXTRACT from *Regimental Orders*.

“ Madras European Regiment, 2d June, 1809.

“ A roll of the detail ordered on board the Fox frigate, to serve as marines, to be sent to the paymaster, to enable him to furnish them with a pay certificate. The roll alluded to, when ready, is to be inserted in the regimental orderly book. Every thing requisite from the regimental stores to equip the detail, is to be indented for directly, that the whole may be prepared to embark at an hour's notice. Pay is ordered to be issued to the detail alluded to above.

“ The commanding officer has approved of the arrangement made for the detail directed to embark; but as Lieutenant Maitland has expressed a wish to the adjutant to make some exchanges of the non-commissioned officers, accedes to the wishes of Lieutenant Maitland, provided the officers commanding the companies to whom they belong consent to the exchange; otherwise those already ordered will go.”

EXTRACT from *General Orders, 2d June.*

“ PAY in advance for June, and arrears for May, to be issued to the troops under orders of embarkation in the course of this day, to enable them to prepare for their passage to the Presidency in the Fox frigate.”

EXTRACT from *Regimental Orders, Madras European Regiment, dated 3d June, 1809.*

“ THE adjutant will furnish Lieutenant Maitland with a roll of his detachment; and officers commanding companies are directed to send to that officer the pay advanced (as in yesterday's orders) for the detachment ordered as marines.”

EXTRACT from *Division Orders, by Lieutenant-Colonel INNES.*

“ LIEUTENANT DIXON of the 1st battalion 19th regiment native infantry, having joined his corps this morning with the detachment from Condapillee, is directed to resume the command of that station to morrow, to relieve Lieutenant D. Forbes, in conformity with the Division Orders of the 1st instant, and will be provided with a passport by the acting fort-adjutant.

(Signed)

“ JAMES INNES,
“ Lieutenant-Colonel, in charge
“ of the N. D. of the Army.”

“ Masulipatam,
“ 5th June, 1809.”

EXTRACT from Regimental Orders, Madras European Regiment, June 6th, 1809.

“ THE commanding officer having taken upon himself to grant family certificates to the detail ordered on board his Majesty’s ship Fox, Lieutenant Maitland is requested to refer to the last order issued upon this subject, which it will be requisite to attend minutely, to prevent retrenchments hereafter.”

EXTRACT from Division Orders, by Lieutenant-Colonel INNES, 7th June, 1809.

“ THE detail ordered from the Madras European regiment is now reduced to 1 subaltern, 1 sergeant, 1 corporal, 1 drum, and 26 privates,—in all 30,—to be held in readiness to embark at a moment’s notice on board the Samarang sloop of war, hourly expected.

(Signed)

“ J. INNES,
 “ Lieutenant-Colonel, in charge
 “ of the N. D. of the Army.”

EXTRACT from Garrison Orders, 13th June, 1809.

“ LIEUTENANT D. FORBES of the Madras European regiment being summoned as an evidence, by an Ensign Baker, to attend the Court of Inquiry ordered to assemble

for the purpose of investigating the conduct of Ensign Baker, Lieutenant D. Forbes is consequently directed to remain here till further orders."

EXTRACT from *Garrison Orders*, 20th June, 1809.

"THE detail from the Madras European regiment, ordered to be held in readiness to serve as marines on board the Samarang sloop of war, are directed to join their respective companies, and to do garrison duty till further orders; but to be considered as under Division Orders to embark on a short notice."

EXTRACT from *Division Orders by Lieutenant-Colonel JAMES INNES*, dated 23d June, 1809.

"Two detachments from the Madras European regiment to be held in readiness to embark, at a short notice, on board of such of his Majesty's ships as may be prepared to receive them, to serve as marines, and to consist of the following strength; viz.

"One detachment, to be composed of 1 lieutenant, 2 sergeants, 3 corporals, and 35 privates; making a total of 41.

"The other, of 1 lieutenant, 1 sergeant, 2 corporals, and 27 privates—31 total. Such men as wish to have family certificates are to be provided with them by the officers under whose command they may be placed immediately.

“ No time being fixed for the embarkation of the above details, they are to be considered on the strength of the garrison, (as also Lieutenant Maitland’s party,) till further orders.

(Signed)

“ JAMES INNES,
“ Lieutenant-Colonel, in charge
“ of the N. D. of the Army.”

EXTRACT from *Regimental Orders*,
June 24th, 1809.

“ LIEUTENANTS LAWLESS and CARBERY to indent for ammunition and every thing requisite to complete their respective detachments directly.

“ Should Lieutenant-Colonel Innes receive any additional information from the ships, he will write to Lieutenant Nixon instantly.”

SUBSTANCE of a *Verbal Declaration made by*
Major STOREY.

MAJOR STOREY declared to Lieutenant-Colonel Malcolm, that he was fully satisfied, that if Lieutenant-Colonel Innes had persisted in the plan he adopted for the coercion of the garrison, there must have been immediate bloodshed; and he (Major Storey) was assured, from what he knew of the general temper of the officers of the Company’s

army at the moment, that such an occurrence, whatever was its issue, would have produced an insurrection against the authority of Government in many other quarters. This belief, Major Storey declares, was the chief motive that made him take the step he did.

F I N I S.

OBSERVATIONS
ON
LIEUT.-COLONEL MALCOLM'S
PUBLICATION,

RELATIVE TO THE

Disturbances in the Madras Army;

CONTAINING

**A REFUTATION OF THE OPINIONS OF THAT
OFFICER;**

**FROM THE EVIDENCE OF THE PAPERS LAID BEFORE
PARLIAMENT:**

CONTAINING ALSO,

COPIES AND EXTRACTS

OF

SOME INTERESTING LETTERS

ADDRESSED BY

THE LATE MARQUIS CORNWALLIS

TO

SIR G. BARLOW.

LONDON:

PRINTED FOR BLACK, PARRY, AND CO.
BOOKSELLERS TO THE HON. EAST INDIA COMPANY,
LEADENHALL STREET,
By E. Blackader, Took's Court, Chancery Lane, London.

1812.

OBSERVATIONS, &c.

THE frequent publications on the subject of the late disturbances at the Presidency of Madras, having nearly exhausted the public attention, there was reason to hope, that events which must ever be the source of the most painful remembrance, would have been now permitted quietly to descend the stream of oblivion. This is manifestly the most salutary course that can be pursued, for the purpose of allowing those heated passions, from which arose such manifold evils, gradually to resume a state of settled tranquillity. We deviate from a course of this nature with reluctance : but the authority attached to a publication which has been recently given to the world under the name of Lieut.-Col. Malcolm, induces us to state some observations on a work which, however unintentionally on the part of that Officer, we think calculated to mislead the public judgment. It is to

be lamented, that an Officer so highly respectable as Colonel Malcolm, should have directed so large a share of his attention to such crude statements as are contained in numerous anonymous pamphlets, while the powerful evidence exhibited in the papers laid before Parliament, has been almost wholly overlooked. Those papers have been produced on the motion of an Honorable Member (Mr. Creevy), professedly as the means of establishing grounds for the crimination of Sir George Barlow. That Honorable Member has not hitherto ventured to persevere in his motion, and we may fairly presume that the papers now before the House of Commons, exhibit a very different view of facts from what he had anticipated. Whatever may be the feelings of the Honourable Member, he could not have served the cause of Sir G. Barlow more essentially than by the production of the papers he moved for, as they furnish a series of proof stronger than has perhaps ever appeared in any public question, and establish beyond contradiction, the wisdom, ability, and firmness with which Sir G. Barlow administered the important affairs committed to his charge, during more arduous times than any Governor of our eastern possessions ever before experienced.

Respecting, as we do, the character of Colonel Malcolm, we think it unlikely, if he had perused the Parliamentary Papers with attention, that he would have advanced those opinions which appear in his recent publication. The sentiments

which he has expressed are certainly calculated to fall in with the current of feelings and passions prevailing in a pretty wide circle; but we are willing to believe the ~~mind~~ ^{mind} of Colonel Malcolm to be superior to any popularity that can be obtained at the expence of justice.

The declared object of Colonel Malcolm's publication is *defensive*;—"to vindicate himself, not to attack others." If these limits had been observed, we should have followed equally our duty and our inclination, in abstaining from all comment; and should have rejoiced in seeing Colonel Malcolm preserve undisturbed that reputation to which a long course of public service had entitled him. But it is enough to refer to the publication to perceive that a very wide deviation has taken place from the proposed path, which seems indeed scarcely to extend to the close of the Prefatory Remarks. When we find the personal character of Sir G. Barlow attacked with great asperity, and the Government of Madras, on numerous occasions, charged, in terms sufficiently direct, with the excitement of the Mutiny, a new aspect is given to the subject; and whatever may be our feelings with regard to the author of the publication, and whatever our unwillingness to continue a discussion which it would be infinitely preferable to lay at rest, we are called on, by the most powerful motives, not to pass in silence, opinions which coming from a quarter in itself respectable, and conveyed in somewhat an imperative tone of con-

fidence,* are calculated to carry with them a degree of weight, to which we assume not, we think, too much in stating, that they have not an intrinsic claim.

We shall spare ourselves and our readers the task of going, with any minuteness, over ground already abundantly traversed. Such minuteness

* Among many other examples of self-confidence, surely exaggerated, we find it assumed by Col. Malcolm, in the very outset of the work,—“ That if *any one* of the many slighted “ suggestions which I offered, had met with attention, the most “ serious evils would have been averted.” This is stated in opposition to the sentiments of every authority to whom it has belonged to consider and to decide, on the measures which Col. Malcolm has professed to discuss. It is, too, stated, in opposition to the evidence derived from the complete success which attended a course of proceeding, nearly the reverse of that which Col. Malcolm recommended.

In referring to the Preface of Col. Malcolm’s publication, we are led to think that he can scarcely have been serious in the observations which he has introduced, as to the supposed inactivity of the press, relative to the affairs of India. We are inclined to the belief, that no part of the British possessions has afforded a more unceasing theme of discussion. Surely no proof of inactivity is to be found in the discussion of those events to which our attention is now directed; and if we had not been told the contrary, we might have been led to believe that the press had never chosen a subject for a more diffusive exercise of uncontrolled freedom:—perhaps, too, we might have thought, that there never was a case, in itself the plainest possible, which the perversion of that freedom had more tended to perplex.

cannot be necessary, as with respect to the origin and progress of the Mutiny, Colonel Malcolm has stated no new fact, and the conclusions which he has drawn, being generally unsupported by any reference to authorities, our own minds must decide the degree of confidence with which they are to be received. With every possible deference to the sentiments of Col. Malcolm, we may be allowed to observe that, they are opposed, in most cases, by a succession of opinions coming from the highest quarters, and founded on evidence which there has been no attempt to controvert. Most of the measures referred to by Col. Malcolm, have been discussed at great length by the Government of Madras, by the Supreme Government of India, by the Court of Directors, and in conjunction with them by His Majesty's Ministers; and the conclusions drawn by these authorities have been, on most points, in immediate opposition to the conclusions of Col. Malcolm. This is a preponderance of opinion which any unbiassed mind will not find it easy to resist. Still less easy must be such resistance, when we perceive that this preponderance is derived from no cursory, declamatory view of the question, but rests on the basis of a more perfect chain of evidence than perhaps ever before supported any matter proposed for public consideration. We quote from memory, but we think we have read in a distinguished writer (Mr. Burke), frequently quoted in the pamphlet before us, that "Public authority

“ carries with it great weight; but that Power,
 “ armed with Reason, is irresistible.”

In proceeding to consider, with as much conciseness as possible, some of the topics adverted to by Col. Malcolm, we are induced to express some degree of surprise at the laconic mode in which that Officer has, after a few hasty lines, at once traced the Mutiny of Madras to the supposed origin of a “ quarrel which occurred between the Governor, Sir G. Barlow, and the Commander-in-Chief, General Macdowall.” We should have expected, from the large store of Oriental knowledge possessed by Col. Malcolm, a more comprehensive and just view of the great event which he has undertaken to describe, making at the same time, as we do, every possible allowance that can be desired, for the operation of trifles in the affairs of State. The perusal of the publication before us might suggest the idea, that if any predisposing cause leading to mutiny was in existence, it was of the slightest kind; and that “ petty differences between the Commander-in-Chief and the Governor,” was the soil in which this stupendous occurrence at once took root and flourished. We think that a perusal of the Papers within the reach of most persons, must furnish a picture of a very different nature. Lord Minto, who receives from Colonel Malcolm the deserved appellation of an “ able and virtuous nobleman,” several months after the termination of the Mutiny, directed his attention with the utmost care, to

Pamphlet,
 page 4—5.

Pamphlet,
 page 7.

Lord Minto's Letter,
 5th Feb.
 1810.

the investigation of that important point—the “sources” of the evil which had occurred. The same subject has been investigated with great perspicuity in a Paper of distinguished ability, bearing the signatures of a large portion of the Directors of the India Company; and we should have thought that the information contained in those valuable papers would have satisfied any mind not wholly inaccessible to conviction. In the enumeration of causes that combined in the excitement of the Mutiny, Lord Minto observes:—“The Officers of the Company’s Army have been long in the habit of pursuing every object of personal interest, by artificial combination. They have learned to consider pertinacity, clamour, and violence, in the furtherance of such views, not only as legitimate means to attain the end, but as furnishing tests of professional spirit, which constitute a sort of public virtue, and give lustre to the individuals most distinguished for those military vices.” The effects which have followed have been perfectly true to the causes so accurately described by the above authorities. In the countries of Europe, mutiny is a rare occurrence. In England, a general combination among the Officers of the army, for the purpose of over-awing the Government, is a thing unknown. In India, such an event is not only not unknown, but has been frequent. During the last half century, there have been two open Mutinies of that nature; the one which occurred in Bengal in 1766, under

Printed Papers—Letter signed by Mr. Grant, and Nine other Directors, 10th Sept. 1810.

the Government of the great Lord Clive, and that which broke out at Madras in 1809, both bearing the nearest features of resemblance in their origin, and in the circumstances which marked their progress and termination. In 1776, the Commander-in-Chief, at the head of the army, seized the Governor of Madras, (Lord Pigot,) confined his person, and subverted the Government. In 1783, a combination of the Officers of the Madras army compelled the Governor, Lord Macartney, to revoke his orders, and to re-establish certain allowances which he had judged it proper to discontinue. The events which occurred in the Indian army in 1795 and 1796, are of too recent a date not to be in remembrance. Lord Minto, and the authors of the able Paper to which we have already referred, both concur in ascribing the most pernicious consequences to the concessions of that period. Lord Minto terms them, “ a victory
 “ gained over Government by an imposing and
 “ compulsory mode of demand ;”—and says, that the regulations then passed, are usually claimed,
 “ as articles of a charter, constituting indefeasible rights, and protected by public faith, passed
 “ between equal and contracting parties.”* The

* We have found some difficulty in collecting Colonel Malcolm's definite opinion as to these proceedings. In one part, that Officer apparently views them with complacency; as “ a course
 “ which certainly made many and important sacrifices of ordinary maxims of rule, but which led to a quiet and just

influence produced in the mind of the Indian army, by the success which had attended that, as well as former combinations, seems too apparent to be questioned. It would have been almost contrary to those principles which usually influence the actions of mankind, to expect a different effect, for it was sufficient to cast the eye back to the history of no remote times to see that every military combination in India had been successful, with one only exception—an exception which it had required all the vigour and ability of the illustrious Lord Clive, in the zenith of power, to produce. General Macdowall in his letter to Sir George Barlow, of the 16th May, 1808, recalls to mind that “the army having formerly gained so many points by representation, will naturally expect relief;” and significantly observes,—“You were in Bengal during the convulsions of the army (in 1796), and the subject must be familiar to you.” Lord Minto describes this kind of agitation as continuing in the army of

Printed Papers—
quoted in
the Direc-
tor's Letter
of 10th
Sept. 1810,
and in Lord
Minto's
Letter of
5th Feb.
1810.

Lord Minto's
Letter,
5th Feb.
1810.

“settlement of all complaints,” as a matter where “most persons, when they contemplated the great end, would at least pardon the means by which it was obtained.” p. 57. At an earlier period, Col. Malcolm, in viewing the different modes of tranquillizing the rising tumults in the army, says, in a letter to Sir G. Barlow, “I need not state to you that any mode would be less injurious to the interests of Government, than that of its even entering (as it once did) into a discussion with the officers of its army, upon this great question.” (p. 132.)

Madras, during a long period of time under various Governors and various Commanders-in-Chief, accumulating in its progress, and acquiring strength with "the habit of beholding authority" and rank insulted and degraded.* The precise state of the army of Madras in October 1807, two months before Sir G. Barlow received charge

Printed Papers—Letter from the Government of Madras to the Court of Directors, 21st Oct. 1807.

of that Government, is not matter of vague surmise, but was at that time, Mr. Petrie then presiding in the Government, brought under the attention of the Court of Directors in terms the most impressive. After stating various examples of proceedings in the greatest degree insubordinate, the Government expressly inform the Court, "that a spirit of insubordination and cabal has lately shewn itself among several of your Officers, which must be dangerous to all armies, and which, after the events that have agitated the native army of this Presidency, might lead to consequences of the most fatal nature. We have been led to observe, that those persons are frequently the most forward in such reprehensible proceedings, who have most abundantly shared the advantages of the public favour; and we are satisfied that nothing but a firm determina-

* Lord Minto, in addition to the accumulating evils in the military branch of the service, describes the inflammatory proceedings of Sir H. Gwillim, one of the Judges at Madras, during the Government of Lord William Bentinck, as one of the fertile sources of the mischiefs which followed.

“ tion to resist, and to punish every appearance of
 “ disrespect to the public authority, can uphold
 “ that degree of discipline which is essential to
 “ the existence of your army.” The Govern-
 ment proceed to state, that they are “ strongly
 “ impressed with the necessity of discouraging
 “ by every means such factious proceedings as
 “ generally lead to consequences of dangerous
 “ extremity,” and warn the Court of Directors
 “ that any encouragement of the groundless pre-
 “ tensions (which had been urged) may be fatal
 “ to the discipline and interests of their army.”

The Reader least informed relative to India, knows, that about this time, in consequence of the extreme embarrassment of the India finances, orders of the most peremptory nature were sent from England to the Indian Governments, calling on them to make all the reductions possible in every department of the service, as a measure essential to the existence of the Company. Lord William Bentinck and Sir John Cradock had made arrangements for carrying into effect these orders to a considerable extent; but their abrupt recall left the work incomplete, and its ultimate execution devolved to Sir G. Barlow, who succeeded to the Government in December, 1807. All the material reductions which he carried into effect had been proposed by Lord William Bentinck and Sir John Cradock, had been strongly recommended by Mr. Petrie, and had been sanctioned by the Supreme Government. No one however can

doubt the extent to which they operated, in giving a new impulse to the deadly poison already diffused in the army. In addition to these, and other predisposing causes to Military Mutiny, it is established on the same undoubted authority, that principles of the most seditious nature, had been widely disseminated in the civil department of the service. It is inconsistent with our limits to go at present into this subject. It is sufficient to say, that the adjustment of the debts of the Nabobs of the Carnatic, which commenced in 1808, was the signal for calling into full activity the operation of all those passions and intrigues which had for a series of years palsied every measure of the Government, and had repeatedly endangered its existence. To those were added, with united force, the dissatisfaction which the reductions in the civil department had not failed to excite; and those feelings of insubordination which previous circumstances had tended powerfully to create. There can, apparently, be little cause of surprise, that such sentiments as have been described, prevailing in a large portion of both the civil and military branches of the public service, united by common motives of action, and in a common cause, should have tended, by almost inevitable progression, to the excitement of the unhappy conflagration which ensued.

We might have expected that Col. Malcolm, with these and such other facts before him, as are to be found in the Parliamentary Papers, would

not have narrowed his view to the ground of a "quarrel" between the Governor and Commander-in-Chief; and that with a torrent of overwhelming evidence in sight, he would not have turned aside to seek in shallow streams for Reasons, which, like an airy portion of the element, must vanish on the slightest touch of examination. That the conduct pursued by General Macdowall had a fatal effect in applying the match to the charged mine, cannot be doubted; but this proceeded from no personal "quarrel;" from no "petty differences." We recur with feelings of sincere regret to any part of General Macdowall's conduct, which cannot be mentioned otherwise than in terms of condemnation. Greatly reluctant are we to dwell on the demerits of an Officer now no more! but whatever reluctance we may feel in this respect, still more reluctant shall we be to allow the clouds of error to throw their obscurity round the light of truth, without using the best means in our power to dissipate the delusion. We may be allowed to notice, generally, as an apparent defect in Col. Malcolm's publication, that circumstances, comparatively immaterial, seem to be ranged very much in front view, while facts of the first moment find a place, if not entirely out of sight, at least in the back ground, or in an obscure corner of the picture. There are, too, some events, regarding which it is not altogether clear, whether Colonel Malcolm intends to express praise or blame, or where condemnation is render-

ed inevitable by the redundancy of proof, the language of censure is, we think, not unfrequently so much softened as nearly to merge in that of approbation. As Colonel Malcolm evidently attaches great importance to the conduct of General Macdowall, as materially influencing the proceedings which he describes, we are called on, as far as possible, to supply the deficiencies which seem to exist in his Statement.

From the prominent feature which the conduct of General Macdowall forms in numerous pages of the Parliamentary Papers, there is much more difficulty (our limits being unavoidably narrowed), in selecting the facts most material, than in finding evidence to support the conclusions which no unbiassed mind can avoid forming on the subject. The question has been amply discussed in the dispatches addressed by the Indian Governments to the Court of Directors, and in the dispatches from the Court, all concurring in the same point : but it is sufficient at present to direct the attention to the Paper signed by ten of the East India Directors, to which we have already referred ; and to Lord Minto's letter, of the 5th February, 1810, as the subject has been there examined with great precision, and as the opinions expressed in these documents demand implicit confidence, being founded on incontrovertible evidence. We have already adverted to the reductions which were ordered in the civil and military branches of the service, and to the effect which those reductions produced.

They were received with great dissatisfaction throughout the Company's army on the establishment of Madras, and in a short time led to a general combination and correspondence on the subject of military allowances. This first appeared in the form of a proposed Memorial to the Supreme Government in Bengal, which was clandestinely circulated at certain military stations, applying for an extension to the coast army of the same allowances as exist in Bengal. The subject was brought to the knowledge of Sir. G. Barlow, through an indirect channel, in May, 1808, and about the same time it was brought to his notice in a private letter from General Macdowall, who was then absent from the Presidency on a military tour. That letter, though written in the style of confidence, is much more calculated to intimidate, than to inform, or assist, the judgment of Sir G. Barlow, in the difficult circumstances which General Macdowall represented as existing. Lord Minto considers it a letter "which, if addressed in the same language to any other quarter, was calculated, not to repress a particular act of insubordination, but to excite a general mutiny." It states the reductions as the proximate causes of "the seeds of discontent being very widely disseminated; and almost every individual in the service, more or less dissatisfied." The letter is of a nature to require no comment in addition to what any one will find who refers to the Printed Papers. We shall therefore proceed to state, that Sir G. Barlow communicated to Ge-

Para. 17.

neral Macdowall his sentiments, in a confidential form, as to the course proper to be pursued, in which that Officer, to all appearance, entirely concurred; and prohibitory orders of a very strong nature were circulated by General Macdowall against the further agitation of the question of military allowances. To adopt the words of the Paper recorded by the India Directors: "Could it have been conceived, that at the very time he was thus in appearance acting in concert with Government for the suppression of this prohibited, culpable, and dangerous proceeding, he was really co-operating with the insubordinate spirit of the army he commanded, and counteracting his own circular letter? The fact is now established." Lord Minto, in his letter of 5th February, 1810, states, that "at this very period, General Macdowall was acquainting the Officers in person, and convivial communications, that his circular letters were merely official, written at the requisition of Government, but not expressing his own sentiments; and that he wished them success in their pursuit." These proceedings took place in the course of 1808, and the sequel was such as there was abundant cause to anticipate. When General Macdowall was on the eve of embarking for England, in January, 1809, at the time when he had placed the Quarter-master-General, Lieut.-Col. Munro, in arrest, and was pressing on the attention of the Government other matters of the most embarrassing nature, the ques-

tion of military allowances burst from its concealment, and was brought to the full view of the Government, in the shape of a Memorial, signed by a large portion of the Officers of the Madras army, and containing not only a demand of Bengal allowances, but a statement of various alleged grievances of an almost unlimited nature. The Memorial was accompanied by a letter from General Macdowall, supporting it with his warmest recommendation. The observations stated on this subject in the Paper of the India Directors are so clear and conclusive, that we are induced to insert an extract of some length on the subject. It is observed:—"When the Memorial, projected in May, which had for its object only the obtaining of Bengal allowances, is compared with the present, it will be evident that some powerful influence must have operated upon the minds of the Officers, to work them up to such an unprecedented representation. It should be observed, that not one of the articles of grievance set forth in it, originated with Sir G. Barlow. It condemns the acts of preceding Governments, ratified by the Supreme Government and the Court of Directors. It claims certain allowances as *matter of right*; it interferes with the prerogative of the Court of Directors, in framing the civil Government, requiring a seat in Council for the 'Representative of the Army;' thus incorporating the cause of General Macdowall with their own; and all this is done at a moment

“ (we must be pardoned for repetitions) when the
 “ well-known exigencies of the Company had im-
 “ periously demanded a very general reduction
 “ in their expenditure, when the resentment of
 “ General Macdowall against the Court of Direc-
 “ tors, and his hostility to the actual Government
 “ of Madras, were notorious—and when the Go-
 “ vernment had been deliberately attacked by the
 “ arrest of Colonel Munro—and all this was done
 “ by combination, in direct violation of the gene-
 “ ral regulation, of which the Officers had been re-
 “ minded by the circular letter of May.

“ After reviewing the different subjects of this
 “ Memorial, and what has been said on them from
 “ India, and by the Court of Directors, in the letter
 “ to Fort St. George; and after considering the
 “ time and manner in which it was brought for-
 “ ward, hardly any one will be disposed to main-
 “ tain that it is not animated by a vehement spirit
 “ of insubordination and encroachment; neither
 “ will it be contended that, if General Macdowall’s
 “ part in this proceeding, had been put wholly out
 “ of view, the Government could have done other-
 “ wise than express a decided disapprobation of it.

“ But was it possible to consider it distinct from
 “ the share he took in it? That share gave a new
 “ and alarming aspect to the whole—a combination
 “ between the Commander-in-Chief and the Officers
 “ of an army, to press each other’s objects upon
 “ Government—objects not to be yielded—
 “ and to endeavour to carry them by a general

“ attack, in violation of all the rules of subordina-
 “ tion! And what an appearance does General
 “ Macdowall make on this occasion! He who had,
 “ but eight months before, as his duty required,
 “ though the question was only about *one* of the
 “ many points now contended for by the Officers,
 “ warned them, by a circular letter, of the culpa-
 “ bility of the course they were pursuing, and the
 “ obligation which would attach upon him to bring
 “ to punishment the leaders in such a proceeding,
 “ he now comes forward, with the most indecent
 “ inconsistency and disregard of the duty of his
 “ high station, to abet all the discontents of the
 “ Officers, and all the accumulations of their extra-
 “ vagant pretensions, to do every thing in his
 “ power to *protect their rights, and redress their*
 “ *grievances*; and with a plain intimation that the
 “ Government will not be *generous or just*, if it does
 “ not also espouse their cause.

“ It was not possible, General Macdowall and
 “ the army must not have been aware that the
 “ Government could give no countenance to such
 “ a proceeding; that it was a proceeding in defiance
 “ of subordination and positive rule, at the most
 “ exceptionable time which could have been cho-
 “ sen; and that General Macdowall's part in it,
 “ was a *flagrant insult to the Government*.

“ If the Government had then proceeded to in-
 “ flict punishment upon General Macdowall, and
 “ to expose to the Officers, in General Orders,
 “ their highly blameable conduct, they would cer-

" tainly have still been within the line which
 " the case warranted; but they took the least
 " notice of this proceeding that was possible, con-
 " patibly with their duty. They only stated, in
 " answer to the Commander-in-Chief, that they
 " could not view the sentiments contained in the
 " Memorial without extreme disapprobation, and
 " that they would suspend the final disposal of that
 " paper until it had been laid before the Supreme
 " Government. No notice whatever is taken of
 " the conduct of General Macdowall. Does this
 " look like harshness, severity, arbitrary oppres-
 " sive proceeding, of which so much is said in the
 " Dissents? Like any desire to irritate or provoke,
 " or to indulge an unconciliatory spirit? And we
 " wish those who see, in the proceedings of the Ma-
 " dras Government, on this trying occasion, a want
 " of conciliation, would be pleased to explain how
 " that principle could otherwise have been applied
 " here. Do they think it could have been hoped,
 " that solicitations on the part of Government, if
 " such could have been used to individuals, would
 " have broken the confederacy? Or that soothing
 " speeches would have made the confederacy re-
 " linquish their objects? To expect any thing of
 " this sort argues, in our opinion, a most erroneous
 " conception of the very serious nature of this case.
 " This was not, as we have remarked on another
 " occasion, the sudden ebullition of a new impulse;
 " it was the progress of a long existing principle,
 " now much invigorated by additional influences,

“ and grown to a size truly formidable. The Go-
 “ vernment seem to have had a just idea of their
 “ situation and their duty; and to have had far
 “ higher and better objects than the indulgence
 “ of tempers and humours of their own. They
 “ appear to have been sensible that there was dan-
 “ ger, and that they ought to maintain their legiti-
 “ mate authority with temperate firmness. In our
 “ humble judgment, this was the true line of po-
 “ licy in these circumstances, and will be so in all
 “ similar cases in our Indian Governments.”

The preceding extract is so ample as to leave nothing to be added. The facts, however, to which it refers, form a part only, and even an inconsiderable part, of the heavy offences charged against the conduct of General Macdowall. During the tour through the provinces in which he was employed, in 1808, he omitted no opportunity of disseminating doctrines of the most dangerous tendency. Lord Minto quotes General Macdowall's speech, addressed to the Company's European regiment at Masulipatam, on the 24th December, 1808, “ as one example of the means he employed
 “ habitually to ferment discontent in the army, and
 “ to exalt his own popularity with that body, at
 “ the expense of the most obvious duties of his
 “ station.” General Macdowall addressed the Commanding Officer at the head of this European regiment as follows:—“ Colonel Taylor, in per-
 “ forming a necessary part of my duty, by review-
 “ ing the different corps on this establishment, it

“ was my particular wish to see those in the Nor-
 “ thern Circars, and particularly the Madras Eu-
 “ ropean regiment. From many circumstances,
 “ this regiment has, in a manner, been overlooked,
 “ indeed, I may say, neglected ; placed in a corner
 “ of this extensive country, it has seldom had its
 “ practice of duty with the other corps of the
 “ army.

“ Notwithstanding these circumstances, from
 “ my knowledge of your zeal and ability, Colonel
 “ Taylor, I was confident I should find this corps
 “ in the high state of discipline it has this morning
 “ evinced ; and it shall be my business, as much
 “ as lays in my power, to let the service benefit
 “ from this state of discipline, by calling it into
 “ more general notice ; for I know that this state
 “ of inactivity must be painful to the feelings of
 “ honorable gentlemen and Officers, and painful
 “ to the feelings of brave soldiers. Indeed I am
 “ at a loss to know the reason for this neglect.
 “ This regiment has always been forward for its
 “ courage and loyalty ; you are composed of the
 “ same materials as the other European corps in
 “ the service, and I am certain that the same brave
 “ and generous spirit actuates you.”

During this time General Macdowall maintained
 with Sir G. Barlow, the appearance of confidential
 intercourse, which continued until the return of
 that Officer to the Presidency, about the end of
 1808. It was then broken off, not from any per-
 sonal disagreement, but on the systematic plan of

opposition to the Government, which General Macdowall at that period openly avowed. Lord Minto states, that "from the period of his return, " he had chosen to discontinue all personal intercourse with Sir G. Barlow, to the extent of " omitting those outward marks of respect and attention which were due to the situation of the " Governor." Sir G. Barlow was not discouraged by this circumstance from treating General Macdowall with every possible attention, both in his official and personal character. Of the latter disposition, the explanation given by Lord Minto affords abundantly clear evidence; and in proof of the moderation observed by the Government towards the Commander-in-Chief, it is sufficient to refer to the correspondence which took place at the period of General Macdowall's embarkation for England, relative to the arrest of the Quarter-Master-General, and the various embarrassing topics then brought under discussion, as that correspondence evinces a degree of conciliation, of forbearance under accumulated injuries, and an earnestness to avert farther extremities, wholly unexampled.

Lord Minto's letter
5th Feb.
1810.

We are informed by Colonel Malcolm, that the discontent of the army was directed against the Government " by the proceeding of the Commander-in-Chief, very unadvisedly, and inconsiderately, however unintentionally." There is scarcely any other than one point, on which there is concurrence of opinion between Lord Minto and

Colonel Malcolm, namely, the influence which the conduct of General Macdowall had on that of the army, and the consequent tendency "to exonerate the army itself of a very great portion of that guilt, which must otherwise have been laid exclusively to their account." In viewing the many painful scenes which are opened by the present question, the mind derives some satisfaction in the idea of reaching, in part at least, the foundation of the evil; and while the *retrospect* is clouded by various dismal reflections, the *prospect* is gilded by the renewed hope that the returning loyalty, good sense, and discipline of the army, will for ever avert a repetition of those calamities by which the military character was for a time involved in so deep a shade.

Colonel Malcolm says, that the effect of General Macdowall's conduct was "unintentional," and that "few will accuse General Macdowall of more than want of reflection." Here Colonel Malcolm, and Lord Minto, as well as the authors of the able paper recorded by the India Directors, decidedly differ; and as their opinion is given long after the termination of the mutiny, and is the result of a calm and minute examination of every point of evidence, it is nothing short of the weight of judicial decision. Lord Minto too, gives his opinion when fully possessed of all the information which Colonel Malcolm had furnished "with boldness and freedom." His Lordship expressly charges General Macdowall with a "deliberate intention to make

“ the army an instrument of opposition and dis-
 “ turbance to the Government ;” and with kind-
 ling, “ with infinite industry, and no inconsider-
 “ able skill, a flame, the destructive progress of
 “ which, he could not fail to foresee, although
 “ he did not stay to witness it.” If we are to
 judge by the tenor of a private letter from Colonel
 Malcolm (of the 11th February, 1809, from Bom-
 bay,) quoted by Lord Minto, that Officer appears
 himself to have entertained, at one time, sentiments
 considerably more decided, than those which he
 has lately expressed. We should have thought
 that any subsequent enquiry which Colonel Mal-
 colm may have made, would have rather tended to
 encrease, than to diminish, the force of those sen-
 timents. Colonel Malcolm observes ; “ I feel
 “ obliged to congratulate myself at my absence
 “ from your side of India ; for to be forced to wit-
 “ ness, without having the power to remedy, such
 “ scenes as you have had at Madras, must be
 “ terrible. I judge only from report, and the Com-
 “ mander-in-Chief’s Orders, particularly that about
 “ Munro, which appears the boldest and most ex-
 “ traordinary attack upon Government I ever
 “ knew. It is all levelled direct at Government,
 “ for they have evidently taken Munro’s cause
 “ upon themselves.

“ I know not what others may think, but I can
 “ find no excuse for a man in high station allow-
 “ ing his private feelings, however much they
 “ may have been wounded, to make him forget his

“ public duty, and set an example of that contemptible and insubordination which it is his particular duty to repress. There is no calculating the mischief of such proceedings. It is waiving “ a torch over a magazine.”

We shall leave every one to form their own conclusions on the preceding view of circumstances, comparatively with that exhibited in the pamphlet lately published by Colonel Malcolm.

Pamphlet,
page 7.

Colonel Malcolm having disposed of the general observations contained in the first part of his late publication, proceeds to consider the “ first act “ which led to serious discussions,” viz. the placing the Quarter-Master-General, Lieut.-Col. Munro, in arrest. It being our endeavour to limit the Remarks, which we have deemed it our duty to make, to as few pages as possible, we shall not attempt to follow Col. Malcolm in any detail through his commentary. As, however, the observations relative to the case of the Quarter-Master-General stand first in order, and afford, we think, not an unfair specimen of the course of reasoning pursued by Colonel Malcolm, we shall state, as briefly as possible, such reflections as occur on the subject.

Colonel Malcolm says, that “ the nature of this “ case is well known.” But as the opinions given by Colonel Malcolm have left in our mind the impression of considerable doubt, whether it has been understood even by himself, it may be advisable to give a short and connected view of the

question. Lieut.-Col. Munro, an officer of distinguished talents and merit, was called on, by his Commander-in-Chief, Sir John Cradock, in his official capacity of Quarter-Master-General, to give his sentiments as to the reductions which were about to take place in the military department of the service. Among various papers of great ability, which the Quarter-Master-General in consequence prepared, he submitted to the Commander-in-Chief a Report on the system of supplying Camp Equipage, which had been established in the Madras army in 1802, under the denomination of the Tent-Contract, which system the Quarter-Master recommended to be discontinued, being in his opinion attended with unnecessary expense, and liable to other obvious objections. The Report was warmly approved by Sir John Cradock, who, in communicating it to the Government, where Lord William Bentinck then presided, observed that the sentiments expressed by the Quarter-Master-General, "were the result of their joint reflection on the subject, and were the issue of that experience which arose from their respective situations." The Report, in like manner, received the entire concurrence of the Governor, Lord William Bentinck; and of Mr. Petrie, who succeeded to the temporary charge of the Government of Madras, on his Lordship's departure for England, in September, 1807. It was, under these recommendations, referred to Bengal, where being also approved by the Commander-in-Chief in India,

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and by the Supreme Government, orders were finally transmitted to Madras (Sir C. Barlow being then Governor at that Presidency), for carrying the recommendations into effect. This measure gave great offence to the Officers commanding Native Corps, who held the contract for the supply of Tents to their Corps, and led to a very extensive combination against the Quarter-Master-General. It is now established that the Report having, in the usual mode of official intercourse, come into the hands of the Adjutant-General, Lieut.-Col. Capper, “ he forwarded to several Officers in his own and “ General Macdowall’s confidence, all the passages “ in it that could be construed into an offence to “ the army ; and that letters were immediately “ addressed by those Officers to the Commander- “ in-Chief (General Macdowall), transmitting to “ him the passages mentioned, and demanding jus- “ tice for the insinuations contained in them.” It has been seen that the Quarter-Master-General was expressly ordered to furnish the Report. It was confidential, and not meant for publication : but the expressions alluded to, have been pronounced, by every authority under whose observation they have come, to be of the most inoffensive nature. “ They are divested of all personal allusion, and merely suggest, in the course of general reasoning, the liability of abuse, under the operation of a system in various other respects objectionable. Lord Minto observes : “ How is sincere and use- “ ful advice to be obtained ; how is provision

Lord Min-
to’s Letter,
5th Feb.
1817. Par.
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“ ever to be made against abuse, if no man can
 “ hazard the allegation, in terms however general,
 “ that it exists, without the imputation of being a
 “ slanderer, and without incurring the disgrace of
 “ a prosecution.” If the expressions of the Quar-
 ter-Master-General had been altogether of a dif-
 ferent character, and had been directly criminatory
 in their nature, all legal authorities concur in
 thinking, that even in such case, he would have
 done no more than his duty demanded, in furnish-
 ing the best opinions that his information and judg-
 ment might dictate; and that it was to his supe-
 riors, not to the Officers of the army, that he would
 have been responsible for their truth. The Quar-
 ter-Master-General had done no more than say,
 that certain *inducements* to abuse existed, under
 the system for the supply of Camp Equipage, which
 on general principles should not be allowed to
 constitute a part of any system. But even those
 expressions, unoffending in the letter and in the
 intention, that Officer used every means in his
 power to explain to the satisfaction of the army.
 So soon as a discovery was made of the miscon-
 struction attached to the words, he requested Gene-
 ral Macdowall to be allowed to address him publicly
 for the purpose of disavowing any injurious mean-
 ing. He made the request both personally, and
 through the intercession of a respectable Officer
 who stood high in the mutual confidence of the
 Commander-in-Chief, and of the Quarter-Master-
 General: but in both ways was the application re-

fused, on the ground alleged by General Macdowall, that the abolition of the Tent Contract having been decided before he received the command of the army, it was a subject in which he did not intend to take a part. This passive line of conduct was manifestly incompatible with the duty of the Commander-in-Chief. But it not long after came to light, that General Macdowall, far from adhering even to that line, was himself the active promoter of the unexampled persecution of a meritorious Officer, who had done no more than his duty indispensibly required, a persecution which he was bound by every tie of public principle, and of moral obligation, to have instantly repressed. The charge preferred against the Quarter-Master-General by the Officers commanding Corps, is understood to have been in the possession of the Commander-in-Chief a considerable time before he took ostensibly any step regarding it. He then referred it to his legal adviser, the Judge Advocate-General, who, in a report of great perspicuity and ability, condemned unanswerably the whole proceeding, as radically unjust and subversive of the first principles of discipline. More than two months again elapsed after the receipt of the Judge Advocate's report, before any public step was taken; and it was not until within a few days of General Macdowall's embarkation for England, that he announced the unexampled resolution of placing the Quarter-Master-General in arrest, for the purpose of his being brought to trial, telling

publicly that he did so, that a door might not be left open "to the possible introduction of undue influence and arbitrary power." The Quarter-Master-General in vain submitted to the attention of General Macdowall, "the extraordinary spectacle (which was exhibited), of an Officer holding one of the first situations under the Government, being placed in arrest by a Commander-in-Chief, for a Report prepared under the special orders of the preceding Commander-in-Chief, which the latter declared, upon record, to be the combined result of his own and that Officer's reflection." The Quarter-Master-General too, in vain requested the benefit of a reference to the Government, which was refused by General Macdowall as an "application extremely indelicate and disrespectful." After these repeated failures, the Quarter-Master-General, with great propriety, made a direct appeal to the Government, on a question immediately involving the most important public arrangements, and regarding which, in regard to the Government, General Macdowall had observed a profound silence, withholding all knowledge of his proceedings from the controlling authority, which was deeply interested in being made acquainted with them. The letter of the Quarter-Master-General fully explained the circumstances of his situation, and again strongly disclaimed all offensive intention. This letter was sent to General Macdowall, accompanied by an earnest recommendation of the Government, that

the arrest of that Officer should be removed. These communications failed to produce the least effect. The recommendation was repelled under circumstances of an aggravating nature, and in a high tone, the Governor in Council was informed by General Macdowall, that the appeal which had been made to his authority, was to be rendered a new ground of charge against the Officer who had been compelled to make it. No notice was taken of the satisfactory explanation offered by the Quarter-Master-General, and as Lord Minto has stated, "it was with this explanation before him that the Commander-in-Chief suffered the prosecutors to persist in their charges, and that he himself persevered in promoting so extraordinary a trial." The sequel is sufficiently known. After every means of persuasion and of intreaty, conveyed in the most conciliatory terms, had been unsuccessfully tried, the Government had no resource, but to interpose the exercise of its power for the purpose of stopping the progress of an act of the most gross injustice, and of the most manifest public injury, that ever entered the contemplation of the human mind.

Pamphlet,
page 7.

With the above facts in his knowledge, or within his reach, Colonel Malcolm has not questioned the *right* of the Government to order the release of the Quarter-Master-General from arrest, but he has questioned the expediency of exercising that right—observing, "that it is nonsense to say that it (the Government) would, by so forbearing

“ and moderate a proceeding, have abandoned an
 “ Officer entitled to protection.” This language, if
 “ it means any thing, implies, that Government
 “ did not conceive there were, at that moment,
 “ thirteen Officers, either in the King’s or Com-
 “ pany’s service, on the Coast, upon whose ho-
 “ nesty and honour it could rely—a proposition
 “ too extravagant for notice.” Colonel Mal-
 colm suggests, that if Lieut.-Col. Munro had been
 found guilty by the sentence of a Court Martial,
 the Government would not have been “ in that ex-
 “ treme case, deprived of the right to protect that
 “ Officer;”—that, on the contrary, in such an
 event, the exercise of that right would have
 been “ much more apparent and unobjection-
 “ able.”

It requires nothing short of the most express
 terms to satisfy us that the above are really the
 sentiments conveyed by Colonel Malcolm; senti-
 ments which are, not in our judgment only, dia-
 metrically opposed to all order and experience, and
 to every established fact. We have, unhappily,
 too many examples of the degree to which party-
 spirit is capable of throwing a haze round the
 clearest understandings, and of misleading the
 most honest intentions. That such a spirit had
 assumed a decided ascendancy in the army at that
 period, cannot be a moment doubted. Eight
 months before, General Macdowall had expressly
 stated to Sir G. Barlow, his belief that “ almost
 “ every individual in the service was more or less

“dissatisfied.” We have little doubt that the statement, then, was much exaggerated: but during the eventful interval, as has been proved, the most fatal intrigues were in active operation. The storm, which various pre-disposing causes, arising from the elementary constitution of the Indian service, and from a combination of collateral circumstances, had tended to create, had been collecting, with accumulated force, and at the period of General Macdowall’s embarkation, was ready to burst with fearful violence. The absolute impossibility of forming a Court-Martial consisting of Officers, wholly untainted by the prevailing passions and prejudices of that period, and superior to the influence of the clamour which had been industriously excited, is not a thing susceptible of proof; but we may safely appeal to any understanding capable of taking an impartial view of the events which had then occurred, whether the chances would not have been greatly against the success of such an attempt. Much the same spirit was then prevailing in the civil department of the service; and we find the Chief Justice, a short time after, officially stating, that he was compelled to stop proceedings in the Supreme Court, as the Settlement of Madras was “in that state in which, under similar circumstances, in any town or county at home, any Judge would stop a trial, convinced that the mind of the place was labouring under an influence unfitting it for judging.” In truth, a

numerous portion of the principal Officers of the army had, in the very act of preferring a charge against the Quarter-Master-General, declared pretty plainly their opinion; for, as to the fact itself, there was no kind of doubt; the doubt that existed, was concerning the construction of certain words, a subject, of all others, little fitting in the most placid times, for discussion in a public court; but, above all, least fitting at that time, when the public mind was greatly distempered, and when many of the leading persons in the army had already pronounced an unequivocal judgment on the question. It is not easy to imagine how the Government was to be justified in overlooking every difficulty of this nature, and in abandoning at once, to almost certain condemnation, an Officer of distinguished merit, whose opinions had been formally adopted by a succession of the principal authorities in India, and had been rendered the ground of their public acts. Would the Government have been justified in sanctioning a measure which, to say nothing of its manifest injustice, as affecting a deserving individual, was to strike at the root of all confidence, on the part of every Officer acting under its orders? for what was the fate of the Quarter-Master-General to-day, might on the morrow have been extended indefinitely to others, exposed to the same unmerited cry of obloquy. Would the Government have been justified in consenting to the humiliation of having its acts, and the acts of those high autho-

rities who had adopted the opinions of the Quarter-Master-General, submitted to the judgment of a Court-Martial? Would any Government have deserved the name, that could have been capable of sanctioning such injustice, and such degradation, even if the probability of an impartial trial had been greater, much greater, than there was the least reason to hope for? Colonel Malcolm has suggested the expedient of the Government interposing in the event of the sentence of a Court-Martial having pronounced the Quarter-Master-General to be guilty. But surely the time of interposition would then have been past. The stain of such a decision could not have been wiped away by any exercise of power, however just; and the Government would have been deservedly exposed to the charge of deception, if it had countenanced a trial destined to end in the mockery of justice.

We have the satisfaction to think, that the opinions which we have expressed, on the case of the Quarter-Master-General, are in perfect unison with those given by much higher authorities, the Supreme Government of India, and the Court of Directors. After an accurate examination of the circumstances, the Supreme Government observe, — “The whole proceeding was monstrous; and we repeat, in the strongest terms, our warmest approbation of your just, legal, and indispensable interposition, on that occasion, to vindicate the honor of your Government, and to

“ shield one of your best and ablest servants
 “ from an arbitrary and oppressive abuse of power.
 “ If you had omitted to do so, you would have
 “ failed in the most sacred duties of your high
 “ stations; and would have merited, because you
 “ would have sanctioned, that long train of insult
 “ and encroachment which was to follow, and of
 “ which the prosecution of Lieut.-Col. Munro,
 “ would have proved to be only the first experi-
 “ mental step.” The Court of Directors, after
 the same accurate examination, say,—“ It be-
 “ came, in our opinion, the bounden duty of our
 “ Governor in Council at Fort St. George, to in-
 “ terpose the direct authority of Government, for
 “ the protection of Lieut.-Col. Munro, by requir-
 “ ing the Commander-in-Chief to release that Of-
 “ ficer from the arrest in which he had placed him.
 “ To have permitted Lieut.-Col. Munro to be
 “ brought to trial for sentiments, and statements
 “ delivered by him in his official capacity, in obe-
 “ dience to the orders of our former Commander-
 “ in-Chief at Madras, Sir John Cradock, by whom
 “ they were adopted as his own, as they were also
 “ approved, sanctioned, and enforced by the Local
 “ and Supreme Governments, would have been not
 “ only to withhold protection from a meritorious
 “ Officer in the discharge of his indispensable du-
 “ ties, but to have brought into question, and, in
 “ fact, subjected to trial, the character and acts
 “ of the former Commander-in-Chief, Sir John

Printed Pa-
 pers.—Let-
 ter from
 the Court of
 Directors,
 10th Sept.
 1809.

“Cradock, and even those of the Government
“themselves.”*

* Colonel Malcolm has illustrated (if the term can be so applied), his opinion, as to the expediency of allowing the Quarter-Master-General to be brought to trial, by a reference to the history of Sir Francis Burdett and the House of Commons. The force of the allusion does not, we confess, appear very perceptible: but, as a reference has been made to European events, we may suggest for consideration the course which would have been likely to have been pursued by the Commander-in-Chief of the forces in this country, if the Officers of the army had combined in preferring Charges against the principal Staff of His Royal Highness, on account of opinions delivered in the performance of their duty, and which he had highly approved and acted on. Would His Royal Highness have consigned his Staff Officers to trial by a Court-Martial, to be selected from an inflamed army?—or, is it not more likely, that he would, if all expostulation failed (supposing such to have been resorted to), have quashed the proceeding with a strong hand; and that he would have done so rather before the experiment of a trial, than after the Staff Officers had been tried, and probably found guilty? Perhaps, too, His Royal Highness might have been disposed to have taken some notice of the conduct of those Officers who had been active in promoting the supposed proceedings, and of those, particularly, who had signed the charges. Possibly His Majesty might have been advised to order the discontinuance of their names in the list of the army. It is possible, much more than possible, that all this would have been done, with the warmest approbation of the nation; and if so, the course taken would have greatly exceeded in severity, any thing done by the Government of Madras, under circumstances of the like nature. No notice whatever was taken of the conduct of those Officers who signed, or who promoted the charges preferred against the Quarter-Master-General at that Presidency.

In stating that we differ wholly from every part of the opinion given by Colonel Malcolm, as to the case of Lieut.-Col. Munro, we trust that we make not this statement on light grounds, or on any other than such as are incontrovertible.

We have before noticed the reasons which induced us, at some length, to examine the conclusions drawn by Col. Malcolm, regarding the preceding question. It would be impracticable to follow that Officer, with the same closeness, through the other observations contained in the first part of his Pamphlet, without extending these sheets to an inconvenient degree; and it appears wholly superfluous to do so. There is scarcely one broken link in the chain of crimination attached by Colonel Malcolm to the conduct of the Government of Madras, while, with scarcely an exception, every one of the material measures which that Officer has seen cause to censure, the Supreme Government of India; and the Court of Directors, in conjunction with His Majesty's Government, have, after the most careful examination, seen cause to approve, in the warmest strain of eulogium. In the same tone as has been evinced in the case of the Quarter-Master-General, Colonel Malcolm condemns the cautious, but firm, conduct, pursued by the Government, in regard to the two Memorials which General Macdowall endeavoured to force on their attention, at the time of his embarking:—The suspension from the service of the Adjutant-General and his Deputy, whom the Go-

Printed Papers—Letter from Bengal to the Government of Madras, 27th May, 1809.

Letter from Lord Minto to the Sec. Committee, 12th Oct. 1809.

Letters from the Court of Directors to the Government of Madras, 15th and 29th Sept. 1809.

Do. 9th Feb. and 1st May, 1810.

vernment considered to have been actively instrumental in disseminating the seditious Orders of the Commander-in-Chief;* and the suspension which

* As the proceedings relative to the Adjutant-General and his Deputy, form the only material question, regarding which, the least difference of opinion has occurred, between the Government of India and that of this country, in the course of the late important and difficult discussions, it seems material to say a few words on the subject. We may first observe, that it argues no ordinary share of wisdom, vigor, and ability on the part of any administration, which has so conducted the affairs committed to its charge, that during a period of unexampled peril and embarrassment, and during a long succession of the most important public measures, only one point has occurred, on which a diversity of opinion has existed among the authorities to whom the right of decision belongs. When the storm is over, when the winds and waves have subsided, and when the vessel which had encountered the tempest, is brought safe into port, nothing is more easy than calmly to criticise the conduct of the mariner, to make light of his dangers, and to reckon every shred that had suffered, and every nail that had been lost, in the effort to save the whole from destruction. This is an illiberal, but it is, unhappily, the usual course of judgment, and it has been largely applied in the case of the Government of Madras, whose measures, however, are of that firm and consistent texture as to bear any examination, near or distant, narrow or expanded.

In regard to the case of the two Officers in question, it has been so perplexed by a course of polemical discussion, that the actual circumstances attending it have been, in great measure, lost sight of. We know, from all experience, that nothing is more usual in seditious times, than to see a matter of no radical importance, raised as the rallying point of clamour, and the real motives of action screened behind such as are pretended. The

took place under the General Orders of the 1st May, 1809, of some of the Officers, who, on evidence of which, the validity cannot be questioned, were considered to have been actively engaged in the pursuit of plans which were directed to the immediate subversion of the Government. We

machinations of Jacobinism in this country, at no distant period, sought refuge under the alleged grievance of a foreign war, of a war against the source from whence Jacobinism sprang; and even the unbending principles of the Great Minister, by the power of whose arm the hydra was subdued, were at times urged as a cloak for the shelter of the hydra's growth. The arguments stated, relative to the case to which we refer, have been much more suitable to the spirit of a debating society of forensic quibbling, than to the consideration of a measure connected with, and arising from, a system of other great public measures directed to the preservation of the Empire's nearest interests. But, as the circumstances connected with it, have been examined with critical accuracy, in a periodical publication (the Quarterly Review), of distinguished merit, which contains by far the most comprehensive and able account of the late commotions at Madras, that has yet appeared in any publication of the kind; a reference to that publication obviates the necessity of going into much detail. We shall therefore only state such an outline of the question, as will be sufficient to afford a distinct view of it.

Quarterly
Review,
No. IX.

There can be no doubt of the criminal nature of the General Order published by General Macdowall, on the 28th January, 1809, when on the eve of embarking for England. According to a Regulation of old date, established by the Court of Directors, all orders of the Commander-in-Chief at Madras are required to be communicated to the Governor twenty-four hours before they are issued to the Army, in order that he may see that

should have expected that, consistently with the liberality of Colonel Malcolm's character, some allowance would, in the course of his Statement, have been made for the great and acknowledged difficulties in which Sir George Barlow was placed, difficulties of which many had been be-

Printed Pa-
pers - Lord
Minto's
Letter,
5th Feb.
1810.

nothing improper is so published. This Regulation had not been rigidly enforced, but it had been the invariable rule in practice, that all orders of the Commander-in-Chief were communicated to the Governor *immediately when* published. Not one instance of a deviation from that practice had ever occurred, until the publication of the above General Order, of a nature manifestly directed to the excitement of sedition in the army. This Order was issued from the Office of the Adjutant-General to several Military Stations, on Saturday the 28th January: many more copies were circulated on the following day; but all knowledge of the Order was withheld from the Governor until Monday, the third day after it was issued to the Army; and it was not then communicated until the Ship on which General Macdowall had embarked had put to Sea. The evil which this seditious paper was, by its circulation, sure to produce, was then done, past the power of recall, or of remedy.

Printed Pa-
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ters from
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vernment
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of Direc-
tors, of 31st
January,
and 1st Feb.
1810.

The copy of the General Order which was sent officially to the Governor, was signed by the Deputy-Adjutant-General, who, as the responsible person in signing and circulating a paper of that kind, was suspended from the service of the Company. The Adjutant-General afterwards, in a tone of exultation, avowing his share of the responsibility, was also suspended. The Government adopted these measures, under the impression that the Staff Officers had been acting in collusion with the Commander-in-Chief, and that his authority could not sanction them in abetting an act deemed treasonable against the civil power.

queathed to him as a succession from preceding Governments, and of which others arose in that course of events which the Government tried all means, in vain, to avert. But no allowance of this kind is made; and we must certainly lament, that in the whole course of the Pamphlet before us, acts which

The Supreme Government of India approved what had been done by the Government of Madras. The Court of Directors, when the question was brought before them, considering the Staff Officers to have been placed "in a situation of difficulty," were of opinion, that their removal from their Staff situations would have been sufficient, without removing them from the Company's service; and desired that they might be restored to the latter. The Court of Directors, however, in consequence of further information, modified this resolution, and directed that the Deputy-Adjutant-General should be again suspended from the service. These Resolutions passed in 1809; and in 1811, after long discussion, it was decided, that the Deputy-Adjutant-General should be restored to the service, but not to be permitted to return, for the present, to India.

Printed Papers—Letter from the Supreme Government, 27th May 1809, Ditto, from the Court of Directors 15th Sep. and 20th Sept. 1811 and 22d Feb. 1811.

The above is a correct outline of the facts, unaccompanied, however, by several circumstances, "the adjuncts of time, place, and situation," which would bring the subject more forcibly to view, but which want of room compels us to omit. The Reader may be enabled to judge, from what has been stated, whether the clamour raised, as to military responsibility, has been founded in Sense, or in Faction. That the proceeding involved a direct breach of established orders;—that it was flagrantly insulting to the authority of the Government, and was attended with the deepest injury to the public welfare, are points which have never been questioned. Whether the Government was, or was not, called on to notice the conduct of the Officers,

have appeared generally to others, wise in their purpose, and salutary in their consequences, soundly planned and ably executed, should have presented themselves to Colonel Malcolm, through the distorted, discoloured medium in which he has

without whose co-operation those consequences could not, apparently, have ensued, is a point on which some have differed. On the part of the official authorities, they have concurred as to the existence of criminality, and as to the necessity of punishment, but have differed as to the degree of punishment. This, with all possible disposition to the most narrow inspection, has constituted the sole difference of opinion in the least material, that has occurred between the official authorities of India and this country, (so far as the Government of Madras is concerned) in the course of the late long and important discussions; a circumstance that may challenge an honorable comparison with the conduct of any administration the most wise, vigorous, and successful, in any country.

Pamphlet,
page 11.

From the general tenor of Col. Malcolm's publication, there can be no room for surprise, that he disapproves the measures to which we have referred; and that without advertent to the preceding state of the army, and to the actual circumstances at the time, he at once pronounces that the army "underwent a complete revolution," in consequence of the suspension of the Staff Officers. On such an opinion we shall make no comment; but we may be allowed to express some surprise, that Col. Malcolm should have perseveringly ascribed to the Government a wish to ask for an apology from the Deputy-Adjutant-General, for his offence, in defiance of an express declaration of Sir G. Barlow, and of General Gowdie to the contrary. The palpable misconstruction, attached by other writers, to the conduct of General Gowdie, appears quite unsuitable to the motives of individual consideration, that seem wholly to have dictated it.

viewed them. * Colonel Malcolm has dwelt somewhat fully on the Test imposed by the Orders of Government of the 26th July, 1809, and it cannot be matter of surprise that he disapproves it. It is a measure, notwithstanding, which has received elsewhere great and deserved approbation. On this, as on other points of consideration, no reference has been made by Colonel Malcolm to the abundant explanation contained in the dispatches of the Government of Fort St. George, relative to its motives of action—these “luminous writings,” (as observed by a high authority),

* We shall make no comment on some stories which we should have thought too futile for Colonel Malcolm to have honored with a place in his Pamphlet, as a proof of “provoking suspicion.” These stories were inserted in some of the early anonymous pamphlets, and we thought that they had long ago sunk into the oblivion belonging to them. We regret, however, still more, that Colonel Malcolm should have only given a “bare catalogue;” as a little further enquiry would have probably satisfied him, that none of the measures to which he alludes were adopted without the clearest necessity, unless the Government had been prepared to follow the course, which no doubt some would have approved, of overlooking all acts of insubordination, however manifest in their nature, and however distinctly brought to attention. In times of public ferment, it is unavoidable, that frequent examples should occur of disorderly proceedings, which will call for reprehension and punishment; but of which a “bare catalogue,” without a knowledge of the collateral circumstances, will be quite insufficient to convey any true idea.

Pamphlet,
page 21.

Letter from
the ten Di-
rectors, of
10th Sept.
1810.

“ many of which, though produced in times of
“ great disorder and peril, are, in reasoning, tem-
“ per, and composition, surpassed by no State Pa-
“ pers on the Records of the Company.”

The Government of Madras has fully explained the circumstances of the Test, and the extreme exigency which led to the necessity of imposing it. At a time when the most alarming symptoms of disaffection had appeared at every Military Station, and when a great part of the Army had openly mutinied, it was surely justifiable in the Government, it was surely indispensable, to ascertain who were the Officers on whom reliance could in that emergency be placed, and that “ those who were not dis-
“ posed to support the authority of Government,
“ should be no longer permitted to exercise func-
“ tions which they were unwilling to employ in
“ the service of their country.” This measure, so essential in its nature, was executed in a manner as conciliatory as was consistent with its success. It was explained that the Government did not
“ suspect individuals ;” but that the urgency of affairs rendered it necessary to call for such a declaration of fidelity, as was required ; while those whomight decline to subscribe the declaration, were permitted to withdraw on their usual allowances,
“ until the state of affairs, and the temper of their
“ own minds, should admit of their being again
“ employed with advantage to the State.” Colonel Malcolm has given several reasons to shew that

Printed Pa-
pers — Let-
ter from
the Govern-
ment of
Madras,
10th Sept.
1810.

the "Government had no right to look to the
 "fidelity and attachment of the Native Troops,"
 and that the chief resource was the loyalty and
 good disposition of the Officers themselves. Such
 reasoning, we confess, appears greatly overstrained;
 and it is with infinite regret that we see such topics
 again dragged into discussion; but it is nevertheless
 essential that when opinions of this kind are forced
 on attention, they should not pass wholly un-
 noticed. The opposite proofs that might be ad-
 duced, are almost innumerable. It is, however,
 quite sufficient to quote the opinion of Lord Minto,
 as the result of minute enquiry, many months after
 the termination of the mutiny. After describing
 the progress of that event, his Lordship says—
 "Such was the state of things, when the masterly
 "and decisive measure of the 26th July, gave at
 "once a death blow to the rebellion. The Native
 "Troops abjured the criminal designs of their Of-
 "ficers; the latter were separated from the only
 "force they had counted upon; the arms dropped
 "out of their hands, and they found themselves a
 "small band of defenceless and fugitive indivi-
 "duals, at the mercy of the Government they
 "were the day before confederated to pull down."
 The Government acted throughout this "masterly
 "and decisive measure," under the impression
 that the Native Troops would not support their
 Officers in rebellion against the State; and the
 result manifested the wisdom of the opinion, for

Paraphlet,
 page 36.

Lord Min-
 to's Letter,
 5th Feb.
 1810.

at all the places where there were the means of making known to the troops, the actual situation of affairs, they hesitated not in their choice, but immediately "ranged under the standard of Government." The measure was certainly of a bold nature, and there is no cause of surprise that some Officers, under an anxiety as to future events, hesitated in the execution of it. Those Officers acted, no doubt, under honorable, but they acted under mistaken impressions; for, when the orders of the Government were peremptorily required to be enforced, complete success was the effect. Colonel Malcolm has attached consequences to the "wisdom and forbearance," to the "conciliatory efforts," of those Officers, which we cannot believe that they themselves ever thought of, for they seem in our idea at variance with every recorded fact. Among the respectable names thus introduced, we should have expected some notice to have been taken of the highly distinguished characters, who proceeded with a firm undeviating step in the execution of the arduous duty confided to them. We think that such names as those of Colonel Wilkinson, Colonel Davis, and Colonel Hare, should not have been wholly omitted, names to which, with those of other meritorious persons, have already been attached the public thanks of the Representatives of the East India Company, which the future historian will record with satisfaction, as casting a ray of lustre round transac-

tions, which their loyal and vigorous exertions so essentially contributed to bring to a successful conclusion.

Colonel Malcolm, after condemning the measure of the Test, has stated, in prophetic strains, the series of consequences which are to arise from it. Some of these we must, with every deference, say, we do consider fanciful, and others, we humbly hope, as we firmly believe, will never be realized. That the necessity of recurring to the measure in question, was a great evil, no one will deny, and the repetition of it is to be deprecated as a public calamity; but it is not to the Government that the evil, whatever it may be, is imputable. The Court of Directors have observed, "It is one of the many melancholy, and perhaps, "irremediable consequences of the disloyalty of "the European Officers, for which they are so "deeply responsible to us and to their country." Printed Papers—Letter of the Court of Directors, 1st May, 1810. In encouraging, however, the expectation that no permanent inconvenience is to arise from a measure, which, in the first instance saved the Government from overthrow, we feel satisfaction in recurring to the "lamp of life," historical experience exemplified, strikingly exemplified, in the Mutiny in Bengal, in 1766. Colonel Malcolm says, "To such as examine the particulars of "these two important events (alluding to the "Mutiny of Madras), and trace to its true cause "the defection of the Officers of the Bengal army,

Pamphlet, page 55.

“ in 1766, and then observe, the open, military, and manly conduct of Lord Clive, there will appear much more grounds for a contrast, than a comparison.” *We know not on what Colonel Malcolm has grounded such an opinion, as an examination of “ particulars,” seems to lead to precisely an opposite conclusion, and affords, perhaps, the most striking parallel of historical events that is any where to be found. The particulars of the Bengal Mutiny do not appear to have been in any one’s recollection, in the progress of the Mutiny at Madras : but the same causes were, notwithstanding, steady in their effects. The heated passions of the Madras army hurried them to far greater and more dreadful extremities, than occurred in Bengal ; but nearly the same system of combination, and of menace, was pursued in both cases : and on the part of the Government, the same manly vigor, energy, and wisdom, which signalized the measures of Lord Clive, were called into action, on a much more extended scale, and, if possible, with more signal success, under the administration of Sir George Barlow. But the distinguishing features of the course pursued by both Governments, are precisely similar ; both evinced a determination, equally strenuous, to reject all compromise of the public authority, and to accede to no terms short of entire submission to the lawful power of the State.

We are informed, in an Authentic Account of the Bengal Mutiny, that a "general peace" being established in the British Provinces in India, Lord Clive proceeded to carry "into execution the "Company's orders, relative to the reduction of "Batta," which was directed to take place from the 1st January, 1766. "The Officers had been "too successful in their remonstrances against "former orders of the like nature, to omit pre- "ferring them upon this occasion." But the commands were positive; and the Officers appeared to acquiesce. "But this was only the appearance of "submission: private meetings and consultations "were held, in each brigade; secret committees "were formed, under the denomination of free- "mason's lodges; and means of obtaining redress "devised." "A general resignation of commis- "sions," was the measure decided on. "A so- "lemn oath to secrecy was administered, and kept "so strictly, that even the Field Officers upon the "spot entertained not the least suspicion of what "was going forward." A fund was formed for the relief of such as might require assistance, under the loss of their commissions, to which "a "considerable sum is said to have been contri- "buted privately by gentlemen in the civil ser- "vice." The 1st of June, 1766, was the time agreed on for the resignation of Commissions; but the combination which was in progress came accidentally to light in the month of April, at which time Lord Clive was at Muxadavad, adjusting the

An authen-
tic Account,
laid before
the House
of Com-
mons, in
1772.

16,000*l.* is
said to have
been sub-
scribed in
this mode.

revenues of Bengal. This "premature discovery" made the Officers adopt the determination of resigning on the 1st of May, if their demands were not complied with. Lord Clive saw the danger of his situation; but he determined not "to grant a request, demanded, as it were, "sword in hand;" and submission on his part, "would not bear a moment's deliberation." He accordingly proceeded to call into action all the resources in his power, and among other means of assistance applied to the Government of Madras for all the Officers that could be spared from the service of the Coast of Coromandel. He issued orders to the Officers commanding brigades, "to engage the attachment of the non-commissioned Officers, by assurances of reward;" to prepare "for detaching the troops in small parties," and for sending the refractory Officers prisoners to Calcutta. Lord Clive proceeded with the utmost dispatch a distance of several hundred miles, to Monghyr, the nearest principal military station, "where he had reason to think the whole scheme had been originally planned." Two days before Lord Clive reached Monghyr (15th May) a mutiny had broken out among the European troops at that station, who "got under arms, intending to follow their Officers." But this was promptly quelled by Captain Smith, at the head of two battalions of Sepoys, "with fixed bayonets;" and, "having neither subaltern, nor serjeant to assist him." Lord Clive, the day

after his arrival, paraded the European and native troops, and addressing them, separately explained to them the criminal views in which their Officers had engaged, and admonished them to do their duty. He highly applauded the native troops, "for the instance they had so lately given of their steadiness, and faithful attachment to the Company," and distributed among them honorary rewards and money. "A detachment of Sepoys was next day sent out in quest of the resigned Officers," who were waiting "the arrival of their associates from the other brigades," with eventual orders for conveying them to Calcutta by force; but they anticipated the necessity of executing these orders by their departure. Lord Clive having settled affairs at Monghyr, proceeded to the other military stations in the Upper Provinces, where his measures were attended with the same success. At Serajepor, an advanced station, where Colonel Smith then commanded a strong detachment, employed in watching a numerous body of Mahratta horse, the Officers had persevered in the confederacy, notwithstanding the most conciliatory efforts of their commander; and though in that critical situation, Colonel Smith determined to "trust wholly to the fidelity of the Black Officers." This firmness aiding the resolute conduct of Lord Clive, led to the most happy results. When the Officers of Colonel Smith's brigade saw the course which he pursued, and "that Lord Clive would not yield to their

“ demands;” “ that some of their associates were
 “ in arrest for mutiny and desertion; that many
 “ others were to be shipped off for England,” their
 eyes were opened to the precipice, and they
 “ made all possible submission for the irregulari-
 “ ties they had been guilty of.” “ Repentance
 “ and humiliation became general;” and the least
 culpable of the Officers were restored to their
 rank, while the others “ were kept in arrest, to
 “ take their trials; and those, whose conduct was
 “ in a less degree exceptionable, were ordered to
 “ hold themselves in readiness to embark for Eu-
 “ rope.” As observed by the intelligent Writer of
 the Narrative, “ The army was thus, in a manner,
 “ new modelled, and we may venture to assert,
 “ became soon as complete, with respect to good
 “ Officers and discipline, as any army of the Com-
 “ pany in India ever was before that period.”

The above outline of the Bengal Mutiny is suf-
 ficient to enable any Reader to judge for himself,
 regarding the features of strong resemblance to
 which we have alluded; and must suggest many
 forcible reflections. The separation of the Euro-
 pean Officers from the native troops; the employ-
 ment of the native troops, not once, but repeated-
 ly, to use force against their Officers, and the em-
 ployment of the native troops to bring European
 troops to order, were all unquestionably great
 evils: but though they considerably exceeded in
 magnitude any evil of the like kind that oc-
 curred in the progress of the Mutiny at Madras,

we have not heard that Lord Clive was blamed for the measures that subdued the Rebellion raised against his authority: nor, though our dominion in India did then, much more than now, depend on the "breath of opinion," have we heard that those measures have been followed by consequences injurious to the permanency of our power. Whatever predictions may have been then, with much more justice than now, conjured into view, like the Phantom Kings of our immortal Bard, have like them, long since vanished in their kindred vapor, "Come like shadows, so depart." We desire to be distinctly understood, that we consider the events to which we have been referring, as great misfortunes; but in dangerous maladies the physician is not blameable who applies strong remedies for their cure.* We may, too, carry the view farther, and look to the hope that good will arise from the source of evil. The late events have afforded a lesson never to be forgotten, either by the army, or by future Governments of India.

* Colonel Malcolm, we observe, ascribes Lord Clive's conduct, with regard to the European Officers, to his being "actually engaged in war." The Narrative, on the contrary, states, Pamphlet,
page 22. that Lord Clive's measures were founded on the circumstance of the "war being ended;"—and the only *deviation* from the course which Lord Clive determined to pursue, was authorised in the case of Colonel Smith, who was employed in watching the movements of a body of Mahratta horse, and who, in the event of the renewal of hostilities, was empowered, if "reduced to the utmost extremity," to "make terms with the malcontent tents."

They have taught, that military combination, if firmly resisted, will not be always successful, and they have established a recent and broad rule of precedent, from which no Government, however weak, will hereafter dare to depart.

The parting and friendly advice to the army, and to the Government, with which Colonel Malcolm concludes the first part of his Publication, might afford ground for more detailed comment than it is our wish to enter on. We shall only notice the concluding passage of the counsel to the army, where they are told, that the "last, and "worst of all," the evils of Mutiny, is the giving "popularity and character to those they deem their "enemies." We conclude that it is not the intention of Colonel Malcolm that such expressions should be taken in their full sense: but they are a specimen of what we think a predominant feeling, strong "in that moment as in all the past."

Pamphlet,
page 48.

We wish that Colonel Malcolm had, in the advice which he confers on the Government, been a little more specific as to the mode of making retrenchments popular, "by evidently shewing, that "they are necessary, and that they are equitably "imposed on all classes." This is required to be done in a country where the frame of Government is necessarily very different from what we are accustomed to in our native land; where no deliberating voice can be allowed to the inhabitants, and still less to the army. We think that Colonel Malcolm's observations on this subject, however unintentionally, are a good deal calculated *ad cap-*

tandum; or, to use a more homely phrase, have a great deal more show than substance. Considerable reductions have been lately made in Bengal, but we have never understood that any particular means of explanation or deliberation, out of the usual course, were employed at that Presidency. Colonel Malcolm informs us that "no man of common sense will doubt that a popular Governor may reconcile men to retrenchments." Yet we have seen a mutiny produced in Bengal under the great Lord Clive, from that very cause. Lord Clive, too, then uniting the civil and military authority in his own person, had no Commander-in-Chief to clamor against, and misrepresent every act of his Government; he was also supported by the decided unanimity of his Council, all of which advantages, on a late occasion, infinitely more trying than any difficulty Lord Clive was exposed to, were wanting.*

* To prevent misapprehension, we think it right to record the names of Mr. Oakes and Mr. Casamajor, the two Members of Council who firmly and meritoriously supported the measures of Sir G. Barlow, through the eventful crisis of the Mutiny. In doing so, those Gentlemen have established the most lasting claims to public gratitude.

Colonel Malcolm having adverted to the name of a highly respected and distinguished Officer (General Maitland, late Governor of Ceylon), we may be allowed to observe, that the situation of the Governor of Ceylon bears no analogy whatever to that of the Governor of Madras. The Governor of Ceylon unites in his own person the most absolute civil and military powers, and from the limited extent of the island every inhabitant, civil and military, is almost under his immediate eye. The whole

Pamphlet,
page 37.

Having, we think proved the most material of the premises contained in the first part of Colonel Malcolm's Publication to be radically wrong, we need not make much farther observation as to the conclusions drawn from those premises. We are however, induced to insert at length the last passage but one, in the part of the pamphlet to which we are now referring. Colonel Malcolm says, "It will be ascribed to the unbending temper of Sir George Barlow, that he did not perceive the probability of amnesty being at length granted, after open resistance, by the humanity of the British Administration in India and England, almost as general as that of which, before the sword was drawn, he treated the proposal as every thing but a crime."

Did we not know the whole temper of Col. Malcolm's statement we might have been disposed to construe the above into a sarcastic remark, on the proceedings of the Supreme Government of India, and of the Government of this country, relative to the Mutiny at Madras. The remark in that view would be assuredly unjust; but it is not less so in the view in which it is intended that it should be taken. It is impossible for the power of language to convey in terms more strong than Lord Minto has done, his warmest approbation of every part

number of troops in Ceylon does not, we believe, exceed 3 or 4000 men; and the permanent revenues of the island do not, we believe, much exceed the amount of the *reductions* lately made at Madras.

of the conduct pursued by Sir G. Barlow. The Court of Directors have in like manner been as strong as possible in their commendation, and in the solemn assurances of their support. The Court, in their letter of the 15th September, 1809, addressed to the Government of Madras, after a careful consideration of the proceedings which had then occurred, say, “ We shall conclude our observations and decisions on this important reference by recording, as an act of justice, our complete and decided approbation of the conduct of our Governor in Council of Fort St. George, with respect to Lieut.-Gen. Macdowall, under circumstances of peculiar difficulty, in which they appear to have shewn no less moderation and temper in their several discussions with the Commander-in-Chief, than promptitude, energy, and firmness in supporting the just authority of Government.” In their letter of the 29th September, 1809, the Court say, “ We cannot conclude without expressing our high approbation of the firmness and temper with which you have maintained the just authority and dignity of Government amidst very unusual oppositions and difficulties; and whilst you continue thus to discharge your public duties, you may depend upon our support.” The Court, in a letter of the 9th February, 1810, observe, “ It now only remains for us to record the high sense we entertain of that firmness, energy, and wisdom by which the conduct of

Printed
Papers.

“ the Governor-General and of your Government
 “ has been distinguished throughout the whole of
 “ this most unhappy, difficult, and dangerous
 “ crisis of our affairs; and to assure you that we
 “ shall continue to afford every support in our
 “ power to your honorable and meritorious public
 “ exertions.” There are other passages in the
 dispatches of the Court of Directors full of similar
 commendations, and the whole tenor of those
 manly, energetic compositions, are such as to re-
 flect lasting honor on their authors. If there have
 been occasional aberrations from the high, digni-
 fied tone which distinguishes the above dispatches,
 they are but occasional, and do not affect the
 firm foundation on which the sentiments they
 convey immutably rest. To expect perfect una-
 nimity on such a great question as that which has
 been lately agitating the public attention, and
 which is, above all others, calculated to call forth
 the interests, the passions and prejudices of an
 extended circle, would be to expect a degree of
 excellence incompatible with the infirmity of hu-
 man nature.

If it is the intention of Colonel Malcolm to in-
 fer that the measures of the Government of Ma-
 dras have been “virtually disavowed,” because
 most of the Officers suspended by the General
 Orders of the 1st of May, 1809, have been re-
 stored by the Court of Directors, it may be well
 to refer to the Resolutions passed by the Court on
 that subject, as the terms of those Resolutions

convey as strong an approval of the act of suspension as it was possible to record. The Court of Directors have added to their Resolution, that the Officers in question are only to be permitted to return to India “ when the Court shall have declared their opinion that the complete restoration of order and military subordination at Madras shall have rendered such a measure justifiable, and consistent with that support which it is the paramount duty and determination of the Court, at all times, to give to the civil authorities.”

Having inserted this part of the Court's Resolution, we shall now state that we have done so with no invidious purpose; but have satisfaction in adding, from an unquestionable source, that Sir G. Barlow has, with the magnanimity belonging to him, taken the earliest opportunity of declaring his judgment, that from the tranquillity which now happily prevails in the Army of India, all obstacle has ceased to the immediate return of the restored Officers to their duty*.

* What has been stated above must be sufficient, we think, to lay open the kind of grounds on which Colonel Malcolm has endeavoured to establish a “disavowal” of the proceedings of the Government of Madras. If it had been quite otherwise, and if the measures of that Government, instead of being warmly applauded and confirmed, had terminated in a result the opposite of this, still such a termination would not have given absolute grounds to infer that those measures were in themselves wrong. All that a subordinate authority can do, is to follow the

Pamphlet,
page 55.

line of proceeding which may seem, in its judgment, most conducive to the public interests; but though that course may have been perfectly wise and proper, various circumstances may arise to occasion counteraction on the part of the ruling power, for which that power will alone be responsible. It seems to have escaped the attention of Colonel Malcolm, that notwithstanding "the open, military, and manly conduct of Lord Clive," he was not supported in his measures; and we find him vehemently complaining of the total abandonment of them. Lord Clive, in concluding his celebrated speech, in the House of Commons, in 1772, stated—"After the Court of Directors had, in the highest terms, approved of the conduct of that Committee who restored tranquillity to Bengal; who had restored a Government of anarchy and confusion to good order; who had made a peace with Suja Dowla, by which they obtained upwards of six hundred thousand pounds for the Company; who had quelled both a civil and a military mutiny; who had re-established discipline and subordination in the army; who had obtained the Dewanny of Bengal, Bahar, and Orissa, and which produced to the Company a net income of one million three hundred thousand pounds; who had paid off the greatest part of a bond debt in Bengal, amounting to near nine hundred thousand pounds; who had left the treasury in such a flowing state, that they drew few or no bills upon the Company at home; who laid the foundation of investments so large as were never before known or heard of; and who had, by these means, enabled the Company to assist Government with four hundred thousand pounds a-year, and to make an increase of dividend to the Stockholders of two hundred thousand pounds. One would imagine, that the Court of Directors would have supported a system of government which had been so very successful. But they acted upon very different principles; they dropped the prosecutions against those gentlemen in Bengal, whose conduct the Committee had censured, and fully represented. Thus they gave a stab to their own vitals. From that instant they destroyed their own power abroad, and

“ erased from the minds of their servants in India every whole-
“ some regulation which the Committee had established. The
“ servants abroad were in anxious suspense to learn whether
“ they were punishable or not for misconduct. The lenity or
“ weakness of the Court of Directors removed the doubts. From
“ that instant all covenants were forgotten, or only looked upon
“ as so many sheets of blank paper; and from that instant began
“ that relaxation of Government so much now complained of,
“ and so much still to be dreaded.

“ Their next step was to destroy the powers of that Com-
“ mittee, whose conduct they with reason so highly approved
“ of. They divided the powers; they gave half to the Council,
“ and left the other half with the Committee. The consequence
“ was, the Council and Committee became distracted by alter-
“ cations and disputes for power, and have ever since been at
“ variance, to the great detriment of the service. The Court of
“ Directors, as if this was not enough, restored to the service
“ almost every civil and military transgressor who had been dis-
“ missed; nay, they rewarded some of them, by allowing them a
“ continuation of their rank all the time they were in England.”

The above has been quoted without any reference to the late discussions; but stronger proof can hardly be given of the fallacy of the course of reasoning which Colonel Malcolm (contrary, we should have thought, to the dictates of his own clear understanding and experience), has been induced to pursue.

WE have in the preceding part of these Observations taken a view of Colonel Malcolm's opinions regarding the general events of the late Mutiny at Madras; and we shall now proceed to state some observations on what is termed the *Narrative* of that Officer, being the part particularly referrible to Colonel Malcolm's own conduct. If Colonel Malcolm had confined himself to an exposition of his motives of action, we should have gladly spared ourselves the task of farther comment; we should have allowed the statement of that Officer to speak its own language; and though we might have differed widely as to the course of proceeding pursued, or recommended to be pursued, by Colonel Malcolm, we should have looked with respect to the principles of public zeal, by which we have no doubt that Officer, however mistaken his principles may have been, was actuated. The opinions of Colonel Malcolm have,

however, in the second, as in the first part, of his publication, taken a much more comprehensive range, than the narrow view of personal justification: and the shafts have been scattered, if not with discrimination, at least, with profusion. In that part to which our attention has been already directed, Colonel Malcolm appears, from the credit he has given to the vague statements of anonymous Writers, to have greatly overlooked the excellent rule adopted by Sir William Jones, “ of requiring evidence for all assertions.” In the part which we shall now consider as shortly as possible, there is more reference to testimony; but, contrary to the usual course of reasoning, the testimony, in a great measure, contradicts the inferences drawn from it, as we think any one who attentively peruses Colonel Malcolm’s Narrative will have no difficulty in discovering.

Pamphlet,
page 63.

The scene of the Narrative opens at Bombay; from whence Colonel Malcolm appears, in April, 1809, to have addressed letters to different distinguished personages, giving his sentiments on the state of affairs at that period at Madras. Colonel Malcolm appears, by his own account, to have founded his opinions on “ exaggerated reports,” and “ to have been very imperfectly informed of “ what had occurred:” but he, notwithstanding, pronounces with a degree of confidence, which nothing but the most accurate information could well justify, his sentiments, as to the weighty matters which were then at the distance of about a

thousand miles, occupying the deliberate attention of the Government of Fort St. George. Without any particular reference to the inflammatory conduct of General Macdowall, or to the other numerous collateral circumstances, to which we have already had occasion to advert, it is roundly stated in a letter addressed to Lord Wellesley, in England, that, "All the reforms which Sir G. Barlow Pamphlet
page 61.
" thought it his duty to make, might have been made without giving rise to any serious discontent, if he had proceeded with that caution, and that attention, to the temper of men, which the " situation in which he found the army required." Colonel Malcolm proceeds to say,—“ All these “ were subjects worthy of consideration; and relaxation from a severe system, till an insubordinate spirit was somewhat subdued, and the “ ruling authority fortified, would have not merely “ been warranted, but have been wise. At all “ events, the means of suppressing a disposition “ to violence should have been correctly calculated, before it was provoked to action. This, “ I fear, has not been the case; and it is most difficult to discover any means by which such a general spirit of discontent, as that which now exists, can be repressed.” Colonel Malcolm adds, “ It will probably, if met with a firm and dignified “ spirit of conciliation, correct itself.”

From the circumstances confessedly attending these communications, they cannot claim much weight; and we notice them only as exhibiting

the outline of that system to which Colonel Malcolm, in the midst of proofs innumerable of its utter danger and impracticability, continued with great perseverance to adhere; we notice them as the cradle which rocked those infant opinions that afterwards grew to greater stature. We shall only here observe, that although “a disposition to violence” was assuredly not “provoked to action” by the *Government*, we at least hope, that any “fear,” which Colonel Malcolm may have had, as to the Government being taken by surprise, will have been proved, by the sequel, to have been quite unnecessary.*

* The letters quoted in the first part of Col. Malcolm's Narrative, seem to have been entirely private; and considerable allowance is to be made for the freedom of private communication. But in the shape in which they are now given to the public, they assume quite a different character; and from the tenor of those papers, the propriety of their publication in such a shape, seems more than questionable. Entering fully, as we may do, into the feelings of a person desirous of placing himself in the most favorable view, we doubt, more than doubt, the propriety of such a disclosure of confidential conferences and opinions as we find interspersed in various parts of Col. Malcolm's Narrative. Still more doubtful are we of such a course of proceeding, when it is calculated to hold up to popular and undeserved odium, meritorious Officers, who, were at a time of great public danger, exerting themselves to the best of their judgment and ability, in the service of the Government, then placed in the most critical circumstances—(*Pamphlet, page 31--32*). This is so unsuitable to that generosity of mind, which we believe Colonel Malcolm to possess, that we cannot doubt, that in a calmer moment, it will receive his own condemnation.

Colonel Malcolm arrived at Madras from Bombay about the middle of May, 1809, at which period the discontents were hastening fast to the crisis of the Mutiny which afterwards ensued. From his arrival at Madras, until the revolt which broke out at Masulipatam, in the end of June, Colonel Malcolm appears to have been chiefly engaged in devising plans of accommodation with the army, to all which plans it is apparent, from the account before us, that Sir G. Barlow gave the most patient and mature attention; and, if he differed, which he diametrically did, in regard to the measures strenuously urged by Col. Malcolm, it is obvious that he did so from no hasty impulse, but from the calm conviction of those measures being radically incompatible with the public interests or safety. Colonel Malcolm informs us that he “not once, but a hundred times, repeated to “Sir G. Barlow,” that they (the Army) had “a “more serious quarrel than that with Govern- “ment—they had quarrelled with themselves; “and, unless he could adopt some measure that “would restore them to their own good opinion, “every attempt to establish order and subordina- “tion would be vain, as they were goaded on to “further guilt by a torturing sense of that into “which they had already plunged.” In pursuing the schemes intended to settle this kind of metaphysical quarrel, and to “reconcile men to themselves,” we think that Colonel Malcolm very much overlooked those outrages, which the autho-

Pamphlet,
page 67.

rity of the Government had been long, and was then daily experiencing. The Address which Colonel Malcolm proposed, on this occasion, to be presented to the Government, will be read with different feelings, according as the Reader is more or is less impressed with the importance of every Government holding high its power, and with the danger of a Government descending to the expedient of courting an Address from an army standing on the verge of Mutiny, an Address, too, couched in terms far from respectful, and conveying in something more than the oblique language of insinuation, a pretty strong condemnation of the public measures. If such an Address had been voluntarily proposed by a considerable part of the principal Officers in the army, it might perhaps have been a question, whether, in the critical state of matters at that time, it should, or should not, have been received. But truly, we see no cause to concur in the blame which Colonel Malcolm is willing to attach to Sir G. Barlow, because he would not lend himself to the measure of *seeking* an Address, which it would hardly have been compatible with the character of the Government, under any circumstances, to receive. Supposing, too, every objection of this kind to be got over, the attempt was to be made without the least solid assurance of success, while, on the contrary, to judge from the failure of the conciliatory efforts which the Government had before made, and from the general phrenzy which Colonel Malcolm repeatedly

describes as then prevailing in the army, there appears to be the strongest reason to believe that it would have ended in complete disappointment, and would have been, to use Colonel Malcolm's words, "treated with scorn," a scorn, too, the more injurious, as it is impossible to say that it would not have been somewhat deserved. Colonel Malcolm, indeed, tells us,—Pamphlet,
page 20.—"I also took every Page 10.
"pains to satisfy his (Sir G. Barlow's) mind, that
"it should never be known, that he had been con-
"sulted on the subject." We need not, however, recur to very remote experience to know, that secrets of that kind are from some accident or other not easily kept; and we are not surprised that Sir G. Barlow should have felt hesitation in staking the reputation and safety of the Government on the chance of any such contingency, involving, as that contingency did, a long train of other almost insuperable obstacles, and eventually, in our judgment, a series of the most pernicious consequences.*

* For the immediate reference of the Reader, we have thought it proper to insert Colonel Malcolm's proposed Address, as follows:

"We, the undersigned Officers of the Madras establishment,
"trust, that the very extraordinary and unprecedented situation
"in which we are placed, by some recent occurrences, will
"plead our excuse for an Address, which has no object but
"that of vindicating ourselves, as a body, from those serious
"imputations to which we conceive it possible we may become
"liable, from the nature of late proceedings in the army to
"which we belong; and to assert our devoted allegiance to our

Respecting, as we do, the talents of Colonel Malcolm, we must view with surprize, the importunate eagerness with which the scheme, to which we have been referring, appears to have been pressed on Sir G. Barlow's attention. We are, indeed, at a loss to reconcile the kind of empiricism which is evinced in this and other parts of the

“ King, our unalterable attachment to our country, and our
 “ consequent respect and submission to the laws and acts of
 “ that local Government under which we are placed, and whose
 “ commands it is our duty, under all circumstances, to obey, as
 “ those of a legitimate branch of the Constitution of our
 “ country.

“ It would be painful to retrace all those events which have
 “ led to the present unhappy state of feeling in the army, and
 “ have compelled Government to those measures which it has
 “ judged proper to adopt: we shall therefore content ourselves
 “ with expressing our conviction, that, however far they might
 “ have been carried by the warmth of the moment, none of our
 “ brother Officers who were concerned in those proceedings
 “ which have been deemed so reprehensible by Government, ever
 “ harboured an idea in their minds that was irreconcilable to
 “ their allegiance, as subjects, or their duty, as soldiers. Go-
 “ vernment must be fully acquainted with the rise and progress
 “ of all the proceedings to which we allude, and can refer to its
 “ true cause any apparent excess, either in expression or act,
 “ that may have marked the conduct of any individuals: and it
 “ will, we are assured, separate actions, which have their motive
 “ in generous and honorable, though mistaken, feeling, from
 “ any deliberate design of showing a spirit of contumely and
 “ insubordination to that authority which it is their duty to
 “ obey, and whose orders they could never dispute, without a
 “ total sacrifice of their characters as good soldiers and loyal
 “ subjects: and we feel perfectly satisfied, there is not one Officer

Narrative before us, with that practical knowledge of public affairs which we believe Colonel Malcolm to possess. We will venture to say, that it is the part of every wise Government to adhere as closely as possible to established principles, and to prefer, in all practicable cases, the beaten path of experience to the airy regions of theory. Such is

“ in this army who would not sooner loose his life than forfeit
 “ his claim to such cherished distinctions.

“ We cannot have a doubt but it must have been with extrême
 “ reluctance that Government has adopted the measures it has
 “ done, against those of our brother Officers who have more
 “ particularly incurred its displeasure, from the forward share
 “ they took, or were supposed to take, in the proceedings which
 “ have met with its disapprobation ; and though we never can
 “ presume to question, in any shape, the acts of that Govern-
 “ ment which it is our duty to obey, it is impossible for us to
 “ contemplate the present situation of those Officers without
 “ sentiments of the deepest concern; and when we reflect on
 “ the general high reputation, and the well merited distinctions,
 “ which some of them have, by their valour and ability, ob-
 “ tained in the public service, we should be unjust to the charac-
 “ ters of our superiors, both in India and England, if we did
 “ not entertain a hope, that their case would meet with a favor-
 “ able and indulgent consideration. But we feel restrained
 “ from dwelling upon this subject, as we are aware its very men-
 “ tion might be deemed improper in an Address, the great and
 “ sole object of which is to correct misapprehension, and to
 “ convey a solemn assurance of our continued and unalterable
 “ adherence to the same principles of loyalty and attachment to
 “ our King and country, and of respect and obedience to the
 “ Government we serve, that have ever distinguished the army
 “ to which we belong.”

Pamphlet,
page 134.

Ditto, 133,
70. &c.

the foundation on which every great empire must rest, and such the rule by which every great statesman will be guided. But throughout the opinions expressed by Colonel Malcolm, we see, with regret, a species of crusade declared against the “bug-bear principle of consistency,” and every thing like “common rule,” and a “reference to general principles, or to precedent,” is treated with almost bigotted intolerance. These opinions, too, we find reiterated in defiance of the most complete demonstration, that it was only by firm adherence to consistency of principle, united with the due exercise of vigor and discretion, that the Government was enabled, in the midst of the most imposing dangers, to preserve its power unimpaired, and to restore the tranquillity which now happily prevails in the establishments, Military and Civil, under its control.

Accounts of the Mutiny at Masulipatam reached Madras about the end of June, 1809. This event Colonel Malcolm, without any qualification from preceding circumstances, or the notoriously insubordinate state in which the Garrison of Masulipatam had long been, at once ascribes to “an imprudent measure of Government.” The circumstances are, however, more distinctly, and more justly stated, in the dispatch of the Government of Madras. The Government observes,—“Lieut.-Col. Innes found it necessary, immediately on assuming the command of Masulipatam, to exert his authority in checking the intemperate pro-

Printed Papers—Letter from the Government of Madras, dated 10th

“ceedings of his Officers. The violent and dis-
 “respectful conduct of Lieutenants Forbes and
 “Maitland at the mess of the Regiment, on the
 “evening of Lieut.-Col. Innes’s arrival, obliged
 “him to recommend to the Officer commanding
 “the army in Chief, the measure of marking their
 “misconduct, by detaching the former to a re-
 “mote station, and suggesting the removal of the
 “latter from the situation of Quarter-master; the
 “Officers affected to consider this measure as an
 “act of unmerited rigor, derogatory to the cha-
 “racter of the regiment, and of the-service.

Sept. 1809,
 to the Sec.
 Committee

“About this time an urgent application was
 “received by us from the Naval Commander-in-
 “Chief, for the services of one hundred Euro-
 “peans, to act for a time as marines on board of
 “His Majesty’s ships. It had for some years
 “been customary to detach parties of troops
 “serve as marines on board of His Majesty’s
 “ships, when required by the exigencies of the
 “public service. Orders had, however, been re-
 “cently received from His Royal Highness the
 “Duke of York, prohibiting the employment of
 “His Majesty’s troops on that duty, excepting in
 “cases of the greatest emergency. His Majesty’s
 “regiment had for some years furnished the par-
 “ties required for this duty, and several of those
 “parties had been nearly two years detached
 “from their corps. The Madras European regi-
 “ment had been long unemployed, and the ser-
 “vices of the whole corps were not required at

“ Masulipatam; we determined, therefore, to
 “ comply at once with the urgent application of
 “ the Naval Commander-in-Chief, and the orders
 “ of His Royal Highness the Duke of York, by di-
 “ recting a detachment from the Madras Euro-
 “ pean regiment, of three Officers, and one hun-
 “ dred men, to embark on His Majesty’s ships.
 “ The ships of war intended to receive those men
 “ arrived at Masulipatam on the 24th June.

“ The Officers of the European regiment
 “ being prepared for Mutiny by the concurring
 “ causes already described, resolved to avail
 “ themselves of this opportunity to execute their
 “ purpose; and to obtain the co-operation of their
 “ men, they persuaded the men that the embark-
 “ ation of the detachment was only a preliminary
 “ step to breaking the regiment, and transferring
 “ the men to the navy. They assured the men
 “ that it was their intention to resist this unjust
 “ and oppressive act of the Government, and call-
 “ ed upon them in return to support their Officers.
 “ A deputation from the Officers of the garrison
 “ waited upon Colonel Innes; informed him of
 “ their determination to resist the orders for the
 “ embarkation of the detachment, recommended to
 “ him to wait the result of a reference to Madras
 “ on the subject, and proceeded, on being ap-
 “ prized of his determination to execute the or-
 “ ders of the Government, to place him in close
 “ arrest. Major Storey of the 19th Regiment of
 “ Native Infantry, the Officer next in seniority at

“ Masulipatam, assumed the command of the gar-
 “ rison, to obviate as he pretended, the dangerous
 “ consequences which would have resulted from
 “ an attempt to enforce the embarkation of the de-
 “ tachment. It has been ascertained, that the
 “ whole of this proceeding had been concerted and
 “ communicated to the rest of the army some time
 “ previous to the period of its execution.”

The idea of disbanding the European regiment at Masulipatam appears to have been, not in the remotest degree, in the contemplation of the Government of Madras. But supposing that such had been the intention, Lord Minto observes, “ It
 “ will sound strange in England, that a garrison
 “ should mutiny, and put their commanding Offi-
 “ cer in arrest, and take possession of the fortress
 “ with which they are charged, and that a whole
 “ army should revolt in its favour against the Go-
 “ vernment it serves, because it might be in con-
 “ templation to reduce a corps of a particular de-
 “ scription.”*

Lord Min-
 to's Letter,
 5th Feb.,
 1810.

* Colonel Malcolm appears to have recommended, in a private letter addressed to the Governor's Military Secretary, that the order for embarking a part of the European regiment on board His Majesty's ships, should not be dispatched. We deem it unnecessary to examine in any detail, the subject of that letter. But we shall generally observe, that the army had been during many months, advancing from one to another step in the course of sedition; and that matters had come to that crisis when the Government was called on, either to maintain vigorously and effectually, the powers belonging to it, or to surrender those pow- Pamphlet, page 78.

On the receipt of the intelligence from Masulipatam, it was decided, on Colonel Malcolm's own suggestion, to depute him to take the command of that garrison. The motives which led to this nomination, appear to have been highly judicious, and the "warmth of zeal" with which Colonel Malcolm offered to proceed on this duty, perfectly accords with the ardor of character which he has evinced on many public and important occasions. Appreciating as we do the worth of public zeal, guided by ability and integrity of mind, we should be glad here to close the subject with a tribute of praise, sincerely given, as we believe it truly deserved. But the proceeding of Colonel Malcolm at Masulipatam, forms too prominent a feature in the publication which we have

ers into the hands of those, who, by an unnatural state of things, had become its adversaries. Supposing that the Government could have reconciled itself to the humbled state of holding a mere nominal jurisdiction over the army, and should have timidly shrunk from the duty of issuing orders, lest those orders should have been disobeyed, there could not have been the least reason to hope, from the lawless violence then almost universally prevalent, that even this nominal appendage of authority would have been long permitted to remain. To use the words of the unfortunate Monarch, Charles the First,—“These twigs would not long flourish when the stock on which they grew was dead.”

The fear expressed in Colonel Malcolm's letter, that the garrison of Masulipatam might, in consequence of the stated order, be hurried by a sudden impulse, to further extremities, rested on no foundation, it having been ascertained that the plan of the meeting “had been concerted and communicated to the rest

been called to consider, not to require some observations regarding it.

One of the most authentic sources to which reference can be made for a distinct exposition of the views connected with Colonel Malcolm's appointment, is the official Report addressed by that Officer to Sir G. Barlow, after his return from Masulipatam, as the circumstances referrible to Sir G. Barlow himself, may be considered, from the nature of that communication, to have received, in some degree, the sanction of his concurrence. The following extract of that Report gives, accordingly, a distinct view of the feelings and intentions of Sir G. Barlow, at the period of Colonel Malcolm's departure. Sir G. Barlow reposed in

" of the army some time previous to its execution." In addition to the authority of the Government on this point, we have the authority of Colonel Malcolm himself; who, in a letter to Sir G. Barlow, written the day after his arrival at Masulipatam (5th July), expressly says; " The question of the marines, and " the removal of some of the Officers, had, I find, (for they " have shown me all their papers,) been anticipated by the other " Stations; and the opposition here was in part by instruction: " and subsequent letters sufficiently show, that this case is no " longer that one; nor of the garrison of Masulipatam, but of " the whole army, and that they are most deeply pledged to the " support of each other."

Pamphlet.
page 129.

In such a state of things, it seems impossible for a moment to doubt, that if one pretext of overt Revolt had been wanting, others would have been speedily found, unless the Government was disposed to anticipate the further extremity, by an implicit surrender.

Colonel Malcolm the greatest confidence that it was possible to place in any public Officer; to him he "committed the dignity and interests of Government," at a period of very critical emergency. The motives for doing so are here explained; and while they must appear in a high degree honourable to Sir G. Barlow, the circumstance of such a selection, at such a time, certainly placed Colonel Malcolm on a very conspicuous theatre of public action.

Pamphlet,
page 17

Colonel Malcolm states; "I was repeatedly assured by you, at the last interview with which I was honoured, that you committed the dignity and interests of Government (as far as those were implicated on this occasion,) into my hands with perfect confidence, and that you gave me the fullest latitude of action; adding, that I was fully acquainted with your sentiments upon the whole subject of the existing discontents among the Officers of the Company's army. I certainly was, from the confidence with which you honoured me, fully aware of your sentiments. I knew that you were most solicitous to allay the ferment that had arisen in the army, and that you were at that moment resolved to use every means in your power to effect that object, but such as you deemed derogatory to the honour and dignity of the Government with which you were charged. You regarded, I knew, the occurrence of a rupture between the state and any part of its army, as one of the most desperate

“ evils that could arise, and thought every moment that such an event was delayed was of ultimate importance, as it gave time for reflection, and the action of better feeling, and strengthened the hope that deluded men might yet return to that path of duty and good order from which they had so widely departed.”

Being vested with those discretionary powers, Colonel Malcolm left Madras on the 2nd, and reached Masulipatam on the 4th July.

We shall give a short view from Colonel Malcolm's Correspondence and Journal of the events which occurred during the period of his command at Masulipatam. Having landed at that place, it became matter of violent discussion among the Officers, whether Colonel Malcolm “ should be recognised, or not, as their Commanding Officer.” After this discussion had continued five hours, Colonel Malcolm was at length allowed to assume the command, on the ground of personal respect to his character. Colonel Malcolm dined in the evening with the mess of the European regiment, where inflammatory toasts were as usual given, to which, however, Colonel Malcolm did not accede without certain modifications, proposed on the spur of the occasion. The Officers of the garrison on that day, and afterwards, pressed strongly to obtain from Colonel Malcolm, the assurance of an amnesty for their offences, which he firmly refused. The communications which followed between Colonel Malcolm and the Officers, du-

Pamphlet,
page 121.
Ditto, 155.

ing the period of his command, became quite confidential on both sides, both parties under a mutual understanding, freely imparting all papers and proposed plans of proceeding. Colonel Malcolm took every opportunity, verbally, and in writing, of impressing on the Officers better sentiments, by appealing to their reason, and by bringing in their view the desperate circumstances in which they had placed themselves. On the 15th July, being the eleventh day after Colonel Malcolm had assumed the command of the garrison, an incidental occasion was taken to inform publicly, the men of the European regiment, "that it never was in the contemplation of Government to disband or disperse the corps." The Address delivered on this occasion to the regiment, was not viewed without suspicion by many of the Officers, who thought it "calculated to excite the men against their Officers." Two days after Colonel Malcolm was formally called on to give an explanation of the disposition "of the Government of Madras to redress their grievances,"—it being signified that if he did not, "the confidence of the garrison would be withdrawn from him; and they would consider themselves released from all promises they had made." Colonel Malcolm declining to make a "communication of the nature required," it became, next day (18th), a matter of violent debate, whether the garrison should not have "recourse to immediate violence." After "a warm discussion for

“several hours,” it was decided among the Officers “to wait six days, when, if they heard no-
 “thing favorable to their hopes, they meant to
 “take such steps as they thought calculated to
 “forward the objects they had in view.” Colonel
 Malcolm rejected these resolutions as “nothing
 “less than an open defiance;” and in an interview
 with two of the senior Officers, pressed many ar-
 guments on the subject. Colonel Malcolm says;
 “I went immediately after this interview to dine
 “at the mess of the regiment, and (strange in-
 “consistency!) received every mark of respect
 “and kindness from men who had been debating
 “all the morning whether they should enter into a
 “contest with me for the authority of the garri-
 son!” On the 19th it was again decided, on the
 ground of personal respect towards Colonel Mal-
 colm, that the Officers would, for a time, abstain
 from any further act of violence, “unless a rise in
 “other stations was to take place.” On the fol-
 lowing day General Pater took the command of
 the garrison. About this time a Resolution was
 passed by the Officers, “that the Garrison Com-
 “mittee, which were mobbish meetings of the
 “whole of the Officers, should be abolished, and
 “the proceedings to be entirely carried on by the
 “eleven senior Officers, by whose judgment all
 “questions were in future to be decided.”

Having given the above, we hope, impartial out-
 line, of the state of affairs at Masulipatam, while
 Colonel Malcolm held the command, the reader

will naturally look with interest to the opinion expressed by the Government of Madras on that subject: this opinion is accordingly given in the following extract of a dispatch, addressed by the Government to the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors.

Printed Papers—Letter from the Government of Madras to the Secret Committee of 10th of Sept. 1809.

It is stated in that dispatch: "On receiving the intelligence of the Mutiny, we appointed Lieutenant-Colonel Malcolm, in whose zeal and talents we were entertained the fullest confidence, to the command of the Madras European regiment and the garrison of Masulipatam, for the purposes of re-establishing the authority of the Government over the troops, enquiring into the causes of the Mutiny, and placing the most guilty of the offenders under arrest. Lieutenant-Colonel Malcolm was not furnished with any written instructions; it was left to his discretion to adopt such measures as circumstances might render advisable, with the view to the accomplishment of the objects of his deputation."

"Lieutenant-Colonel Malcolm immediately proceeded by sea to Masulipatam: on his arrival he found that the Officers of the garrison had formed themselves into a Committee, in which every Officer had a voice. The greatest anarchy and confusion prevailed, and it was with difficulty that he prevailed on the Officers to acknowledge his authority."

"As it was never in the contemplation of the Government to disband the European regiment,

" it was expected that Lieutenant-Colonel Mal-
 " colm would have taken the earliest opportunity
 " to communicate to the men a distinct and pub-
 " lic disavowal of that intention on the part of the
 " Government, and have employed the most stre-
 " nuous exertions to recall the men to a sense of
 " their duty, by impressing upon their minds the
 " degree of guilt and danger in which their Offi-
 " cers, for purposes entirely personal to themselves,
 " had endeavoured to involve them. It was also
 " expected, that Lieutenant-Colonel Malcolm, by
 " establishing his influence and authority over the
 " troops composing the garrison, would have se-
 " cured their obedience, and by that means have
 " deprived the Officers of the power of prosecut-
 " ing their designs, and brought the leaders to
 " trial for their mutinous conduct.

" Lieutenant-Colonel Malcolm appears, how-
 " ever, to have adopted a course of proceeding
 " entirely different from that which we had in view
 " in deputing him to Masulipatam. He abstained
 " from making any direct communication to the
 " men; and when we authorised him, with the
 " view of detaching the troops from the cause of
 " their Officers, to proclaim a pardon to the Euro-
 " pean and Native Soldiers for the part which they
 " might have taken in the Mutiny, he judged it
 " to be proper to withhold the promulgation of
 " the pardon, from an apprehension (as stated in
 " his letter to our President, dated the 18th of

July,) of irritating the minds of the European Officers and driving them to despair.

To this apparently unreasonable forbearance and attention to the feelings of Officers, who had, by their acts of violence and aggression, forfeited all claims to such consideration, may we conceive, be ascribed Lieutenant-Colonel Malcolm's failure in the establishment of any efficient control over the garrison; and he appears to have been principally occupied, during the period of his residence at Masulipatam, in negotiations with the disorderly Committees, calculated, in our opinion, to compromise, rather than establish, his authority, and in fruitless attempts to induce them, by argument, to return to their duty, and abandon the criminal combination in which they had engaged. Lieutenant-Colonel Malcolm's reasons for pursuing this line of conduct, and for recommending to us the adoption of conciliatory and temporizing measures, are detailed in his Letters to our President, of the 4th, 5th, and 6th of July. In those letters, he states, that the Officers of Masulipatam had received assurances, from most of the military stations of the army, applauding their conduct, and promising them their effectual support; that the whole army were united in a resolution to oppose the authority of Government; that the combination was general; that there was not a single corps, from Gajjam

“ to Cape Comorin, which was not prepared to
 “ break out into open rebellion. The measures
 “ recommended by Lieutenant-Colonel Malcolm,
 “ as constituting, in his opinion, the only means of
 “ averting the most dreadful calamities, consisted
 “ of a modified repeal of the orders of the first of
 “ May; the restoration to the service, and to their
 “ appointments, of all the Officers whom we had
 “ found it necessary to suspend or remove, with
 “ an intimation to the army, that their claims to
 “ Bengal allowances would be brought to the no-
 “ tice of the Honorable Court of Directors.
 “ Lieutenant-Colonel Malcolm returned to Madras
 “ on the arrival of Major-General Pater at Masu-
 “ lipatam, to assume the command of the northern
 “ division of the army, having succeeded no fur-
 “ ther in accomplishing the object of his mission,
 “ than in preventing the Officers from adopting
 “ any flagrant acts of outrage to authority, during
 “ his residence at Masulipatam.”

The Government, in expressing the above opi-
 nion, laid before the Secret Committee all the ma-
 terial correspondence and papers on which it was
 founded;* and the opinion has, we believe, ob-

* Colonel Malcolm alludes, in his Preface to the circum-
 stance of the Government having recorded several of his pri-
 vate letters; but adds, (a very sufficient explanation,) “ I do not
 “ however conceive that I have any right to complain of this
 “ act: the letters contain not one sentiment of which I am
 “ ashamed; they were all on public subjects; and that alone

tained the perfect acquiescence of the official authorities, under whose observation the subject has been brought. The grounds on which it rests seem quite improveable, and on all material points, the information contained in Colonel Malcolm's Journal and Letters, is in perfect accordance with the view of the question taken in the Dispatch of the Government; an accordance not shaken by any reasoning contained in the Pamphlet. It was perfectly understood, that the idea of disbanding the European regiment had been used by the Officers, as an instrument to excite the men to mutiny. The Government naturally "expected that Colonel Malcolm would have taken the *earliest opportunity* to communicate to the men a distinct and public disavowal of that intention." That this was not done, Colonel Malcolm has himself shown; for he has stated, that no explanation of the kind took place till the eleventh day of his being at Masulipatam, at which time (combined with the course of proceeding which Colonel Malcolm had then decided to pursue), the explanation could not certainly be of much avail. Colonel Malcolm says, in a letter to the Military

"when they were addressed to Sir G. Barlow, or his Secretary, rendered them public."

If the Government had expressed the opinion which it did, without a full explanation of the grounds on which it was founded, Colonel Malcolm would have had reason to complain, but not otherwise, as he has himself sufficiently explained.

Secretary, of the 18th of July: "You will satisfy Pamphlet, page 8"
 "Sir G. Barlow, that one of the first things that
 "I did, after I came on shore, was to satisfy the
 "minds of the Officers, and ~~through them~~, of the
 "men, of the intentions of Government, in or-
 "dering a party of marines from the corps;" that
 is to say, Colonel Malcolm trusted to the Officers
 for the removal of the main prop of their own
 desperate cause, and looked to them, as the organ
 for clearing away a deception, which they had
 themselves deliberately created, in pursuit of pur-
 poses to which they were daily giving to Colonel
 Malcolm, the most decided proofs of their de-
 termined adherence.*

Colonel Malcolm refers to an approval of his

* Colonel Malcolm, in his letter to the Military Secretary of
 the 18th July, refers to an extract of the Address which he de-
 livered on the 14th of that month, to the European regiment at
 Masulipatam, which extract appears not to have been recorded
 with the letter. It relates to the intended embarkation of a de-
 tachment of the regiment as marines. Colonel Malcolm says:
 "I may ask, with great surprize, and some indignation, why the
 "extract alluded to in this letter, was not transmitted to the Ho-
 "norable Court of Directors?" We however think, that there is
 not much room for either surprize or indignation. Under the
 desire which we have felt to state nothing in these sheets that
 might not be founded on accurate enquiry, we have ascertained,
 from a quarter ~~which~~ had abundant opportunity to be informed of
 the transactions of that period, that the omission of the extract
 was wholly accidental, and contrary to the intention of Sir G.
 Barlow, who gave special directions that every paper should be

measures by Sir G. Barlow. The only approval which we have been able to trace, is contained in the Military Secretary's letter to Colonel Malcolm of the 12th July, being an answer to a letter written by that Officer, on the very day of his arrival at Madulipatam. As the Military Secretary's letter is material, and as it has not been included among the letters published by Colonel Malcolm, we think it proper to be inserted here. The letter is as follows :

" Fort St. George, 12th July, 1809.

" DEAR MALCOLM,

Printed Paper—1 n-
closure No 8, of the
Dispatch of the
Govern-
ment of
Madras of
10th Sept.
1809.

" Sir George Barlow has received your letter of the 4th instant, and he desires me to express his entire approbation of all your proceedings, as reported in that letter.

" The obedience to your authority, manifested by the Officers and men of the garrison, has afforded to the Governor the greatest satisfaction.

" As it is possible that considerable delay may arise in the arrival of the other Members of the Committee, appointed to inquire into the circumstances which led to the late occurrences at

laid before the Secret Committee. It was apparently overlooked among the great mass of voluminous papers then sent to England. A reference, however, to the facts stated above, must convince that the extract was scarcely of the least importance.

“Masulipatam, the Governor authorizes you, if
 “the measure should appear to you to be advisea-
 “ble, to proceed in that enquiry by yourself, re-
 “porting the result for the information and or-
 “ders of Government.

“In the mean time Sir George Barlow leaves it
 “to your discretion to grant a pardon to the Non-
 “commissioned Officers and Privates of the Ma-
 “dras European regiment, and to the Native
 “Commissioned and Non-Commissioned Officers
 “and Privates of the Native Corps, for any part
 “which they may have taken in the late irregu-
 “larities.

“The Governor presumes, that you have ex-
 “plained the circumstances which led to the or-
 “ders for the purpose of performing marine duty
 “on board of His Majesty’s ships; and that you
 “have distinctly stated, that there never existed
 “any idea or intention on the part of Government,
 “to disperse or break the Madras European regi-
 “ment, and place the Officers on half-pay, or in-
 “flict any punishment, impose any mark of dis-
 “grace or disapprobation whatever, on that corps.

“Sir George Barlow has also received your
 “letters of the 5th and 6th instant, and will re-
 “ply to them without delay.

“I remain, &c.

(Signed)

“R. BARCLAY,
 “Military Secretary.”

“To Colonel Malcolm.”

It will be perceived by the preceding letter, that Sir G. Barlow was, from the earliest period, under the impression that Colonel Malcolm would, as matter of course, have made it one of his earliest objects to free the men of the European regiment from the delusion which had been the cause of their mutinying. As a further means of restoring the authority of the Government in the garrison of Masulipatam, Colonel Malcolm was empowered to grant a pardon to the non-commissioned Officers and privates. But the knowledge of this, Colonel Malcolm withheld from the men, "from an apprehension of irritating the minds of the European Officers, and driving them to despair." This apprehension, and feeling of delicacy, was entertained and expressed by Colonel Malcolm, in a letter addressed to the Military Secretary, on the 18th July, on which very day the Officers were again, in fact, in open mutiny against Colonel Malcolm's authority, it being matter of declared debate for several hours, whether they should not come "to extremes that day." We should have thought, that a letter, written by Colonel Malcolm, under such circumstances, would have breathed sentiments of a very different strain, from those we find in the letter to which we refer. The explanation given by Colonel Malcolm on these points, is, in our judgment, as remote as possible from a satisfactory conclusion. That the Government entertained a laudable anxiety to avert the necessity of resorting to extre-

mities, is apparent; but it was obviously not the intention of the Government, that this should be attained by the virtual surrender of all military control. It was part of the instructions communicated to Colonel Malcolm, that he should exert his influence and ability in "satisfying the Officers that it was not less for their interests, than it was consistent with their duty, to await the decision of the authorities in England;" but it was at the same time part of those instructions, to keep "the Garrison of Masulipatam firm to their duty."*

Printed Papers — Enclosure
No. 8, of Dispatch from the Government of Madras, 10th Sept. 1809.

Colonel Malcolm lays some stress on the circumstance of his having dissuaded the Garrison of Masulipatam from executing their "design of marching to join the Hyderabad force, and prevented, from the 4th till the 22nd of July, their committing any outrage;" and complains, we think wholly without reason, that the Government had omitted to mention this fact. We beg to point out the concluding passage of the dispatch of the Government already quoted, it being there expressly mentioned that Colonel Malcolm had returned to Madras, having only succeeded "*in preventing the Officers from adopting any flagrant acts of outrage to authority, during his residence at Masulipatam.*" Colonel Malcolm no doubt accomplished a desirable object, in obstructing for a time the movement of troops from Masulipatam. At the same time, it is perfectly plain, that, if the Officers had rashly engaged in the proposed measure, and had marched to join the Hyderabad force, this combined movement could not have been effected without a march of several hundred miles, and long before it could have been completed, the Government would have had the most abundant means of meeting and repelling every hostile attempt.

Pamphlet, page 103.

In regard to another point, to which Colonel Malcolm seems

We have the fullest belief, that through all the difficult circumstances in which Colonel Malcolm was placed at Masulipatam, he acted with the purest intentions, and with strenuous exertion; and though the course on which he entered was radically wrong, he pursued it with address and ability. We cannot but feel some degree of pain in seeing that hilarity of mind, which, in a "happy hour of social pleasure," was calculated to gain all hearts, so misplaced, as it was in those scenes which we have been viewing. Throughout those scenes, Colonel Malcolm was the "safe companion, and the pleasant friend." But as to military command, it was the "*nominis umbra*," the shadow of a name, and nothing more. The garrison of Masulipatam was left by Colonel Malcolm in very near the same state as that in which he found it, with the exception, that the garrison, instead of being ruled by "mobbish meetings of the whole Officers," which Colonel Malcolm describes, was ruled by a more

to attach some importance, namely, the circumstance of the Government having assembled a force near Madras, in consequence of the intelligence which he had communicated from Masulipatam, we shall only observe, that there was, unhappily, too much intelligence of the same kind daily coming from other quarters, to make it likely that the arrangements made by the Government were hastened more than two or three days, in consequence of any information that Colonel Malcolm may have furnished.

limited council: Keeping, in some degree, pace with the Revolution in a neighbouring country—the Convention had passed away, and was succeeded by a Council of Elders, a Council, however, which continued under the absolute domination of its constituents. During Colonel Malcolm's residence at Masulipatam, he held the nominal command by the most slender of all tenures, personal favor; by a thread, ready every instant to be broken by the slightest breath. Though he had exhausted every effort of conciliation, Colonel Malcolm "could not put his foot over the threshold," without having his power disputed. So complete a proof of the nullity of the system which Colonel Malcolm earnestly recommended; of the utter danger, in times of great disorder, of trusting to a mere appeal to "mens' minds," cannot, perhaps, be more strikingly exhibited any where, than in the case before us. We again say, that we give Colonel Malcolm entire credit for his honorable intentions; but the times were times of great difficulty; and in the midst of the darkness of the night, of clouds and storms, that Officer evidently mistook his way; and, instead of maintaining triumphant the broad surface of the ocean, he got entangled among rocks and shoals, where every wind was adverse, and where even the gently fanning zephyrs of popular favor, the "*aura famæ popularis*," rather increased, than diminished the danger.

A strong contrast was afforded of the efficacy

of a contrary system to that pursued by Colonel Malcolm, at all those Stations where a direct appeal was made to the troops, in opposition to the rebellious views of the Officers. We may, however, particularly select for comparison, a very memorable example, that of Colonel Close, at Hyderabad, as all parties have concurred in admiring the conduct of that Officer, and as Lord Minto has pointed it out as one of the great means by which the first link in the chain of rebellious confederacy was broken. The letter from Sir George Barlow to Colonel Close, requesting that Officer to proceed from Poonah to Hyderabad, is dated the 14th July, not many days after Colonel Malcolm's arrival at Masulipatam; both Officers were placed in circumstances of a very similar nature; and from the confidence reposed in their talents and experience, they had both discretionary powers to act according to the emergency of the case. We cannot give an account of the distinguished efforts of Colonel Close in better language than has been done in a periodical publication of deserved celebrity, from which we accordingly extract the following description :

Quarterly
Review,
No. IX.

"The mutineer Officers had heard of the appointment of Colonel Close; had divined the purposes of it; and dreading his known influence over the minds of the Sepoys, had originally determined to prohibit his approach within the distance of a stage from Hyderabad. This prohibition, had they persevered in it, they would

have found it necessary to carry into effect by force; for Colonel Close had so fully entered into the mind of Government, respecting his mission, that he was resolved on obtaining, at whatever risk, an interview with the troops. Lieut. Col. Montresor, however, prevailed on the Officers to abandon their purpose, but it was still doubtful whether they would permit Colonel Close to enter the Cantonment. Whatever might at that time be their intentions on this point, it is well understood that they employed every art and the greatest pains, to pre-occupy the minds of the native soldiery. Among other tales of a similar kind, they assured them that it was the determination of Government to disband half the battalions, to reduce the pay of both Officers and men; and, in event of their resisting these arrangements, to march against them the King's troops, and deliver them to military execution. Colonel Close was represented as the instrument chosen for the perpetration of these monstrous acts, and of course, as an object of peculiar jealousy.

“ Having travelled from Poonah with extraordinary celerity, Colonel Close arrived at the Residency in Hyderabad on the 2d of August. Here he was received by Lieut. Col. Montresor and the Officers of the Staff, and the former resigned to him the command of the subsidiary force. Nor could this supercession at all wound the feelings of that excellent Officer, consider-

ing the superior standing of Colonel Close, and his distinguished aptitude, derived from long acquaintance with the native troops, for the office entrusted to him. At the Residency, the senior Major of the subsidiary force, waited on him, announcing himself as the forerunner of a deputation of his brother Officers, who were on the road. Colonel Close observed, that he had been appointed to the command of the subsidiary force, and that a proper place for a conference with his Officers was the Cantonment, whither he was about to proceed. Being urged to declare the intentions of Government, he replied, he would declare them at the Cantonment; and that the communication would be such as, he hoped, might prove satisfactory. He then mounted his horse and rode to the Cantonments, accompanied by Colonel Montresor, the General Staff, and some other Officers, and escorted by a troop of native cavalry from the Residency.

It is to be observed, that by this time, Colonel Close had received further instructions from Government than those with which he set out from Poonah. He was also enjoined to enforce the test of allegiance on the Company's Officers, a measure which had been devised subsequently to his appointment: by this order, his anxiety to show himself in the Cantonment had been increased. At first it had occurred to him that he would do well to place himself,

“ on his entrance, at the head of the single King’s
 “ regiment, contained in the entourage, with a
 “ view, not of using violence, but of commanding
 “ respect. Such a step, however, would have
 “ excited the jealousy of the disaffected party;
 “ and, besides, was the less practicable, since the
 “ regiment in question happened to be quartered
 “ at a considerable distance from the entrance into
 “ the Cantonments. The plan was therefore aban-
 “ doned.

“ It had been expected, that the attempt of
 “ Colonel Close to enter the Cantonment, would
 “ have been resisted by the main piquet, but the
 “ piquet saluted him respectfully, and permitted
 “ him to pass. Then, halting in front of the
 “ lines of a native battalion, he summoned the
 “ Chief Officers of Corps; he was joined, how-
 “ ever, only by two Majors; but of these one
 “ was the Senior Company’s Officer, with the
 “ force.

“ These Officers he addressed strongly, but in
 “ a temperate manner, describing to them the cri-
 “ minality of their conduct, and the desperate
 “ situation to which they reduced themselves.
 “ Under present circumstances, it was necessary
 “ (he said); for the Government to ascertain ac-
 “ curately the sentiments of its armies, and to
 “ distinguish the obstinately guilty from those
 “ who retained, or who were disposed to resume,
 “ their loyalty. He then tendered to them the
 “ Test; stating, at the same time, that, from a

"consideration towards the feelings of such Officers as might have entangled themselves in culpable engagements with their brethren, Government allowed them the alternative of a temporary retirement from the exercise of their military functions, still drawing their allowances."

"The Officers were much affected by this Address, but replied, that a compliance with the wish of the Government, in either alternative, was impossible; that the army had pledged itself to the prosecution of certain objects, and could not desist from the pursuit. They then desired time to deliberate and to consult with their brother Officers; but Colonel Close, who knew what would be the certain result of delay, refused to grant it.

"A long and anxious conversation now took place, in which Colonel Close pressed every appeal to the reason and the feelings of the two Officers. He particularly addressed the Senior Major, reminded him of the long period of his service, his rank, and his particular situation in the force, and implored him to embrace this last occasion of returning with honor to the bosom of his country. The Officers seemed deeply agitated, but finally refused to abandon their purpose.

Colonel Close, on this communication, altered his tone, informed those Officers that their disobedience had left him at full liberty to follow his farther instructions. Then, turning to

" the troop of Native Cavalry which had formed
 " his escort, he accosted them in their own lan-
 " guage, explaining to them the situation of af-
 " fairs, the misconduct of their Officers, and their
 " paramount obligation to obey him, as their au-
 " thorised Commander. The Native Soldiers had
 " long been acquainted with the name and ser-
 " vices, if not the person, of Colonel Close. They
 " listened attentively and *salamed* to him with
 " great respect. The Mutineers perceived the
 " danger of this crisis, and while Colonel Close
 " was yet addressing the troopers, he observed the
 " Sepoys of the battalion rushing to arms and form-
 " ing with the greatest rapidity, under the direction
 " of European Officers. Not a moment was to be
 " lost. Beckoning to the troopers to follow him,
 " he rode into the divisions, and with his breast at
 " the points of their bayonets, expostulated with
 " the Sepoys. He called on the native Officers to
 " explain the cause of all this agitation and vio-
 " lence. He told them, that he was himself an old
 " Officer in the same service with them, that with
 " them he had served and fought, that he was
 " their leader and their friend, and that the Go-
 " vernment was their benefactor and their support.
 " He seized several of them with his hand, and
 " entreated them to obey their Commander. The
 " confusion and bustle, however, were now so
 " great, that much of what he said was lost on the
 " Sepoys. The Officers too, became more and

"more enraged and urgent; and the order was
 "given for the troops to *wheel into line*. This was
 "the critical point of the whole contest." An
 "Officer gave the word for his company to wheel
 "into line: Colonel Close opposed himself to the
 "order: the conflict was violent; the Officer call-
 "ing on his men to march, the Colonel with
 "equal peremptoriness commanded them to stand
 "fast. The Sepoys confounded and agitated,
 "paused for a while, but, at length, delusion and
 "disobedience, for the time, prevailed. The com-
 "pany wheeled; the other companies followed
 "the example; and all primed and loaded. The
 "escort of cavalry drew their swords, and trot-
 "ting off, took their place in the line. The
 "other battalions had also in the mean while
 "formed, and thus the whole force, together
 "with the park of artillery, was arrayed in arms
 "against their commander, and prepared for
 "action.

"Even this strange scene, disgraceful as it
 "might be to the principles of these misguided
 "men, left some little salvo to their fame, in the
 "credit which it did to their tactical discipline.
 "In the midst of so much agitation and confusion,
 "the troops formed with that perfect skill and pre-
 "cision, which have ever rendered the Madras
 "Soldiers the envy even of European warriors.
 "An Officer of the Staff of Colonel Close, on this
 "critical occasion, seems to have surveyed the

“spectacle, awful as it was, and has since de-
 “described it, with the involuntary sympathy of
 “a soldier. ‘The formation (he observes,) was
 “completed with the greatest order and regulari-
 “ty, and I never in my life saw a more beautiful
 “line.’”

“Colonel Close was not yet subdued, and made
 “a last struggle to recover the Sepoys to their al-
 “legiance. The Officers, at least the Juniors
 “among them, were incensed beyond bounds,
 “and demanded permission of the Commander
 “to fire on the Colonel and his Staff; but it was
 “refused. The artillery-men, however, fell out
 “in front of their guns and seemed marching
 “to seize his person. Colonel Close perceiving
 “that the contest was at an end, once more ad-
 “dressed the Senior Major. ‘As you (he said,)
 “are the Senior Officer present at the shameful
 “opposition which has been shown to my orders,
 “I shall consider you as particularly responsible
 “for what has occurred. My authority has been
 “openly and completely rejected: and I am your
 “prisoner.’ The senior Officers, however, had not
 “thrown off their long established feeling of re-
 “spect for his character. In the strongest terms
 “they disclaimed the intention of subjecting him
 “to personal violence, and expressed their deep
 “regret at the necessity which had driven them
 “to insult his authority. The Colonel then reur-
 “ed from the Cantonment; defeated indeed, but

"as hereafter will be seen, not utterly unsuccessful.
"ful.

"Surely the whole of this picture wants not
"clear traits of dignity and greatness; nor will
"the transaction misbecome the pages of that
"historic chapter which confers immortality on
"our Clives and our Cootes. The Officer whom
"we before quoted, accompanied his Account of
"it with the following interesting comment: 'I
"was within three yards of the Colonel during the
"whole time, and a more awful or a more anxious
"scene I never witnessed. Every mind, even
"those of the very persons who were resisting
"his authority, seemed filled with admiration, at
"the firm, manly, and soldier-like conduct of
"Colonel Close.'

"Immediately after the departure of Colonel
"Close, the Field-Officers waited on him at the
"quarters of Lieutenant-Colonel Montresor, with
"an Address, respecting the grievances of the
"army. Colonel Close declined receiving it; and,
"being requested by them to proceed to Madras,
"where, by his influence with the Government,
"he might promote their interests and wishes, he
"replied, that his orders did not give him the op-
"tion of proceeding to Madras, and that he had
"no intention of undertaking the office they pro-
"posed to assign to him. On the following day he
"received from the Officers a letter, requiring that
"he would immediately leave the vicinity of Hy-

“drabad, on pain of their resorting to ‘more un-
 “pleasant, decisive measures.’ The truth is, that
 “a reflection on the events of his visit to the
 “Cantonment, acting on their conviction of the
 “general estimation in which he was held by the
 “Native Soldiers, had satisfied them that not
 “only his presence, but even his neighbourhood,
 “was dangerous to their usurped authority. This
 “requisition, Colonel Close had expected, and
 “had determined to remain in defiance of it; but
 “receiving in the interim an intimation from ‘Go-
 “vernment, that in the event of the ill success of
 “his mission, it was their purpose to place him at
 “the head of the force destined against those in-
 “surgents, whom he had failed to conciliate or to
 “divide, he thought proper to comply.”

We shall not offer any of the many reflections
 which the preceding account is calculated to sug-
 gest. We shall only observe, that the efforts of
 Colonel Close, by clearing away the delusion
 which had been imposed on the minds of the troops
 at Hyderabad, as elsewhere, shook the pillar on
 which the mutinous confederacy, that so violently
 opposed his authority, had rested, and the confe-
 deracy, in a few days after, fell to the ground.

It has been seen, that the Government, in the Page 84
 dispatch to the Secret Committee, already quoted,
 referred to the conciliatory propositions, of which
 Colonel Malcolm recommended the adoption, with
 considerable earnestness. Our own time and pa-
 tience, with that, no doubt, of our readers, being

nearly exhausted, we shall willingly abstain from any lengthened comment on this part of the question, and hasten to the conclusion of observations which have extended greatly further than the expected limits. We before noticed the premature opinions which Colonel Malcolm was led to express, in his private correspondence, on this subject, while at Bombay; then, as he has mentioned, in an uninformed state. It is impossible to peruse the Pamphlet published by Colonel Malcolm, without perceiving the ogling glances, on all occasions, directed to the same object. But at the momentous period referred to by the Government, the plan of conciliation was urged in a more formal manner; and we cannot but see, with concern, that the proposition came from the very centre and focus of rebellion. Being desirous of doing perfect justice to the arguments used by Colonel Malcolm, we shall, at the hazard of some prolixity, insert the whole of the letter which he addressed, on the occasion, to Sir G. Barlow, the day after his arrival at Masulipatam.

✧ "TO SIR GEORGE BARLOW.

" *Masulipatam, 5th July, 1809.*

" DEAR SIR,

" I wrote you a hurried letter last night. I have since come to the knowledge of many additional facts, and have had some time to reflect on what I have seen and heard; and I should be as wanting in my duty to you as to my country, if I

" was withheld by any motive whatever, in stating
 " my sentiments in the most undisguised manner
 " on the present state of affairs : and whether you
 " coincide in my opinion or not, you can have no
 " doubt, regarding those motives that lead me to
 " express, in that sacred confidence, which your
 " knowledge of my character authorises me to use,
 " the conviction of my judgment on the steps ne-
 " cessary to be taken upon the present unfortunate
 " crisis.

" I have now seen the concerted plans of almost
 " the whole of the army against the authority of
 " Government ; and can say, with almost an as-
 " surance that I am correct, that there is not one
 " Company's corps, from Cape Comorin to Gar-
 " jam, that is not implicated in the general guilt,
 " and that is not pledged to rise against Govern-
 " ment, unless what they deem their grievances
 " are redressed. Be assured that no Commanding
 " Officer, whatever they may write, has any real
 " authority over their corps :* and though in some
 " places (where there are King's regiments), they
 " are more guarded, their resolution is the same ;
 " and they mean to act, the moment the example
 " is shown, by those parts of the army whom they
 " consider as most likely to be successful in their
 " first efforts. The Hydrabad and Jaulnah force,
 " are chiefly looked to, and the northern division
 " of the army ; and the European regiment has,

* Note by Colonel Malcolm.—This chiefly alludes to the Offi-
 cers of the corps.

" from what they style its regimental grievances,
 " become the corps from which they expect the first
 " act of opposition. Its late proceedings are ap-
 " plauded and confirmed by the force at Hyderabad;
 " and I know it was intended, if there had been
 " the slightest indication of any coercive measures,
 " or even had the Commander-in-Chief arrived, to
 " have marched this corps, and the two Sepoy bat-
 " talions, in the division, to effect a junction with
 " the Hyderabad force, in order to organize an army
 " to commence hostilities with Government.
 " Their march was to have taken place as to-day;
 " and it was, for five hours after my arrival, a
 " subject of warm discussion, whether I should be
 " recognised or not as their Commanding-Officer?
 " And, after stating every thing a man could state,
 " to reclaim them to better feeling, I was obliged
 " to give them the choice of the extreme, of either
 " immediately submitting to the order of Govern-
 " ment, or of opposing it. They chose at last the
 " former; but placed it on the grounds of that
 " general respect which was paid by them, and all
 " their brother Officers, to my character. I did
 " not think it necessary to fight, regarding the
 " grounds of their obedience on this point, being
 " satisfied with the substance, and particularly as
 " I had received this proof after they were in-
 " formed of my sentiments and intentions. Though
 " an immediate open rebellion against Govern-
 " ment has been prevented by my arrival at Ma-
 " sulipatam, the danger is not past; and we must

"not deceive ourselves, or any longer evade this
 "serious question. The Officers of the Company's
 "army on the coast are, no doubt, at this moment
 "in a state of actual insurrection against the Go-
 "vernment; and this combination against autho-
 "rity is every moment maturing and spreading
 "wider. I have seen the letter* from the Bombay
 "army to that of the coast, and it is unqualified
 "in its condemnation of the orders of the 1st of
 "May, and its promise of support; several pri-
 "vate letters have been received from Bengal.
 "An Address from that army, to the same effect
 "as that of Bombay, is expected: at all events,
 "they appear certain, that no human power will
 "lead the Bengal troops to act against them.
 "They calculate upon opposition from the King's
 "army, and their plans are concerted to meet it.
 "These deluded men are aware of the ruin they
 "are bringing upon themselves, but their infatua-
 "tion is so great, that they are reconciled to their
 "ruin, in the expectation that it will equally in-
 "volve that Government against which their rage
 "has been so industriously and so successfully
 "excited. All attempts to reason with men in the
 "state of mind they are in, appears vain. Even
 "the calculation of the able letter from Bengal is,
 "as I apprehended, likely to inflame, instead of
 "appeasing their passions. It is so true, that

* Note by Colonel Malcolm — This was afterwards discovered
 to be a forgery.

" when men's minds have gone completely wrong,
 " that which ought to put them right, has, in ge-
 " neral, a direct contrary effect ; and the fact is,
 " that all those correct principles and loyal feel-
 " ings, which are so eloquently expressed, in
 " the letter from the Supreme Government, but
 " serve to impress them more forcibly with a
 " sense of that guilt into which they have so pre-
 " cipitately rushed, and to render them more des-
 " perate in their proceedings, as they can (after
 " what has passed, and particularly late events at
 " this place,) only see individual safety in all being
 " equally involved in the deepest guilt. I in-
 " treat you to be persuaded, that these sentiments
 " are quite general ; or, at least, that the few who
 " do not entertain them, have neither the means
 " nor the courage to oppose their progress ; and
 " allow themselves, with an indefensible passiveness,
 " to be borne along with the tide. Under such
 " a state of circumstances, all hopes of this spirit
 " of insurrection subsiding must be at an end.
 " Some steps must instantly be taken ; and no
 " good can result from the application of any par-
 " tial remedy. The disease is general, and the
 " remedy must be so also. It remains with you to
 " decide on the measures that are to be adopted :
 " The first and most military, though not, per-
 " haps, the most political, that suggests itself, is
 " the employment of actual force. In such a con-
 " tact, however, not only the means must be cal-
 " culated, but the result ; and, as far as I can

" judge, success, even in this extreme, would not
 " save us from the most baneful consequences. It
 " seems, therefore, not wise to have resort to such a
 " measure, till every other that is possible for Go-
 " vernment to take, without the annihilation of
 " its own power and dignity, has been tried, and
 " failed. Unqualified concession to the demands
 " of the army, either in dismissing public servants
 " of Government, or in rescinding its orders, would
 " be a virtual resignation of its power, and cannot
 " therefore be made. It would, indeed, be better
 " and more honourable, if matters were, at the
 " worst, that Government should fall by any hands
 " than its own. Should Government not resolve
 " on having immediate resort to force, one line
 " only remains that could, at the present moment,
 " afford a rational hope of the necessity of having
 " recourse to that extreme being avoided, or at
 " least, of its being resorted to with advantage,
 " which is, to meet the crisis, at once, by a gene-
 " ral order to, something of the following pur-
 " port :

" Government finds, with concern, that it can
 " no longer indulge that sanguine hope which it
 " once entertained, that the irritation which a va-
 " riety of causes have combined to produce in the
 " minds of the Company's army, on the coast,
 " would subside ; and as it is satisfied, that the evils
 " which must result from the existence of those
 " combinations against its authority, that are now
 " formed in almost every Station, will, if suffered

'to continue, however injurious to the public inter-
 'ests, so if those by whom these proceedings are
 'carried on, were in a state of open hostility to
 'Government, it feels compelled to anticipate
 'every extreme that can occur, and to publish to
 'the army at large, the final resolutions which it
 'has adopted, under this extraordinary and unpa-
 'ralleled situation of affairs: and these resolutions
 'will be satisfied to be found to combine as much
 'attention to the feelings of the army as is pos-
 'sible to show, without a sacrifice of the public
 'interest, and an abandonment of the authority
 'and dignity of Government. The Governor in
 'Council can, and does make every possible allow-
 'ance for feelings so strongly excited as those of
 'the Officers of the Coast Army have been, and is
 'disposed to refer that great agitation of mind into
 'which they have been thrown by a concurrence
 'of causes, which must greatly mitigate, if they
 'do not altogether extirpate, that degree of ori-
 'ginality which must always attach to such pro-
 'ceedings, and, under such impressions, his ex-
 'press their intense solicitude regarding those
 'of their brethren Officers, whom he has thought
 'it his duty to suspend the service with that con-
 'sideration which is due to a highly important
 'body of Officers, acting under the strong in-
 'fluence of warm and honorable, but mistaken
 'feelings, and with such sentiments, he cannot
 'but in derogation to Government be satisfied that
 'he intends, in the full confidence that the Off-

'cers of the Coast Army will abandon their present
 ' dangerous course of proceeding, to recommend
 ' to the Honourable the Court of Directors, the
 ' restoration to the service, of those Officers,
 ' whose suspension, and the reasons which led to
 ' it, have been reported to them, and who are
 ' consequently, the only authority by which that
 ' act can be repealed : and he can have no doubt,
 ' but the earnest desire of their brother Officers,
 ' combined with the high character which most of
 ' the Officers, under suspension, formerly held,
 ' will induce the Honourable Court to overlook
 ' their late conduct, and comply with this recom-
 ' mendation. Acting upon the same principle,
 ' Government is pleased to appoint Colonel Bell to
 ' the charge of the battalion of artillery at the
 ' Mount, and Colonel Chalmers to the command
 ' of the subsidiary force, in Travencore. Lieute-
 ' nant Maitland is appointed Quarter-Master of
 ' the European regiment of infantry.

" " The Committee of inquiry ordered to as-
 ' semble at Masulipatam is repealed ; and no act,
 ' either of any body, or of individual Officers in
 ' the Company's service, of which no cognizance
 ' has yet been taken, and which occurred before
 ' the present date, will be made subject of future
 ' notice, or even operate to the disadvantage of
 ' such body of Officers or individuals, unless they
 ' should by perseverance in the same course, and a
 ' repetition of the same conduct, forfeit all claim
 ' to such lenity and consideration. At a moment

' when Government has taken such steps to trans-
 ' quillize the agitated minds of the army, and to
 ' leave even the most mistaken without a plea ~~or~~
 ' perseverance in their present dangerous course,
 ' it must declare its positive and final resolution,
 ' neither to alter nor modify this proceeding. It
 ' will yield no more to the intreaties or demands
 ' of the army; and if any Officers are so infa-
 ' tuated, and so lost to every consideration of the
 ' public good, and the general prosperity of their
 ' country, as not immediately, on the promulga-
 ' tion of this order, to abandon their present course
 ' of proceeding, Government must, however much
 ' it may deprecate such an extreme, meet it
 ' with that firmness and courage which becomes a
 ' constituted authority of the Empire of Great
 ' Britain. It has contemplated this possible,
 ' though, it trusts, highly improbable event; and
 ' the different Officers, entrusted with command,
 ' are directed, should any spirit of turbulence and
 ' insubordination appear among the Officers of the
 ' troops under their command, to punish the indi-
 ' viduals with all the severity of Martial Law.
 ' And should the operation of the regular course
 ' of justice be impeded, either by a combination
 ' among the Officers or men, such will instantly
 ' be proclaimed rebels, against the legal authority
 ' of Government and their country; as Govern-
 ' ment is perfectly satisfied that the public inter-
 ' ests will receive more injury from any effort to
 ' conciliate men, who persevere (after what has

passed) in principles so opposite to the restoration of order and discipline, than it even can meet from them as open enemies to their King and Country.

"I am aware that a thousand objections may be made to an order of this nature; but it must only be tried by the times; matters have arrived at such a crisis, that something decided must instantly be done. There is not an hour for delay. And what I have suggested, is only the first proclamation in a war, that seems to me, even with this step, almost unavoidable. If human means could avoid it, this act will; for it holds out every motive that can incline men to good and deter them from evil. It concedes no doubt, in some points, but the case is urgent, and the spirit of concession is corrected by the firmness and resolution which is mixed with it. But your own mind will suggest every thing. I am, as you know, devoted to the cause of my country. It will depend upon you where I am to act, if matters draw to an extreme. I should prefer my situation at Mysore, as that in which I have most influence, and could in consequence, contribute most to the support of the public interests. I cannot conclude, without again intreating you not to allow yourself to be lulled into security; and to be satisfied of the absolute necessity of taking some steps or another, to save the State from the imminent danger to which it is exposed.

"But inaction, even dangerous as it is, may be
 "better than the commencement of a coercive
 "system, before steps have been taken to gain
 "more friends to Government than it has at pre-
 "sent in the Army; and I confess, I can see no
 "mode of doing this but by a measure which is
 "completely decided and final; and which, while
 "it grants every indulgence, even to erroneous
 "feelings, looks to the close of this great question
 "with a moderate and conciliatory, but a firm and
 "manly spirit. I shall be most anxious for your
 "sentiments as soon as possible, on the line I am
 "to pursue at this place. The question of the
 "marines, and the removal of some of the Offi-
 "cers, had, I find, (for they have shown me all
 "their papers,) been anticipated by the other sta-
 "tions; and the opposition here was in part by in-
 "struction: and subsequent letters sufficiently
 "show, that this case is no longer that one, nor of
 "the garrison of Masulipatam, but of the whole
 "army; and that they are most deeply pledged
 "to the support of each other. Indeed *there can-*
 "not be a doubt, but the punishment of any one
 "would cause the whole to break out. This I feel
 "it my duty to avoid, as well as to prevent their
 "marching, which was their intention, and which
 "they expect to be called upon to do; till I know
 "the general line you mean to pursue,"

I am, my dear Sir, &c.

(Signed) JOHN MALCOLM."

The above Letter was followed, on the subsequent day, by another letter, from which we give the following extract:

"After my letter of yesterday, I have little to add. I can only again implore your most serious consideration to the whole question, and your instant decision on the line that is to be pursued; not merely here, but with the whole army. No half measures will at this moment answer; and unless some effort is made to appease the minds of the deluded Officers of this army, you must make military preparations to reduce them to order; and these must be directed against every station under your Presidency; for though success may be various, an effectual opposition will be made at all; and none are more violent than some of those nearest the Presidency. If you adopt a measure of the nature that I recommended yesterday, it should be *quite final*; and therefore embrace every concession and act of conciliation *that you can make* without a substantial sacrifice of the dignity of Government.

"I can think of no improvement to this order, except you conceive the great object of availing hostilities, would justify the following addition to it.

"Government received a representation from a number of the Officers of the Coast Army, in which they solicited the equalization of their allowances with those of the Officers of the Bengal Army. This is a subject, the consideration of

' which must exclusively rest with the Court of Directors, under whose notice this application will, *in course*, be brought, and by whose decisions, it will be the duty of the Officers of the Coast Army to abide.' "

If any thing could have shaken the fortitude of mind which Sir G. Barlow so strikingly displayed at this alarming period, Colonel Malcolm's Letters were certainly of a nature to produce that effect; and the remedy which that Officer proposed, for the many urgent evils he had forcibly brought to view, was not likely to diminish the anxiety. The Government had, in every stage of the question, from the period of General Macdowall's Letter to Sir G. Barlow of May 1808, until the latest moment, used every means of explanation, and had exerted the most conciliatory efforts to avert the excesses towards which the army were, during many months, visibly advancing. The Letter, addressed by Sir G. Barlow, to General Macdowall, in May 1808; the subsequent correspondence with that Officer, relative to the arrest of the Quarter-Master-General, and other of his public acts; the General Order published, to the army, in Feb. 1809, after the removal of General Macdowall from the command; the explanatory letters and orders repeatedly circulated in the army, in the following months, all breathed the same amicable feeling the same earnest anxiety, on the part of the Government, to prevent further extremities. The

Printed Paper — Letters from the General to the Quarter-Master-General, of the 29th Jan. 29th Feb. 10th Sept. 1809 with two Enclosures.

Government took no strong step whatever, without the clearest proof of its necessity, and without having previously tried every means to obviate it. In order, too, that the army might be apprized that the sentiments of the Supreme Government, entirely accorded with those of the Government of Madras; and that all that had been done, was ratified by the Supreme Authority; different letters of the Governor-General in Council were published to the army; and added to the number of the many appeals which were made, "to their reason, their discipline, and their patriotism." We know that there are some persons of great intelligence, who think that the Government went too far in the way of conciliatory effort; but Colonel Malcolm is among the few, the very few persons of an intelligent description, whose minds have been warped by impressions of an opposite kind. The efforts of the Government, though meritorious and proper, were, indeed, far from meeting an adequate return, for they seemed rather to embolden the assailants, and to invite new acts of aggression. Colonel Malcolm in numerous passages, describes the army as having been "completely infatuated," as in a state "where the voice of passion is alone heard, and every man that speaks with temper and reason, is condemned and calumniated,"—"as deluded men," in such a "delirium, as to desire the occurrence of the crisis that must end in their ruin." Colonel Malcolm had told Sir G. Barlow,

Pamphlet,
page 140,
149, & c.

Letter of
the Gover-
nor General
to the Council
of the Go-
vernment
of Madras,
of 27th
May, 1809.

that, "Even the circulation of the able letter from Bengal, is, as I apprehended, likely to im- flame, instead of appeasing, their passions. It is so true, that when men's minds have gone completely wrong, that which ought to put them right, has, in general, a direct contrary effect." Under the full impression of all these circumstances, and in the knowledge of all the facts, stated in Colonel Malcolm's correspondence with Sir G. Barlow, did he feel himself justified in recommending, with great earnestness to the Government, not only a repetition of the conciliatory efforts, already notoriously unavailing, but the declared abandonment of the whole system of measures, which had appeared to the Government of Madras, as well as to the Supreme Government of India, indispensable to the public safety.—We cannot peruse the General Order proposed by Colonel Malcolm, on that occasion, without pain and surprise; and our surprise is increased by seeing that Colonel Malcolm proposed it under a strong impression of the danger of the Government yielding to the clamorous demands of the army, repeatedly declaring, "that the Government had better fall by any hands than its own." Persons of plain understanding must be quite unable to follow Colonel Malcolm through the wise-drawn refinements he has given us, to concession and conciliation, where the bounds are divided by such thin partitions, as almost to elude the casuist's mole-eyed perception.

Colonel Malcolm proposed that the Government should place itself in the situation of publicly declaring to the army, that the struggle which it (the Government) had hitherto maintained, could no longer be carried on, in consequence of the formidable violence that the army had shown, and that it was, therefore, prepared for submission on certain terms. Those terms were, chiefly, that the Government was to acknowledge, that the criminality of all the past proceedings, in which the army had been engaged, were, from concurring circumstances, "greatly mitigated, if not "altogether extenuated:" and the Government, under the influence of this new light, was to become an advocate with the Court of Directors, to obtain from the Court, the restoration of those Officers who had been suspended from the service; for conspiring to effect its overthrow;—Officers who had been removed from command on similar grounds, were to be publicly restored;* and *pour comble de misere*, the Government was to declare itself the ready channel to bring before the Court of Directors the question of equalizing the Madras allowances with those of Bengal, the main

* It is impossible to say to what extent Colonel Malcolm meant to carry these re-appointments, as in a subsequent letter to the Governor's Military Secretary, he says, "I, of course, meant to include several that I did not mention by name."

point for which the Army had been all along contending.*

* We are unable to reconcile what Colonel Malcolm has proposed on this subject in page 131 of his Pamphlet, with what he had before said in page 51, where he states it as an inadmissible concession on the part of the Government, "to promise an effort to obtain an equalization of their allowances with the Officers of Bengal." The Government of Madras had already referred the Memorial, received from General Macdowall on the part of the army, on this subject, to the Supreme Government, the only authority to which it was competent to the Government of Madras, to refer a question of the kind, involving, as it obviously did, not the allowances of the army of Madras only, but those of the whole Indian army, and the whole subject of the Indian finances. The countenance recommended by Colonel Malcolm to be given to the claim (according to what is stated in the latter part of his pamphlet), could not possibly be given without impressing the army with the idea of an implied sanction of the claim; if it was to be of any use at all, that was to be the effect. The obscurity of the whole proceeding is such, that the eye can scarcely see an inch before it: but we confess, that if the Government had pursued such a course, it would have, in our idea, betrayed its own duty; it would have betrayed the Supreme Government, who had declared, that the demand of Bengal allowances could not be granted; it would have betrayed the Court of Directors, who had told the Governments of India that the extension of allowances was incompatible with the existence of the Company; and it would have betrayed the army, by holding out fallacious hopes, which the Government well knew could never be realized. We are satisfied that these facts did not occur to Colonel Malcolm's mind, or that a course leading to such consequences would never have been recommended by him.

All this, and more than this, was conveyed in the General Order proposed by Colonel Malcolm. If what was proposed to be done was not concession—if it was not the Government falling by its own hands, we know not what the words mean. We know not what the words mean, if it was not establishing the Army in the character of a Judge of the acts of the Government, and compelling the Government to appear and to plead guilty at the bar of that tribunal. It was not even a surrender on terms; it was a supplication for mercy; for the Government had not the smallest assurance that the experiment, degrading and dangerous as it would have been, was to be in the least successful, while every preceding event seemed to make the reverse almost inevitable. Colonel Malcolm indeed contemplates the probability of the army viewing the proceeding as a “victory;” and that many would be led by a “hardened spirit of disaffection and turbulence, to continue in opposition:”—but this we are told was “*Nothing.*” If the army was still unreasonable enough to resist, the Government was then to measure back its way—to resume the high ground from which it had voluntarily descended—to redeem its character, and to do prodigies. Mr. Burke observes, “This is an experiment cautiously to be made. *Reculer pour mieux sauter*, according to the French by-word, cannot be trusted to as a general rule of conduct. To diet a man into weakness and languor, afterwards to give him

Pamphlet,
page 100,
&c.

Proposed
Government
Order.

"greater strength, has more of the empirick than the rational physician."* We shall only say further, that the whole of the proposed course which we have been considering, appears, in our idea, so derogatory to the character of the Government, so inconsistent with its honor, its interests, or its existence; so totally subversive of all future discipline, or subordination; so fatally injurious to the interests of the army itself, and so boundless in its injurious effects on every part of the Indian Administration, that if the counsel leading to it had come from any unknown quarter—if it had come from almost any other quarter than Colonel Malcolm himself, we should have felt a difficulty in not ascribing it to motives which, however much we may have differed from him in opinion, as to the points under discussion, we are sincerely satisfied found no place in his mind. We have already stated, that we think Colonel Malcolm mistook the nature of the evil with which the Government was compelled to contend, in the per-

* Colonel Malcolm has quoted largely from this distinguished Writer; and we, too, have ventured to support some of our opinions by a reference to this oracle of human wisdom. We hold the writings of Colonel Malcolm in too much respect, to say with the Author of one of our best comedies, that the quotations which he has used, "lie like lumps of marble on a barren moor," but placed as they are, we certainly cannot recognize in them any of the high-toned sentiments which characterises the original. They appear much less as volunteers, than as conscripts forced into a foreign service.

formance of its most sacred duty, and in defence of those rights which it was bound by the most solemn obligation to maintain: and the foundation being defective, the whole superstructure shared in its nature.

It remains, that we should close this head by briefly shewing the opinions expressed by Sir G. Barlow, and by the Court of Directors, regarding Colonel Malcolm's proposition.

The opinion of Sir G. Barlow was given in a private letter from his Military secretary, addressed to Colonel Malcolm, which is here inserted.

“ Fort St. George, 12th July, 1809.

“ DEAR MALCOLM,

“ You have received my letter of this date, in reply to your letter of the 4th instant, which related more immediately to the recent occurrences at Masulipatam, and to the measures which you had adopted with regard to that garrison.

Printed papers — Enclosure No. 8, of the Despatch from the Government of Madras, of 10th Sept. 1809.

“ I am now directed by Sir George Barlow, to reply to your letter of the 5th and 6th instant, respecting the state of the army generally, and the course of policy which you recommend to be pursued.

“ Sir George Barlow desires me to express to you his thanks for the very unpreserved manner in which you have communicated to him your opinion on this important subject.

“ After the maturest consideration, he cannot
 “ satisfy his mind of the policy of the course of
 “ measures which you have recommended to his
 “ adoption. . . .

“ You have, indeed, been long apprized of the
 “ sentiments of Sir George Barlow, with regard
 “ to that course of policy ; and the information
 “ which you have now communicated to him, in-
 “ stead of altering those sentiments, has confirmed
 “ him in his opinion of the necessity of maintain-
 “ ing the authority of the Government with un-
 “ shaken firmness and resolution.

“ You cannot now render a more acceptable ser-
 “ vice to the public interests, than by exerting
 “ your influence and ability in keeping the garri-
 “ son of Masulipatam firm to their duty, and in sa-
 “ tisfying the Officers, that it is not less for their
 “ interests, than it is consistent with that duty, to
 “ await the decision of the authorities in England,
 “ on the several questions which have occasioned
 “ so much agitation in the minds of a consider-
 “ able portion of the army of this establishment.

“ Sir George Barlow entertains the fullest con-
 “ fidence that, your endeavors for this purpose will
 “ prove successful, and that no extreme cases of the
 “ nature of those to which you allude, will occur.
 “ If, however, any such cases should occur, he
 “ leaves it entirely to your discretion to adopt such
 “ measures as you may deem best calculated to
 “ meet the exigency of the occasion, and to enable

"you to maintain your authority in the garrison
"under your command.

"In consequence of the information communi-
"cated by you, Sir George Barlow has deemed it
"expedient to assemble a considerable force, con-
"sisting of His Majesty's and the Honorable
"Company's troops in the neighbourhood of Ma-
"dras, for the purpose of protecting the seat of
"Government, and enabling the Government to
"maintain its authority under all possible circum-
"stances.

"I remain, &c."

(Signed)

"R. BARLOW,

"Military Secretary."

"To Colonel Malcolm."

* The Resident at Hyderabad having submitted to Sir George Barlow, propositions, somewhat similar to those recommended by Colonel Malcolm, he was in like manner informed, that it was "the firm and unalterable determination of Government not to compromise the public authority in the slightest degree: any such compromise would lead to evils of the greatest magnitude which would be irremediable."

Printed
papers—
Enclosure,
No. 15, of
Dispatch,
of 10th
Sept. 1809.

We have already noticed the striking similarity in almost every feature of the Mutiny in Bengal in 1766, with the late Mutiny at Madras, with the exception, of the last being greatly more formidable. The Reader will have no difficulty in tracing a close resemblance of the reply of Sir George Barlow, to that given by the late Lord Clive, under the like circumstances; they differ only in words; both being animated by the same spirit. Lord Clive states in a letter to Sir Robert Barker:—"Will you, so abandoned to all sense of honor, and who still perse-
"vere in supporting acts of mutiny and desertion, when they

The opinion of the Court of Directors is conveyed in a letter, addressed by the Court to the Government of Madras, on the 1st May, 1810, from which we insert the following extract:—

Printed Papers—Letter of the Court of Directors, 1st May, 1810.

“ We have observed, with peculiar satisfaction, your undeviating adherence to the principle which you first opposed to the factious proceedings of the Officers, namely, that no concession ought to be made to an armed combination; and it is to your uniform adherence to this unquestionable principle of policy that we ascribe, under Providence, the early termination of a rebellion, which threatened at once ruin to its authors, to the Company, and to the most valuable interests of Great Britain.

“ We are the more forcibly impressed with the merit of your conduct on this occasion, by

“ have obtained one point, cease there? History can furnish but few instances of that nature. For my own part, I must see the soldier's bayonets levelled at my throat before I can be induced to give way, and then not so much for the preservation of my own life, as the temporary salvation of the Company. Temporary only it can be, for I shall think Bengal in the utmost danger when we are reduced to the necessity of submitting the civil power to the mercy of men who have gone lengths that will astonish all England.

“ With me it is beyond a doubt, that if the Officers do not resolve to submit and acknowledge their crime, ruin and destruction must equally be their lot, whether they succeed or not; and if arguments of this kind can make no impression, none will.”

“ observing that from many quarters, and some
 “ of them of respectability, measures of concession,
 “ under the name of conciliation, were pressed
 “ upon your adoption.

“ We are unwilling to impute to these advisers
 “ any but the most honorable motives; but we feel
 “ it to be our duty to declare our decided conviction
 “ that no greater evil can exist in any State
 “ than the submission of its Government to the
 “ dictates of an armed association, and consequently,
 “ that no such submission can ever with
 “ safety be made.

“ Such submission would, in fact, amount to an
 “ abdication of the Government, and that in the
 “ worst possible form and manner. It would compromise
 “ the authority and power of Government,
 “ not only in India, but in Europe, and might prevent
 “ the measures absolutely necessary to vindicate
 “ the insulted authority of the nation.

“ The line of conduct which you pursued, in
 “ temperately, yet steadily, upholding the dignity
 “ and authority of Government, by a refusal of
 “ all compromise and concession to Officers in
 “ open rebellion, proper at all times, was, in the
 “ circumstances which we are now reviewing, imperiously
 “ required of you. For the question
 “ then at issue was not a question of assistance,
 “ but of authority; not one of a partial nature,

“ but, in fact, a question of the integrity and
 “ resolution of the Government.

“ The Council demanded not a retreat, or a

" ~~and~~ affecting themselves personally, but a for-
 " ~~mal~~ ~~revocation~~ of the judgment of Government,
 " ~~deliberately and legally~~ pronounced (on the 1st
 " May, 1809) upon Officers serving under their
 " authority. This was in fact, an attempt to take
 " the Government into their own hands. It be-
 " came, therefore, your unquestionable duty man-
 " fully to resist such a daring and treasonable
 " usurpation.

" The modified recal of your Orders of the 1st
 " May, which we are sorry to find was recom-
 " mended to you by some of our servants, for
 " whose judgment and integrity we in general en-
 " tertain great respect, would, in our opinion,
 " have been equally impolitic, and still more dis-
 " graceful than their entire revocation. For it
 " would have avinced all the weakness of a timid
 " and unqualified recantation: and would equally
 " have admitted what never can be admitted, that
 " Government have no power to suspend or dismiss
 " ~~their~~ Military servants without the judgment of
 " a Court Martial, a power which though seldom
 " exercised, and which, as far as respects your
 " Government abroad, is limited to suspension
 " alone, is obviously necessary to the security and
 " existence of every Government, and particu-
 " larly of a Government so far removed from the
 " supreme authority of the State.

" Upon these principles, and considerations we
 " ~~unanimously~~ approve the line of conduct which you
 " ~~adopted~~ and followed, as described in the 27th,

" 28th, and 29th paragraphs of the letter to which
 " we are now replying; the natural and happy
 " consequences of which so soon appeared in the
 " unconditional submission of the revolted Offi-
 " cers, and the restoration of legal authority."

Colonel Malcolm's Narrative is not extended more than a few pages after the period of his return to Madras from Masulipatam. But though these pages might afford considerable matter for remark, we have no wish to dwell longer on the subject. One point only we shall concisely notice, namely, the refusal of Colonel Malcolm to sign the Address presented to Sir George Barlow by the principal inhabitants of Madras, at the time when the Mutiny was raging with the fiercest violence. At a time more suitable for such an Address, or an Address more suitable for such an occasion, could not well be imagined.* Every

* The Address will best speak for itself, and is therefore here inserted:—

" We whose names are hereunto subscribed, impressed with a
 " deep sense of our duty to our country, and of the necessity of
 " good order and obedience to the constituted authorities, beg
 " leave to tender you, at this moment of difficulty and danger,
 " our assurances of support to the interests of Government, and
 " of our readiness to devote our lives and fortunes to the main-
 " tenance of the public tranquillity in any way in which to you,
 " in your wisdom, it may seem meet to command them.

" We desire to take this opportunity of publicly expressing
 " our fullest disapprobation of that spirit of insubordination
 " which has recently shown itself amongst the Officers of the

Pamphlet t,
page 111.

community, in all countries, has, in times of public danger, chosen such modes for giving expression to the feelings of loyalty, and for conveying to the ruling power those pledges of support which must ever be valuable in the hour of need. It was wisely enacted by the Athenian Lawgiver, that when the country was in danger, there should be no neutrality: for who, in such times is not for, must be against. We have no doubt that the reasons which Colonel Malcolm has given, for not signing the Address, satisfied his own mind he was doing right; but we regret that we are very far from having the same feeling. We think the time in question was that, when all the respectability deservedly attached to the name of Colonel Malcolm, should have been ranged on the side of

Honorable Company's Army serving under the Presidency of Fort St. George. Fully convinced, that it is the duty of every good subject to yield obedience to the commands of those whom the will of his Sovereign, and the laws of his country have placed in authority over him, and patiently to await the result of a reference to Europe for the redress of real or supposed grievances; any conduct, impatient of the period of such appeal, and backward to the calls of professional obedience, we regard as subversive of all good order and discipline, hostile to the Constitution of our Native Country, and big with danger to the existence of the British Empire in India.

And we therefore, Honorable Sir, beg to repeat the assurances of our firm determination to resist the operation of such principles, which we are convinced must be equally reprobated and condemned by all good and loyal subjects."

established order, and in defence of lawful Government.*

* It is wholly unnecessary to follow Colonel Malcolm through the reasons to which we have alluded. The subject is in itself quite immaterial, but from what we have heard, from the most authentic quarter, we are disposed to think, that Colonel Malcolm must have been misinformed, as to some of the points to which he has referred. We are not a little surprised, after the condemnation which Colonel Malcolm has pronounced in many parts of his Publication, regarding established rule, to see that he has founded one of his objections to the Address on the circumstance of its not having been prepared agreeably to "common usage," at a time when the state of the settlement of Madras appears to have made the observance of that usage quite impossible. After the many aberrations which we have had occasion to notice, we see, with satisfaction, this return to the beaten and safe path of established principle.

APPENDIX.

THERE has been lately circulated a "Brief Sketch" of the Public Services of Sir G. Barlow, containing very ample testimony of the great services which he has rendered to his country, during a long public life of upwards of thirty-three years, passed in the most laborious and important occupations. The course of measures in which Sir G. Barlow was, in the later years of his administration abroad, compelled to engage, was of a nature to call forth a host of opponents, against whose clamorous efforts, unaided by political influence or connexion in this country, he has had nothing to oppose but the shield of virtue. The absence of Sir G. Barlow for so long a period of time from his native land, has debarred him from the benefit of that political support, which the corruption of human nature unhappily renders, in times of difficulty, too essential : but the purity and exalted excellence of his own character has supplied

the deficiency of extraneous aid. The question affects not Sir G. Barlow alone, but should come near to the view and feelings of every man of virtue or of honor in this kingdom: for, admitting the ties of obligation and gratitude towards a person, whose life has been, from his earliest years, devoted to the public good, to be for a moment suspended, it must be apparent, that the Nation cannot well expect to be faithfully served, if such a person should fall the victim of calumny, and be hunted down by obloquy, created in the honorable and able discharge of that duty which he had been expressly enjoined to execute.

The services rendered, in late years, by Sir G. Barlow, stand on a high eminence; and the facts connected with them are now so well known, that nothing requires, at present, to be added to that subject. The services which Sir G. Barlow was enabled to perform in his earlier years, though greatly important, are from their nature, less conspicuous and less understood; it is, however, proper, that they should be understood, in order that the Nation, and the East India Company may know that the whole course of that distinguished person has been marked by the same undeviating traits of the most ardent and successful devotion to the public interests.

Having obtained from an authentic source the following Copies and Extracts of Letters addressed by the late Marquis Cornwallis to Sir G. Barlow, we think it a duty not to withhold them from

public knowledge. They speak in language very impressive the feelings of that great and virtuous nobleman, that they cannot fail to raise our admiration of the unsullied worth and purity of his fame, while they afford an honorable testimony of the extensive share which Sir G. Barlow had in the formation of that system of internal government, on the basis of which rests all the prosperity of our Eastern Possessions, and which has been one of the great means of conferring lasting security and happiness on a population of not less than fifty millions of our Indian subjects.

We judge it proper to notice, that the series of correspondence might have been extended, but all letters, or passages of letters, of which the publication could not be liable to any objection, have been omitted. A reference to the Correspondence will explain the times and circumstances connected with it.

Extract from a Letter from Marquis Cornwallis to Mr. Barlow, dated Madras, 17th September, 1793.

“ I shall ever consider the connexion and friendship that I have formed with you, as one of the most fortunate events of my life, and, although it must be long before we can meet, I shall communicate with you constantly, not only on Indian affairs, but on all subjects in which either.

“ of us may be in any way concerned ; as I know
 “ you cannot be indifferent in matters that relate
 “ to me, and I shall ever be interested for your-
 “ self and those that belong to you.”

*Copy of a Letter from Marquis Cornwallis to Mr.
 Barlow, dated Madras, 1st October, 1793.*

“ DEAR BARLOW,

“ I am well aware of the great, and, indeed,
 “ almost unreasonable task, that I imposed upon
 “ you, when I requested that you would take the
 “ charge of drawing up and framing the regula-
 “ tions, in conformity to the resolutions which were
 “ passed by Government, from the propositions
 “ contained in my minute on the new judicial ar-
 “ rangements. But I have seen so many instances
 “ of your persevering industry, that I am san-
 “ guine enough to hope, (notwithstanding your
 “ official avocations) that your laborious work is,
 “ by this time, nearly completed.

“ As I must naturally feel most warmly inte-
 “ rested in the success of a measure, in which I
 “ have so great a share of responsibility, and up-
 “ on the proper execution of which, I think,
 “ the future prosperity of our Indian empire so
 “ much depends, I trust you will not blame my
 “ anxiety when I beg that, before the regulations
 “ are sent to the press, you will look them over
 “ with particular care to see that they are perfectly

“ correct, and that there has not, from inactivity
 “ ence or mistake, been any deviation from the
 “ spirit and true meaning of the minute, and of
 “ the subsequent resolutions of Government.

“ I am, with great regard,

“ Dear Barlow,

“ Most sincerely yours,

(Signed) “ Cornwallis.”

*Copy of a Letter from Marquis Cornwallis, dated
 Madras, 9th October, 1793.*

“ DEAR BARLOW,

“ I cannot take my final leave of India, with-
 “ out repeating my sense of the powerful assist-
 “ ance which I have received from you, and
 “ which alone enabled me to carry the most im-
 “ portant acts of my government into execu-
 “ tion.

“ I feel, at present, a mixture of regret and
 “ anxiety at quitting this country, and of joy, at
 “ the thoughts of seeing my children, after a se-
 “ paration of eight years. As I advance in my
 “ voyage, the latter will naturally preponderate,
 “ but after the first hurry of spirits is over, my
 “ thoughts will be often turned to the success of
 “ the judicial regulations,

"I am, with the most earnest wishes for your
health and prosperity,

" Dear Barlow,

" Your most faithful

" and affectionate friend,

(Signed)

" CORNWALLIS."

*Extract from a Letter from Marquis Cornwallis,
dated Brome, 13th March, 1794.*

" I have just learned that the fleet is to sail im-
mediately for India; and although the report
is probably not true, and I am much hurried, I
could not let the first ships have a chance of ar-
riving in Bengal without your being assured, un-
der my own hand, that I am perfectly recovered
from a slight indisposition, and that I shall ever
feel the value of your friendship, and the im-
portance of the services that you have rendered
me."

*Extract from a Letter from Marquis Cornwallis,
dated London, 4th July, 1795.*

" Every thing which you have hitherto done is
universally approved, as far as it is understood ;

" and be assured, that the more it is understood,
 " the more it will be admired."

*Extract from a Letter from Marquis Cornwallis to
 Mr. Barlow, dated London, 23d Jan. 1796.*

" I have received your letters to the 28th of
 " May, and have read them, with the inclosures,
 " with great attention, and with the warmest
 " gratitude to you, both public and private, for
 " upholding a system which is of such infinite con-
 " sequence to the cause of humanity, as well as
 " the British interests in India: and which with-
 " out your powerful support, could never have
 " been carried into useful effect. I request that
 " you will not be discouraged from persevering in
 " a conduct which must reflect the highest honor
 " on yourself, whilst it renders the most essential
 " service to your country; and, from which, your
 " benevolent mind will ever derive the most grati-
 " fying reflections."

*Extract from a Letter from Marquis Cornwallis to
 Mr. Barlow, dated Paris, 18th Nov. 1801.*

" After this preface, which, will, I hope, in
 " some degree, save me from the suspicion of for-

“ getting, or neglecting, my friends in India, I
 “ have now to express the sincere joy which I felt
 “ on hearing of your appointment to the Supreme
 “ Council; a circumstance so beneficial to the
 “ public, so honorable to yourself, and which has
 “ been so just a reward for your most able and
 “ meritorious services.”

*Extract from a Letter from Marquis Cornwallis to
 Mr. Barlow, dated Brome, 7th Sept. 1802.*

“ I have now retired for ever from all pub-
 “ lic situation, but my feelings are still alive
 “ to the honor and interest of my country; and
 “ I shall, to the end of my life, reflect with the
 “ most heartfelt satisfaction, that, by adopting and
 “ patronizing your suggestions, I laid the founda-
 “ tion of a system for the prosperity of our Indian
 “ empire, which has so gloriously flourished.”

The last letter addressed by Lord Cornwallis to
 Sir G. Barlow, is dated 6th Jan. 1805. It ex-
 plains, at considerable length, the circumstances
 connected with his Lordship's re-appointment to
 the station of Governor-General; an explanation
 which is, for obvious reasons, omitted. We insert,
 however, the following paragraph:

*Extract from a Letter from Marquis Cornwallis
Sir George Barlow, dated Culford, the 6.
Jan. 1805.*

“ Unemployed as I have been, and appear-
“ likely to remain, in the line of my profes-
“ sion, and, in its present state, useless to my ow-
“ n family, I have consented to take the rash step
“ of returning to India; by which, if I should be
“ the means of ultimately placing the charge of
“ our Asiatic empire in your hands, I shall feel
“ that I have rendered an essential service to my
“ country.”

FINIS.
